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Editorial on the Research Topic
Mental State Understanding: Individual Differences in Typical and Atypical Development
We often refer to mental states such as intentions, desires, and beliefs to explain and predict
our own behavior and that of others. Mental state understanding develops from infancy through
adolescence and adulthood. A deeper understanding of influencing developmental factors may be
obtained by studying individual differences in typical and atypical populations.
The current Research Topic addresses several topics about mental state understanding and
development in childhood. It is organized into three sections, comprising 18 papers in total.
The first section addresses the development of social cognition in typical populations through
seven papers. Different from most research on Theory of Mind (ToM) that commonly focuses
on age-related changes, Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert investigated whether there occur non-
linearities during ToM development in childhood. Within an overall developmental trend
that leveled off toward the age of 10 years, results showed two non-linearities suggesting a
developmental shift in ToM understanding: a stagnation at the age of around 4 years and 8 months
and a dip at the age of 6 years to six and a half years.
Four papers concern influencing social factors on children’s ToM. Rosso and Airaldi showed
that maternal reflective functioning (but not maternal attachment security) predicted their
preadolescent child’s reflective functioning, and that maternal ability to metalize mixed-ambivalent
mental states predicted the corresponding ability in their child. While maternal education and
linguistic competence are well researched influencing factors (e.g., NICHD HLB, 1998; Pons
et al., 2003; Sammons et al., 2004), Bulgarelli and Molina showed that preschooler’s linguistic
competence mediated the effect of maternal education. Moreover, center-base care in the first 3
years of life eliminated the effect of maternal education, suggesting a protective role of center-base
care for children with less educated mothers. Göbel et al. assessed the relation between emotion
understanding and internalizing and externalizing behavior in 7- to 10-year-old children in a
non-clinical, community sample. Inconsistent with prior research, the overall level of emotion
understanding, comprising nine components, was not related to externalizing symptoms, but
correlated positively with elevated levels of somatic complaints and anxious/depressed symptoms.
Also, and specifically, higher levels of social withdrawal were associated with worse performance
in understanding emotions elicited by reminders. Pinto et al. showed that joint narratives only
improve 6- to 10-year-old’s children’s mental state talk performances when children were at the
moment of initial elaboration or emergence of mental state talk, and when intersubjectivity levels
were high, that is, when children produced more utterances to orchestrate and regulate the dialog.
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Other two papers concern possible implications of ToM
development on social interaction. Bosco and Gabbatore
suggested that first-order ToM may play a causal role in
explaining 3- to 8-year-old children’s performance in handling
pragmatic phenomena, namely sincere and deceitful speech acts.
As to children’s cognitive performances in social interaction
regarding spatial tasks, Viana et al. showed that 5- to 9-year-
old children’s ToM was a better predictor of their spatial
performances in a dyadic condition than their age, gender, and
spatial performances in an individual setting.
Overall, the papers regarding typically developing children
present some interesting ideas about the development of
understanding mental states. This competence proves to be
linked with different aspects of development, at social, cognitive,
and relational levels: Rosso and Airaldi showed that only
maternal reflective functioning, and not maternal attachment
security, predicted children’s mental state understanding; in turn,
the paper of Bulgarelli andMolina confirmed the role of language
and that of Pinto et al. the role of communicative context
on children’s ToM. Understanding mental states shows to be
a complex ability that involves different functions and effects
different aspects of development. Finally, the contribution of
Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert presented an interesting new
approach to the study of ToM development that has implications
for the debate whether this development may be stage-like or
continuous.
The second section of this Research Topic encompasses
nine papers that address the development of mental states
understanding and its correlates in atypical populations. The
possibility to compare results derived from studies carries out
with typical and atypical populations is of key importance. In fact,
similarities and differences in typical and atypical development
can shed light on the processes at the base of the ability to
understand, attribute and interpret mental states.
Lábadi and Beke’s study concerned the role of structural
connectivity across the hemispheres in neurodevelopmental
disorders. They showed that 6- to 8-year-old children with
agenesis of the corpus callosum exhibited mild impairments in
recognizing emotions and in understanding theory of mind, and
also showed more behavioral problems than control children
matched by IQ and sociodemographic variables.
White et al. showed differential effects of social exclusion
on children’s usage of their capacity to understand mental
states in relation to anxiety. After children were non-
accidentally excluded in a virtual game, typically developing 5-
year-olds’ (Study 1) completion of peer-scenario stories were
characterized by portraying story-characters more strongly as
intentional agents, with use of more mental state language, and
more between-character affiliation. Differently, 4- to 8-year-old
children with anxiety disorder (Study 2) told stories in which
story-characters exhibited less intentionality and less use of
mental-state language. Thus, while exclusion may induce young
children to mentalize, and thus to more effectively reconnect
with others, excessive anxiety may impair this usage of controlled
mentalizing.
The study by Amadó et al. investigated the relation between
social cognition and executive functioning in children with
Down Syndrome (DS). Children with DS were delayed in social
cognition and in executive functioning, with unequal impairment
of different functions. Moreover, working memory explained a
higher amount of variability in social cognition performance than
in typically developing children matched by age.
Implicit mentalizing consists of a spontaneous anticipation of
an agent’s false belief-based action that can be observed through
anticipatory looking biases in tasks where eye movements are
assessed. Using eye tracking devices, Schuwerk et al. showed
that implicit mentalizing persists over infancy up to childhood
in typical population; on the contrary, children with Autistic
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) appeared to be impaired in such
skill, even when their performance in the explicit tasks were
similar to the matched control group. The results of this study–
intact explicit mentalizing, impaired implicit mentalizing and no
relation between that and executive function in children with
ASD−support theories that propose two dissociable mentalizing
systems.
The review by Margoni and Surian and its corrigendum
discussed the idea that impairment inmental state understanding
is the main factor explaining why children with ASD face
difficulties in moral judgements: in fact, these children mainly
rely on actions consequences and other external factors rather
than on the agents’ mental states when solving moral reasoning
tasks.
Due to restricted discussion of abstract concepts, and to a
possible to mismatch between language capabilities of children
and their parents, the literature reported that deaf and hard-
of-hearing signing children can display delays in mental states
development (Peterson, 2009). Wang et al. compared children
with a cochlear implant or a hearing aid with normally hearing
participantsmatched by age and gender and showed that children
with cochlear implants and hearing aids were developmentally
delayed not only in verbally labeling the facial expressions
of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear, but also in a non-
verbal emotion-matching task. Holmer et al. showed that deaf
and hard-of-hearing signing children were delayed in ToM
tasks performances; only three of them have been exposed to
sign language since birth. ToM was associated with reading
comprehension and workingmemory, but not with sign language
comprehension.
The inter-relation between language and ToM has been
clarified in a meta-analysis by Milligan et al. (2007). Deepening
this relation in children with Specific Language Impairment
(SLI) is interesting, because some studies found delays in this
population while others did not (Perner et al., 1989; Shields
et al., 1996; Bulgarelli and Molina, 2013). In the review by
Vissers and Koolen preschoolers with SLI appeared to be
impaired both in cognitive ToM (imitation, joint attention, false
belief understanding) and in affective ToM (recognizing and
understanding emotions).
The review by Zmyj et al. addressed the role of joint attention
as a precursor of social cognition, focusing on pre-term born
children: they were less likely to initiate joint attention with
others and to respond to others’ attempts of engagement. The
authors suggest that these deficits in joint attention might lead to
impairments in social cognition, and in social interaction skills.
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Deficits in mental states understanding are reported for
children with different developmental disorders or impairments,
from neurological ones (agenesis of the corpus callosum),
prematurity, ASD, and personality difficulties such as anxiety.
The paper of Schuwerk et al. suggested an interesting topic
for future research: the possibility to differentiate implicit from
explicit ToM based on different results in typical and ASD
populations. On the contrary, as in typical development, the role
of language is supported also by the present studies on children
with SLI (Vissers and Koolen) and hearing impairment (Holmer
et al.; Wang et al.).
A third and final section in this Research Topic is composed
by two papers regarding evaluation and training tools. Valle
et al. presented the “Thoughts in Mind (TiM) Project” that
aimes at training mentalizing skills in adults (e.g., teachers
and parents) to positively affect children’s mentalization. They
reported first evidence of the efficacy of the training when
done with teachers: only the TiM Project training group
significantly improved in third order false belief understanding
and in two of the three components of a Mentalizing Task.
Herbort et al. presented a new tool to assess ToM, the
ToMenovela, that consists of 190 scenes depicting daily-life
situations, addressing cognitive and affective ToM, emotional
reactivity, and complex emotion judgment with respect to
Ekman’s basic emotions. First results on the use of the test with
neurologically and psychiatrically healthy adults were reported.
The tool proposed by Herbort et al. is very interesting because
tools assessing adults’ ToM are very scarce. Valle et al. proposed
a teacher’s training effective in improving children’s abilities:
a relevant aspect of research in mental states understanding
effectiveness.
The current Research Topic addressed the development of
mental state understanding in children with typical and atypical
population, and reported new suggestions about the way to
evaluate it and to support it through training. The presented
frame was multifaceted. In respect to typical populations, the role
of maternal reflective functioning, language, communication,
and educational contexts has been deepened; and the association
with internalizing/externalizing behaviors, performances in
spatial tasks and pragmatics has been addressed as well. As to
atypical populations, deficits in mental states understanding were
reported for children with different developmental disorders
or impairments, as the agenesis of the corpus callosum,
Down Syndrome, prematurity, ASD, hearing impairment and
personality difficulties such as anxiety.
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Research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) has mainly focused on ages of core ToM
development. This article follows a quantitative approach focusing on the level of
ToM understanding on a measurement scale, the ToM Storybooks, in 324 typically
developing children between 3 and 11 years of age. It deals with the eventual occurrence
of developmental non-linearities in ToM functioning, using smoothing techniques,
dynamic growth model building and additional indicators, namely moving skewness,
moving growth rate changes and moving variability. The ToM sum-scores showed an
overall developmental trend that leveled off toward the age of 10 years. Within this overall
trend two non-linearities in the group-based change pattern were found: a plateau at
the age of around 56 months and a dip at the age of 72–78 months. These temporary
regressions in ToM sum-score were accompanied by a decrease in growth rate and
variability, and a change in skewness of the ToM data, all suggesting a developmental
shift in ToM understanding. The temporary decreases also occurred in the different ToM
sub-scores and most clearly so in the core ToM component of beliefs. It was also found
that girls had an earlier growth spurt than boys and that the underlying developmental
path was more salient in girls than in boys. The consequences of these findings are
discussed from various theoretical points of view, with an emphasis on a dynamic
systems interpretation of the underlying developmental paths.
Keywords: Theory-of-Mind, ToM_Storybooks, development, dynamic_systems_theory, non-linearities, anomaly
INTRODUCTION
Theory-of-Mind
The child’s Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is an important condition for showing socially adequate
behavior (Astington and Jenkins, 1995; Imuta et al., 2016). ToM refers to the ability to attribute
mental states – such as beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and perceptions – to oneself and others
and to use these mental states in understanding, predicting, and explaining the behavior of oneself
and others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Mitchell, 1997).
For instance, a child comprehends that if Sam thinks his soccer ball is in the garage (a belief),
he will look in the garage for this soccer ball (the consecutive action), even though the soccer ball
may in reality be in the garden. A typical five-year-old who is questioned about the actions of Sam
and who also knows the true location of the soccer ball will be able to predict the action of Sam
correctly. A typical three-year-old, however, will not be able to do so: he will most likely say that
Sam will look in the garden. The 3 year old cannot distance himself from the knowledge of the true
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 1970 | 8
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location, and he does not comprehend that others can hold beliefs
that do not match reality as he sees it. He does not grasp false
beliefs yet.
Numerous studies have suggested that a distinct change occurs
in understanding these false beliefs between the age of 3 and
5 years old (for meta-analyses on false beliefs see Wellman
et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2008). Though considered a cornerstone
ability, ToM is far more than only false belief understanding and
also extends beyond the 3–5 age period. Infants already possess
‘implicit’ mindreading capacities (Slaughter, 2015), treating
themselves and others as intentional agents and experiencers;
while older children understand lies and deception (Peterson
and Siegal, 2002). Research shows that ToM development even
prolongs into late adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Vetter
et al., 2013; Valle et al., 2015).
Developmental Sequences in
Theory-of-Mind
Research has shown that ToM develops in normally developing
children according to a particular, age-related sequence. It evolves
from a simple desire theory to a complete belief-desire theory,
from true beliefs to false beliefs, and from the understanding
of first-order beliefs to second-order beliefs (Wellman, 1990).
Deviations from this normal developmental path have been used
in describing ToM difficulties of, for instance, children with
autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Peterson et al., 2012). Relatively
little research has been done on the effect of gender on ToM
development, but, some studies have found an advantage for
girls (Charman et al., 2002; Calero et al., 2013), including the
finding that the association between ToM and prosocial behavior
is stronger in girls than in boys (Imuta et al., 2016).
Wellman and Liu (2004) looked into the conceptual changes
of different ToM aspects, using the ToM Scale. They found
a consistent progression of conceptual achievements that
pace ToM understanding in normally developing children:
diverse desires > diverse beliefs > knowledge access > false
belief > hidden emotion (Wellman, 2012, 2014). Wellman and
Liu (2004, pp. 536) argue that the ToM developmental order
is not one of addition or substitution, but one of modification
or mediation. Initial insights broaden or generalize into later
insights, following orderly conceptual progressions. A conceptual
development has recently also been demonstrated for more
advanced ToM tasks (Osterhaus et al., 2016).
Temporary Regressions in Development
One can question how these ToM generalizations come about.
Is there a gradual development or are there temporary
accelerations, delays or even regressions observable during
ToM development? Temporary regressions imply that children
can have a temporary relapse before a newly acquired ability
consolidates. This phenomenon is often referred to as U-shaped
or N-shaped development (Siegler, 2004; Zelazo, 2004).
Temporary regressions have been found in a variety of
domains, including motor and verbal development (Gershkoff-
Stowe and Thelen, 2004; Swingley, 2009), non-verbal symbol
learning (Namy et al., 2004), face perception (Cashon and Cohen,
2004), false belief understanding (Bernstein et al., 2011), intent-
based moral judgments (Margoni and Surian, 2016), creativity,
reasoning, and auditory localization (for an early collection of
studies, see Strauss and Stavy, 1982; for modeling this U-shaped
development, see Morse et al., 2011; for a recent overview, see
Pauls et al., 2013).
In addition to temporary regressions, developmental curves
may also show accelerations, which are often the hallmark
of rapid changes that mark developmental transitions (see
for instance Fischer and Bidell, 2006). Such developmental
transitions are likely to be preceded by temporary regressions
(Van Geert, 1991; Fischer and Bidell, 2006).
Temporary regressions, accelerations, and temporary plateaus
are examples of non-linear forms of developmental change. One
can question to what extent such non-linearities also apply to the
development of ToM.
Measuring Potential Non-linearities in
Theory-of-Mind Development
In order to be able to observe potential regressions and
accelerations in ToM development, one should take two issues
into account. First, since ToM development does not solely
depend on the development of false belief understanding,
the research instrument used to measure ToM development
should involve a variety of ToM components, like emotion
understanding, belief understanding linked to actions (such
as false beliefs) and emotions, desire understanding linked
to actions and emotions, and relevant ToM precursors and
associated abilities, like the understanding of the difference
between mental and physical entities (Wellman, 1990). For that
purpose, we developed the ToM Storybooks (Blijd-Hoogewys
et al., 2008; see also “Materials and Methods”). Second, as there
is no convincing evidence that by the age of six ToM is fully
acquired (e.g., Hala and Carpendale, 1997; O’Hare et al., 2009)
and stable, research should aim at a considerably broader age
range, for instance up to 12 years old and even older (until
adulthood).
At first glance, a time-serial design would be superior in
order to follow the changing level of ToM over the course of
developmental time. This is a design with as many measurements
as are needed to capture the temporary and often non-linear
forms of change characteristic of a particular developmental
phenomenon in individual children (Steenbeek and van Geert,
2002; van Geert and Steenbeek, 2005). However, such a method
also brings along considerable logistic problems. Children need to
be tested repeatedly over an extended period. Also, since so few
research has focused on the dynamics in ToM development, it is
hard to predict at what time intervals children should be tested
in order to find evidence of developmental phenomena such
as accelerations and decelerations, transitions and temporary
regressions.
Meanwhile, a cross-sectional design might provide a
preliminary answer to the question of age-related changes and
potential critical points in ToM in the population, and is a first
step toward future time-serial research of developmental paths,
as they occur in individual children. However, it is becoming
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a well-established fact that a developmental curve based on
cross-sectional data should never be automatically identified
as a representation of individual developmental curves (e.g., as
the curve that applies to the ‘average’ child or the majority of
children), until it has been empirically demonstrated, with the aid
of a sufficient number of individual developmental curves, that
individual-based curves are statistically and structurally similar
to the developmental curve based on group data. This latter
condition is known as the homology or ergodicity condition, and
is rather unlikely to occur in the case of developmental processes
(Molenaar and Campbell, 2009).
Using Cross-Sectional Data to Tap
Potential Non-linearities in
Theory-of-Mind Development
Cross-sectional growth curves may serve yet another purpose
than serving as first approximations of phenomena that require
further scrutiny by means of individual time-serial designs.
In this article, we propose an alternative perspective on the
interpretation of cross-sectional data, which is based on the
obvious fact that making a test amounts to the performance of
a particular task, in which the child is asked to solve a particular
series of problems, framed in a particular format.
In general, there exist various ways in which task performance
can be used to obtain information about children’s development
and about what they have learned from experiences. One way
is to ask children to perform a familiarized and trained type
of task independently and without help, such as solving math
problems that are framed in a familiar and trained format,
to see how much they have learned from their math lessons.
Another way is to ask children to perform a particular task that
lies beyond the child’s capability to solve this particular task
independently, and to provide the child with help for doing so.
This is the approach taken in dynamic testing (Grigorenko and
Sternberg, 1998). A third possibility is to confront the child with
a novel task, and to observe how far the child can get if it has
to rely entirely on its own capabilities, eventually pushing the
child to its limits by giving counter-suggestions or by repeatedly
asking the same sort of question. The novel task can be novel
in terms of content, and/or in terms of the problem format.
In this case, the level of capability, development or learning is
defined as the ability to transfer knowledge or skills from one
context (e.g., the context of spontaneous daily experience and
actual behavior) to another context, which can be of various
kinds.
We contend that the administration of a ToM test that
the child is unfamiliar with, amounts to observing a child’s
developmental capabilities by providing it with a novel task
content and format. A cross-sectional administration of the test
that is likely to be a novel context for virtually every tested
child can thus be seen as a way of mapping individual and age-
related variability in the way children process this novel task,
by means of a highly simplified measure, which is the set of
sub-scores and the total test score of each individual. In this
way, a cross-sectional procedure provides yet another perspective
on a complex phenomenon, namely children’s development of
ToM that can only be fully understood if it is viewed from
a wide variety of perspectives. Hence, a cross-sectional design
provides an answer to the question of age-related changes in how
children transfer their knowledge about ToM that functions in
daily contexts of spontaneous activity to a new context, namely
that of explicit verbal questions and pictorial representations. It
should be noted that a repeated administration of the same test
may provide yet another kind of information, namely differences
between children in their ability to spontaneously learn from
repeatedly performing the same task (without feedback; Blijd-
Hoogewys et al., 2010).
Statistical Indicators of Non-linear
Developmental Phenomena
In order to describe changes in development, different fitting
models can be used to represent the general underlying
trend. In research, linear or quadratic models are often used.
Unfortunately, such models do not sufficiently take local
deviations of the distribution of data into account. This may lead
to over- and underestimations of the expected average scores in
certain age periods.
In contrast, non-parametric models, like Loess (or Lowess)
estimate smoothing procedure, follow local distributions of data
as reliably as possible. They apply a locally weighted least squares
estimate, and are commonly used as smoothing techniques
(see for instance Simonoff, 1996). Such non-linear techniques
can be of substantial value for testing non-linear changes even
when applied to cross-sectional data. Examples of such non-
linear changes are accelerations, decelerations, and temporary
regressions. Additional indicators of developmental transition
are changes in the skewness of the distribution, temporary
changes in growth rate and changes in variability (van Geert and
van Dijk, 2002; Bassano and van Geert, 2007; Van Dijk and van
Geert, 2007).
Changes in the skewness of the distribution over time may
provide information about alternations between periods of
relative stability (zero skewness) and periods of rapid change
beginning with a minority of rapid developers (positive skewness)
heading toward a new period of relative stability with a minority
of children lagging behind (negative skewness).
A temporary change in growth rate can be demonstrated in
the form of marked oscillations in the first derivative of the
developmental curve, which represents the rate of growth at that
point. A particularly strong instance of change in the growth rate
occurs in the form of a temporary regression (a local dip), where
the growth rate temporarily drops down to negative values. Since
the changes in skewness over time are related to accelerations in
the growth of the developmental phenomenon at issue, we expect
to find a certain level of coherence between the first derivative
of the non-linear ToM growth curve and the change of skewness
over time.
Change in variability, the third indicator of developmental
transition discussed in this article, can be observed as intra-
and inter-individual variability. A temporary increase in the
intra-individual variability is considered a strong indicator of
a developmental transition (van Geert and van Dijk, 2002).
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However, such an indicator can only be used in repeated
measures designs. Inter-individual variability, which is applicable
to cross-sectional data and which is expressed in terms of
standard deviation over a certain period of time, might also
temporally increase during a transition.
Although these three indicators are likely to be correlated,
if they are indeed indicative of an underlying developmental
transition, they are, in principle, independent of one another.
For instance, an acceleration in the group-based growth curve
might occur without any change in intra-individual variability,
or without any change in skewness.
Aims, Hypotheses, and Research
Questions
In the sections above, we have provided evidence for the
occurrence of developmental regressions and various other non-
linearities in the development of a wide variety of skills and forms
of knowledge. So far, no studies have explicitly looked at such
eventual non-linearities in ToM development. The objective of
this study is to investigate whether there occur developmental
regressions and other non-linearities during ToM development
in childhood.
In addition, we have seen that ToM is not a monolithic
ability. It consists of various sub-abilities, each with their
characteristic developmental timing. Hence, if ToM development
is characterized by non-linearity, it is likely that the forms of these
eventual non-linear properties will differ between various aspects
of ToM.
Finally, gender differences have been found in ToM
development, with girls having a slight advantage over boys. The
question is whether this difference is also observable in the form
of the cross-sectional developmental trajectories in boys and girls,
i.e., whether eventual non-linearities in the curves have a gender
specific timing or form.
Given the present state of our knowledge, all these issues
amount to open questions. So far, there is no theory from which
the answers to these questions can be predicted and that allows
us to formulate these questions in the form of hypotheses. In this
article, we will formulate a dynamic model of ToM development
that might serve as a first attempt toward such a theory.
To summarize, our research questions are as follows:
(1) Are there non-linearities in the cross-sectional growth
curve of ToM in the form of temporary regressions and
accelerations? (2) If such non-linearities are observed, are
they real or ordained due to statistical or sampling artifacts?
(3) Are eventually observed non-linearities supported by
additional indicators of non-linear change as described above?
(4) Are there differences in the eventually observed non-
linearities between (4a) the various aspects of ToM as
represented by the ToM sub-scores, and (4b) boys and
girls?
In order to answer these questions, we follow a cross-
sectional design, for reasons explained in the section on
tapping eventual non-linearities in ToM development. We
use the ToM Storybooks, an instrument that incorporates a
variety of ToM components. In order to describe the possible
temporary regressions and accelerations in ToM development,
we use techniques that also look at additional indicators for
developmental transitions: changes in the skewness of the
distribution, temporary changes in growth rate and changes in
variability.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The ethical committee of the University of Groningen approved
this study and written consent was obtained in advance from
parental guardians. The methods were carried out in accordance
with the approved guidelines. Minors were involved. Their
parents were asked for written consent.
Participants and Setting
We tested 324 children. The ages ranged from three up to and
including 11 years, with approximately the same number of boys
and girls per age range (Table 1 for the age distribution).
The children came from preschools, kindergartens, and
elementary schools, from both provincial and urban regions in
the Netherlands. All children had a Dutch linguistic background,
and did not have language acquisition problems that could
have hampered their performance on the tasks (for the role of
language in ToM development and ToM performance: Milligan
et al., 2007; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2014; Ebert, 2015).
Two Dutch language tests were used, depending on the age
of the child. For 3–6 year olds, the Reynell was administered
(test for receptive language comprehension; Van Eldik et al.,
1997); and for 6–9 year olds, the TvK (Taaltest voor Kinderen,
Language Test for Children: subtests ‘vocabulary’ and ‘sentence
construction’; Van Bon, 1982) was used. Language scores were
available for 249 children (Reynell: n = 170, TvK: n = 79). Those
children who did not receive a language test were older than
6 years and judged as having appropriate language skills by their
teachers. Thirteen percent of the children came from a lower
social background, distributed over the whole age range. This
TABLE 1 | Age distribution of sample being administered the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) Storybooks (N = 324).
Age (in years)
3 4 5 6 7 8–9 10–11 Total
Boys 32 31 31 31 15 14 13 167
Girls 29 24 32 26 16 12 18 157
All 61 55 63 57 31 26 31 324
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percentage corresponds with the percentage as known from the
Dutch National Bureau of Statistics, at time of the research.
Measure
Children’s ToM knowledge was tested with the ToM Storybooks,
version Sam (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). It is a comprehensive
test, composed of multiple tasks, that measures a variety of
ToM components and associated aspects. The ToM tasks are
incorporated in short stories. These stories are illustrated with
full color pictures and enlivened by the use of cuddly patches
of fur, toy doors that can be opened, and magnetized emotion
faces that can be placed on the characters. The test takes 40–
50 min, including a short break (5 min of free play), also for the
youngest age group (no significant effect of fatigue was found;
Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). Children experience the assessment
as a ‘being read to’ activity, rather than a ‘being tested’ activity.
In total, there are 34 tasks spread over six storybooks in total.
A maximum sum-score of 110 points can be obtained, which can
be divided into five sub-scores (for example tasks, see Appendix
A in Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008): (1) emotion recognition
(maximum = 14 points), (2) distinction between physical and
mental entities (real-mental, real-imaginary, and close impostors;
maximum = 44 points), (3) understanding that seeing leads to
knowing (maximum = 3 points), (4) understanding of desires
(maximum = 17 points), and (5) understanding of beliefs
(maximum= 32 points). The latter encompass tasks on standard
belief, changed belief, not own belief, explicit false belief, false
belief, inferred belief, and inferred belief control. In addition
to providing a single, quantitative measure of the level of ToM
ability, the ToM Storybooks also allow investigators to compare
various relevant ToM components.
Each task incorporates one to five questions, including both
test questions and justification questions. There are in total 74
binary test questions and 18 justification questions. The answers
to the test questions are coded as correct or incorrect (1 or 0
points; maximum of all test questions = 74). The justification
questions result in 2, 1, or 0 points, depending on the amount
and correctness of the mental state terms spontaneously used by
a child (maximum of all justification questions = 36). In order
to evaluate the justifications, a category system is used (for more
details, see the Appendices in Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008).
Since the ToM Storybooks is a comprehensive test, no other
ToM measures were included in this study. The test has good
psychometric qualities. The internal consistency [Cronbach’s
alphas: ToM total score = 0.95, ToM sub-score 1 (emotion
recognition) = 0.83, ToM sub-score 2 (physical/mental) = 0.88,
ToM sub-score 3 (seeing knowing) = 0.51, ToM sub-score 4
(desires) = 0.84, ToM sub-score 5 (beliefs) = 0.89], test-retest
reliability (r = 0.86, p = 0.001 for typically developing children,
r = 0.98 for children with PDD–NOS), inter-rater reliability
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81–0.97), divergent and convergent validity
are good (see also Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008, 2010). The
ToM Storybooks has been translated in different languages,
such as English, Finnish, French, Italian, and Spanish; and it
has been standardized on two European populations, namely
Dutch children (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008) and Italian children
(Molina and Bulgarelli, 2012; Bulgarelli et al., 2015).
Procedure
All subjects were individually tested in a quiet room at school.
Test administrators were carefully instructed to follow standard
procedures. For practical reasons, kindergarten children were
tested at home. If necessary, the parent was allowed to be present
during testing but was requested not to interfere. The justification
questions were judged later on. The inter-rater reliability of the
justifications is known to be high (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81–0.97,
see Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). The few differences left were
unanimously agreed on after discussion by four researchers.
Data Analysis
In order to acquire insight in non-linear changes in ToM
development, we used a descriptive non-parametric method,
namely Loess curve smoothing (Simonoff, 1996). Next to that,
we used random permutation techniques, and more generally,
Monte Carlo analyses, which are assumption-free techniques
(Kroese et al., 2014). Wellman et al. (2001) have argued for the use
of more assumption-free techniques, such as bootstrap methods,
in ToM research. It entails a simulation of the test statistic at
issue (e.g., a particular numerical indicator of change or of non-
linearity) as based on the null hypothesis, which can be compared
to our empirical ToM data (Good, 2001; Todman and Dugard,
2001; Manly, 2007).
RESULTS
Non-linearities in ToM Sum-Scores
The Loess smoothed curves of the ToM sum-scores
(maximum = 110 points) reveal three points of developmental
interest (Figure 1; see also Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2010). To
determine the exact timing of these points, minima and
maxima of the second derivative (acceleration of growth) of
the developmental curve were inspected. The most marked
inflection points are seen at 56 months (4 years and 8 months),
72 months (6 years), and 78 months (6 years and 6 months).
The second inflection point (72 months) is followed by a dip
in the curve, which shows its deepest point at 78 months. This
FIGURE 1 | The Loess fitting curve of the Theory-of-Mind (ToM)
sum-score data plotted versus age displays a non-linearity. Based
upon the second derivative of this curve three points of developmental
interests were found, namely at 56, 72, and 78 months.
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dip is a temporary regression or local U-shaped age curve. It is
the most striking deviation from monotonicity in the non-linear
developmental curve based on the data from boys and girls
taken together. More detailed analyses can be found in the
section ‘Non-linearities in ToM sub-scores and in gender based
sub-groups.’
Is the Temporary Regression at
72–78 Months Real?
It should be checked whether the non-linearity in the form of a
temporary dip is not the result of inadequate selection procedures
or of statistical artifact, such as accidental sampling effects or the
influence of specific, biased or incompetent test administrators.
To begin with, inadequate selection procedures are highly
unlikely since the selection procedure was carried out with the
utmost care and selection criteria were uniform over all ages.
Second, it is unlikely that the non-linearity in the form of a
temporary regression (a dip) is a statistical artifact. In order to
demonstrate this, the null hypothesis was tested that the generic
curve underlying the data is actually a monotonically rising curve
and that the dip is due to accidental sampling variations. The
latter could amount to an accidental overrepresentation of low
scoring individuals. In order to test this possibility, we calculated
the best fitting monotonic growth curve and a regression model
for the variances. Since we had no prior assumption about where
a non-linearity, in the form of a temporary regression, in ToM
ability should occur, we tested for the accidental occurrence
of an apparent temporary regression anywhere along the time
interval. Because a theoretical expectation about the length of
the temporary regression is also lacking, the null hypothesis was
also tested for time windows of different length. By means of a
Monte Carlo technique, we calculated the probability that the
null hypothesis model yields a temporary regression, comparable
to the observed one. The pattern of probabilities supported
the conclusion that it is unlikely that the observed temporary
regression is an accidental sampling effect of an otherwise
continuous, monotonically rising simple curve (Monte Carlo,
p = 0.01 through p = 0.05, depending on the length of the tested
interval). Another indicator for non-linearity in the form of a
temporary regression, namely negative slope (over intervals of
variable length), provided converging evidence (Monte Carlo,
p= 0.02).
Next, we checked if particular test administrators caused the
non-linearity in the form of a temporary regression (dip). We
defined eight groups of data sets by leaving out the data of
one particular test administrator at a time. If the temporary
regression is due to an anomalous test administrator, it should
disappear in the dataset from which this particular person
is lacking. We repeated the statistical procedure described
above for each of the reduced data sets. The resulting
p-values showed that the dip remained significant for each
of the reduced data sets (Monte Carlo, p < 0.001 through
0.05).
In summary, neither selection errors, nor accidental sampling
errors nor a deficient test administrator can account for the
occurrence of the observed non-linearities.
Non-linearities in ToM Sub-Scores and in
Gender Based Sub-Groups
We checked whether the main temporary regression (a dip
at 72–78 months) is observable in all five ToM sub-scores
and preferably in the core ToM sub-scores (on desires and
beliefs). For this purpose the ToM sub-scores were rescaled, to
make comparisons easier (otherwise they would have different
maximum scores). Loesses with a 20% window size were
calculated. All ToM sub-scores showed dips at roughly the same
age (Monte Carlo, p= 0.01; see Figure 2).
The curves of the ToM sub-scores showed the same
characteristics as that of the ToM sum-score, with start and end
of the major dip at roughly the same age as the dip based upon the
ToM sum-score (start: respectively, 71–74 months vs. 72 months;
end: respectively, 77–79 months vs. 78 months). The sub-score
on false beliefs displayed the steepest dip.
Second, we looked whether there are gender differences. On
average, girls had slightly higher ToM sum-scores than boys
(M = 71.71 versus M = 68.73, respectively; independent samples
t-test, p = 0.098). The variance hardly differed between both
sexes (20.82 and 20.44) and is considered equal (Levene’s test,
p = 0.749). When we divided the group in three age groups,
however, (n = 87, <54 months; n = 119, 54 < 78 months;
n = 118, ≥78 months), we found the gender difference to be
significant for the youngest and oldest group (p = 0.05); and the
variances within these two age groups were not equal (Levene’s
test, p = 0.01 and p = 0.05, respectively). Subsequently, we
compared the Loess curves for both genders (Figure 3). The
girls showed two non-linearities: an increase between the fourth
and fifth year, followed by a plateau (first temporary regression)
and then again a growth spurt between the fifth and sixth year,
followed by a dip (second temporary regression) and ending
with an ultimate growth spurt. The boys showed only one non-
linearity, namely a dip that was more pronounced than the
simultaneous dip of the girls. Through slope hunting techniques,
we investigated the statistical significance of these dips in the null
hypothesis model. The dip of the boys was significant (Monte
Carlo, p = 0.007). The dip of the girls (their second temporary
regression) was more flat and did not reach significance (Monte
Carlo, p = 0.20). However, this dip appeared around 3 months
earlier than in boys. If we reckon with the fact that ToM develops
earlier in young girls than in young boys (Charman et al., 2002),
the earlier appearance of the dip in the girls seems a meaningful
phenomenon. The probability that the occurrence of a dip of this
magnitude, appearing up to 3 months earlier, but not later than in
the boys is unlikely to be accidental (this difference is statistically
significant; Monte Carlo, p= 0.03).
Skewness and Variability as Additional
Indicators of an Underlying Transition
In the introduction, we discussed three qualitative indicators of
developmental transition, namely skewness, temporary changes
in growth rate and change in variability. Before further
analyzing the developmental ToM pattern, we first wished
to determine whether the hypothesized properties stated are
indeed characteristic of a developmental transition of the kind
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FIGURE 2 | Loess curves of the ToM sub-scores plotted versus age. All ToM sub-scores showed dips at the same ages as the dips found for the ToM
sum-score. ER, Emotion Recognition; D, Desire; B, Belief; FB, False Belief; MP, Mental Physical. The deepest point of the dip based upon the ToM sum-score is
pointed out with the arrow and dotted line.
FIGURE 3 | Loess curves of the ToM sum-scores plotted versus age, for boys (black line) and girls (gray line). The girls show two non-linearities, the boys
only one.
we now expect to find in the ToM data. In order to do so,
we mathematically simulated a transition model in order to
check whether the expected qualitative indicators occur. A good
example of a developmental transition is a two-step growth
process (for details on how such models can be specified
and simulated, see Van Geert, 1991, 1994; a two-step growth
process can easily be extended toward a three- and more-step
model if needed). This transition model can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
Figure 4 shows the Loess curves with a 30% window of the
skewness, growth rate, and variability of the real ToM data.
A mixture between a two-step and a three-step growth process
is apparent. There are two large peaks, with a smaller peak
in between, most clearly observable in the variability measure
(standard deviation) and less in the other two measurements.
The qualitative similarity with the model simulation of a two-step
process is striking. There are two peaks, both in the skewness and
in the first derivative (i.e., growth rate) curve. As is the case in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 1970 | 14
fpsyg-07-01970 January 3, 2017 Time: 11:44 # 8
Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert Non-linearities in Theory-of-Mind Development
FIGURE 4 | Loess curves of the three qualitative indicators of developmental transition based on empirical data. A mixture between a two-step and a
three-step growth process is obvious. There are two peaks, both in the skewness and in the first derivative curve. FD, first derivative (or growth rate); SD, standard
deviation (or variability).
the simulation, the peaks of skewness largely coincide with those
in the first derivative (growth rate), and the skewness peaks come
somewhat earlier than those of the first derivative. The covariance
of the series is 0.88, which is comparable to (and even higher
than) the high covariance that the simulation model predicted
(0.70).
Before concluding that the skewness and first derivative
data support the notion of a two-step developmental process,
we need to know what the probability is that a similar co-
variation of skewness and first derivative curves can be obtained
if the underlying statistical variation of the sum-scores is in
fact symmetrical across age (and not varying systematically, as
hypothesized). This null hypothesis model can be tested by
generating random series of sum-scores based on a normal
distribution model, with means equal to the successive values of
the non-linear growth curve and standard deviations equal to
the observed standard deviation of the residuals. Only 2 out of
the 200 simulated series had a covariance greater than or equal
to the observed covariance (p-value is ∼2/200, i.e., p = 0.01).
We can thus conclude that the skewness data provide further
independent evidence for the existence of at least a two-step
process in the development of ToM.
Is There a Two or Three-Step
Developmental Model?
As we mentioned before, girls evidenced a three-step
development and boys more a two-step development (Figure 3).
However, it is highly probable that also boys show a three-step
development. It can be hypothesized that the first transition
is observable only in girls, because of differences in major
parameters – in particular the value of the main parameter,
which is the growth rate – and not because of differences in the
underlying variables affecting the growth of ToM.
In order to show that this interpretation is indeed feasible,
we fitted a three-step growth pattern of ToM knowledge, based
on the emergence of two underlying, supportive variables, one
around the age of 56 months (A) and another around the age
of 72 months (B; Figure 5). These supportive variables are
hypothetical and may for instance include executive functions,
which are known to be an important facilitator in ToM
functioning (for the relation between ToM and executive
function see, e.g., Carlson et al., 2002, 2013; Devine and Hughes,
2014), also found across cultures (Wang et al., 2016).
The growth model that was fitted to the smoothed data
is of the type described by Van Geert (1991, 1994), and by
Fischer and Bidell (2006). It contains positive parameters, i.e.,
a supportive relationship, for the A and B levels and negative
parameters, i.e., a competitive relationship, for the first derivative
of the hypothetical A and B levels (which corresponds with
the actual change in these levels). Figure 5 shows the fit with
the smoothed curves of boys and girls separately, based on
underlying hypothetical variables A and B, which are of the same
magnitude and occur at the same age in both sexes. Table 2 shows
the values of the model parameters.
A striking difference between boys and girls is that the
parameter values cause faster growth and more effect of
supportive and competitive variables in girls than in boys. The
first discontinuity, a plateau, which is observable in the girls
thanks to their higher growth rate, is in fact concealed in boys,
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FIGURE 5 | A three-step growth pattern (broad striped line) fitted over
the smoothed ToM sum-score data (interrupted line), taking into
account the emergence of two underlying, supportive variables
A and B. The top graph shows the fit of girls, the bottom part shows the fit of
boys. The underlying variables A and B are of the same magnitude and occur
at the same age in both genders.
TABLE 2 | Values of the model parameters used for the dynamic systems
growth model.
Girls Boys
Growth rate 0.15 0.10
Support from A 0.33 0.10
Support from B 0.24 0.16
Competition from the growth of A 0.00 0.00
Competition from the growth of B −3.20 −2.50
as a consequence of their lower growth rate and lesser effect from
the A-variable (which is a hypothetical variable emerging around
the age of 4.6 years). The second discontinuity is observable in
both girls and boys. Although the competitive effect of B on
ToM is greater in girls than in boys, the observable effect is
more salient in boys. This finding may lead to the conclusion
that girls evidenced a three-step development and boys only
a two-step development. However, in dynamic growth models,
parameters often show non-linear co-variations, for instance
competitive effects among variables can be masked by higher
growth rates. The dynamic growth model (Figure 5) showed that
the expression of the steps in the form of observable plateaus and
marked dips may depend on the values of the growth parameters,
in particular the value of the main parameter, which is the growth
rate. It can be concluded that a dynamic growth model involving
the effect of two variables affecting the growth of ToM, one
occurring around the age of 56 months and the other around
the age of 72 months, can account for the variety of non-linear
phenomena observed in the data, including the differences and
similarities, the plateaus and dips between boys and girls.
DISCUSSION
Non-linearities in the Development of
ToM: One or Two Temporary Regressions
Our findings support the general developmental view of ToM.
Based on cross-sectional analyses of a ToM task that is new to
the children, our results show that ToM increases with age – with
the greatest increase between 42 and 56 months, that is between
3.5 and 4.7 years of age – and that it continues to develop after
the age of six. The development before the age of four and a half
is evidently monotonous. However, after this age non-linearities
occur. Two temporary regressions – one around the age of 4 years
and 8 months and one at the age of six to six and a half – are found
not only in the ToM sum-score Loess curve but also in the ToM
sub-score Loess curves.
The temporary regressions can be viewed as indicators of
non-linearity in ToM development. We have demonstrated
that the probability that the main temporary regression (a
dip at 72–78 months) is either a statistical selection artifact
or an experimenter artifact is very small. The application of
additional indicators – skewness, growth rate, and variability –
provided further support for the occurrence of a transition –
or two transitions – in the development of ToM, as evidenced
by an instrument that requires children to transfer their
daily knowledge to a context of explicit verbal questions and
pictorial representations. Also, the non-linearity found cannot
be accredited to gender differences. Both boys and girls showed
a marked regression around the age of six. However, girls also
showed evidence for an additional earlier regression (a plateau),
around the age of five.
There are different views on the manner in which ToM
develops in preschoolers. For instance, one view implies
continuous increases in ToM related processing abilities rather
than radical conceptual shifts in understanding mental states
(e.g., German and Leslie, 2000; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Birch
and Bloom, 2004). A second view assigns central importance to
the occurrence of a conceptual change. This change takes place
between the age of three and four/five for simple ToM skills
(Perner, 1991; Gopnik, 1993; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman,
2014), and this conceptual development continues into more
advanced ToM skills at the age of eight/ten (Osterhaus et al.,
2016). Our data show a pattern of overall continuous increase,
with a steep growth of ToM knowledge around the age of four,
followed by a more continuous increase of ToM knowledge
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leveling off toward the age of five and interrupted by a temporary
regression around the age of six, which occurs in boys and
girls alike. Overall, we found boys and girls to follow the
same developmental path. However, we also found some gender
differences in ToM development. Such differences have seldom
been reported in ToM research (for exceptions: Charman et al.,
2002; Walker, 2005; Calero et al., 2013). In fact, most studies
find no statistically significant differences between boys and girls,
which might be due to the use of tests that are insufficiently
capable of capturing subtle individual ToM differences (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997), or have insufficient statistical power. Our
study included a more extensive sample than the majority of
studies did. In addition, we employed statistical techniques that
are sensitive to more subtle developmental patterns. Under such
methodological conditions, eventual gender differences are more
easily recorded from the data, not only in the appearance of
ToM skills but also in the rate of ToM development. The
early ToM growth in girls was more rapid than that of boys.
Gender difference in the rate of ToM development has been
hypothesized before by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) and by
Charman et al. (2002) who found that young girls have a
ToM advantage, which disappears as children get older. Such
a higher early rate of growth results in a greater likelihood
of a later temporary standstill (Van Geert, 1994), which has
indeed been demonstrated in our data, for girls showed two
non-linear changes in the form of temporary regressions (a
plateau and a dip), and boys only one (a dip). This is in
correspondence with the scarce research on the effect of gender
on ToM showing slight ToM advantages in both young girls
(2.3–4.3 year olds, Charman et al., 2002) and more profound
ToM advantages in older girls (6–8 year olds, Calero et al.,
2013). The more rapid ToM growth in girls might be due to
the fact that, from the beginning, girls are more focused on
sociability. For instance, already in 1 day old neonates, a definite
sexual dimorphism is observable (Connellan et al., 2000). Next
to that, girls also have better verbal abilities than boys (Halpern,
2000), stronger syntactic abilities and a larger amount of social
experiences (Charman et al., 2002). Language is considered an
important factor in ToM functioning (e.g., de Villiers and de
Villiers, 2014). Finally, there is some evidence that females show
more pronounced responses of the mirror neuron system than
males (Cheng et al., 2006); the mirror neuron system has been
hypothesized to directly relate to ToM abilities in both children
and adults (for a review see Oberman and Ramachandran,
2007).
Potential Explanations for the Observed
Temporary Regressions
In this article we reported the discovery of one or two temporary
regressions, indicative of either a two- or three-step development.
The literature on U-shaped growth and non-linear growth curves
in general provides some hints on possible explanations.
The first explanation is that the non-linearities reflect
a temporary conflict between competence and performance
(Marcus, 2004). According to this view, the development of ToM
competence follows in reality a monotonically rising function,
but for some accidental reason, performance on ToM tests gets
a little worse around the age of six, maybe because a particular
performance component interferes negatively. The question is
of course what this performance factor is. In addition, one
may question whether this competence-performance distinction
is relevant on the level of testable psychological functions.
Dynamic systems theory, as advocated by the late Esther
Thelen and her collaborators, makes no distinction between
these two levels, and sees a temporary regression as a direct
consequence of dynamic interactions between components
that are responsible for the production of answers to ToM
questions in specific problem contexts (Gershkoff-Stowe and
Thelen, 2004). According to this view, there is no ToM in
the sense of an identifiable, internal conceptual structure.
All behavior is soft assembled, and temporary regressions
reflect the “continuous changes in the collective dynamics of
multiple, contingent processes” (Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen,
2004, page 11).
Another point that we wish to re-emphasize is that, from
a dynamical point of view, cross-sectional data based on test
scores provide an answer to the question of how children transfer
their daily probably non-discursive experiences to a context of
repeated, explicit verbal questions and pictorial representations.
From a dynamic systems point of view, all forms of knowledge
expression reflect the process by which this expression has come
about. In that sense, all information about development reflects
the contextual conditions under which it has been obtained. It
is thus possible that the non-linearities found in our study are
a typical property of the current test conditions. However, this
eventual context dependency does not reduce the developmental
significance of the information obtained. The question is of
course which aspect/aspects of ToM related knowledge and
behavior is/are responsible for the observed non-linearities, in
particular the temporary regression.
According to Brainerd (2004), temporary regressions in
performance occur if a particular performance class – for
instance the class of ToM related questions – is served by
opposing strategies, or dual processes. It is conceivable that
up to the age of six, the child has employed an intuitive
and direct solution to ToM problems, while at around the
age of six a new approach begins to emerge, which is more
cognitive and reflective in nature (see also the hypothesis of
embodied/enacted and explicit/reflective perspectives on other
persons, e.g., Bohl and van den Bos, 2012; Fuchs, 2013; Gallagher
and Varga, 2014). The emergence of a second strategy –
for instance implying an explicit third person perspective as
Fuchs (2013) has called it – requires a form of reorganization
of components responsible for ToM performance, and the
observed non-linearities are likely to reflect this reorganization
(Feldman and Benjamin, 2004; Friend, 2004; Marcovitch and
Lewkowicz, 2004; Rogers et al., 2004; Wewrker et al., 2004).
That such non-linearities indeed occur as a consequence of
continuous, long-term growth in a developing system has been
demonstrated by modeling development, either by means of
connectionist networks (Rogers et al., 2004) or by means of
dynamic systems models of the type advocated by Van Geert,
Fischer, and others (see Demetriou and Raftopoulos, 2004, for
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a discussion regarding U-shaped growth). In these models,
long-term development is context-specific and dependent on
dynamic interactions among many components – biological,
cognitive, emotional, behavioral – that constitute the developing
system (Van Geert, 1991, 1994, 1998; Fischer and Rose,
1994; Fischer and Bidell, 2006; Fischer and Van Geert,
2014). Relationships between the multiple components in a
system can be supportive, competitive, conditional, or neutral.
The dynamics of these relationships over time explain the
emergence of phenomena such as accelerations, decelerations,
and regressions.
Based on dynamic modeling and indirect evidence from brain
development, neo-Piagetian theory predicts relatively major
shifts in development around the age of 6 years, dependent on
the context or content of the developmental function (Case,
1991; Fischer and Bidell, 2006). The shift is broadly associated
with a marked increase in more reflexive, coordinated ways of
thinking in contrast with the more intuitive, uni-dimensional
ways of thinking that precede it. Although the application is
purely speculative, it might be so that around the age of six
the intuitive ToM judgment, which is considered to be largely
based on biologically founded forms of empathy (Preston and
de Waal, 2002) is supplemented by a more reflective, cognitive
form of ToM reasoning (already constructed form age 4 onward;
Low, 2015). In this regard, it has been shown that six-year-
olds have little trouble assigning false beliefs to others, but
only arrive at a truly interpretive ToM at the age of seven
(Carpendale and Chandler, 1996; Lalonde and Chandler, 2002),
however, ToM continues to develop and change throughout life
(Moran, 2013; Vetter et al., 2013). Children with autism seem
to have an implicit ToM deficit (Schuwerk et al., 2015). As
predicted by the theories discussed earlier, this emergence of a
new ToM specific strategy in typical development might explain
the temporary regression found in our data. The fact that this
regression was found for all ToM sub-scores supports this way
of thinking.
The previous explanations all rely on the notion of distinctive,
developmentally ordered strategies for solving ToM problems.
In fact, there is supportive but indirect evidence of two
‘approaches’ to ToM: an intuitive (or automatic) and a reflective
(or controlled) route (Lieberman, 2007). Indirect evidence for
an intuitive, neuro-physiologically based understanding of ToM
related properties of other persons comes from the rapidly
growing literature on the neuronal systems that underlie the
spontaneous understanding of human actions and psychological
states of others. An example of such a system is the mirror
neuron system (for a systematic review see Hamilton, 2013).
It is hypothesized that through cognitively mediated routes
people with autism are able to compensate for the lack of an
intuitive ToM (Eisenmajer and Prior, 1991; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1993; Dissanayake and Macintosh, 2003). It is a strategy they
can only master if a verbal mental age of 11 years is attained
(e.g., Happé,, 1995). Typically developing subjects, on the other
hand, use the direct biology-based routes as well as the more
cognitive ones. Their understanding of ToM is a combination
of approaches and strategies (Lieberman, 2007), the combination
of which changes across development (Kobayashi et al., 2007).
It is not unlikely that the temporary regressions found in our
study reflect a major reorganization in the composition of
strategies.
It should be noted though that the non-linearities found in
our data need not reflect a difference in ToM understanding
per se, but could reflect a developmental difference in
other factors necessary for the task. For instance, attention,
inhibition, and ‘curse of knowledge’ may play a role (e.g.,
German and Leslie, 2000; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Birch
and Bloom, 2004). At the age of six, the development of
executive functions undergoes its first active stage of maturation
(Brocki and Bohlin, 2004). It is not unthinkable that this
development also has consequences for the ToM development
of children (Carlson et al., 2002). According to the emergence
account, executive function is even considered a necessary
condition for the acquisition of ToM understanding (Moses,
2001; Devine and Hughes, 2014). San Juan and Astington
(2012) have even suggested that executive function and
language abilities can aid the developmental step from an
implicit to an explicit ToM. However, Osterhaus et al. (2016)
found that advanced ToM abilities were not determined by
information-processing capacities (such as executive control:
working memory and inhibition), instead indicating conceptual
development.
Finally, data collected on children with PDD–NOS, an
autism spectrum disorder, (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2010)
show a highly comparable dip in ToM scores. However, in
accordance with the developmental delay in ToM typical of
such children, the dip occurs at a slightly later age than in
the typically developing children. This delay in the timing
of the dip supports the conclusion that the dip is a genuine
phenomenon of ToM development, and not of interference
with some other non-ToM factor, which is not necessarily
delayed in children with PDD–NOS. Note that children with
autism spectrum disorder are also known to have executive
function problems (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2014; Craig et al.,
2016).
A Three-Step Developmental Model
Visual inspection of the graphs revealed that girls showed two
discontinuities (a plateau and a dip) and boys only one (a dip).
The dip of the boys coincided with the second (more shallow)
dip of the girls. The dynamic growth model showed that the
observable properties of the growth trajectories depend on the
values of the parameters governing the growth rate and the
supportive and competitive relations between the variables in
the model. A typical prediction of the model is that growth
rates will result in more clearly observable plateaus and less
clearly observable temporary regressions. This prediction is in
line with the observed trajectory of the girls: the fact that
they show an earlier growth spurt than the boys suggests
that the growth rate of their underlying ToM components is
higher than that of the boys. Consistent with this presumable
higher growth rate, the girls show more clearly observable
plateaus and more shallow dips. In short, the proposed dynamic
growth model might provide a speculative explanation of the
non-linear phenomena observed in the data, including the
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differences and similarities, the plateaus and dips between boys
and girls.
Limitations of the Research, Prospects
for Further Study, and Implications for
Clinical Practice
One limitation of our research is that it had fewer children
in the older age range (from 8 years on), which implies a
reduction in reliability at the older ages. Also, the test was
probably too easy for the older children since we did not
include more advanced ToM tasks that are typically mastered
at later ages. Perhaps additional regressions would have been
found at the older ages if second-order belief tasks (Perner and
Wimmer, 1985) or more complex emotional constructs would
have been used. However, not having included such tasks does
not change anything to our main message, that there are non-
linearities in ToM development, if it is viewed at from a cross-
sectional perspective, with children being confronted with an
essentially unfamiliar task, as far as their ToM knowledge is
concerned.
A second limitation of our research is that the growth
curve of ToM is based on cross-sectional data. This is only
one particular perspective on ToM development, namely
the perspective provided by asking children to transfer
their knowledge to a new and unfamiliar ToM context,
namely that of a storybook with explicit verbal questions.
Various other complementary perspectives can be provided,
for instance that of time-serial frequent measurements or
observations of individuals. As is now becoming well-established
knowledge, models based on group data should not be
seen as models of typical individual curves (see the earlier
remark on ergodicity in the introduction, Molenaar and
Campbell, 2009). However, there is also converging evidence
from longitudinal ToM research both in typically developing
children (see Figure 3 in Serra et al., 2002) and children
with PDD–NOS (Serra et al., 2002; Blijd-Hoogewys et al.,
2010), further supporting the robustness of this developmental
phenomenon.
Concerning future research, it might be interesting to
include a broader age group, also including second-order and
third-order belief tasks. In addition, it might be interesting
to focus on directly perceived and enacted forms of other
person understanding in the form of micro-observations of
social interaction in young children and to compare these
implicit forms of understanding with the more explicit forms
of understanding that a test like the ToM Storybooks is trying
to capture. A third possibility is to focus on the nature of
the explanatory schemes that children use or enact while
answering questions about desires and intentions. After all,
many questions focusing on the understanding of desires and
intentions evoke a potential conflict between a scheme of
persons as rational-agents (acting on the basis of the real
states of affairs in the world) and a scheme of persons as
psychological agents (acting on the basis of their knowledge
and perception of states of affairs in the world). Of course,
these schemes must be coordinated into a scheme of the
person as a rational psychological agent, but this process of
coordination might not be an easy accomplishment for many
children.
The findings of the current research may have implications
for clinical assessment and intervention. In the sixth year of life
(72–78 months), a dip in ToM understanding and reasoning –
in the form of answering explicit questions about imaginary
situations – seems common. Note that this is also the age
period in which ASD is often diagnosed in children (Miodovnik
et al., 2015). Test developers and diagnosticians should take
into account that children with ASD may at that time ‘appear’
to have less severe problems on a ToM test if compared to
their typically developing peers who are undergoing a temporary
ToM dip. Children with ASD show this dip much later (Blijd-
Hoogewys et al., 2010). This may appear counterintuitive, for
children with ASD do have ToM problems (Baron-Cohen, 2000).
Research concerning the impact of the ToM dip on clinical
assessment is needed. In individual children, the temporary
dip found on the group level might be expressed in the form
of temporarily increased intra-individual variability in their
reactions to questions involving ToM decisions, for example
shifts between direct, rapid, and primarily implicit understanding
on the one hand, and reflective, thoughtful and primarily explicit
understanding on the other hand, or shifts between rational-
agent and psychological-agent perspectives. In principle, clinical
interventions might explicitly reckon with the non-linearities
in the processes of ToM development, and focus on individual
indicators of such non-linearities in the form of rapid learning,
resistance to learning, response variability, and so forth, to adapt
the intervention to the idiosyncratic nature of the young client’s
developmental pathway. Also, ToM training should perhaps
focus mainly on acquiring an intuitive and direct way of ToM,
only taking into account the cognitive and reflective approach
after the dip-age has been reached (Gallagher, 2004; Gallagher
and Varga, 2015). How exactly this should be done is of course
a matter of further clinical research.
CONCLUSION
In sum, this article has explored the existence of non-linearities,
in particular temporary regressions, in ToM development.
Because little is known about the dynamics in ToM development,
a cross-sectional design was applied in combination with non-
linear fitting methods. Data from the ToM Storybooks, a
comprehensive measurement of ToM, showed that a two or
three-step developmental model can be distilled. One non-
linearity occurs at the age of 4 years and 8 months (a plateau),
and one between the ages of six to six and a half (a dip). These
non-linear phenomena could not be explained as accidental
sampling effects and were supported by additional indicators of
non-linearity, namely changes in skewness, in growth rate, and
in variability. The non-linearities, for instance in the form of
temporary regressions or dips, were observable not only in the
ToM total score, but also in the ToM sub-scores and in both
boys and girls. Boys and girls differed somewhat in the form and
timing of the non-linear properties. Finally, the dynamic growth
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models presented in this article might serve as a starting point for
the formulation of a theory of ToM in a broader developmental
context, focusing on the individual-in-interaction as the locus of
the developmental process.
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The present study investigated whether, and to what extent, reflective functioning (RF)
during preadolescence is associated with maternal attachment security and RF, and
with the child’s attachment security. Thirty-nine mother–preadolescent child dyads from
a non-clinical population participated in the study. Maternal and child RF were assessed
by applying the Reflective Functioning Scale to the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI)
and to the Child Attachment Interview transcripts. Children of mothers who showed a
secure attachment model regarding the relationship with their parents during childhood
reported higher levels of RF than the children of mothers who were classified as
insecure on the AAI. Child RF was positively associated with maternal “Coherence of
the Mind” on the AAI and negatively associated with maternal derogation of attachment.
A strong, significant association was also found between child attachment security
and child RF. Children who were rated as being more emotionally open, more able
to balance positive and negative descriptions of their parents, more prone to support
their assertions through examples, and more able to positively resolve conflicts with
their parents showed higher RF. On the contrary, children who resorted to a higher
extent to idealization and dismissal toward their parents showed a lesser degree of
RF. Notably, a very strong association was found between the score on the “Overall
coherence” subscale and the child’s ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent mental states
in the context of their family relationships. As expected, child and maternal RF resulted
significantly positively correlated with each other. In particular, only maternal RF (and not
maternal attachment security) predicted child RF, and only maternal ability to mentalize
mixed-ambivalent mental states predicted the corresponding ability in the children.
Keywords: child reflective functioning, maternal mentalization, Child Attachment Interview, preadolescence,
dismissing attachment model
INTRODUCTION
The development of the human ability to understand the mental states of oneself and of others
has been studied by philosophers (e.g., Brentano, 1924; Dennett, 1987; Fodor, 1987), cognitive
and developmental psychologists (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Dunn, 1988; Gopnik and
Astington, 1988), and neuroscientists (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). This ability is commonly referred to
as “mentalization.” However, a growing body of evidence supports the notion that the construct
of mentalization includes several components which are only partially correlated to each other
(Fonagy et al., 2012). In addition, the term “mentalization” often refers to different constructs
[e.g., theory of mind (ToM), mind-mindedness, emotional intelligence] which albeit partially
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overlapping, originated from different theoretical frameworks
and were investigated by means of different experimental
paradigms or tasks (Sharp and Fonagy, 2008).
In this study, we focused on reflective functioning (RF), a
definite operationalization of mentalization that was suggested
by Fonagy and Target (1997) in the context of the attachment
theory. RF was defined as the ability to mentalize in the
context of close, interpersonal relationships, thus allowing “to
distinguish inner from outer reality, pretend from ‘real’ modes of
functioning, intra-personal mental and emotional processes from
interpersonal communications” (Fonagy et al., 1998). It promotes
a more coherent sense of self as well as a better understanding
of others, thereby making the individuals’ behavior meaningful
and predictable. It is assumed that RF originates in the context of
early attachment relationships and is promoted by a mentalizing
mother who is able to treat her child as a being with a mind, and
can keep her child’s feelings, desires as well as intentions in her
own mind (Fonagy et al., 2002). Such a mentalizing mother helps
the child to recognize, tolerate, and regulate his/her emotional
experiences through her ability to represent them, through her
gestures and actions, and later also by playing and talking in terms
of mental states (Gergely and Watson, 1996; Meins et al., 2002).
Reflective functioning was initially assessed in adults by
applying the Reflective Functioning Scale (RFS) to the Adult
Attachment Interview (AAI) (Main and Goldwyn, 1998), a semi-
structured interview which focuses on the subject’s attachment
experiences with their parents during childhood. As will be
further explained in more detail, some questions in the AAI
(e.g., “Why did your parents behave as they did during your
childhood?,” “Do you think your childhood experiences have
an influence on who you are today?”) require RF, while others
allow it. Based on the RFS, RF emerges when the interviewee
shows that he/she is aware of the nature of mental states, an
explicit effort to tease out mental states underlying behavior, the
proneness to recognize developmental aspects of mental states or
mental states in relation to the interviewer (Fonagy et al., 1998).
The longitudinal London Parent–Child Project (Fonagy et al.,
1991) found that mothers with higher RF (who were interviewed
during their first pregnancy) were more likely to have a child with
a secure attachment model at the age of 1 year. In particular,
the longitudinal study highlighted that elevated RF in mothers
who had suffered from painful and/or traumatic experiences
in their childhood was a protective factor against the risk of
the child developing insecure and/or disorganized attachment
models. On the contrary, these were frequently found in the
children of mothers who had suffered traumatic experiences in
their own childhood, and who never developed the protective
ability to mentalize their own, or their parents’ mental states
that were involved in the painful emotional experiences (e.g.,
severe neglect, loss, physical, or sexual abuse) they experienced
(Fonagy et al., 1991). A more recent study (Arnott and Meins,
2007) found that mothers with higher RF showed better mind-
mindedness (i.e., the parent’s ability to represent their children’s
thoughts and feelings) when their children were 6 months old. In
addition, in this study the mothers’ RF predicted child attachment
security at 12 months. A later, very recent study (Ensink et al.,
2016) replicated the results of the London Parent–Child Project
(Fonagy et al., 1991), and found that the RF of the mothers, as
assessed during pregnancy, was associated with later adequate
parenting as well as infant attachment security.
Afterward, a modified version of the RFS (Slade et al., 2004)
was developed to be applied to the Parent Development Interview
(PDI) (Aber et al., 1985), a semi-structured interview designed to
evaluate the mental representation the parent has of him/herself,
as well as of the child, and of their relationship. Studies found that
good maternal RF, as assessed in the context of the PDI, mediated
the intergenerational transmission of attachment security and
was associated with more sensitive and adequate caregiving
behavior (Grienenberger et al., 2005; Slade et al., 2005).
A third version of the RFS, i.e., the Child Reflective
Functioning Scale (CRFS) was recently developed and validated
(Target et al., 2001; Ensink, 2004; Ensink et al., 2015) to be
applied to the Child Attachment Interview (CAI) (Shmueli-Goetz
et al., 2000). It is a semi-structured interview that was developed
to assess attachment models in children aged 7–12. Children
with secure attachment showed that higher RF was significantly
associated with higher scores on some CAI subscales, namely
“Emotional openness” and “Coherence” (Ensink, 2004). A recent
study found that maternal RF, as assessed by the PDI, was
associated with child RF, and that the latter resulted impaired in
children who had experienced sexual abuse (Ensink et al., 2015).
The availability of the CRFS has led to progress in this field,
ultimately overcoming some of the previous study limitations.
Until recently, the lack of a measure to assess child RF in the
context of attachment narratives prevented us from exploring
both the impact of mother–child attachment security and the
influence of maternal RF on the ability of RF in the child.
Previous studies, which focused primarily on preschool aged
children, mostly used measures of different components of
child mentalization, such as ToM, or emotional understanding
in impersonal contexts. These studies found that maternal
attachment security predicted the child’s ability to identify
painful emotions, to cope with challenging circumstances (Steele
et al., 2002), to recognize emotions, especially negative ones
(Laible and Thompson, 1998; Steele et al., 1999, 2003, 2008),
and to solve false-belief tasks (Fonagy and Target, 1997).
Maternal mind-mindedness, as well as maternal RF predicted the
child’s performance in ToM tasks as well (Meins et al., 2002,
2003; Steele and Steele, 2008). To date, only few studies have
focused on preadolescence (Rosso et al., 2015; Scopesi et al.,
2015).
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether,
and to what extent, RF during preadolescence is associated
with maternal attachment security and RF, and with
the child’s attachment security. Based on the available
literature, we expected to find an association between
child RF, maternal attachment security and RF, and child
attachment security even though some studies (de Vito
and Muscetta, 1998; Ammaniti et al., 2000; Ammaniti
and Sergi, 2003) pointed out that in the transition to
adolescence children might more frequently adopt dismissing
strategies toward their parents which could decrease their
ability to mentalize in the context of their closest familial
relationships.
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Previous studies also showed that dismissing attachment
correlated both with an impairment of the ability to process
negative emotions, particularly sadness (Strathearn et al., 2009),
and to a proneness to inhibit negative affective responses
(Leckman et al., 2004; Strathearn, 2006; Crittenden, 2008).
Conversely, it was found that secure mothers showed better
attunement with their children and greater ability to repair
mismatched states during free play (Riva Crugnola et al.,
2013), as well as the maternal proclivity to talk about painful
emotions predicted emotional understanding in children (Dunn
and Brown, 2001), as well as the early acquisition of ToM
(Hughes and Dunn, 2002). Mixed emotional understanding in
children was also predicted by their attachment security (Ensink,
2004). Recent studies (Rosso et al., 2015; Scopesi et al., 2015)
confirmed the association between a dismissing model and
impaired mentalization, as well as the association between the
maternal ability to mentalize mixed emotions and mentalization
in their children. Thus, the aims of the current study also include
investigating (1) whether and to what extent dismissing and
preoccupied maternal defensive strategies are associated with
an impairment of RF in children, (2) whether the maternal
ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent mental states is associated
with higher RF in children. Replication of the findings that
were observed in the previous studies was expected. To our
knowledge, no empirical studies have ever been conducted
to investigate the impact of the preoccupied state of mind
on mentalization ability. Fonagy et al. (2010) hypothesized
that preoccupied individuals showed strong activation of
the attachment system and simultaneous deactivation of the
mentalization system. More recently, Fonagy et al. (2016) found
that psychologically suffering mothers used mental state talk
extensively in their narrative which, however, was not really a
marker of authentic mentalization. In line with these hypotheses,
we could assume that children of preoccupied mothers do
not show good mentalizing, but it would be more cautious
in this regard to consider the current study as an exploratory
one.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-nine mother–child dyads were recruited on a
volunteer basis at an Italian public school. Children were
aged 12.3–12.9 years, there were 25 (64.1%) males and 14
(35.9%) females, mostly (74.4%) from intact families. In
order to exclude children with physical or psychological
impairments, mothers were interviewed regarding the
child’s developmental history, while teachers were briefly
questioned about learning and/or behavioral disorders. Twenty-
three parents (59%) gave consent for their children to be
administered the verbal scale of the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children (WISC)-III. The Verbal IQ of the
children was found to range from 99 to 145 (M = 116.96,
SD = 12.8). Mothers came from working and middle class
backgrounds. They were aged between 37 and 53 years
(M = 42.95; SD = 4.36), and their level of education ranged
from 8 to 23 years (M = 13.31; SD = 3.65). All but two were
employed.
Measures
Maternal Attachment Models
The AAI (George et al., 1985) was administered to the mothers.
It is a semi-structured, hour-long interview designed to classify
the state of mind with respect to early attachment experiences.
The protocol consists of 18 questions. The interviews begin by
asking the subject to describe his/her relationship with their
parents during childhood. Then he/she is requested to give five
adjectives that describe the relationship with each parent and
to recall specific memories that would support the previously
chosen adjectives. The next questions ask about the experiences
of emotional distress, physical injury, illness and separation from
parents during their childhood. The subject is further asked about
any possible experiences of rejection, abuse, maltreatment and
loss. The interviewee is also asked to give his/her opinion about
the impact of their childhood experiences on their personality
and the mental states underlying their parents’ behavior. Finally,
the interview questions shift to the current relationship with their
parents, and the present relationship with their own children,
if any. The last question requires them to describe how their
experiences of being parented impact on their own parenting.
According to the Main and Goldwyn (1998) coding system,
the subjects are judged “secure/autonomous” if the narrative is
sufficiently coherent regardless of the positive or negative quality
of their relationships during childhood. The transcripts are
classified as “dismissing” when the speaker shows an attempt to
minimize the influence of attachment experiences, in particular
idealizing or derogating the attachment figures. The category
“preoccupied” is assigned to people who appear entangled in
their past experiences. They may be confused, passive, vague,
fearful, overwhelmed or angry, conflicted and unconvincingly
analytical. “Unresolved/Disorganized” is an additional category
that is assigned when the narrative contains markers of lapses in
the monitoring of reasoning or discourse during the discussion
of experiences of loss and/or abuse. The category “cannot
classify” is assigned to those transcripts that show a mixture
of inconsistent and incompatible states of mind. In the non-
clinical populations the latter classification is rarely assigned.
According to the findings of the most recent meta-analysis, the
following distribution was observed in the non-clinical adult
population: 58% secure, 23% dismissing, 19% preoccupied, and
18% additionally classified unresolved/disorganized (Bakermans-
Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn, 2009). Several studies have
supported the power of the AAI to predict parenting and
subsequent infant–parent attachment (Fonagy et al., 1991; van
IJzendoorn, 1995; Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn,
2009; Berthelot et al., 2015).
In the current study, the two-way classification (Secure vs.
Insecure) was used. The decision to dichotomize the sample was
the only choice since, due to the limited number of participants
in the study, our sample included only 15 mothers who were
classified as Insecure (five Dismissing, seven Preoccupied, and
three Unresolved). Furthermore, a dimensional approach to
the AAI was also utilized, as suggested by recent studies
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(Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn, 2009; Whipple
et al., 2011) after Roisman et al. (2007) explored the AAI latent
structure and found two dimensions, namely the dismissing
and the preoccupied dimension. Using the state of mind scales
in the analyses is also recommended because it allows to
investigate the impact of the dismissing and the preoccupied
dimensions with enhanced statistical power (Roisman et al.,
2007). Thus, we considered the subscales “Idealization regarding
mother,” “Idealization regarding father,” “Overall derogation of
attachment,” and “Coherence of the mind” to explore the definite
impact of the dismissing strategies and the subscales “Passivity,”
“Involving anger toward mother,” and “Involving anger toward
father” to investigate the influence of the maternal preoccupied
state of the mind on the children’s RF. All of the AAIs were
coded in terms of the Berkeley AAI System (Main and Goldwyn,
1998) by a licensed coder, blinded to scores on other measures.
Eight transcripts (20%) were then randomly selected and re-
coded by the first author. The resulting inter-rater reliability was
satisfactory (Cohen’s k = 0.86 for overall classification, and ICC
ranging from 0.81 to 0.85 for the subscales).
Maternal Reflective Functioning
The Adult Reflective Functioning Scale (ARFS) (Fonagy et al.,
1998) was applied to the AAI transcripts to evaluate maternal
RF. In coding RF, some AAI questions are considered “Demand
Questions” in that they require RF (e.g., “Why do you think
your parents behaved as they did during your childhood?”), while
other questions are called “Permit Questions” in that they do
not require, but only allow RF (e.g., “Could you describe your
first separation from your parents?”). According to the scoring
guidelines, the following four markers of RF are identified:
“Awareness of the nature of mental states” (marker A), “Explicit
effort to tease out mental states underlying behavior” (marker B),
“Recognizing developmental aspects of mental states” (Marker
C), and “Mental states in relation to the interviewer” (Marker
D). After rating each identified passage of the AAI, an overall
classification is assigned to the interview as a whole, ranging from
−1 (negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF). In this study, in addition
to the overall RFS rating score, we considered three further RF
variables on the basis of a recent study (Rosso et al., 2015), namely
the frequency of RF in the context of positive, negative, and
mixed-ambivalent mental states (e.g., “I felt secure with my mum,
because she always tried to comfort me”; “Unfortunately, I often
got mad at my mother, it seemed that she could not understand
me when I was sad”; “I really don’t know how the relationship
with my mother was when I was a child, sometimes I felt well with
her, sometimes I felt some kind of irritation, maybe I was really
sensitive to her sudden mood swings, without understanding that
she was terribly depressed”). Validation studies of RFS (Fonagy
et al., 1998) showed discriminant and predictive validity, good
inter-rater reliability, low correlation with education level, and no
correlation with socioeconomic status (SES) or age.
In the present study, the RF score did not correlate to either
the mothers’ level of education (r = −0.032, p = 0.845) or to the
mothers’ age (r = 0.121, p = 0.463). The first author, who was
blinded to the scores on the other measures, rated the transcripts
according to the guidelines manual (Fonagy et al., 1998), then
eight transcripts (20%) were randomly selected and re-coded by
an independent coder. The resulting inter-rater reliability was
excellent (ICC = 0.82).
Child Attachment Models
The CAI (Shmueli-Goetz et al., 2000, 2008, 2011; Target
et al., 2003) was administered to the children. It is a measure
designed to assess attachment models in children from 7 to
12 years of age. The protocol includes 19 questions about the
composition of the family, and about the child him/herself and
the relationship with his/her parents. The child is encouraged to
talk about specific relationship episodes involving each parent,
even concerning moments in which he/she was ill or felt troubled
or was in conflict with them or in need of help. Similarly
to the AAI, the CAI investigates the emotional reactions to
experiences of mourning as well as of separations. Coding
the protocol takes into account not only an analysis of the
speech, but also the non-verbal behavior of the child. A score
ranging from −1 to 9 is assigned to the following subscales:
“Emotional openness,” “Balance of positive/negative references to
attachment figures,” “Use of examples,” “Preoccupied involving
anger,” “Idealization,” “Dismissal of attachment,” “Resolution
of conflict,” “Atypical/Disorganized behavior,” and “Overall
coherence.” Then, a main attachment classification (Secure,
Dismissing, Preoccupied, Disorganized) is assigned individually
to the mother and to the father. Secure children show greater
ability to express and to identify emotions and to give examples,
as well as low levels of anger, idealization, dismissal/derogation
of attachment, a higher balance of positive and negative
references, and the ability to resolve conflicts constructively.
Preoccupied children are entangled in their painful experiences,
sometimes overwhelmed by anger feelings, and excessively
focused on the parent. Dismissing children are highly rated
on “Idealization” and/or “Dismissal,” as well as low rated on
“Emotional openness” “Balance of positive/negative references to
attachment figures,” “Use of examples,” “Resolution of conflict,”
and “Overall coherence.” Disorganized children often show a
proclivity to control through punitive or care-giving behavior.
During the interview, these children may show sudden changes in
the affective tone, interruptions in speech, affective inadequacy,
and/or bizarre behavior. In some cases, they exhibit unrealistic
self-representations. CAI validation studies (Target et al., 2003;
Shmueli-Goetz et al., 2008; Venta et al., 2014; Borelli et al.,
2016) conducted on clinical and non-clinical populations showed
good psychometric properties. Inter-rater reliability was good (k
between 0.58 and 0.93), both between expert coders and between
students who had received 3 days of training. The distribution
of attachment classifications in non-clinical samples was in line
with what is reported in the literature (i.e., 66% secure, 30%
dismissing, 4% preoccupied with respect to the mother, and 64%
secure, 30% dismissing, and 6% preoccupied with respect to
the father). The concordance of classifications between mother
and father was very high (92%, k = 0.84). The group of scales
related to the state of mind showed a high internal consistency
(Cronbach’sα = 0.87). The test-retest reliability showed k values
between 0.52 and 0.81 after 3 months, and k values between 0.52
and 0.74 after 1 year. The classification with respect to the mother
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showed higher temporal stability compared to the classification
toward the father. No significant differences were observed when
comparing secure and insecure children, with regard to age,
gender, SES, ethnicity and verbal IQ. A significant association
was instead observed between attachment classification of the
children and that of their mothers (Shmueli-Goetz et al., 2008).
In the current study, the second author, who was blinded to
scores on other measures, rated the transcripts according to the
guidelines (Shmueli-Goetz et al., 2011), then eight transcripts
(20%) were randomly selected and re-coded by an independent
coder. The resulting inter-rater reliability was excellent (k = 0.88
for the overall classification and ICCs ranging from 0.84 to 0.88
for subscales).
Child Reflective Functioning
The CRFS (Target et al., 2001) was developed on the conceptual
basis of the ARFS, with modifications to the guidelines so as
to apply it to children. As for AAI, the markers of RF include
“Awareness of qualities of mental states,” “Explicit effort to tease
out mental states underlying behavior,” “Recognizing that mental
states develop in the context of developmental, psychobiological,
and social processes,” and “Mental states in relation to the
interviewer.” It must be kept in mind that as compared to adults,
children often give evidence of RF in more implicit ways, for
example by mimicking, changing their tone of voice and by facial
expressions. This is why coding from videotaped interviews is
also needed since coding from transcripts alone is not enough.
CRFS inter-rater reliability was found to be good, with ICC
ranging from 0.60 to 1.00, with a median of 0.93, temporal
stability was found to be high over a 3-month period and
adequate over 12 months (Ensink, 2004). A recent study (Ensink
et al., 2015) supported the validity of the CRFS in distinguishing
sexually abused children from a community control group.
In this study, in addition to the overall CRFS rating score,
we considered the frequency of RF in the context of positive,
negative, and mixed-ambivalent mental states, just as we did
when coding RF in the mothers. All the CAI transcripts were
coded according to the CRFS guidelines (Target et al., 2001) by
a licensed coder, blinded to scores on the other measures. Then
8 transcripts (20%) were randomly selected and re-coded by the
first author. The resulting inter-rater reliability was satisfactory
(ICC = 0.85).
Children’s Verbal Intelligence
The WISC-III verbal scale was administered to assess the
children’s verbal IQ.
Procedure
Mothers and children agreed to participate in this study after
receiving a letter from the headmaster of the school attended
by the children. The letter presented our research project as a
study aimed at investigating the inter-generational transmission
of attachment models. Only 13% of the families of children
attending the second year of the middle school agreed to
be contacted further. Mothers had a brief interview with
the researchers aimed at further illustrating the study and at
collecting the developmental history of the children to rule
out physical or mental disorders, after which the children were
informed about the aim of the study. All of the contacted
children agreed to participate, then both parents gave their
written consent. While all of them gave their consent for the
interviews, only 23 families gave their consent to administer the
WISC-III verbal scale. Graduate psychology students, who had
previously been trained by the first author in the administration
of the AAI and the CAI, administered the interviews in rooms
made available by the headmaster inside the school. The AAIs
were audiotaped, the CAIs were videotaped, and then both
were transcribed verbatim. All the coders involved in the study
had received their coding license after ad hoc training at the
Anna Freud Centre and University College in London. The
study followed the 2010 ethical guidelines of the APA (American
Psychological Association, 2010).
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
First of all, we checked the distribution of the variables of
interest. All, but maternal derogation, maternal involving anger
toward mother and father, and maternal references to mixed-
ambivalent mental states, resulted normally distributed. Thus, in
the subsequent analyses non-parametric statistics were used only
for the four not normally distributed variables. Then, we explored
the data for possibly puzzling variables. Gender differences in
CRF-overall score, F(1,38) = 0.342, p > 0.05, CRF-references to
positive mental states, F(1,38) = 0.172, p > 0.05, CRF-references
to negative mental states, F(1,38) = 0.064, p > 0.05, and CRF-
references to mixed-ambivalent mental states, F(1,38) = 2.152,
p > 0.05, were not significant. No significant correlation emerged
between maternal level of education, maternal RF (r = −0.032),
and child RF (r = 0.206). The children’s verbal I.Q. did not
correlate with child RF (r = 0.062).
Child Reflective Functioning and
Maternal Attachment
According to the AAI coding system, 24 mothers were classified
as secure and 15 mothers as insecure. The children of secure
and insecure mothers were compared on RFS scores using
independent t-test. A moderate effect of the group (Cohen’s
d = 0.63) was found regarding overall CRFS, with higher scores
being observed in the children of secure mothers. Comparisons
are reported in Table 1.
Correlation analysis was used to investigate the association
between the maternal scales of mind referred to attachment and
the child RF. The results are shown in Table 2.
Child RF correlated significantly positively with maternal
Coherence of Mind (r = 0.326, p = 0.043) and negatively
with Maternal overall derogation of attachment (ρ = −0.327,
p = 0.043). No significant associations emerged between child
RF and the maternal idealization of her relationships with
her parents during her childhood. A negative association
(ρ = −0.252), albeit not statistically significant, was found
between maternal “Involving anger toward mother” and child RF.
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TABLE 1 | Child Reflective Functioning Scale (CRFS) descriptive statistics and group comparisons between children of secure and insecure mothers.
Secure mothers
N = 24
Insecure mothers
N = 15
Comparisons
Variable M SD M SD t p d
CRFS 3.92 1.47 3.13 0.99 −1.816 0.078 0.64
CPMS 4.46 3.98 4.27 3.26 −0.156 0.877 0.05
CNMS 8.96 4.75 10.13 5.15 0.728 0.471 −0.24
CMMS 2.42 2.24 2.66 1.72 0.369 0.715 −0.12
M, mean; SD, standard deviation; t, t-statistic; p, p-value; d, Cohen’s measure of effect size (|d| < 0.20: negligible; |0.20| < d < |0.50| : small; |0.50| < d < |0.80|
moderate; d > |0.80| : large); CRFS, Children’s overall Score reported on Child Reflective Functioning Scale; CPMS, Children’s references to positive mental states in the
context of RF; CNMS, Children’s references to negative mental states in the context of RF; CMMS, Children’s references to mixed-ambivalent mental states in the context
of RF.
Child Reflective Functioning and Child
Attachment
Twenty-two children (56.4%) were classified as secure toward
their mother, and 17 children were rated as insecure, of whom
14 (35.9%) were dismissing and three (7.7%) were rated as
preoccupied. None of the children were classified as disorganized.
Secure children obtained higher scores on CRFS (M = 4.14,
SD= 1.36) compared to insecure children (M= 2.94; SD= 1.03).
The comparison was carried out using the independent t-test
and yielded a significant difference between the two groups
(t = −3.021, p = 0.005) as well as a large effect size (Cohen’s
d = 0.99).
Correlation analysis was used to explore the association
between the scores obtained on the CAI subscales and the CRFS.
Results are provided in Table 3.
Overall CRFS score correlated significantly with “Emotional
openness” (r = 0.607), “Balance of references to Attachment
Figures” (r = 0.382), “Use of examples” (r = 0.552), “Resolution
of conflicts” (r = 0.472), and “Overall coherence” (r = 0.549).
An inverse correlation was observed between Overall CRFS
score and “Idealization of father”(r = −0.350), “Dismissal of
mother” (r = −0.458), and “Dismissal of father” (r = −0.423).
The children’s ability to mentalize positive mental states was
significantly positively associated with “Emotional openness”
(r = 0.402), “Use of examples” (r = 0.378), and significantly
negatively associated with “Dismissal of mother” (r = −0.466),
and “Dismissal of father” (r = −0.416). The children’s ability
to mentalize negative mental states was significantly positively
associated with “Emotional openness” (r = 0.469), “Use of
examples” (r = 0.445), and “Overall coherence” (r = 0.352),
whereas it was significantly negatively associated with “Dismissal
of mother” (r =−0.474), and “Dismissal of father” (r =−0.360).
The ability of the children to mentalize mixed-ambivalent
mental states also resulted significantly positively associated with
“Emotional openness” (r= 0.416), “Use of examples” (r= 0.385),
and “Overall coherence” (r = 0.898), whereas it was significantly
negatively associated with “Dismissal of mother” (r = −0.431),
and “Dismissal of father” (r =−0.369).
Child Reflective Functioning and
Maternal Reflective Functioning
Correlation analysis was also conducted to investigate the
association of child RF with maternal RF. As reported in Table 4,
a positive significant association emerged between child and
maternal overall scores on RFS (r = 0.375). In particular, the
children’s overall RF score was associated with maternal ability to
mentalize negative mental states (r = 0.348), as well as maternal
ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent mental states (ρ = 0.508).
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for maternal scores on AAI subscales and correlations between maternal AAI subscales and child reflective functioning
scores.
M SD CRFS CPMM CNMS CMMS
Maternal idealization M 2.40 1.61 −0.085 0.147 0.138 0.025
Maternal idealization F 2.35 1.51 −0.101 −0.044 0.197 0.035
Maternal overall derogation 2.10 1.97 −0.327∗ −0.220 0.036 −0.167
Maternal passivity 3.01 1.92 −0.161 0.009 0.187 0.056
Maternal involving anger M 2.10 2.31 −0.252 −0.206 0.012 −0.050
Maternal involving anger F 1.59 1.70 −0.120 0.044 −0.161 0.063
Maternal coherence of mind 5.69 1.55 0.326∗ 0.049 0.015 0.081
M, mean; SD, standard deviation; CRFS, Children’s overall score reported on Child Reflective Functioning Scale; CPMS, Children’s references to positive mental states
in the context of RF; CNMS, Children’s references to negative mental states in the context of RF; CMMS, Children’s references to mixed-ambivalent mental states in
the context of RF; Maternal Idealization M, maternal score on “Idealization toward mother” AAI subscale; Maternal Idealization F, maternal score on “Idealization toward
father” AAI subscale; Maternal Overall Derogation, maternal score on “Overall Derogation” AAI subscale; Maternal Passivity, maternal scores on “Passivity” AAI subscale;
Maternal Involving Anger M, maternal score on “Involving anger toward mother” AAI subscale; Maternal Involving Anger F, maternal score on “Involving anger toward
father” AAI subscale; Maternal Coherence of Mind, maternal score on “Coherence of Mind” AAI subscale; ∗p < 0.05.
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics for CAI subscales and correlations between CAI subscales and child reflective functioning scores.
M SD CRFS CPMM CNMS CMMS
Emotional openness 5.06 2.10 0.607∗∗∗ 0.402∗ 0.469∗∗ 0.416∗∗
Balance of references to AF’s 5.09 1.68 0.382∗ 0.248 0.208 0.217
Use of examples 5.04 2.10 0.552∗∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.445∗∗ 0.385∗
Anger toward mother 1.40 .97 0.149 −0.022 0.134 0.186
Anger toward father 1.58 1.22 0.043 −0.054 0.258 −0.043
Idealization of mother 3.10 1.78 −0.208 0.036 −0.111 −0.109
Idealization of father 2.71 1.67 −0.350∗ −0.045 −0.313 −0.117
Dismissal of mother 2.77 2.02 −0.458∗∗ −0.466∗∗ −0.474∗∗ −0.431∗∗
Dismissal of father 3.01 2.11 −0.423∗∗ −0.416∗∗ −0.360∗ −0.369∗
Resolution of conflicts 5.53 1.26 0.472∗∗ 0.269 0.151 0.175
Overall coherence 5.28 1.77 0.549∗∗∗ 0.287 0.352∗ 0.898∗∗∗
M, mean; SD, standard deviation; CRFS, Children’s overall (ccore)elim score reported on Child Reflective Functioning Scale; CPMS, Children’s references to positive
mental states in the context of RF; CNMS, Children’s references to negative mental states in the context of RF; CMMS, Children’s references to mixed-ambivalent mental
states in the context of RF; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
The maternal ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent mental states
was also significantly associated with the children’s ability to
mentalize positive (ρ = 0.325), negative (ρ = 0.426), and mixed-
ambivalent (ρ= 0.434) mental states.
To explore the extent to which maternal security of
attachment and maternal RF might predict RF in children,
a stepwise regression analysis was performed using maternal
“Coherence of mind,” maternal overall RFS score, and maternal
references to mixed-ambivalent mental states as predictors
of the children’s RF. The final models are shown in Table 5.
The models account for approximately 21% of the variance
in children’s overall RF score, and about 22% of the variance
in children’s references to mixed-ambivalent mental states.
Specifically, only maternal overall RFS score predicted
children’s overall RFS score (t = 3.082, p = 0.004), and only
maternal ability to mentalize in mixed-ambivalent mental states
predicted the corresponding ability in the children (t = 3.167,
p= 0.003).
DISCUSSION
Child Reflective Functioning and
Maternal Attachment
The children of mothers who showed a secure attachment model
regarding the relationship with their own parents during their
childhood reported higher levels of RF than did the children of
mothers who were classified as insecure on the AAI. Child RF
was positively associated with maternal “Coherence of the Mind”
on the AAI and negatively associated with maternal derogation
of attachment. No association was found between Child RF
and maternal idealizing strategies in the context of the AAI.
A negative association, albeit not statistically significant, was
found between maternal “Involving anger toward mother” and
child RF.
These findings were mostly consistent with our hypotheses,
and replicated results from previous studies. Thus, support
was given to the notion that the maternal coherent mental
TABLE 4 | Correlations between maternal and child reflective functioning
scores.
CRFS CPMS CNMS CMMS
MRFS 0.375∗ 0.055 0.094 0.179
MPMS 0.168 −0.001 −0.216 −0.044
MNMS 0.348∗ 0.055 0.183 0.081
MMMS 0.508∗∗ 0.325∗ 0.426∗∗ 0.434∗∗
CRFS, Children’s overall score reported on Child Reflective Functioning Scale;
CPMS, Children’s references to positive mental states in the context of RF; CNMS,
Children’s references to negative mental states in the context of RF; CMMS,
Children’s references to mixed-ambivalent mental states in the context of RF;
MRFS, Mothers’ Overall Score reported on Reflective Functioning Scale; MPMS,
Mothers’ references to positive mental states in the context of RF; MNMS, Mothers’
references to negative mental states in the context of RF; MMMS, Mothers’
references to mixed-ambivalent mental states in the context of RF; ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01.
representation of her personal history, free from rigid defensive
strategies, both maximizing and minimizing the importance
of attachment relationships, allows the mother to freely access
and process emotions in herself as well as in her child,
in turn promoting the child’s RF. Previous studies already
found that securely attached mothers showed more emotional
openness, whereas dismissing mothers were prone to minimize
internalizing emotions in themselves as well as in their children,
specifically by not being responsive to emotions of fear and
sadness in their children (DeOliveira et al., 2005). The ability to
accurately identify the child’s emotions and to understand the
causes of his/her distress was found to be related to attachment
security, while experiences of neglect in childhood were found
to be associated with an impairment of this maternal ability.
Insecure women were less accurate in identifying emotions in
children, and were more prone to negative attributions, and
to be amused or neutral in the face of the child’s distress
(Leerkes and Siepak, 2006). In line with these findings, the
results of the current study confirm that maternal derogation
of attachment is specifically associated with impaired RF in
children. A mother who derogates her emotional and attachment
needs may be unable to be sympathetic with her child’s emotional
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TABLE 5 | Stepwise regression analyses for predicting child reflective functioning.
Children’s overall RF score F(1,36) = 9.497;
R2 = 0.209; p = 0.004
Children’s references to MMS F(1,36) = 10.029;
R2 = 0.218; p = 0.003
B SE β t p B SE β t p
MRFS 0.453 0.147 0.457 3.082 0.004 MMMS 0.416 0.131 0.467 3.167 0.003
CoM 0.128 0.206 0.141 0.622 0.538 CoM 0.064 0.315 0.047 0.204 0.840
MMMS 0.138 0.113 0.234 1.226 0.229 MRFS −0.142 0.406 −0.095 −0.351 0.728
Final model in bold; MMS, mixed-ambivalent mental states; MRFS, Mothers’ Overall Score reported on Reflective Functioning Scale; CoM, Maternal Coherence of Mind;
MMMS, mothers’ references to mixed-ambivalent mental states in the context of RF.
needs, and it could be argued that her empathetic deficit in
turn weakens her child’s ability to recognize, to pay attention
to, and to place importance on mental states. It has been found
that the maternal proneness to contemplate children’s negative
emotions predicted emotional understanding in children (Dunn
and Brown, 2001) whereas maternal difficulties in understanding
the child’s mind predicted an impairment in the children’s
ability to identify and deal with negative emotions (Sharp et al.,
2006).
It was noteworthy that the results of the current study
highlighted that maternal derogation, rather than maternal
idealization, was associated with the child’s impairment in RF.
We could assume that idealizing strategies have a less destructive
influence on mentalization, possibly impairing hostile feelings
toward their attachment figures rather than impairing their entire
emotional awareness, and thereby damaging RF to a lesser degree.
This finding suggests that the overall dismissing category might
be confusing in that it includes different sub-classifications: DS1
and DS3 (based mostly on the idealizing strategy), and DS2
(based on the derogating strategy). Results from the current
study suggest that it is the maternal dismissing strategy based
on derogation of the attachment figures as well as of one’s own
attachment needs that has a more disruptive impact on the child’s
mentalization.
Child Reflective Functioning and
Attachment Security
A highly significant association was also found between child
attachment security and child RF, thus replicating the results of
the CRFS validation study (Ensink, 2004). Children who were
rated as being more emotionally open, more able to balance
positive and negative descriptions of their parents, more prone
to support their assertions through examples, and more able to
positively resolve conflicts with their parents showed better RF.
On the contrary, children who more often resorted to idealization
and dismissal toward their parents showed a lesser degree of
RF. Moreover, it is remarkable that the child’s dismissal strategy
and not the child’s idealizing strategy negatively correlated with
the child’s RF. Yet, findings from the current study highlighted
the more disruptive influence of the dismissal strategy on the
mentalizing ability. Notably, a very strong association was found
between the score on the “Overall coherence” subscale and the
child’s ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent mental states in
the context of their family relationships. Thus, these results
strongly support the definite relationships that exist between
attachment security and RF in the context of family relationships.
Fonagy et al. (2010) recently reported specific associations
between different attachment models and responses to the
activation of the attachment system. Whereas secure individuals
were able to maintain the mentalization and attachment
systems simultaneously, dismissing individuals did not activate
the attachment system, and preoccupied individuals showed
strong activation of the attachment system and simultaneous
deactivation of the mentalization system. Early studies assumed
that since secure children feel an inner sense of emotional
security in their relationship with their parents, they do not
activate an attachment system and therefore are able to maintain
an active mentalization system (Fonagy, 2006; Fonagy and
Target, 2008). However, it was more recently hypothesized
(Fonagy et al., 2010) that maternal mentalization mediated the
relationship between secure attachment and mentalization in
children.
Child and Maternal Reflective
Functioning
As expected, child and maternal RF resulted significantly
positively correlated with each other. Correlation analysis yielded
interesting findings showing that, above all, maternal ability to
mentalize negative as well as mixed-ambivalent mental states
correlated with the child RF. In particular, only maternal
RF (and not maternal attachment security) predicted child
RF, and only maternal ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent
mental states predicted the corresponding ability in the children.
Thus, results from the present study add support to the
hypothesis according to which maternal mentalization, more
than maternal attachment security promotes mentalizing ability
in children.
According to Fonagy et al. (2010), the maternal ability not
to be overwhelmed by the emotional experiences of the child,
especially when they are intense and/or painful, and her ability
to mirror them in a marked and contingent way (Gergely
and Watson, 1996), enhance the child’s ability to effectively
regulate emotions, allowing him/her to keep both attachment and
mentalization systems activated. On the basis of this hypothesis,
emotional regulation, rather than secure attachment, would allow
mentalization. In other words, effective emotional regulation,
promoted by a mother who is able to mentalize even in conditions
of increased arousal as well as in the context of negative and
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ambivalent mental states, mediates the relationship between
attachment security and mentalization ability. Results of the
current study seem to support the hypothesis put forth by
Fonagy et al. (2007). They argued that particularly negative affects
related to inevitable conflicts (provided they were moderate
and experienced in the context of a good enough relationship)
elicit the emergence of mentalization. At the same time, a
good enough mother–child relationship provides the necessary
emotional containment to promote the ability to mentalize. Our
study suggests that mothers who are open to recognizing the
emotional experience related to mixed-ambivalent mental states
both in themselves and in their children, and to reflect upon it
without being overwhelmed or in need to deny or to avoid it, are
more able to promote the corresponding mentalizing ability in
their children. However, further studies are needed to investigate
whether and to what extent mothers with better mentalizing
abilities use more mental state talk in the conversations with their
children, and whether and to what extent the maternal ability
of mental state talk mediates the intergenerational transmission
of RF.
Furthermore, findings from the current study provide a
fresh contribution to the research in this field, in that previous
studies investigated the relationship between maternal and
child mentalization comparing indeed different components
(e.g., mind-mindedness, emotional understanding, ToM, mental-
state talk) of the multifaceted construct of mentalization in
mothers and in children. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to compare the same operationalization
of mentalization, namely RF, in mothers and their children
by using the narratives about attachment in close family
relationships both for mothers and for children. A previous
study (Ensink et al., 2015) investigated RF in mothers and
children of about 10 years of age on average, by assessing
maternal RF in the context of the PDI. Ensink’s study differs
from ours because in that context the authors specifically
evaluated the maternal ability to mentalize the child, instead
of mentalizing the mother’s own mental representations of
her early attachment relationships. As Ensink et al. (2016)
stated, taking into account the maternal RF even in the AAI,
and not only in the PDI, is crucial because the mother’s
mentalization regarding her attachment experiences in childhood
plays a critical role in her parenting. Maternal RF about her
personal attachment history helps the mother to put herself
in her child’s shoes and be interested in his/her emotional
experience and mental states. In addition, maternal RF might
help the mother to understand what impact her feelings and
thoughts could have on the child, thus preventing negative
parenting.
Furthermore, the present work contributes to the study of
the intergenerational transmission of RF in preadolescence,
a rarely investigated developmental phase with regard to
mentalization. As expected, we found a slightly increased
frequency of the dismissing model in preadolescents.
This finding, which is in line with previous studies (e.g.,
Weinfield et al., 2004; Doyle et al., 2009), could raise questions
about the generalizability of the results of the current study.
However, it is noteworthy that a significant association
was observed between child and maternal RF, even in this
developmental stage in which children are usually striving to
achieve more autonomy.
The relatively small sample size (due in part to the very time
consuming measures of attachment model and RF) prevented
us from investigation the association between the distinct
models of insecure attachment, namely dismissing, preoccupied,
and disorganized, and distinct impairment of RF. Lastly, in
addition to the above mentioned limitations of the study, it
should be pointed out that only a very small number of the
contacted families agreed to participate in the study. On the
one hand, this was expected because of the very confidential
and intimate nature of the measures that were used, on the
other hand it might be questioned whether and to what
extent the sample could be considered representative of the
population.
CONCLUSION
The present study investigated whether, and to what extent, RF
during preadolescence was associated with maternal attachment
security and RF, and with the child’s attachment security.
Results yielded significantly positive associations between child
RF, maternal attachment security, maternal RF as well as child
attachment security. On the contrary, maternal derogation of
attachment and children’s dismissing strategies were associated
with lower RF in children. Specifically, only maternal RF
(and not maternal attachment security) predicted child RF,
and only maternal ability to mentalize mixed-ambivalent
mental states predicted the corresponding ability in the
children.
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Social cognition is the way in which people process, remember, and use information in
social contexts to explain and predict their own behavior and that of others. Children’s
social cognition may be influenced by multiple factors, both external and internal to the
child. In the current study, two aspects of social cognition were examined: Theory of
Mind and Emotion Understanding. The aim of this study was to analyze the effects
of type of early care (0–3 years of age), maternal education, parents’ country of
birth, and child’s language on the social cognition of 118 Italian preschoolers. To our
knowledge, the joint effect of these variables on social cognition has not previously
been investigated in the literature. The measures used to collect social cognition and
linguistic data were not parent- or teacher-reports, but based on direct assessment of
the children through two standardized tests, the Test of Emotion Comprehension and
the ToM Storybooks. Relationships among the variables showed a complex pattern.
Overall, maternal education and linguistic competence showed a systematic effect on
social cognition; the linguistic competence mediated the effect of maternal education.
In children who had experienced centre-base care in the first 3 years of life, the effect of
maternal education disappeared, supporting the protective role of centre-base care for
children with less educated mothers. The children with native and foreign parents did not
significantly differ on the social cognition tasks. Limits of the study, possible educational
outcomes and future research lines were discussed.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, emotion understanding, childcare, language, maternal education, parents’ country of
birth
INTRODUCTION
Social cognition is the way in which individuals process, remember, and use information in
social contexts to explain and predict how people behave (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). In the current
study, two aspects of social cognition were examined: Theory of Mind (ToM) and Emotion
Understanding (EU). ToM concerns the attribution of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions,
etc.) to oneself and others, and the ability to use these attributions to understand, predict and
explain one’s own behavior and that of other people (Mitchell, 1997). EU, on the other hand,
is a component of social cognition and emotional competence, which concerns how individuals
understand, predict, and explain their own and others’ emotions (Harris, 1989; Denham, 1998;
Saarni, 1999).
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From a theoretical point of view, ToM and EU are partly
correlated. In Pons and Harris’ (2000) view, EU is made of
nine components hierarchically organized. The simplest ones
are recognition of emotional expressions and external causes
of emotion, followed by the role of desire, beliefs and external
reminder on emotions, emotion regulation, displayed emotions,
role of moral dimension and mixed emotions. In Wellman’s
(1990) approach, basic ToM in childhood consists of five
components: recognition of emotion expressions and external
causes of emotion, understanding of desire and beliefs, ability to
distinguish between physical and mental entities, and awareness
of the link between perception and knowledge. Thus, the external
features of emotions are necessary to read and predict people’s
internal states, while beliefs and desires can shape emotions. The
correlation between ToM and EU is also supported by research
outcomes (Hughes and Dunn, 1998; Cutting and Dunn, 1999;
Pears and Fisher, 2005).
The current study focused on some factors, both external and
internal to the child that can influence social cognition abilities
in a group of Italian pre-schoolers: the role of early type of care
on ToM and EU has been examined together with the effects
of other intervening variables as maternal education, parents’
country of birth, and linguistic competence. In what follows, the
literature showed that the effect of type of care on social cognition
has not been studied yet; that a complex interplay among these
factors could be expected and that a study to take into concern
simultaneously these several variables is necessary. This study
focused firstly on early type of care and other variables that
are strictly related to it; some other factors that could influence
children’s social cognition development as socio-economic status
(Shatz et al., 2003; Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Meins et al., 2013),
cognitive functioning and executive functioning (De Stasio et al.,
2014; Schneider et al., 2014) were not deepened.
In early childhood, toddlers receive two main types of care:
centre-based and home-based. In centre-based care, children
experience daily life in a group setting with adults and peers, and
routines, spaces and toys are organized for a group of children
and adults; in addition, the adults providing the care are trained
professionals. In home-based arrangements, children are more
likely to be alone with adults or to share routines and toys
with a very small number of other children, usually younger or
older siblings. In these informal settings, caretakers are usually
mothers, grandparents or non-professional baby-sitters (for a
broader discussion, see Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016).
The literature emphasizes that type of care is associated
with children’s later development, reporting positive effects of
centre-based care on cognitive and linguistic outcomes (Broberg
et al., 1997; NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2002,
2004, 2006; Sylva et al., 2004; Belsky et al., 2007; Loeb et al.,
2007; Magnuson et al., 2007; Hansen and Hawkes, 2009). With
regard to more general social behavior, centre-based care appears
to be related to teacher-reported externalizing problems in
preschool and school age children (NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 2002, 2005). A study on Canadian families
showed that maternal care acts as a protective factor in the
first year of life as compared to non-maternal care (provided by
relatives, non-relatives, day care centres, etc.): parent-reported
physical aggression and emotional problems at 4 years of age
were lower in children from low-risk families who had been
in maternal care (Côté et al., 2008). In the US on the other
hand, high quality centre-based care has been found to protect
against internalizing and externalizing behavior problems in
preschoolers from low-income families (Votruba-Drzal et al.,
2004). Thus, besides different types of care have shown to affect
cognitive and social dimension of children’s development, as far
as we are aware, to date no studies have examined the relationship
between social cognition at preschool age and the type of care
received during early childhood. Maternal education predicted
centre-based care usage in several countries: Norway (Zachrisson
et al., 2013), Finland and West Germany (Krapf, 2014), Belgium
(Vandenbroeck et al., 2008), UK (Sylva et al., 2007), Italy (Del
Boca et al., 2005) and US (NICHD Early Child Care Research
Network, 1997a, 2006). Moreover, maternal education is the
most robust sociodemographic predictor of mother and infant
behavior (Bornstein et al., 2003; Mistry et al., 2008).
Previous research has shown that children’s social-cognitive
development is positively associated with parental education
level (Perner et al., 1994; Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Pons et al.,
2003). In the UK and US, maternal education is positively
associated with cognitive and linguistic outcomes (NICHD
Early Child Care Research Network, 1997b; NICHD Human
Learning Branch, 1998; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001; Sammons
et al., 2004). Similarly, Italian children’s cognitive and linguistic
competence have been found to be systematically related to
maternal education (Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016). Moreover, type
of care has been shown to moderate the maternal education effect
in preschool and school-aged children: specifically, linguistic
and cognitive outcomes improve in line with level of maternal
education in children who receive home-based care only,
indicating that centre-based care can play a protective role in the
first 3 years of life (Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016). For this reasons,
while deepening the role of early type of care on children’s social
cognition, it is crucial to take into consideration the effect of
maternal education as well.
Some studies reported that migrant status is related to type
of care, specifically by predicting lower utilization of centre-
based care (Sammons et al., 2004; Turney and Kao, 2009; Miller
et al., 2013, 2014; Zachrisson et al., 2013); though, it is worth
noticing that other studies did not find this relationship (Kahn
and Greenberg, 2010; Krapf, 2014). A migrant is defined in the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Culture Organization
Glossary (2016) as “any person who lives temporarily or
permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has
acquired some significant social ties to this country”; the parents
of first-generation children are both migrants. Social cognition is
partly affected by culture (for a review, see Molina et al., 2014),
but migrant status is more than a question of cultural belonging:
it is a condition with specific features related to entering a
new social context–for example, separation from one’s family
of origin, changes in economic status, negative stereotypes and
discrimination, language barriers and higher levels of stress. Very
often, the migrant condition combines with other variables that
affect children’s development, such as poverty status and dual
language learning, whereby children acquire both their parents’
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mother tongue and the language of the host country (De Feyter
and Winsler, 2009; Winsler et al., 2014). A Canadian study by
Wade et al. (2014) showed that ToM performance at 5 years
was predicted by children’s language competence, but not by
family income, migrant status or the presence of siblings in the
household. Another study by the same research group (Prime
et al., 2015) showed that mother’s communicative clarity and
mind-reading skills (termed cognitive sensitivity) were positively
related to children’s ToM at 5 years, and receptive language
and academic achievement at preschool age. This pattern of
associations between mothers’ cognitive sensitivity and children’s
outcomes was similar in both native and migrant dyads of
mothers and children, suggesting that the underlying process was
similar. Nevertheless, migrant status appeared to be a risk factor,
because it was negatively associated with maternal cognitive
sensitivity. In keeping with the findings of Prime et al. (2015),
U.S. immigrant mothers have been shown to report higher levels
of parenting stress than native mothers, with stress predicting
aggressive behavior in pre-school age children (Mistry et al.,
2008).
The theoretical frame outlined so far highlighted that the
relationship between social cognition development and early
type of care requires to focus on other intervening variables,
as maternal education and migrant condition, which in turn
are related to linguistic issues. Moreover, social cognition and
linguistic competence are also “directly” associated with one
another. A meta-analysis by Milligan et al. (2007) reported
that the predictive correlations between language and ToM
were significant, even after controlling for age. When linguistic
tasks were administered at an earlier time-point than ToM
tasks, the correlations were higher than under the opposite
condition, suggesting that the influence of language on ToM
is stronger than the influence of ToM on language (Milligan
et al., 2007). It may be that an overarching developmental
factor such as working memory (Astington and Jenkins, 1999)
or executive functioning (Carlson and Moses, 2001) influences
both competences. Multiple aspects of linguistic competence
may be interrelated with ToM: lexicon (for instance, Lohmann
and Tomasello, 2003), syntax (de Villiers and Pyers, 2002) and
conversational experience (Harris, 2005; Deleau, 2012). In the
literature, debate is ongoing concerning the specific contribution
to ToM of the different components of language competence. In
the context of this discussion, Miller (2004) has proposed the
performance hypothesis, which postulates that the influence of
linguistic competence on performance on ToM tasks is affected
by the linguistic complexity of the ToM task itself; evidence
in support of this hypothesis has also come from a study by
Bulgarelli and Molina (2013). For a wider discussion of these
topics, see Bulgarelli and Molina (2013).
The current study deepens the role of early type of care,
maternal education, parents’ country of birth, and children’s
linguistic competence on social cognition of a group of Italian
pre-schoolers: the reviewed literature showed that a complex
interplay among these factors can be expected thus it is worth
investigating them together in one study. Moreover, as reported
in the Introduction session, previous studies focused on the
effect on social behavior: to our knowledge, our study is the
first to analyze the role of type of care on ToM and EU.
Finally, social behavior was usually measured through parent-
or teacher-reported questionnaire (NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 2002, 2005; Votruba-Drzal et al., 2004; Côté
et al., 2008). Parents could be considered reliable observers
when they are requested to evaluate children’s behaviors: they
have a privileged perspective on their child’s development and
can observe the child over time and in a familiar environment
(Matheny et al., 1984). Nevertheless, parents are not trained
observers: their judgment may be biased by social desirability,
they may be incapable of perceiving their children’s real
competence (Fenson et al., 1994), and social representation of
childhood may play a role in distorting adults’ observations and
managing the reliability of the measures (for a wider discussion
of this topic, see: Molina and Bulgarelli, 2012b). It is also worth
noticing that children’s social cognition involves internal states
that are not always directly observable: thus, parents may not be
accurate in evaluating this competence (Kårstad et al., 2014). For
these reasons, in the current study social cognition was measured
directly with the children, through standardized tools that are
internationally used to assess ToM and EU.
The current study focused on four research questions, mainly
deduced from the literature. The first question related to the
effects of type of early childcare on social cognition: given
that this was the first study to investigate such question, we
relied on earlier findings reported by Bulgarelli and Molina
(2016) concerning cognitive outcomes to formulate the second
hypothesis, predicting that type of care would only yield an
effect in interaction with maternal education: specifically, higher
maternal education would positively affect children’s social
cognition only in those who had been in home-based care in
the first 3 years of life. The second question concerned the
role of maternal education on social cognition and we expected
that maternal education would directly affect children’s social
cognition, in line with the literature reviewed above (Perner et al.,
1994; Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Pons et al., 2003). In keeping
with the existing literature, the third question concerned the
role of parents’ country of birth: no direct effect of this variable
on social cognition is expected (Wade et al., 2014; Prime et al.,
2015). Finally, the fourth question related to the role of child’s
language: in line with earlier studies reported in the literature,
as to the fourth hypothesis linguistic competence was expected
to be directly associated with social cognition and also to be
associated with maternal education (NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 1997b; NICHD Human Learning Branch,
1998; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001; Sammons et al., 2004; Milligan
et al., 2007; Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016); we therefore set out
to analyze the possible joint effect of maternal education and
linguistic competence on social cognition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
The sample comprised 118 typically developing children (average
age = 59.6 months, SD = 10.4, range: 38.5–76.7 months; average
IQ = 99.6, SD = 13.5), all of them attending kindergartens in
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Turin (Italy): see Table 1. Data were collected between 2009 and
2012; most of the children in the current study also took part in
earlier reported research by Bulgarelli and Molina (2016).
Sixty-four children were girls (54.2%). A t-test analysis
confirmed that the two subsamples of boys and girls were similar
with respect to age (p = 0.449), IQ (p = 0.174), type of early
childcare received (p = 0.530), maternal education (p = 0.187),
parents’ country of birth (p = 0.650) and verbal quotient (VQ;
p= 0.450).
With regard to education, 53 mothers had completed lower
secondary school (44.9%), 52 held an upper secondary school
diploma (44.1%) and 13 were university graduates (11.0%).
Overall, the sample displayed a lower level of educational
achievement than the Italian population between 25 and 64 years
of age in 2011, in which 44% had completed lower secondary
education, 41% upper secondary education, and 15% third level
education (OECD, 2014). For the purposes of the statistical
analysis, the groups of mothers with upper secondary and
university-level education were collapsed into one group termed
the “highly educated group,” after it had been verified that they
did not significantly differ in relation to the independent variables
in the research design. A t-test analysis confirmed that the
two final subsamples of children, with less educated and more
highly educated mothers, respectively, were similar in terms of
age (p = 0.644), gender (p = 0.784), type of care (p = 0.116)
and parents’ country of origin (p = 0.163). The IQ and VQ
scores of the children with more highly educated mothers were
significantly higher than those of the children whose mothers
had completed a lower level of education (IQ: mLOW = 96.98,
mHIGH = 101.78, tIQ = −1.94, p = 0.055; VQ: mLOW = 76.70,
mHIGH = 84.05, tVQ =−3.18, p= 0.002).
With regard to parent’s country of birth, 92 of the children
had two native-born parents (77.9%); 14 had one foreign-born
parent (11.9%) and 12 two foreign-born parents (10.2%). In
our sample, the percentage of children with two foreign-born
parents was slightly lower than in the Italian population (14.5%)
TABLE 1 | Characteristics of the sample.
Sample Percentage in the
Italian population
Sample size (%) 118 (100)
Male 54 (45.8)
Female 64 (54.2)
Average age in years (SD, range) 5 (0.9, 3–6)
Parents’ country of origin (%)
Both native parents 92 (77.9) 80.6
One foreign parent 14 (11.9) 14.5
Both foreign parents 12 (10.2) 4.9
Mother’s education (%)
Lower school degree 53 (44.9) 44
Upper school degree 52 (44.1) 41
Higher education 13 (11.0) 15
Type of care (%)
Home-based 64 (54.2) 76
Centre-based 54 (45.8) 14
and the percentage of children from mixed couples was higher
(4.9% in the Italian population; Istat, 2012b). For the purposes
of the statistical analysis, the groups of children with two native-
born parents and one native-born parent were collapsed into
a single subsample labeled native children, after it had been
verified that these two groups did not differ in relation to the
independent variables in the current research design. A t-test
analysis confirmed that the two final subsamples, composed of
children with at least one native-born parent and first-generation
children with two foreign-born parents, respectively, were similar
with respect to age (p = 0.433), IQ (p = 0.104), VQ (p = 0.319),
gender (p = 0.627), type of early childcare (p = 0.402) and
maternal education (p= 0.166).
In relation to type of care, in the first 3 years of life 54
children had received centre-based care (45.8%) and 64 children
had been in exclusively home-based care. Home-based care had
consisted of either exclusive maternal care or being looked after
by other family members or babysitters. In 2010/11, 14.0% of
Italian children between 0 and 2 years of age were enrolled in
centre-based care, with marked differences among the different
geographical regions: for instance, in the North, 29.4% of children
attended day care in Emilia Romagna and 15.4% in Piemonte,
while in the South, percentages varied from 9.6% in Abruzzo
to 2.4% in Calabria (Istat, 2012a). A t-test analysis confirmed
that the two subsamples of children who had received home-
based care and centre-based care were similar with respect to
age (p = 0.852), IQ (p = 0.276), VQ (p = 0.136), gender
(p= 0.530) and parents’ country of birth (p= 0.215), but differed
significantly in relation to maternal education: highly educated
mothers were more likely to choose centre-based care (p= 0.021).
Measures and Procedures
At three separate sessions conducted within a month of each
other, the children were individually assessed at kindergarten
using four standardized tests: the ToM Storybooks (Molina and
Bulgarelli, 2012a; Bulgarelli et al., 2015) were used to assess ToM
and the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC, Pons and Harris,
2000; Albanese and Molina, 2013) to assess EU; the Leiter-R
(Roid and Miller, 2002; US version: 1997) was used to assess
non-verbal IQ; the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn and
Dunn, 1981), in its Italian version (Stella et al., 2000) was used to
assess receptive language, reported as Verbal Quotient (VQ).
The ToM Storybooks is a comprehensive 93-item instrument
tapping the five components in Wellman’s (1990) model of
ToM: emotion recognition, understanding of desire and beliefs,
ability to distinguish between physical and mental entities, and
awareness of the link between perception and knowledge; a
classical False Belief task is also included. The total score varied
from 0 to 111; in this study the total score was used because the
standardization of the test is still ongoing. The ToM Storybooks
is made up of six full-picture books telling stories about a boy
called Sam. Each book recounts an adventure of Sam’s (Sam
going to the swimming pool, visiting his grandparents, etc.) and
contains 5 or 6 tasks assessing one or more ToM components.
The experimenter reads the story while the child looks at the
images. In one of the tasks that tap the role of desire in generating
behaviors, Sam is searching for his dog: “Where is Puckie? Puckie
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has hidden [point the picture] behind the tree or [point the
picture] behind the trash can. Sam wants to play with Puckie.
First, he goes to look behind the trash can. But Puckie is not there.
What will Sam do now?”
The TEC evaluates nine hierarchically organized components
of EU that emerge between 3 and 11 years. The simplest
ones are recognition of emotional expressions and external
causes of emotion, followed by the role of desire, beliefs and
external reminder on emotions, emotion regulation, displayed
emotions, role of moral dimension and mixed emotions. The
TEC raw score varied from 0 to 9 and in this study the
Italian standardized z-score was used. Each TEC components
are proposed in the frame of a short pictured story; the
child answers to the task questions by indicating the facial
expression of the correct emotion, accordingly to what happened.
For example, in the displayed emotion task, in which the
difference between apparent and real emotion is tapped, the
experimenter reads this story: “This is Sarah and this is
Dorothy. Dorothy is teasing Sarah because Dorothy has lots of
marbles and Sarah doesn’t have any. Sarah is smiling because
she doesn’t want to show Dorothy how she is feeling inside.
How is Sarah feeling inside? Is she happy, alright, angry or
scared?”
Parents were asked to complete a questionnaire on their socio-
demographic background, which assessed both parent-related
characteristics (country of birth, level of education) and child-
related characteristics (country of birth, gender, siblings, type
of childcare during the first 3 years of life). Thus, the data
concerning the type of early care received in the first 3 years of
life was collected retrospectively.
Mothers’ level of education was coded in terms of the Italian
school system: (0) lower level of education (i.e., mothers had
obtained a low school degree, corresponding to a maximum of
8 years’ school); (1) more highly educated (i.e., mothers had
attended at least 13 years of school/university, with high school,
bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees all collapsed together
into a single category).
For each child, parents’ country of birth was coded as follows:
(0) native children (i.e., two native-born parents or one native-
born and one foreign-born parent); (1) first-generation children
(i.e., two foreign-born parents).
Analysis
T-tests for small sample sizes were performed to check for
significant differences in the children’s ToM and EU scores
as an effect of type of early childcare, parents’ country of
birth and maternal education. The direct effect of language
on social cognition was assessed by analyzing the correlations
between linguistic competence scores and ToM and EU scores,
respectively.
To test for interactions between maternal education and type
of early childcare or parents’ country of birth, separate t-tests for
the effect of maternal education on ToM and EU were performed
on the type of care and parental country of origin subsamples. An
ANOVA analysis has not been run: the sample size was too small
to test the interaction effects through an ANOVA; for this reason,
a regression analysis was not run as well.
The mediating effect of linguistic competence was investigated
by conducting two regression analyses, with ToM and EU scores
as dependent variables and maternal education and parents’
country of birth as independent variables.
RESULTS
Direct Effect of Individual Variables
Type of early childcare did not lead to significant differences in
ToM and EU and the effect size was not relevant as well (Table 2).
Maternal education was found to have a significant direct effect
on ToM and EU scores. First-generation children obtained the
lowest mean scores on the social cognition measures: although
these scores did not significantly differ from those of the other
children, the effect size was relevant (Table 2). Finally, linguistic
competence was found to be correlated with both ToM and EU
scores (r = 0.503, p< 0.01 and r = 0.406, p< 0.01, respectively).
Interaction among Variables: The Role of
Type of Care
Type of care and maternal education were found to interact, in
that maternal education had an effect on the social cognition
abilities of children who had received home-based care only, but
not on those of children who had been in centre-based care.
More specifically, children whose mothers had completed a lower
level of education only obtained significantly lower ToM scores
than children with more highly educated mothers when they had
received exclusively home-based care in the first 3 years of life
(Table 3).
Interaction among Variables: The Role of
Parent’s Country of Birth
Parental country of birth and maternal education were found to
interact: namely, maternal education had an effect on the social
cognition abilities of children with native-born parents, but not
on those of first-generation children. More specifically, children
whose mothers had completed a lower level of education only
obtained significantly lower ToM and EU scores than children
with more highly educated mothers when both parents were
native-born (Table 4). Nevertheless, considering the effect size,
the differences due to parents’ country of birth were lower than
the differences observed in respect to the maternal education.
Interaction among Variables: The Role of
Linguistic Competence
With regard to the role of linguistic competence, both a direct
effect of language on ToM and EU scores and a mediation effect
of language on the relationship between maternal education and
ToM and EU were found.
With respect to ToM (Figure 1), the correlation between
maternal education and language ability scores was 0.283
(p < 0.01), the partial correlation between linguistic competence
and ToM scores (after controlling for the effect of maternal
education) was 0.465 (p < 0.01), while the direct correlation
between maternal education and ToM scores was 0.269
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TABLE 2 | Differences by type of care, parents’ country of origin and maternal education between groups in relation to ToM and EU average scores (SD).
N ToM t p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d EU t p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d
Type of care
Home-based 64 54.50 (12.73) −1.12 0.267 0.21 −0.32 (1.03) −1.94 0.055 0.36
Centre-based 54 57.70 (17.55) 0.04 (0.98)
Parents’ Country of birth
Italian-born 106 56.65 (15.29) −1.47 0.145 0.45 −0.11 (1.01) −1.36 0.177 0.42
Foreign-born 12 49.92 (12.78) −0.53 (1.11)
Maternal education
Low 53 52.92 (13.32) −2.00 0.048 0.37 −0.42 (1.06) −2.60 0.010 0.49
High 65 58.45 (16.16) 0.06 (0.94)
TABLE 3 | Differential effects of maternal education as a function of home- versus centre-based early childcare.
Type of care Maternal
education
N ToM (SD) t Cohen’s d p (two-tailed) EU (SD) t p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d
Home based Low 33 50.85 (11.82) −2.46 0.63 0.017 −0.59 (1.06) −1.74 0.086 0.90
High 31 58.39 (12.70) 0.03 (0.94)
Centre based Low 20 56.35 (15.18) −0.457 0.12 0.650 −0.14 (1.03) −0.521 0.605 0.30
High 34 58.50 (18.97) 0.15 (0.95)
Total Low 53 52.92 (13.32) −2.00 0.37 0.048 −0.42 (1.06) −2.60 0.010 0.49
High 65 58.45 (16.16) 0.06 (0.94)
TABLE 4 | Differential effect of maternal education in children as a function of having native-born versus foreign-born parents.
Parents’
country of birth
Maternal
education
N ToM (SD) t p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d EU (SD) t p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d
Native-born Low 47 53.49 (13.08) −1.98 0.051 0.38 −0.38 (1.05) −2.53 0.013 0.49
High 59 59.17 (16.52) 0.10 (0.93)
Foreign-born Low 6 48.50 (15.64) −0.37 0.720 0.23 −0.71 (1.22) −0.55 0.597 0.34
High 6 51.33 (10.48) −0.35 (1.07)
Total Low 53 52.92 (13.32) −2.00 0.048 0.37 −0.42 (1.06) −2.60 0.010 0.49
High 65 58.45 (16.16) 0.06 (0.94)
(p< 0.01), and this correlation was reduced if the language effect
was considered (Beta= 0.137, NS).
Turning to EU, the same pattern of results was found
(Figure 1): the partial correlation between linguistic competence
and EU scores (while controlling for the effect of maternal
education) was 0.380 (p < 0.01), the direct correlation between
maternal education and EU scores was 0.235 (p < 0.05), and this
correlation was reduced if the linguistic competence effect was
considered (Beta= 0.127, NS).
When these correlations were analyzed separately in the two
groups of children who had received home-based only versus
centre-based care, the pattern of results differed (Figure 1).
With respect to children in home-based care, two significant
direct correlations were found: between maternal education
and linguistic competence (r = 0.422, p < 0.01) and between
maternal education and ToM scores (r = 0.347, p < 0.01);
furthermore, linguistic competence and ToM scores were
correlated, partializing for maternal education (Beta = 0.529,
p < 0.01). Moreover, linguistic competence mediated the
relationship between maternal education and ToM: in fact,
the direct correlation between maternal education and ToM
was reduced if the linguistic competence effect was considered
(Beta= 0.124, NS). With respect to children in centre-based care,
the correlation between linguistic competence and ToM was the
only significant relationship identified (Beta = 0.379, p < 0.01),
with no correlations found between maternal education and ToM
or between maternal education and language.
A similar pattern of results was found for EU (Figure 1): in
the subsample of children who had received home-based care
only, there were direct correlation between maternal education
and linguistic competence (r = 0.422, p < 0.01), and between
maternal education and EU scores (r= 0.271, p< 0.05); linguistic
competence correlated with EU (Beta = 0.500, p < 0.01),
and mediated the relationship between maternal education and
EU: more specifically, the direct correlation between maternal
education and ToM was reduced if the linguistic competence
effect was taken into account (Beta= 0.061, NS). On the contrary,
in children in centre-based care the only significant relationship
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FIGURE 1 | The mediation of language between maternal education and ToM/EU.
identified was the correlation between linguistic competence and
EU (Beta= 0.245, p< 0.01).
When parents’ country of birth was included in the analysis,
only linguistic competence was strongly correlated with ToM and
EU, in both migrant parent and native-born parent subgroups
(Table 5). However, no mediation effect was found: parents’
country of birth was not correlated with language (r = 0.113, NS
for the total sample; r = 0.055, NS for children in home-based
care; and r = 0.154, NS for children in centre-based care), nor
with ToM (r = 0.101, NS for the total sample; r = 0.061, NS
for children in home-based care; and r = 0.154, NS for children
in centre-based care), nor with EU (r = 0.125, NS, for the total
sample; r = 0.071, NS for children in home-based care; and
r = 0.106, NS for children in centre-based care).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to contribute to the debate about the
effects of type of early childcare, maternal education, parents’
country of birth, and child’s linguistic competence on children’s
social cognition as observed at preschool age by analyzing Italian
data. We analyzed two specific social cognition abilities, ToM and
EU, finding them to display a systematically similar pattern of
relationships with the independent variables under study.
Interestingly, in our study type of early childcare did not have
a direct effect on social cognition and, as predicted according
to the first hypothesis, interacted with maternal education: the
ToM and EU scores of children who received their early childcare
in the home were affected by maternal education, whereas this
was not the case for children in centre-based care. It seemed
that centre-based care could play a protective role for children
with lower-educated mothers: on one hand, professionals provide
stimulating contexts and aware educational practice (for a wider
discussion, see: Molina, 2016; Molina et al., 2016); on the
other hand, in day care services children experience stable
and numerous relationship with peers that could foster ToM
development: debate is still open about a positive effect of the
presence of siblings in the family and peers in kindergarten,
observed in some studies (McAlister and Peterson, 2007; Wang
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TABLE 5 | Correlations among parents’ country of birth, language ability
(VQ), ToM Storybooks and TEC scores, after controlling for age.
N VQ ToM
Scores
EU
Scores
Total sample 118
Parents’ country of birth 0.113 0.101 0.125
VQ – 0.503∗∗ 0.406∗∗
ToM scores – 0.347∗∗
Native-born parents 106
VQ – 0.489∗∗ 0.380∗∗
ToM scores – 0.307∗∗
Foreign-born parents 12
VQ – 0.665∗ 0.820∗∗
ToM scores – 0.598∗
Pearson correlation (Two-tailed): ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
and Su, 2009) but not in others (Das and Babu, 2004; Molina and
Bulgarelli, 2012a).
According to the second hypothesis, maternal education was
found to have a direct effect on ToM and EU: evidence of
the effect of maternal education on social cognition has been
found in other studies (Perner et al., 1994; Cutting and Dunn,
1999; Pons et al., 2003) as well as in our own earlier study on
cognitive outcomes (Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016). A possible
explanation for the positive effect of maternal education on
children’s development could lay on mothers’ higher awareness
of the importance of the quantity and quality of time spent
with the offspring: higher-educated parents spend more time
with their children than lower-educated parents; they are more
aware of the link between spending time with their children
and their future development; and are more likely to interiorise
and implement the social norms and behaviors associated with
“involved parenting” (Sayer et al., 2004; Craig, 2006; Monna and
Gauthier, 2008). Moreover, the development of social cognition
is specifically supported by parents’ ability to mentalise: mind-
mindedness is defined as the adults’ tendency to comment
appropriately on their children’s internal states and it plays a
protective role for the children’s social development, specifically
in low socioecomomic families (Meins et al., 2002, 2013).
In line with the Canadian study by Wade et al. (2014) and
the previous Italian study on cognitive outcomes (Bulgarelli and
Molina, 2016), an effect of parents’ country of birth on children’s
social cognition was not expected. Nevertheless, the results were
partly different: no significant differences were found between
children with native and foreign parents, but the effect size of
the difference between the two groups was not negligible (0.45
and 0.42 for ToM and EU scores, respectively). Then, the lack
of significance of the difference could be due to the insufficient
power of the statistical test, taking into consideration that the
sample was highly unbalanced in favor of children with native
parents. Similarly, the very small number of first-generation
children could explain the lack of differences due to maternal
education observed in this subsample.
As expected based on the literature (for instance, Milligan
et al., 2007), the fourth hypothesis was confirmed: linguistic
competence directly affected social cognition. On analyzing the
role of children’s linguistic competence, which is related to both
children’s social cognition and maternal education, linguistic
competence was shown to mediate the maternal education effect
on social cognition, but only in children in home-based care.
As stated before, professional care appeared to play a protective
role for children with less educated mothers. The protective
role of early type of care was less clear when considering the
two groups of children with native and foreign parents: in
this case, the linguistic competence seemed the relevant aspect
to differentiate children’s performances in the social cognition
tasks. In sum, when not correlated with maternal education,
language was the variable that mainly correlated with the ToM
and EU scores. More highly educated mothers had children
with greater linguistic competence, but centre-based care in
the early years compensated for this difference. As previously
discussed elsewhere (Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016), designing
educational intervention and training professionals to better
support children’s linguistic development from the early years of
life seem crucial: day care services are the context where such
support could be better provided (Scopesi and Viterbori, 2008;
Molina et al., 2016) and such intervention could be crucial for
children with two foreign-born parents.
The role if linguistic competence in shaping the differences
among children’s social cognition performances should be
interpreted with caution, because children’s performance on the
ToM and EU tasks were also affected by the linguistic format
of the task itself (Miller, 2004). Moreover, this study focused on
receptive language: this measure was chosen because it is a good
index of children’s general linguistic competence yet easy and
fast to assess; nevertheless, language is a complex construct and
future research could deepen the role of other linguistic aspects,
as syntax and conversational ability.
With regard to the limits of the current study, the quasi-
experimental design required to interpret the results with
caution. The sample was recruited in a specific Italian region:
this guaranteed a higher homogeneity of social influence on
our sample, but limited the generalizability of the results to
the Italian population. Italian children’s ToM and EU showed
specific pattern of development compared to British and German
children (Lecce and Hughes, 2010; Molina et al., 2014): thus
the generalizability of the pattern of the current results to other
western countries should be specifically tested. Furthermore, the
sample included a relatively low number of children with two
foreign-born parents, that did not allow to perform a multiple
regression analysis to test the interaction of the independent
variables; nevertheless, the percentage of this group of subjects
was in line with the percentage of children with two foreign
parents living in Italy in the period when the data were collected.
It is worth noticing that the sample was balanced between
medium-low and medium-high socio-economic status, avoiding
the biases due to the difficulty in enrolling low socio-economic
families. The pattern of the effect of type of early childcare,
maternal education, and parents’ country of birth on social
cognition was similar to that observed in a previous study in
which verbal and cognitive competence were the dependent
variables (Bulgarelli and Molina, 2016) and this could be read
as a partial support to the validity of the current research.
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Nevertheless, this pattern of effects might be limited to preschool
age, and further investigation with older children is needed. In
future research, it would be of interest to explore the role of
cognitive functioning and gender in greater depth, together with
an index of quality of the type of care in early infancy.
To our knowledge this is the first study to have investigated
together the role of early childcare, maternal education, parent’s
country of origin and children’s receptive language in the
development of social cognition. Type of care, in interaction with
maternal education and children’s linguistic competence, affected
social cognition and early centre-based care seemed to play a
protective role for those children with lower-educated mothers.
The protective role of centre-based care was less clear when
considering the effect of parental country of birth and further
research is needed.
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Recent studies show that Theory of Mind (ToM) has implications for children’s
social competences and psychological well-being. Nevertheless, although it is well
documented that children overall take advantage when they have to resolve cognitive
problems together with a partner, whether individual difference in ToM is one of the
mechanisms that could explain cognitive performances produced in social interaction
has received little attention. This study examines to what extent ToM explains children’s
spatial performances in a dyadic situation. The sample includes 66 boys and girls
between the ages of 5–9 years, who were tested for their ToM and for their competence
to resolve a Spatial task involving mental rotation and spatial perspective taking, first
individually and then in a dyadic condition. Results showed, in accordance with previous
research, that children performed better on the Spatial task when they resolved it with a
partner. Specifically, children’s ToM was a better predictor of their spatial performances
in the dyadic condition than their age, gender, and spatial performances in the individual
setting. The findings are discussed in terms of the relation between having a conceptual
understanding of the mind and the practical implications of this knowledge for cognitive
performances in social interaction regarding mental rotation and spatial perspective
taking.
Keywords: theory-of-mind, spatial task, cognitive performance, dyadic interaction, children
INTRODUCTION
The development of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), which is the ability to understand the nature, origins,
and consequences of the mind (beliefs, intentions, desires, feelings, etc.) in the self and others,
has been investigated extensively (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001; Shahaeian et al., 2011; Harris et al.,
2016). However, much less is known about the implications of ToM for children’s social and
cognitive development (e.g., Harris, 2006; Grüneisen et al., 2015). On one hand, recent studies
have shown that children’s ToM is positively associated with their overall prosocial behaviors and
social competences (Caputi et al., 2012; Roazzi et al., 2013; Farina and Belacchi, 2014). On the other
hand, the implications of ToM for children’s cognition has received less attention and the findings
are typically inconsistent (Meins et al., 2006; Veneziano et al., 2008; Guajardo and Cartwright,
2016). Furthermore, albeit it is well documented that on a range of cognitive problems children
obtain better performances when solving these together with a partner (e.g., Doise and Mugny,
1984; Tversky and Hard, 2009), to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed the degree
to which individual differences in ToM can account for cognitive problem resolving performances
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in dyadic settings. In light of the particular reliance on
collaborative task performances in the awaiting and modern
academic and vocational life, understanding whether
collaborative tasks depend on individual abilities can have
both practical and pedagogical implications. The present study
therefore aims to investigate whether ToM can explain children’s
performance in a dyadic spatial transformation task which
demands the cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the
coordination of different viewpoints.
When the term ‘theory-of-mind’ was originally introduced, it
was thought of as the competence to attribute mental states to self
and others, involving the ability to theorize about others’ mind
by making inferences regarding mental phenomena (Premarck
and Woodruff, 1978). It was thus recognized as a socio-cognitive
skill enabling human beings to predict, explain and manipulate
others’ actions and representations. Traditionally, false-belief
tasks, based on the attribution of a mistaken belief, have
been central in assessing children’s ToM capacities (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983). Today, however, it has become more and
more common to consider ToM through a wider lens; not
only involving the understanding of belief and knowledge, but
also encompassing the competence to conceptually understand
intentions, desires, and emotions (e.g., Astington, 2001; Wellman
et al., 2001; Pons et al., 2004; Dunn, 2006; Shahaeian et al.,
2011).
The first studies in the ToM field presented strong evidence
for the progress children obtain between 3 and 5 years of age
on classical false-belief, appearance-reality, and Level-2 visual
perspective taking tasks (Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell, 2004).
Albeit important milestones in ToM development occur in the
preschool years, the knowledge about mental states continues
to increase later on (Flavell, 2004). Research has shown that
from infancy to adolescence, ToM develops from a “peripheral
and superficial” understanding of rather visible or non-reflective
dimensions of the mind (e.g., recognition of basic emotions,
understanding of first order false-beliefs and impact of desires on
emotions) to a more “central and deeper” understanding of more
invisible or reflective dimensions of the mind (e.g., understanding
of moral and mixed emotions, of second order false-beliefs and
double-bluffs; Pons et al., 2009).
Different directions of research emerged from these early
works on trends in ToM development. These studies have been
exploring, for instance, antecedents that might contribute to ToM
development, intra and intercultural differences, and real world
consequences of ToM abilities (e.g., Flavell, 2004; Shahaeian et al.,
2011). It is well documented that ToM development depends on
many social and cognitive factors, such as language, intelligence,
executive function, attachment, and relationships with peers (e.g.,
Cutting and Dunn, 2006; Pons et al., 2014). Recent studies have
also found positive impacts of ToM on social competences at
the ages of 3–6 years and psychological well-being at the ages
of 8–12 years (e.g., Farina and Belacchi, 2014; Bender et al.,
2015). However, the implications of understanding mental states
for children’s cognition remain unclear. For instance, Veneziano
et al. (2008) found that 6–7 year-olds with higher ToM test
scores were better able to express epistemic states when they
narrated a story. A longitudinal study conducted by Guajardo
and Cartwright (2016) tested children at 3–5 years and later at
6–9 years and showed that those who had better understanding of
other’s perspectives were more aware of their thoughts involved
in reading. Lecce et al. (2010) found the same results in a study
assessing children between 9 and 10 years of age. On the other
hand, Meins et al. (2006) argue that between 6 and 9 years
of age, having ToM capacities, measured through conceptual
tasks, is different from being able to use it either to narrate a
book or to describe friends. Likewise, Guajardo and Cartwright
(2016) showed that false-belief understanding did not contribute
uniquely to reading comprehension. Together, this suggests at
least two gaps when it comes to understand the role of ToM
for children’s cognition. First, previous studies do not cover a
broad measure of ToM that also includes the understanding of
desires and emotions; and second, there is still a need to explore
other cognitive dimensions potentially influenced by ToM in
school-aged children that go beyond the use of mental terms and
reading comprehension. One such dimension is the performance
on cognitive tasks completed together with peers.
Studies on the impact of ToM on cognitive performances in
dyadic interaction are rare, and have especially focused on false-
belief reasoning and the process (rather than the outcome) of
cooperation. If on one hand it has been shown that ToM works
as a powerful social tool that facilitates children’s interactions
with peers (Moore and Frye, 1991), it remains unclear whether
ToM has implications for the cognitive outcome produced in
social interaction. For instance, Grüneisen et al. (2015) recently
found that 6-year-olds could use first and second order false-
beliefs to coordinate actions with peers, showing that recursive
mind-reading is an important component of dyadic interaction.
Similarly, Flobbe et al. (2008) demonstrated that 8–10 year-olds
passing a second order false-belief task are able to apply this
when playing a strategic game with a peer. Curry and Chesters
(2012) showed that adults scoring lower on a self-report measure
of autistic traits and understanding of other’s minds were also
less successful at coordinating their behaviors with others in
coordination games. These researchers subsequently called for
studies using a broader range of ToM measures to investigate
the impact of children’s understanding of the mind on their
performances in dyadic settings. Investigating how children solve
a spatial transformation task in a dyadic situation might be
particularly relevant in this context because it requires both the
cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the adoption of the
spatial perspective of someone else (Kessler and Thomson, 2010).
Spatial abilities comprise activities such as perception of
horizontality, mental rotation of objects, or location of simple
figures within complex figures (Linn and Petersen, 1985).
Specifically, spatial transformation demands the ability to
mentally rotating objects and making transformations in their
positions based on a specific referential mark (Hegarty and
Waller, 2004). Piaget and Inhelder (1952) focused in particular
on one aspect of spatial relations called “coordination of
perspectives,” which refers to the ability to identify the appearance
of an object as something dependent on the spatial position from
which they are viewed. Based on the classical “three mountains
task,” they found that children younger than 6 years locate objects
with respect to their own points of view, and it is only between 7
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and 9 years of age, when children reach the concrete operational
stage, that they would be aware of other perspectives than their
own and thus deal with an external frame of reference (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1952). Spatial relations, therefore, comprises both
the cognitive process of projecting relationships between objects,
and the social process of understanding the relation between
two different perceptions, as exemplified by the “If I were in
your place I would see what you see” line of thinking (Fishbein
et al., 1972). Flavell et al. (1981) claimed that even under the
age of 3, children recognize that people can perceive different
objects at the same time (Level-1 perspective taking) but they
have difficulties with recognizing that they can see the same
object from different perspectives (Level-2 perspective taking).
This more sophisticated ability is likely to be developed around
5 years of age. Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992), for instance,
tested children between 3 and 9 years of age and found that
children as young as 5 years can take the spatial perspective of
others when the task does not entail conflict between two frames
of reference.
The Piagetian paradigm presented strong evidence for the role
of socio-cognitive conflicts on the development of coordination
of perspectives. In the “three mountains task,” children have to
visualize themselves in a different position and these conflicting
representations within the individual promote a breakdown
in the cognitive equilibrium that boosts a reinterpretation of
the object (Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012). However, in the “three
mountains task,” the perceptions were not confronted by
someone else. Doise and Mugny (1984) contributed enormously
to this issue by considering the spatial coordination not only as
an intra-individual process but also as an inter-individual one.
Based on a critical review of Piaget and Inhelder’s (1952) work,
they proposed a series of experiments where the coordination of
real viewpoints could take place. They tested children between
5 and 8 years of age in a spatial transformation problem called
“The reconstruction of the village task,” involving both an
individual and a dyadic condition. The findings demonstrated
a positive impact of peer collaboration on spatial performances
as children progressed on the task after they have worked with
a partner. The authors argue that when solving a spatial task
individually, children have to create intra-individual cognitive
conflicts to envision and derive at different solutions, and that
this could be less powerful than collaborative settings where the
inter-individual conflict and the mutual action context promote
subsequent individual progress. Moreover, it could be more
effective if each member of the dyad has access to only one part
of the resources needed to complete the task (Buchs and Butera,
2004). In a recent study, Zapiti and Psaltis (2012) applied the
same “village task” used by Doise and Mugny and tested children
between 6.5 to 7.5 years of age to analyze the impact of interaction
types on task performance. They found that the pair composition
in terms of the children’s gender and spatial knowledge affected
the expression of point of view and the type of the socio-cognitive
conflict that emerged. In a meta-analysis on gender differences
in spatial ability, Linn and Petersen (1985) demonstrated how
gender relates to spatial performance by showing that males are
better than females in mental rotation problems and that the
magnitude of this difference is smaller in spatial visualization.
The authors also pointed out that the impact of gender might vary
depending not simply on the task type but also on the age range
of the participants (e.g., Voyer et al., 1995; Yilmaz, 2009).
Thus, even though previous research has demonstrated a
positive impact of peer collaboration on spatial performances
both with children and adults (Doise and Mugny, 1984;
Tversky and Hard, 2009), more studies are needed in order
to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
spatial performance in dyadic settings. Because the “village task”
demands the cognitive ability to mentally rotate objects and the
coordination of different viewpoints, they can be particularly
fruitful for the purpose of examining whether broader ToM
capacities play a role in children’s spatial performance in social
interaction. Therefore, the current study addresses two main
questions: (1) whether children improve their performance
when resolving a spatial transformation task with a partner
as compared to alone; (2) and to what extent children’s
achievements on ToM tasks explain their spatial performances in
a dyadic setting. The reasons for focusing on a dyadic setting are
twofold: the need to understand potential mechanisms related to
individual differences in dealing with spatial problems in social
interaction; and the intention to explore the impact of ToM on
an advanced cognitive problem, as the performance in the dyadic
condition implies not only mental rotation of objects but also the
coordination of different hands on spatial perspectives.
One could argue that the village task is a perspective taking
problem in itself, so why investigate whether ToM impacts
another perspective taking task? First, in this study ToM is
not measured based solely on perspective taking ability but
as a broad competence including the understanding of beliefs,
desires, and emotions (e.g., Shahaeian et al., 2011). Moreover,
the “village task” cannot be reduced to its perspective taking
dimension. Different from the “three mountains” (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1952) and other classical perspective taking tasks, such
as the picture and turtle tasks (Masangkay et al., 1974), in the
dyadic version of the “the village task” a child can be confronted
by the other, so that both children have to deal with two socio-
cognitive operations at the same time: (1) the mental rotation
of the objects based on an external frame of reference; (2) the
perspective of the other child about the position of the objects in
relation to the referential mark. When confronted with another
spatial representation, the child is challenged to make some
changes in his own spatial representation, and as Gopnik and
Astington (1988) suggested, it is much easier to ignore your
own contradictions than ignore the contradictions between your
own representation and the representation of others. Previous
studies have shown that adopting others’ perspectives remains
cognitively demanding even for adults, especially when the
perspectives are conflicting (Keysar et al., 2000; Epley et al.,
2004; Qureshi et al., 2010). Surtees et al. (2011) tested adults
and children between 6 and 11 years of age and found that
those who succeed on direct tasks of Level-2 perspective taking
showed no evidence of this competence when it was measured
in an indirect task where the participants where not explicitly
asked about what the partner was seeing. This is also the case
with the “village task” in which the participants are encouraged
to work together but there is no explicit question about the
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perspective of the other, though the children need to coordinate
their spatial representations to find the solution to the problem.
Consequently, we are not applying two simple perspective
taking tasks. In addition, the aim is not to assess whether
ToM and spatial performance are related competences, but to
examine specifically to what extent the performances on classical
ToM tasks with different levels of complexity and where the
child attributes mental or emotional states to a character in
a fictional scenario (without being confronted with another’s
perspective) can explain the variation in spatial performances
in an interactional scenario where the spatial representation of
one child can be confronted by that of the other child. In other
words, does a broad conceptual knowledge about the mind have
implication for children’s cognition in the domain of a dyadic
spatial task?
In accordance with previous studies, the first hypothesis is
that children perform better on the Spatial task in the dyadic
setting compared to when doing it by themselves, even when
we consider age and gender. Because resolving the Spatial task
together with a partner depends on mental rotation of objects
and understanding of the other’s point of view, the second
hypothesis is that children’s ToM has a positive impact on spatial
performances in the dyadic version of the task, even after taking
into account age, gender, and the performance in the individual
condition. We expect the results to contribute to the fields
of ToM development and social development in at least three
ways: by consolidating previous results showing that children
take advantage from dyadic setting when resolving a cognitive
problem; by originally informing on the role of individual
differences in ToM on children’s spatial performances in a
dyadic setting (illuminating potential mechanisms underpinning
spatial abilities in social interactions); and by pointing out a link
between conceptual understanding of the mind and its practical
implications on children’s cognitive performance in the domain
of spatial transformation abilities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Initially, 120 parents were contacted through two middle-class
private schools in Recife (Brazil). The parents of 90 children
(75% of the invited) signed a consent form that informed on
the study aims and procedures, allowing their children to be
asked to participate. Subsequently, all children invited agreed
to participate in the study. The Norwegian Social Science Data
Service and the Ethic Committee in Brazil approved the project.
To avoid floor and ceiling effects, children who did not succeed
on the simplest item in the individual condition of the Spatial task
(n = 14), as well as those who achieved the maximum score in
the individual setting (n = 10) were excluded from the sample
(Doise and Mugny, 1984). This ensured that the children could
have the same minimum level and that they could also progress
on the task. There were equal number of boys and girls among
those who failed on the first item and 12 children in the youngest
group. Amongst the children who achieved the maximum score,
four were girls, six were boys, and all of them were in the oldest
group. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Doise and
Mugny, 1984), as younger children failed more often than the
older ones and only children in the oldest group achieved the
maximum score. Thus, the final sample included 66 typically
developing children (32 boys; 34 girls) between 5 years 7 months
and 9 years 8 months (M = 89.94 months; SD = 13.09 months)
with Portuguese as their native language. In order to obtain
more variation in terms of ToM competence (the younger group
with ToM in progress and the other with well-established ToM),
children were divided into two groups according to their age
(n = 36 in the Younger group: 5;7–7;5 years; n = 30 in the
Older group: 7;6–9;8 years). Because we wanted to facilitate that
children would work together – and because asymmetry in terms
of knowledge and gender might create competitive relationship
instead of collaboration (Buchs et al., 2004; Sommet et al., 2015) –
the dyads consisted of children of the same gender, similar age,
from the same classroom, and with similar performances on the
individual version of the Spatial task (SD = 0.84) and the ToM
tasks (SD= 2.19). For the same reason, we wanted to ensure that
the children in the dyads were neither best friends nor not friends,
so that information from the children’s ranking of their friends in
the classroom was also used when composing the dyads.
Procedure, Tasks, and Scoring
The data collection consisted of three sessions carried out at
the children’s schools. In the first session, the children were
tested individually on the Spatial task. In the second session,
the children completed the ToM tasks, and in the third and last
session, they participated in the dyadic version of the spatial
problem. Each session lasted around 10 min, with an average
interval of 15 days between each session.
Spatial Task
Children were first tested individually in an adapted version
of the spatial transformation task “the reconstruction of the
village,” developed by Doise and Mugny (1984) and derived from
Piaget’s famous “three mountains” task (Piaget and Inhelder,
1952). The task material included a miniature village placed on
a model cardboard (50 cm by 50 cm), which was fixed on a
table, and comprised a lake (the referential mark) and three or
four houses (i.e., based on task complexity, which is described
below) with different colors and marked with doors on one side.
On a different table, offset 90◦ from their left, children could see
another cardboard also marked with a lake on it. They received
three or four houses equivalent to the ones previously placed by
the researcher on the model cardboard, and they were instructed
to make a similar village. In order to emphasize the referential
mark, the experimenter said that if a man comes out of the lake,
he would find the houses in the same positions as the ones in
the model constructed by the experimenter. Chairs were placed
in such a way that the children could not move beyond a limited
area.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the task. There were four
different items with increasing complexity. The simplest item had
three houses with no rotation required. The second demanded
a rotation of 90◦ and an inversion of the left-right and front-
back orders of the houses. The third and fourth items had four
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FIGURE 1 | Spatial task.
houses and both required 180◦ rotations and inversions of the
left-right and front-back orders. After the completion of each
item, children were oriented to move to the opposite side of
the cardboard to check whether or not they wanted to make
changes to their villages. When solved individually, this part of
the procedure generated an intra-individual cognitive conflict, as
the child could look at the same village from different perspectives
(Doise and Mugny, 1984).
The same four items were applied in the dyadic condition,
but in this situation children were placed in different face-to-
face positions (position X and position Y in Figure 1). This
required them to coordinate their viewpoints to make a copy
of a village, which entails an inter-individual cognitive conflict,
as it involved looking at the same village from different angles
(Doise and Mugny, 1984). To make sure that one child would
not act alone, the dyadic condition operated with interdependent
resources (Buchs and Butera, 2004), so that each child received
only a certain number of houses (either one or two) and were
only allowed to touch and move their “own” houses. To move
the houses of the “other” child, the children had to convince
the partner to do this, providing opportunities for negotiations
within the dyad.
The same scoring method, based on the original work of
Doise and Mugny (1984), was applied for both the individual
and dyadic conditions. The children first got a spatial score for
each item of the Spatial task. Children showing no compensation
(NC) got 0 points. They did not manage to mentally rotate the
cardboard and just reproduced the perceptual tableau that they
were able to observe without making any inversion regarding
the position of the houses. Children who displayed partial
compensation (PC) received one point, meaning that they
achieved one of the inversions required, either the right-left
order or the front-back order, but not both. Children who
demonstrated total compensation (TC) got two points, and
this involved correct transformation of both dimensions (left-
right and front-back) simultaneously. Subsequently, in both
conditions, a total sum score was calculated from the points on
the four items, therefore could vary from zero to eight in each
condition of the spatial task. Because two dyads did not reach an
agreement regarding the resolution of the problem, the score was
computed for each child separately in both conditions. Thus, the
score in the dyadic setting represents an individual result of the
social interaction.
Theory of Mind Task
Children were tested individually for their ToM with items
extracted from the Theory of Mind Test (TMT; Pons and Harris,
2002), and the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC; Pons and
Harris, 2000). Both tests are the result of an extensive review
of the developmental literature and of a selection of the most
common tasks used to assess children’s ToM. Giménez-Dasí et al.
(2016) have also combined these two tests to obtain a broad
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measure of ToM. However, the authors used a short version
of the two tests by reducing the number of items and keeping
all the components. In addition, they applied the tests in two
separate sessions. Because we had an extensive data collection,
we applied the TEC and the TMT in the same session which,
in turn, required the exclusion of some components. This was
a strategy to ensure that the children would be concentrated
and motivated during the assessment, and reducing the number
of items would still make the tests very lengthy. Moreover,
more items per component should be more reliable than fewer
items within more components. Thus, based on the review of
the literature which focuses on ToM as an understanding of
multiple concepts rather than a single task paradigm (e.g., Pons
et al., 2004; Wellman and Liu, 2004; Blijd-Hoogewys et al.,
2008), we selected components that did not overlap and that
represented different levels of difficulty. Children were therefore
assessed for their perspective taking (two items in Level 1
and one item in Level 2), understanding of false-belief (three
items), understanding of second-order false-belief (three items),
recognition of basic emotion (five items), understanding of the
impact of situational variations on emotions (five items), and
understanding of desire-based emotion (two items). This choice
avoided the tests to become too long, but warranted the inclusion
of both visible or non-reflective dimensions of the mind and
more invisible or reflective dimensions of the mind (Pons et al.,
2009). For each item, the examiner showed a drawing while
reading a story regarding the depicted characters, and the child
was asked to attribute either a cognitive or an emotional mental
state to the main character of the story by pointing to one
of two or four possible answers. A composite score ranging
from 0 to 21 was calculated by summing the number of correct
items.
Statistical Analyses
SPSS Statistics 22.0 was used for all analyses in the current
study. First, preliminary analyses assessed the performances on
the ToM tasks by age and gender through analysis of variance.
Subsequently, the first hypothesis was examined through a
mixed between-within-subjects analysis of variance to assess
the impact of age, gender, and condition (individual and
dyadic) on the performance in the Spatial task. To test the
second hypothesis, correlation analysis and regression analysis
were performed to assess the impact of ToM in explaining
the variation on children’s spatial performance in the dyadic
condition, while accounting for age, gender, and individual
spatial performance.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the performances at the ToM tasks and at the
Spatial task (individual and dyadic conditions) by age and gender.
An analysis of variance Age X Gender indicated a significant
and large effect of age on ToM performances (F(1,62) = 10.91,
p = 0.002, η2 = 0.15), but no significant effect of gender or
interaction between gender and age. Regardless of gender, older
children had higher ToM performances than younger children.
TABLE 1 | Theory of Mind (ToM) by age group and gender and Spatial
Performance by condition, age group and gender.
Spatial performance ToM
Age
group
Gender n Individual condition
M (SD)
Dyadic condition
M (SD) M (SD)
Younger Boys 18 3.1 (1.0) 4.7 (2.2) 17.6 (1.5)
Girls 18 2.5 (0.85) 4.2 (1.3) 17.2 (1.6)
Older Boys 14 3.1 (1.0) 4.4 (2.7) 18.4 (1.6)
Girls 16 2.8 (0.71) 6.8 (1.7) 18.9 (1.2)
Total 66 2.9 (0.96) 5.0 (2.2) 18.1 (1.6)
First Hypothesis
An analysis of variance Age X Gender X Condition showed a
moderate effect of age (F(1,62) = 4.72, p = 0.034, η2 = 0.07), a
large effect of condition (F(1,62) = 65.29, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.51),
and no effect of gender on children’s performances on the Spatial
task. The older children had higher performances (M = 4.3;
SD = 1.7) than younger children (M = 3.7, SD = 1.6), regardless
of condition and gender. Moreover, children had higher
performances in the dyadic condition (M= 5.05, SD= 2.23) than
in the individual condition (M = 2.92, SD = 0.96), regardless
of age and gender. There was also an interaction effect of
moderate size between age and gender (F(1,62)= 7.90, p= 0.007,
η2= 0.011), indicating that older girls performed better (M= 4.8,
SD = 2.3) than older boys (M = 3.79, SD = 2.5), regardless
the condition. An interaction of moderate effect size between
gender and condition (F(1,62) = 6.62, p = 0.012, η2 = 0.10)
furthermore showed that girls were better than boys in the dyadic
setting, whereas there were no significant gender differences in
the individual condition. Finally, a moderate interaction effect
was found between condition, age, and gender (F(1,62) = 6.09,
p= 0.016, η2 = 0.09), suggesting that older girls obtained higher
scores than younger girls and they were better than boys from
both age groups in the dyadic version of the Spatial task, but not
in the individual condition.
Second Hypothesis
Correlation analysis showed that ToM performances correlated
with the spatial performances both in the individual (r = 0.26,
n = 66, p < 0.038) and in the dyadic (r = 0.39, n = 66,
p < 0.001) conditions, even when we control for age and gender
(r = 0.26, n = 66, p < 0.038 and r = 0.32, n = 66, p < 0.010
for the individual and dyadic conditions, respectively). In the
regression analysis, the role of age, gender, spatial performance
in the individual condition, and scores in the ToM tasks for
the performances on the Spatial task in the dyadic condition
were examined. This regression model (Multiple R = 0.45,
F(4,61) = 3.81, p < 0.008) showed that the predictors explained
in total 20% (R2 = 0.20) of the variation in the dependent
variable. When examining the impact of the different predictors,
ToM (b = 0.31; t = 2.4, p < 0.020), but not age, gender, nor
spatial performance in the individual condition, had a significant
effect on the spatial performance in the dyadic condition. ToM
accounted for 15% of the shared variance (r= 0.39) and explained
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alone 8% (r = 0.29) of the variance of the children’s performance
in the dyadic Spatial task.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to investigate: (1) whether children
improve their performance when resolving a Spatial task with
a peer; and (2) whether individual differences in ToM affect
children’s spatial performances in a dyadic setting. In line with
prior research (Doise and Mugny, 1984; Psaltis and Duveen,
2007), we found that children improved their performance on
the Spatial task when they resolved it together with a partner
compared to when resolving it alone. For the first time, this study
showed that children’s performances in a dyadic Spatial task were
predicted by their ToM, even when accounting for age, gender,
and the children’s spatial performances on the same task in an
individual condition.
Spatial Performances Across Age,
Gender, and Condition
Confirming our first hypothesis, children performed better in the
dyadic compared to the individual setting. This is consistent with
the original experiments carried out by Doise and Mugny (1984)
and other studies showing that children between 5 and 9 years
of age profit from resolving tasks with a partner (e.g., Psaltis
and Duveen, 2007; Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012). It has been argued
that such results demonstrate that inter-individual conflicts are
central for children’s cognitive development, and that this is
particularly happening when children work on complementary
resources to resolve problems (Buchs and Butera, 2004). The
current study extends prior results on spatial problems that
have reported beneficial effects of social interaction on cognitive
performances in samples of older children and adults (Teasley,
1995; Tversky and Hard, 2009). One potential explanation is
that the non-verbal and verbal behaviors of the other support
the understanding of the objects and their spatial relations, so
that the mutual action context promoted by social interaction
helps children to (re-)think about the activity from the other’s
perspective (Tversky and Hard, 2009; Frick and Wang, 2013).
As has been suggested earlier in the field (Piaget and Inhelder,
1952), the effect of age on children’s overall spatial performance
indicates that spatial ability follows a developmental trend.
The absence of an effect of age on spatial performance when
children resolved the task by themselves might be related to
the way we divided the groups. According to the literature, it
is typically somewhere between the ages of 7 (younger group)
and 9 (older group) years that children start to imagine an
orientation outside their body, and work with relations such as
before/behind and left/right (Piaget and Inhelder, 1952; Yilmaz,
2009). The enhanced performance of older compared to the
younger children in the dyadic condition could be related to the
higher reliance on more advanced social and linguistic abilities in
this setting (Siegal, 2008).
The fact that gender had no main impact on children’s overall
spatial performance contrasts with previous work that found that
males perform better than females on mental rotation problems
(Voyer et al., 1995; Yilmaz, 2009). However, this gender difference
in mental rotation seems to appear from the age of 10, and
could possibly be related to boys having more experiences with
manipulation of symbolic information than girls by that age.
Thus, gender differences may occur as the children gets older,
which might explain the interaction effect between age and
gender showing that older girls were better than younger boys,
independent of the condition. Indeed, the literature suggests that
the impact of gender varies according to both age and the type
of task (Yilmaz, 2009), which shed some light on the interaction
effect between gender and condition, and between age, gender,
and condition. Thus, one reason for the gender differences in
the dyadic setting may be that this condition depends more on
broader social and language skills, which are dimensions where
girls and older children typically demonstrate better abilities than
boys and younger children (Walker et al., 2002; Siegal, 2008).
More research with a larger age range is needed, however, to
understand why gender differences appear in different conditions
and how they might evolve over time.
The Impact of ToM on Spatial
Performances
The impact of age on ToM performances was expected,
as previous studies have shown that ToM follows a clear
developmental trend, both in boys and girls (e.g., Harris et al.,
2005; Shahaeian et al., 2011). The results originally showed
relations between ToM and spatial performances, both in the
individual and in the dyadic conditions, even when age and
gender were taken into account. Moreover, confirming the
second hypothesis of this study, ToM had a positive impact on the
spatial performance when children worked together, even when
we controlled for age, gender, and spatial performance in the
individual condition.
The link between ToM and the spatial performance in the
individual setting indicates that the abilities to conceptually
understanding the mind in terms of thoughts and emotions
and to cognitively visualize objects in different positions based
on an external frame of reference are related competences. The
findings therefore expand previous results by demonstrating
that understanding mental states has positive consequences
not only on social competences (e.g., Roazzi et al., 2013;
Farina and Belacchi, 2014) and the use of mental terms and
metacognition (Veneziano et al., 2008; Lecce et al., 2010;
Guajardo and Cartwright, 2016), but also on the domain of
children’s cognition with regard to spatial visualization, which is a
spatial transformation where “the positions of objects are moved
with respect to an environmental frame of reference” (Hegarty
and Waller, 2004, p. 127). In the present study it means that
children with higher level of conceptual ToM were better able to
mentally rotate the object and correctly transform the positions
of the houses by taking the lake as the referential mark.
One could argue that once a relation between ToM and
the spatial performance in the individual condition was found,
a relation between ToM and the performance in the dyadic
condition would be expected. Yet, the performance in the two
conditions rely on different levels of spatial skills, as indicated
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by the findings showing the absence of a relation between the
performance in the individual condition (making object-based
transformation) and the performance in the dyadic condition
(coordinating different perspectives). This is in line with the
dissociation between tests of perspective taking and tests of
mental rotation reported by others (Hegarty and Waller, 2004).
Thus, we could not interpret the correlation between ToM
and the performance in the dyadic condition as parallel to
the correlation between ToM and the performance in the
individual condition. It is also noteworthy that the relation
between ToM and spatial performance was stronger in the
dyadic compared with the individual setting. Moreover, beyond
examining how ToM and the spatial performance in the dyadic
condition were related, our aim was to investigate the degree
to which ToM abilities could explain variation in the spatial
performances in a social interaction setting. It was only ToM
that significantly explained the performance in the Spatial task
when children worked together, while the children’s age or
their previous experience with the task did not. This finding
therefore suggests the existence of socio-cognitive mechanisms
underpinning spatial performance in social interactions.
A comparison of the two conditions of the Spatial task might
deepen our understanding on such socio-cognitive mechanism.
When resolving the task alone children had to visualize the
houses in different positions by taking the lake as a reference.
Even when the child changed the position to see the cardboard
from a different angle (intra-individual conflict), the task in the
individual setting centered around object-based transformations,
while in the dyadic setting they needed to go beyond their own
spatial visualization and deal with the other’s spatial perspective.
In fact, the performance in the dyadic condition of the Spatial task
seems to be more strongly dependent on the performance on the
ToM tests where the child also had to take the mental perspective
of the character. Thus, one could argue that a link between
ToM and the spatial performance in the dyadic setting would
be expected because the Spatial task in the dyadic condition
essentially demands perspective taking. Nevertheless, the task in
the dyadic condition cannot be reduced to its perspective taking
dimension as the children also needed to manage the object-based
transformation while coordinating different viewpoints with the
other child, which is an advanced form of cognitive problem.
In addition, we used a broad measure of ToM that assessed
not only perspective taking but also false-belief and emotion
comprehension, in which – different from the Spatial task –
children’s beliefs and perspectives were not confronted by the
experimenter or another child. Thus, the main explanation is
that the findings add a new factor to the previous results on
the reconstruction of the village task (e.g., Doise and Mugny,
1984; Zapiti and Psaltis, 2012) by pointing out that the better the
child is at conceptually theorizing about the mind in a fictional
scenario in terms of beliefs, perspectives, and emotions, the better
he mentally rotates the objects while taking the spatial perspective
of a real partner.
The current findings can therefore shed new light on the link
between conceptual understanding of the mind and its practical
implication for children’s cognition, especially for cognitive
performance in social interaction. According to Tversky and
Hard (2009), seeing another person in a scene near objects
can elicit spontaneous perspective taking, which, in turn, create
mutual expectations between partners while attempting to
coordinate actions, imposed each person to go into multiple levels
of perspectives. Nevertheless, Keysar et al. (2000) showed that
even adults with high levels of ToM can demonstrate difficulties
in applying these abilities to take other’s perspective. Accordingly,
Samson and Apperly (2010) argue that using ToM could be
a cognitively costly process involving the need to resist the
interference from the egocentric perspective and to select relevant
information necessary for ToM inferences, potentially creating
a gap between competence and performance. We should point
out some distinctions between the previous and the current
findings. Notwithstanding the differences in age ranges, the
aforementioned studies focused on perspective taking, while we
have assessed a broad measure of ToM. This might suggest
that the implication of ToM for children’s spatial performances
cannot be seen as a uniform fact, as it can vary depending on the
age range of the participants, how ToM is measured and what
context it is applied in. A broad measure of ToM is potentially
accounting for more variability in spatial performances than
measures of perspective taking or false-belief alone, especially
when the task is spatial and social at the same time (i.e., the
village task). Perhaps a broad measure of ToM that includes
the understanding of beliefs, desires, and emotions is part of a
broader socio-cognitive process underlying spatial and social-
perspective taking. In light of findings suggesting that social
abilities are related to a more visually driven form of perspective
taking (Clements-Stephens et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 2014),
future studies analyzing how children consider the other’s point
of view while cooperatively resolving a spatial problem may
contribute to understanding the extent to which and how ToM,
social perspective taking and spatial performance are intertwined.
In sum, our results showed that conceptual competence can
account for variation in cognitive performances on a Spatial
task in children between 5–9 years of age, and in particularly
so when the ToM measure includes different concepts. This
does not indicate that we can directly translate ToM competence
into spatial performance, and future studies should examine the
role of potential third variables, such as language, cooperative
behavior, intelligence, and executive functions (Wellman, 2014)
to have a more complete picture of the role of ToM on spatial
performance. As for now, the findings illustrate that, although
not sufficient (Astington, 2003; Samson and Apperly, 2010),
higher ToM levels can have positive implications for cognitive
performances in terms of mental rotation and spatial perspective
taking during peer interaction.
Limitations
Some limitations should be mentioned. A larger sample size
would have provided more power to detect significant relations
and group differences in the present study. The inclusion of
a post-test section (Doise and Mugny, 1984) would inform
on possible long-term effects of the dyadic experiences. Future
studies could also apply a longitudinal approach to address
potential developmental processes. In addition, training studies
aiming at strengthening ToM competences might provide
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stronger evidence of the positive impact of ToM on spatial
performances. Inclusion of additional ToM concepts, as well as
examination of the contributions of the separate components
of the TEC and TMT could also contribute to a deeper
understanding of the role of ToM on cognition.
Another limitation is that we did not analyze the interactional
processes in the dyadic setting. Zapiti and Psaltis (2012), for
instance, showed that what happens in the interaction affects
the final spatial performance. In addition, Caputi et al. (2012)
underlined that the relation between having and using ToM
in social interaction is mediated by social factors. It could be
argued that having the same intention toward the task does
not specify the kind of social relation children would establish
(Thomsen and Carey, 2013) and that different dyadic profiles,
either more unilateral/hierarchical or more cooperative could
affect performances in dyadic settings (Psaltis and Duveen, 2007).
Thus, investigating the process of how children interact and
operate with the socio-cognitive conflict could help to better
understand how ToM explains the spatial performance in the
dyadic Spatial task. Last, but not least, it is not certain that the
same results would have occurred in other type of cognitive
problem or if the spatial abilities were examined in a non-
structured task. Investigating the impact of ToM in everyday
interaction could deepen our understanding on the implication
of ToM for children’s cognition with regard to the nature of the
task and the nature of the interaction.
CONCLUSION
Both hypotheses of the current study were confirmed: (1)
children performed better in the dyadic setting compared to when
doing it by themselves; and (2) children’s ToM had a positive
impact on the spatial performance in the dyadic condition.
Theoretically, these findings add a new aspect to the explanations
based on inter-individual conflict and action-based reasoning
(Doise and Mugny, 1984; Tversky and Hard, 2009; Zapiti and
Psaltis, 2012) by illuminating socio-cognitive mechanisms that
link conceptual competence in understanding the mind with
spatial performance within interactional settings. The results
demonstrate that individual differences in ToM – not only in
terms of false-belief or perspective taking, but also in terms of
emotion comprehension – impact children’s cognition and have
to be taken into account in order to get a more complete picture
of what promotes spatial performances in social interactions.
Hence, three practical implications can be derived from it. First,
it implies the need to elaborate more adequate and sensitive
measures to grasp the cognitive consequences of ToM in a
wide range of interactional contexts. Second, pedagogues might
need to consider children’s ToM abilities when composing dyads
and groups to solve spatial problems in cooperation, as such
grouping might yield different outcomes. Finally, the findings
suggest that teaching and strengthening of children’s ToM
competences can have positive impact on children’s cognitive
performance in important settings, such as in school, at least
when it comes to spatial problems. To conclude, the link between
what ToM is and what ToM is for (Liszkowski, 2013) does not
indicate that ToM concepts are sufficient to efficiently promote
successful cognitive outcome in social interaction (Astington,
2003). However, it shows that having such concepts goes beyond
conceptual knowledge and can have practical implications for
children’s cognition. This study demonstrates how this is the case
in the domain of spatial transformation in peer interaction.
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Italian Children
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Joint narratives are a mean through which children develop and practice their Theory
of Mind (ToM), thus they represent an ideal means to explore children’s use and
development of mental state talk. However, creating a learning environment for
storytelling based on peer interaction, does not necessarily mean that students will
automatically exploit it by engaging in productive collaboration, thus it is important to
explore under what conditions peer interaction promotes children’s ToM. This study
extends our understanding of social aspects of ToM, focusing on the effect of joint
narratives on school-age children’s mental state talk. Fifty-six Italian primary school
children participated in the study (19 females and 37 males). Children created a story in
two different experimental conditions (individually and with a partner randomly assigned).
Each story told by the children, as well as their dialogs were recorded and transcribed.
Transcriptions of narratives were coded in terms of text quality and mental state
talk, whereas transcriptions of dialogs were coded in terms of quality of interaction.
The results from this study confirmed that peer interaction does not always improve
children’s mental state talk performances in oral narratives, but certain conditions need
to be satisfied. Peer interaction was more effective on mental state talk with lower
individual levels and productive interactions, particularly in terms of capacity to regulate
the interactions. When children were able to focus on the interaction, as well as the
product, they were also exposed to each other’s reasoning behind their viewpoint.
This level of intersubjectivity, in turn, allowed them to take more in consideration the
contribution of mental states to the narrative.
Keywords: mental state talk, peer interaction, storytelling, narrative competence, theory of mind
INTRODUCTION
Research into the development of children’s mental state understanding has recently focused on
mental state talk in social interactions as a powerful tool to both explore and foster Theory of
Mind (ToM). Mental state talk is defined as that is the set of words used by children to attribute
thoughts, feelings, emotions, and desires to people, when referring to either themselves and other
people (Bretherton and Beegley, 1982). Mental state talk is facilitated by interactional contexts
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in which young children communicate with other people about
thoughts and feelings. In this study, we will analyze the effect
of joint story-telling on children’s mental state talk. Creating a
learning environment for storytelling based on peer interaction,
does not necessarily mean that students will automatically
exploit it by engaging in productive collaboration, thus it is
important to explore under what conditions peer interaction
promotes children’s ToM. Our understanding of such conditions
is limited as most of the studies conducted on joint storytelling
have focused on adult-child interactions, rather than on peer
interactions. Moreover, prior studies on children’s ToM have
mainly focused on its cognitive aspects and on preschoolers.
This study extends our understanding of social aspects of ToM,
focusing on the effect of joint narratives on school-age children’s
mental state talk.
Theory of Mind and Mental State Talk
Children’s ToM includes several basic skills, that is recognizing
emotions, making a distinction between physical and mental
entities, appreciating the casual link between perception
and knowledge, understanding how desires and beliefs
influence behavior, and understanding how beliefs affect
behavior (Wellman, 1990; Bulgarelli et al., 2015). The strict
interconnection between language and children’s understanding
of other people’s mental states has led several scholars to use
children’s mental state talk as an indicator of their ToM (Dunn
and Hughes, 1998; Astington and Baird, 2005; Symons et al.,
2005; Antonietti et al., 2006). Mental state talk includes terms
that children use to attribute physiological (e.g., being hungry),
perceptual (e.g., see), willing (e.g., desire), emotional (e.g., anger),
cognitive (e.g., knowing), moral (e.g., judge), and socio-relational
(e.g., helping) state to others (Bretherton and Beegley, 1982;
Symons, 2004).
Several studies have used mental state talk as a measure
of ToM, for instance to analyze maternal mind-mindedness
(Meins et al., 2002), mother–child conversations (Ruffman et al.,
2002), conversations between young friends (Hughes and Dunn,
1998) and siblings (Brown et al., 1996), and autistic children
(Tager-Flusberg, 1992; Happé, 1994; Capps et al., 2000). A few
studies have also validated mental state talk by finding significant
correlation scores with standardized measures of ToM, such
as the false-belief task (Peterson and Slaughter, 2006; Hughes
et al., 2011; Accorti Gamannossi and Pinto, 2014). Thus,
evidence from the typically and atypically developing population
confirm mental state talk as a reliable indicator of children’s
understanding of other people’s ToM.
Mental state talk brings some advantages with respect to
more traditional assessments of ToM (e.g., ‘false belief task,’
Wimmer and Perner, 1983): it is a more ecological instrument
as it relies on children’s spontaneous production; it allows us
to include and analyze several mental states (e.g., desires and
feelings, besides the cognitive-related aspects of ToM); it allows
us to study the development of ToM in school-age children, since
it does not reach a ceiling as other measures do (Wellman and
Liu, 2004). Previous studies have demonstrated that individuals’
mind-reading ability grows with age, even beyond school years
(adolescence and young adulthood, Valle et al., 2015; and
adulthood and elderly age, Cabinio et al., 2015).
Mental State Talk in Narratives
Narratives represent an ideal context to analyze children’s mental
state talk, as through them children develop, practice, and
re-describe their ToM (Guajardo and Watson, 2002; Accorti
Gamannossi and Pinto, 2014), as is also confirmed by neuro-
psychological studies (Marchetti et al., 2015). According to the re-
description theory (“representational redescription,” Karmiloff-
Smith, 1995), the human mind first develops by learning a
process, and then further develops by turning the information
that is in the mind into explicit knowledge to the mind. In
this way, processes increase the flexibility of the knowledge we
possess. In other words, the mind re-describes its knowledge by
representing in different formats what it is internal stored. Re-
description theory applies to ToM too. When children are in the
process of understanding mental states, they need to understand
that a certain event can be represented and viewed differently
(Qu et al., 2015). Thus, children’s ToM might be improved
by promoting children’s representation, whit the support of
narrative tasks.
Children’s development of narrative competence begins early
and increases significantly during school years (Makinen et al.,
2013). In primary school, children begin to tell or write
stories with a basic and conventional macrostructure, which
includes initiating events, several interlinked episodes, goal-
directed actions, internal responses, and a final resolution (Stein
and Glenn, 1982; Gelmini-Hornsby et al., 2011; Squires et al.,
2014). Thus, children need advanced mental state talk to create
a narrative centered around a protagonist’s intentions and
subsequent actions (Pelletier and Beatty, 2015). The relationship
between narrative competence and mental state talk develops
in particular during primary school years. Generally primary
school children tell stories as a list of actions (Carnine et al.,
1982; McConaughy et al., 1984), but if they possess a certain
level of mental state talk, which allows them to connect action
with consciousness, then they are also able to integrate the
plot actions with the characters’ mental states (Pelletier and
Astington, 2004). Moreover, if the characters’ intentions are
explicitly stated, primary school children are able to identify the
characters’ mental states (Feathers, 2002). Pelletier and Beatty
(2015) examined children’s developing understanding of Aesop’s
fables from Kindergarten through Grade 6, and found that as
children grow, they are increasingly able to understand fables
through their mental state talk, beyond the contribution of
general vocabulary. According to Dyer et al. (2000) it is possible
that narratives themselves can be an important source of mental
state information. The authors analyzed 90 children’s books
and found that they included high rates of mental state terms,
regardless of the children’s age (they compared books aimed at
3- to 4-year-olds vs. books aimed at 5- to 6-year-olds). They also
noted that pictures instead did not represent any mental state, nor
did they refer to mental states mentioned in the text.
The development of ToM is particularly facilitated by
communication between young children and other people (e.g.,
mother, father, siblings, peers, and the like) about others’
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mental states (Symons, 2004), also through the effect of
social shared norms (Massaro et al., 2014). A specific case of
interpersonal discourse about mental states is represented by
joint narratives. In preschool, kindergarten and school children
are exposed to narratives through joint story-telling or story-
reading activities. Besides being an activity in which children
naturally engage, joint story-telling represents one of the ways
in which individual performances can be improved. The effect
of peer interaction on children’s mental state talk is explained by
several mechanisms. Firstly, peer learning is strictly interrelated
with intersubjectivity. The two partners need to achieve a certain
degree of intersubjectivity, which can be negotiated or achieved
through mutual adjustments (Devescovi and Baumgartner,
1993). Intersubjectivity is strictly interrelated with mental
state talk too (Symons, 2004). According to the literature,
two conceptual traditions on development psychology focused
on intersubjectivity in a meaning co-construction activities:
Piaget’s socio-cognitive conflict hypothesis, and Vygotsky’s
internalization hypothesis. According to the former perspective,
in a joint activity an individual has to take the perspective
of the other participant as well, rather than just dealing with
his/her own one (Mugny and Doise, 1978). If the two participants
are able to achieve a mutual understanding of the activity,
then they can achieve a new, and more advanced perspective
on the problem. According to Vygotsky internalization process
(1978), higher-level processes appear fists at an interpsychological
level, and through it are transformed into intrapsychological
processes. Children’s participation in interpersonal discourse
about the thoughts and feelings of other people facilitates the
internalization of the reasoning about mental states, which
implies a cognitive reorganization of their own ToM (Symons,
2004). Actually, these two perspectives can be considered as
complementary, if we focus on the cooperation between partners,
rather than simply the presence of a partner (Kruger, 1993). Both
perspectives, although focusing, respectively, on conflict and
cooperation, claim that children are able to benefit from a joint
activity if they engaged in an extended discourse that explores
the reasoning behind the various viewpoints being presented
(Kruger, 1993). In this way, the two participants are introduced
to each other’s intentions and thoughts on the activity, with a
beneficial retroactive effect on their own mental state talk. On
the other hand, also the type of task assigned to students has
fundamental implications for the efficacy of peer interaction
(Slavin, 2004). An exploration of the levels of participation allows
us to explore interactional patterns and the source of interaction.
In other words, it allows us to understand to what extent
students engage in conversations, who initiates the conversations,
and whether the response aims at developing the meaning-
construction endeavor or rather providing some feedback to the
partner. Instead, an exploration of the use of language allows
us to analyze the semiotic tools used by participants to mediate
the social construction of meaning. Children could engage in a
conversation to negotiate meaning, provide and/or justify their
perspective, share personal experiences or relevant information,
managing the interaction, expressing an agreement/disagreement
on what the partner said, evaluating the partner’s contributions
to the meaning-making process, and the like. As previously
described, narrative represent a perfect outlet for children to
reflect on the character’s inner states of mind, providing an ideal
context for peer learning to positively influence children’s own
mental state talk. In a joint story-telling task, narratives become
object of metacognitive reflection: talking about a narrative
means talking about ToM.
The understanding of the ways through which children’s
mental state talk in primary school can be improved is affected by
a few limitations. Firstly, as Hughes et al. (2007) noted few studies
have explored school-age children’s mental state talk (Lecce
et al., 2010; Longobardi et al., 2016). As with what happened
with traditional forms of ToM assessment, most studies on
children’s mental state talk have generally explored preschoolers.
This is particularly concerning, since several components which
have an effect on mental state talk develop during school years
(e.g., expansion of vocabulary, working memory, referential
communication, and the like). Moreover, schooling introduces
a new set of experiences into the child’s life, which create a new
set of applications of mental state talk in everyday life (e.g., more
social settings).
Secondly, studies in this area have focused especially on
parent–child interactions (e.g., Adrian et al., 2005), conversation
between siblings and/or friends, but they have rarely explored
the facilitation of peer-interaction practices promoted in school,
in which students are working together toward a convergent
outcome. This is particularly surprising, considering the bulk
of research available on the efficacy of peer-assisted learning
(Ginsburg-Block et al., 2006; Riese et al., 2012). Such practices are
often promoted in school for their positive effects on academic
achievements in several different learning processes (Palincsar
and Brown, 1984; Ginsburg-Block et al., 2006; Tarchi and Pinto,
2015). In particular, narratives allow us to explore the effect
of peer-interaction on an open-ended school activity, which
is particularly interesting as it provides children with more
opportunities to negotiate meaning and exchange information
(Tarchi and Pinto, 2015).
Thirdly, prior studies on socio-cognitive conflict and peer
learning (e.g., Mugny and Doise, 1978) have emphasized
the importance of taking into consideration children’s levels
of individual competence to assess the magnitude of the
improvement due to working with a partner. For instance, prior
studies found that a socio-cognitive conflict between children is
most likely to foster progress in a specific process if children
are at the moment of initial elaboration or emergence (Mugny
et al., 1981). Most of the studies on children’s mental state
talk have assessed it in interactional contexts, but without
untangling the relationship between individual and joint mental
state talk performance. Moreover, when interacting, each child
reciprocally influences each other in their use of mental state
talk. However, previous studies demonstrated that children’s
mental state talk, generally highly correlated to performances
in ToM standardized tests when assessed though an individual
task, decrease the strength of this correlation when interacting
with older partners (Symons et al., 2005). On the other side,
children might use more mental state talk when interacting with
peers, rather than with older partners (Dunn, 2000). Thus it
is important to explore under what conditions peer interaction
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promotes children’s ToM. Some studies focused on the individual
levels of participants, with two different approaches. According
to the peer tutoring approach, peer learning is effective when
there is a discrepancy in individual mastery of the target
skill (Topping, 2005). Instead, according to the reciprocal peer
learning approach, peer learning activities are mostly successful
when the two members have similar levels in the target skill and
scaffold each other (Duran and Monereo, 2005). In this study, we
assessed children’s mental state talk twice, in an individual and in
a joint condition.
Lastly, from past studies on peer learning we know that
creating a learning environment for storytelling based on
peer interaction does not necessarily mean that students will
automatically exploit it by engaging in productive collaboration
(Prangsma et al., 2007). Prior studies on the discursive practices
in peer-interaction educational contexts have put emphasis
on both the level of participation in the discourse and the
participants’ use of language (Kovalainen and Kumpulainen,
2005; Tarchi and Pinto, 2015).
A few studies have investigated the relationship between the
quality of the interaction and mental state talk. Hughes et al.
(2006) studied the quality of sibling interactions in relation
to children’s mental state talk. One hundred and one families
participated in the study, which included 111 2-years-olds and
111 female siblings, for a total of 61 same-sex dyads and 50
opposite-sex dyads. Dyads were video-taped during a 2-h play
session at home. Transcripts were coded for presence of mental
state talk (referred as inner state talk in the original article).
The frequency of mental state talk was significantly correlated
with video-based ratings of reciprocal play, also when effects
of age, verbal ability and ToM performance were controlled.
O’Connor and Hirsch (1999) investigated whether adolescents’
understanding and attribution of mental states was a function of
the quality of the relationship, rather than a context-independent
characteristic of the individual. Participants were presented
with six school situations through a semi-structured interview
to assess their mentalising about teachers. Two factors were
manipulated to verify the context-dependence hypothesis, most
liked compared with least like teacher, and self compared with
other student. According to the results, early adolescents exhibit
a more advance understanding and attributing of mental states to
the behavior of teachers who they like, compared to the ones who
they do not like. An indirect measure of the relationships between
quality of interaction and mental state talk derives from a study
conducted by Meins et al. (2006), who explored 7- to 9-year-old
children’s mental state talk in two tasks, book narration versus
describing a friend. Children’s mental state talk scores correlated
between the two tasks, even after the effects of age and verbal
ability were controlled. According to the authors, children’s
mental state talk in non-interactional situations generalizes
across relational contexts. Furthermore, their mental state talk
measures did not correlate with ToM measures, whereas previous
studies found that interactional measures of mental state talk
were related to ToM. One explanation of this discrepancy
could depend on the different ages at which these associations
have been explored. Generally, children’s mental state talk in
interactional contexts has been studied in preschoolers, thus
their developing ToM could have constrained their mental-
state reasoning capacities. In older children ToM capacities are
more advanced and might no longer influence children’s mental
state talk. Alternatively, in preschoolers the association between
children’s mental state talk and ToM might be mediated by the
mind-mindedness of their partner. This study contributes to
the research area on the relationship between the quality of the
interaction and mental state talk by exploring mental state talk
produced by school-age children interacting with a class-mate in
comparison to individual levels of mental state talk.
Aims of the Study
The aim of this study was to analyze the effect of a peer-
interaction condition on mental state talk through a joint
narrative task. Consistently with Vygotsky’s internalization
hypothesis, participating in a joint narrative task might facilitate
children’s development of mental state talk and, in turn, foster
a cognitive reorganization of their own ToM (Symons, 2004).
Also, consistently with the socio-cognitive conflict hypothesis,
peer learning stimulates children to talk about the story, the
plot, the characters’ intentions, actions, and internal responses.
Talking about a narrative makes the narrative itself an object of a
metacognitive reflection.
This study addressed the limitations of the literature by (i)
exploring ToM through mental state talk in school-age children,
(ii) while engaged in a peer learning task (story-telling in school),
(iii) with a focus on the contribution of children’s individual
mental state talk, the discrepancy between mental state talk of
the two members of a couple, and the quality of the interaction
during the joint story-telling task.
Several studies supported the efficacy of peer learning on
several aspects of the child’s psychology (Ginsburg-Block et al.,
2006; Riese et al., 2012), and emphasized the importance
of the interaction with others for the development of ToM
(Symons, 2004). Nevertheless, several studies also pointed out
that peer interaction does not always produce an improvement
in children’s performances, if certain conditions are not satisfied
(Devescovi and Baumgartner, 1993; Slavin, 2004; Prangsma
et al., 2007). Thus, we investigated whether the efficacy of
peer interaction on mental state talk was systematic or not.
Specifically, we explored the following conditions of efficacy:
(i) prior studies on socio-cognitive conflict suggested that peer
interaction might be effective in fostering progress in a
process if children are in an early stage of development
(Mugny and Doise, 1978; Mugny et al., 1981), thus we
expected peer learning to be effective when children’s
individual levels in mental state talk are low;
(ii) prior studies on peer learning have supported the notion
that children can progress in a specific skill if they are
working with a more competence peer (Topping, 2005),
thus we expected peer learning to be effective in the couples
with the higher levels of discrepancy between children’s
individual levels of mental state talk;
(iii) prior studies on peer learning have widely emphasized
the importance for partners to engage in productive
discussions with a high level of intersubjectivity (Devescovi
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and Baumgartner, 1993; Symons, 2004; Kovalainen and
Kumpulainen, 2005), thus we expected peer learning to
be more effective in couples that were able to engage in
interactions characterized by a higher quality of the dialogs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixty-four Italian children participated in the study (23 females
and 41 males). Eight children were excluded from the study
as they did not participate in either the individual story-
telling or the joint story-telling task. The final sample included
56 participants. Participants were randomly selected from one
predominantly middle-class primary school located on the
outskirts of Florence. Four classes were involved (Table 1).
At the time of the study, no participant was diagnosed with
a physical or mental disability, nor was included in a diagnostic
process, or identified by the teachers as having special educational
needs. Parents and school authorities, as well as the children
themselves, gave consent to participate in the study. Regarding
the Italian educational system, children start formal teaching of
literacy at the age of six with entry to primary school and finish it
when they conclude the last or fifth grade, at the age of 10 or 11.
Procedure
Participants were asked to produce oral stories under two
different experimental conditions: (a) a free story production
by a single child; (b) a free story production by a couple: two
children of the same gender constructed and told an invented
story together. Joint-narrative partners were randomly assigned.
The order of the two tasks was counter-balanced. Each story
told by the children, as well as their dialogs were recorded and
transcribed. For joint narratives, the dialogs and the story were
separated and considered as distinct set of data. The researcher,
in agreement with the teachers, at first, explained the story-
telling tasks to the entire class so as to reassure the children
and promote a climate of trust. Children were asked to make up
a story without any book or visual materials or topic to guide
them. As a consequence, children generated stories with a very
different content. It is important to notice that individual and
joint story-telling are daily school activities, since they are often
used by teachers, making them an ecologically valid method to
explore children’s mental state talk. We included an example of
TABLE 1 | Description of the sample: total number, age, distribution of
males and females, and mental state talk performance in individual and
joint condition (mean and standard deviation).
Grade n Age Mean Males Females Individual
narrative
Joint
narrative
1 12 6.75 ± 0.45 10 2 0.05 ± 0.02 0.11± 0.02
2 14 7.71 ± 0.47 6 8
4 14 9.79 ± 0.43 8 6 0.07 ± 0.02 0.14± 0.10
5 16 10.69 ± 0.48 12 4 0.06 0.08
Total 56 8.88 ± 1.64 36 20 0.06 ± 0.02 0.12± 0.07
narrative production of a couple of children from 1st grade (two
individual narratives and one joint narrative) as Supplementary
Table S1. After that, the activity continued in a room adjacent
to the classroom both with the individual children and with
the couples. First phase, a free story production was requested
from the child (Task 1): “I would like you to tell me a story.”
Second phase, a free story production was requested from a
couple of children (Task 2): “I want you and your partner to
tell me a story invented by you together.” In the joint condition,
children could plan their performance how they preferred. Some
first planned and agreed on the title and/or plot, others just
start telling the story and interacted during the construction of
the story. Each child, as well as the couples, stayed with the
researcher from 15 to 30 min and every story was recorded.
Overall, we collected 56 stories and 28 stories told by two
children together. The data collection took place in agreement
with the school and following the requirements of privacy and
informed consent requested by Italian law (Legislative Decree
DL-196/2003). Regarding the ethical standards for research,
the study referred to the last version of the Declaration of
Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013). The present study
was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of
Psychology at the University of Florence, Italy.
Coding Systems
Two independent judges coded the narratives in terms of
narrative competence and mental state talk in individual and
joint narratives, and quality of dialog in joint narratives. Inter-
rater agreement scores were all acceptable (k> 0.70).
Mental State Talk
Mental state talk was analyzed by identifying terms and
expressions referring to mental states (adapted from Bretherton
and Beegley, 1982). In particular, we identified the following
categories: perceptual-physiological states, emotional states,
willingness states, cognitive states, and moral and socio-relational
states (Table 2).
Narrative Competence
Children’s narrative competence was assessed in terms of
structure, cohesion, and coherence, using a coding scheme
developed by Spinillo and Pinto (1994), and adapted by Pinto
et al. (2015).
Structure
On the base of the presence, absence or/and combination of
fundamental elements of a story (title, conventionalized story
opening, characters, setting, problem, central event, resolution,
and conventionalized story closing), children’s productions were
given an index score ranging from 0, “non-story,” to 5, “complete
story” (see Supplementary Material for details and examples on
the narrative coding system, Supplementary Table S2).
Cohesion
Causal and temporal linguistic connectives were counted.
Examples of causal connectives are: thus, because, therefore, it
follows that, to this aim, as things stand, and the like (e.g., The fox
wanted to eat the chicken. To this aim, the fox decided to hide).
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TABLE 2 | Description of the coding system for mental state talk (adatpted from Bretherton and Beegley, 1982).
Category Description Examples
Perceptual and
physiological and states
Terms representing perceptual and physiological states that
might influence our behavior (such as hunger and thirst) and
describe how we perceive the world
Being hungry, eating, drinking, being born, being ill, watching,
listening, smelling, recognizing, feeling bad, felling hot/cold,
noticing
Emotional state Terms describing our feelings and emotions Happy, pretty, nice, kiss, caressing, cuddle, hug, like, caring,
sad, angry, annoyed, ugly, scared, crying, screaming, getting
bored, worrying, complaining
Willingness state Terms describing what we want to achieve and do Willing, can, hoping, achieving, letting, trying, looking for,
ordering
Cognitive state Terms representing what we cognitively think Knowing, thinking, understanding, remembering, forgetting,
clever, paying attention, true, false
Moral and
socio-relational state
Terms representing our moral perspective and the relationships
between characters
Good, having to, reprimanding, promising, giving thanks,
recommending, obeying, joking, helping, alone, becoming
friends, abandoning, tricking
Examples of temporal connectives are: after, before that, at the
beginning, suddenly, soon, and the like (e.g., Suddenly, the two
boys heard a noise). Based on the number of connectives per total
number of words, we assigned the narratives to four categories of
cohesion: absent; low (the ratio of connectives/words was below
the 33rd percentile); medium (the ratio of connectives/words was
between the 33rd and 66th percentiles); and high (the ratio of
connectives/words was above the 66th percentile). Absent was
assigned a score of 0, low a score of 1, medium a score of 2, and
high a score of 3.
Coherence
The number of incongruences were identified (sentences
introduced by an adversative even though it did not contradict
the previous sentence, such as: the monsters did not want to
make peace, but the monsters wanted to attack). Based on the
number of incoherencies per total number of propositions, we
assigned the narratives to four categories of coherence: absent;
low (the ratio of incoherencies/propositions was below the 33rd
percentile); medium (the ratio of incoherencies/propositions was
between the 33rd and 66th percentiles); and high (the ratio
of incoherencies/propositions was above the 66th percentile).
Absent was assigned a score of 0, low a score of 1, medium a score
of 2, and high a score of 3.
Quality of dialogs
The quality of dialogs was analyzed in terms of discourse moves
and communicative functions (Kovalainen and Kumpulainen,
2005).
Discourse moves
The analysis of discourse moves shows the participatory roles of
each member in collective meaning making. The units of analysis
are participants’ utterances. We coded three types of discourse
moves: children’s initiation moves, that is utterances used to
open a discourse on a particular topic; children’s response moves,
that is utterances that elaborated other initiations or responses;
and children’s follow-up moves, that is utterances that provided
feedback on the ongoing interaction. This analysis allowed us
to explore to what extent children engaged in dialogs, rather
than producing solo-utterances, and what was the role of the
experimenter.
Communicative functions
The analysis of communicative functions focalizes on the message
unit and permits us to explore the nature of the interaction
and its construction in ongoing interactions. The units of
analysis are participants’ utterances. We coded nine categories of
communicative function (Table 3).
Data Analysis
Mental state talk was divided by the fluency of the participants’
productions: the total number of words used to tell the
stories was counted to create ratios, standardize participants’
performances, and check for the potentially confounding effect
of narrative length. Ratios were also calculated for cohesion
and coherence score, dividing raw scores by the total number
of words. Following, mental state talk scores were transformed
into percentiles. There are several ways to explore children’s
narrative competence, adopting both continuous data (Haden
et al., 1997; Fivush et al., 2006), and categorical data (Bigozzi and
Vettori, 2015; Pinto et al., 2015, 2016b). In this study, narrative
competence variables (i.e., mental state talk, structure, cohesion,
and coherence) were re-coded into a 3-point scale using the
percentile distribution: the first point was for scores lower than
the 33rd percentile, the second point for scores between the 33rd
and the 66th percentile and, finally, the third point corresponded
to scores higher than the 66th percentile. Each variable was re-
coded coherently with this positional criteria, both for individual
and for joint narrative tasks.
To verify whether the joint condition systematically improved
students’ mental state talk when compared to their individual
performances we identified incremental and decremental
subjects. To this aim, we compared the individual and joint
performances of each subject, and identified two groups:
individuals who incremented their mental state talk from the
individual to the joint condition (incremental), and individuals
that decremented their mental state talk from the individual to
the joint condition (decremental) (Table 4).
Since prior research showed that children’s narrative
competence develops throughout primary school (Bamberg,
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TABLE 3 | Analysis of communicative functions.
Function Description Example
Evidence negotiation Asking for and presenting evidence, justification or reasons “Yes, short like that, a couple of lines are enough for me”
(Male, first grade).
Defining Asking for and providing definitions, elaboration, clarification or
demonstration
“Ok, first we should agree on the title” (Male, fourth grade).
Experiential Asking for and sharing personal experiences, feelings or
examples from one’s own life
“You know, this has really happened to me” (Female,
second grade).
View sharing Asking for and expressing views, opinions or perspectives “I think a good story should end with ‘happily ever after”’
(Male, first grade).
Information exchange Asking for and providing information, solutions or observations “Isn’t this the story that the teacher told us in class the
other day?” (Female, second grade).
Orchestration of classroom
interaction
Taking charge of the interactive management of speaking turns “Come on, go on with the story please” (Male, fourth grade).
Confirming Acknowledgment and acceptance of the topic of interaction “Shall we create a story on animals?” “Yes, it is a good idea.
Once upon a time . . .” (Females, second grade).
Evaluation Assessment of the contributions to meaning-making “Come on, put some effort, you are driving us away from
the story” (male, fifth grade).
TABLE 4 | Frequencies of decremental and incremental individuals/couples (total scores and divided by grade).
Grade Individuals Couples
Decremental Incremental Total Decremental Incremental Total
1st 2 8 10 1 3 4
2nd 8 6 14 2 0 2
4th 6 8 14 2 4 6
5th 12 4 16 5 1 6
Total 28 26 54 10 8 18
1997), we verified the influence of children’s narrative
competence on the efficacy of peer interaction on mental
state talk. To this aim, we compared performances in structure,
cohesion, and coherence of incremental children versus
decremental children. Then, we verified whether the joint
condition is particularly effective for individuals for low levels
of mental state talk. We tested the frequency of participants’
distribution in the three groups through a binomial statistical
test.
To verify the conditions under which joint narratives have
a beneficial effect on children’s mental state talk, we changed
the unit of analysis from the individual to the couple, and
proceeded to identify incremental and decremental couples.
A couple was defined as incremental if the percentile score
in the joint condition was higher than the scores obtained by
the two participants of the couple in the individual condition.
A couple was defined as decremental, if the percentile score
in the joint condition was lower the scores obtained by the
two participants of the couple in the individual condition
(Table 4). We explored two conditions through a series of
Mann–Whitney U tests: (i) whether the joint condition is
particularly effective for couples made up of individuals with
discrepant individual performances in mental state talk; and
(ii) whether incremental couples were engaged in interactions
of higher quality than decremental couples were. For all
statistical analysis, the effect-size was estimated (Fritz et al.,
2012).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for mental state talk and narrative
competence in the individual and joint condition are reported in
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for quality of interaction in the joint
condition are reported in Table 6.
In the individual condition, mental state talk did not correlate
with any narrative competence score, namely structure (r = 0.14,
p = 0.31), cohesion (r = −0.13, p = 0.34), or coherence
(r = −0.02, p = 0.89). In the joint condition, mental state talk
correlated with cohesion (r = 0.41, p = 0.04), but not with
structure (r = 0.12, p= 0.56) or coherence (r =−0.06, p= 0.77).
According to the Mann–Whitney test, the performances in
structure (U = 359.50, z =−0.81, p= 0.94, η2 = 0.00), cohesion
(U = 300.00, z = −1.11, p = 0.27, η2 = 0.07), and coherence
(U = 267.50, z =−1.80, p= 0.07, η2 = 0.18) of incremental and
decremental children were statistically similar.
Effects of Joint Narratives
The joint condition was not systematically beneficial for all
students’ mental state talk performances. The probability of
using more mental state talk in the joint condition than in the
individual one was not above chance (Binomial test, p = 0.89).
On a descriptive level, we compared the differences from the
individual to the joint performances of incremental versus
decremental participants (Figure 1). In the joint condition,
incremental children are able to increase their use of perceptual,
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TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics for mental state talk and narrative competence (ratios: mental state term/number of words): Mean (M), standard
deviation (SD), median (Mdn), skewness (Skw), and kurtosis (Kur).
Variables Individual condition Joint condition
M SD Mdn Skw Kur M SD Mdn Skw Kur
Mental state talk
Perceptual 0.026 0.022 0.022 0.618 −0.377 0.030 0.023 0.026 0.711 −0.344
Emotional 0.006 0.010 0.008 1.763 4.529 0.009 0.018 0.003 4.123 19.231
Willingness 0.014 0.015 0.009 1.66 2.573 0.015 0.015 0.011 1.559 2.833
Cognitive 0.017 0.025 0.010 2.99 11.257 0.007 0.012 0.002 3.465 14.882
Socio-relational 0.012 0.014 0.009 1.943 4.335 0.013 0.015 0.009 2.201 5.099
Total 0.075 0.038 0.076 −0.030 0.234 0.074 0.023 0.069 0.828 2.499
Narrative competence
Structure 2.67 1.25 2.75 −0.053 −1.513 2.68 1.12 2.00 0.023 −1.491
Cohesion 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.048 0.256 0.06 0.04 0.06 3.037 13.949
Coherence 0.03 0.05 0 1.583 2.072 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.762 −0.266
TABLE 6 | Descriptive statistics for quality of interaction (count of
discourse moves and communicative functions): Mean, standard
deviation, median, skewness, and kurtosis.
Variables M SD Mdn Skw Kur
Discourse moves
Student’s initiation 1.68 1.56 1.00 1.579 2.615
Student’s response 6.46 4.61 5.00 0.655 −0.644
Student’s feedback 3.14 3.12 2.00 0.941 −0.010
Total student’s moves 11.28 6.98 10.00 0.960 0.666
Communicative functions
Confirm (accept an argument) 1.21 1.83 0.50 1.991 3.798
Give/ask for a definition 4.07 2.83 4.00 0.949 0.350
Assessment of contributions 0.07 0.26 0 3.520 11.183
Negotiation of evidence 0.68 0.90 0 1.359 1.291
Share experience 0.75 1.14 0 1.494 1.401
Give/ask for questions 3.21 3.63 3.00 1.912 4.696
Orchestrate the interaction 0.61 1.29 0 3.173 11.591
Give/ask for opinion 0.04 0.19 0 5.292 28.000
moral, and willingness terms, whereas emotional terms are
substantially stable in the two conditions. Instead, incremental
children also decrease their use of cognitive terms in the joint
condition. Decremental individuals decrease the use of mental
state talk in all categories from the individual to the joint
condition, with cognitive terms displaying the higher percentage
of change.
Conditions of Efficacy of the Joint
Condition
To explore the conditions under which joint narratives increase
children’s mental state talk, we changed our unit of analysis
to couples (incremental and decremental). To illustrate the
differences in incrementation and presence of mental state in
the individual narrative across grades, in Table 1 we report the
means of the incremental couples’ mental state talk ratios in the
individual and joint condition, for the total sample as well as for
each grade.
When analyses were conducted at the individual level, one
statistical significant result emerged. According to the Mann–
Whitney U test, incremental individuals (Rank mean = 20.54)
had lower levels of mental state talk in the individual condition
than decremental individuals had (Rank mean = 33.96),
U = 183.00, z =−3.14, P < 0.01, η2 = 0.55.
When analyses were conducted at the couple level, two
statistical significant result emerged, both related to differences
in quality of interaction. When we compared types of couples
on the basis of discrepancy among individual performances in
mental state talk of the two members of each couple, the Mann–
Whitney U test did not report a statistically significant difference
(Table 7). When we compared types of couples on the basis
of quality of interaction (discourse moves, and communicative
functions), the Mann–Whitney U test showed that incremental
couples are characterized by more dialogs initiated by the teacher,
and more utterances aimed at orchestrating the interaction than
decremental couples are. Although not a significant result, the
Mann–Whitney showed a tendency for students in incremental
couples to speak more than students in decremental couples
(Table 7).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to analyze whether a joint narrative
condition influenced children’s production on mental state talk.
Mental state talk is a valid and reliable indicator of children’s
ToM (Dunn and Hughes, 1998; Astington and Baird, 2005;
Symons et al., 2005; Antonietti et al., 2006), thus the results of
this study can contribute to our understanding of the influence
of interactional contexts and discursive practices in school
on children’s understanding of other people’s thoughts, beliefs,
feelings, and intentions. School peer-interaction practices have
a demonstrated positive effect on several aspects of the child’s
psychology (e.g., academic performances, O’Donnell and King,
1999; cognitive development, Riese et al., 2012; and social skills,
Ginsburg-Block et al., 2006), and we extended this effect to
mental state talk. We were interested in the conditions under
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FIGURE 1 | Patterns of changes of mental state talk categories from the individual to the joint condition.
TABLE 7 | Mean rank comparison between the two types of couples (incremental vs. decremental) in terms of mean discrepancy between individual
performances of the two members of each couple and quality of interaction (discourse moves and communicative functions): sample sizes, mean ranks,
Mann–Whitney U test (ZU), p-value and effect-size (η2).
U Z p η2 Mean rank
Decremental Incremental
Discrepancy 23.00 −1.51 0.13 0.13 7.80 11.63
Discourse moves
T’s initiation 17.50 −2.08 0.04 0.24 7.25 12.31
T’s response 26.50 −1.26 0.21 0.09 8.15 11.19
T’s feedback 28.50 −1.03 0.30 0.06 8.35 10.94
T’s total moves 23.00 −1.52 0.13 0.13 7.80 11.63
S’s initiation 23.00 −1.59 0.11 0.14 7.80 11.63
S’s response 25.50 −1.30 0.19 0.09 8.05 11.31
S’s feedback 27.00 −1.18 0.24 0.08 8.20 11.13
S’s total moves 21.00 −1.70 0.09 0.16 7.60 11.88
Communicative functions
Confirming 31.50 −0.87 0.39 0.04 10.35 8.44
Defining 38.50 −0.14 0.89 0.01 9.35 9.69
Evaluation 40.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 9.50 9.50
Evidence negotiations 34.50 −0.53 0.60 0.02 10.05 8.81
Experiential 34.50 −0.58 0.56 0.02 10.05 8.81
Information exchange 35.00 −0.45 0.65 0.01 9.00 10.13
Orchestration of the interaction 17.00 −2.18 0.03 0.26 6.89 11.38
View sharing 35.00 −1.12 0.26 0.07 9.00 10.13
T, teacher; S, student.
which a peer-interaction context improves children’s mental state
talk.
Firstly, we controlled the effect of narrative competence.
Narratives themselves are an important source of mental state
talk (Dyer et al., 2000), thus children’s production of mental
states could be influenced by their capacity to represent the
protagonist’s intentions and subsequent actions (Pelletier and
Beatty, 2015). Our resulted indicated that children’s production
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of mental state talk was unrelated to their competence in
producing a narrative with a conventional structure, either in
the individual or joint condition. Mental state talk appears to
be an independent component of children’s mind, which can be
facilitated or hindered by contextual variables, such as a narrative
task, but does not overlap with other skills involved by the task
itself, such as narrative competence. In other words, children’s
mental state talk is activated by narratives, rather than being a
by-product of narrative competence. Prior research showed that
children’s narrative competence develops throughout primary
school (Bamberg, 1997). In this study, we controlled for this
potentially confounding effect by comparing incremental and
decremental children’s performances in structure, cohesion
and coherence. No significant difference emerged, suggesting
that children’s developing narrative competence did not play
a significant role in supporting mental state talk. Narrative
competence and ToM appear to be independent constructs.
The results of this study confirmed that peer interaction
does not automatically lead to increased performances, as not
necessarily are two students able to engage in a productive
collaboration (Prangsma et al., 2007). Before turning our
attention to the conditions under which peer interaction
produces an increase in mental state talk, let us discuss changes
in the patterns of mental state talk from the individual to
the joint condition in incremental and decremental couples.
In the joint condition, incremental couples increase their use
of perceptual and physiological terms, willingness terms, and
moral terms. In particular, incremental and decremental couples
display the largest difference in the use of moral terms. Thus,
peer interaction seems to act on the core component of a
narrative. According to Linde (2010), it is the inclusion of
a moral meaning that distinguishes a story from a list of
events or a chronicle. Interestingly, moral components cannot
be completely defined structurally, as confirmed by the lack of
correlation between mental state talk and narrative competence,
including the structural component. Linde (2010) also added that
a narrative can be considered successful if there is an agreement
on the moral meaning of a story. Generally, such an agreement
should take place between the narrator and the interlocutor,
whereas a joint narrative activity requires this agreement to be
reached by the two narrators. In this sense, peer interaction might
be a reflective tool on the moral aspects of a story and on its
dialogical nature.
The other two main differences between incremental and
decremental couples in terms of change across the two conditions
concern perceptual-physiological terms and willingness terms. As
suggested by previous studies Pelletier and Beatty (2015) children
need high levels of mental state talk to create a narrative based
on the characters intentions and the subsequent actions. Thus,
peer interaction might stimulate children to share and negotiate
the intentions of the characters of the joint narrative (i.e.,
willingness states) and the actions connected to such intentions
(i.e., perceptual and physiological states). Feathers (2002) stated
that if the characters’ intentions are explicitly described in a
narrative, then children are abler to identify each mental state
present in the story, and peer interaction might contribute to this
link.
Once confirmed that peer interaction does not automatically
lead to higher performances in mental state talk, we proceeded
to explore the conditions under which children increased their
mental state talk from the individual to the joint condition.
A first variable controlled in this study was children’s individual
levels of mental state talk. Prior studies have demonstrated in
certain cases, children’s ToM, as assessed by a standardized test,
is more strictly related to their individual mental state talk, rather
than to the mental state talk produced while interacting with a
partner (i.e., older partner, Symons et al., 2005). According to
our data, children included in the incremental couples had lower
levels of mental state talk in individual narratives than children
included in the decremental couples did. Thus the facilitating
effect of a peer-interaction condition is confirmed for children
who are at the moment of initial elaboration or emergence
of mental state talk, in line with prior studies demonstrating
the conditions under which group performance is superior to
individual performance (Mugny et al., 1981).
A second variable explored in this study to explore the
conditions under which peer interaction positively influences
children’s mental state talk was discrepancy between the
individual mental state talk of the two members of a couple.
According to our data, the individual levels of mental state talk of
members of incremental couples were not more or less discrepant
than the ones of decremental couples. This finding emphasizes
that for peer learning to be effective, there is no need to create
a couple with an asymmetrical relationship (“peer tutoring;”
Duran and Monereo, 2005), a model advocated by Vygotsky, who
claimed that problem-solving in interaction with more expert
peers allows the child to enter new areas of potential (i.e., zone
of proximal development), with both members of the couple
benefitting from the interaction by internalizing all the processes
enacted during the meaning-constructing discourse (Vygotsky,
1978).
Finally, we examined the interaction between partners in joint
narratives in terms of source of interaction and communicative
use of language. According to our data, incremental couples
interacted more than decremental couples did, as shown by a
higher number of interventions by the children. Also, children
produced more utterances to orchestrate and regulate the dialog,
which is probably the reason why children in the incremental
couples interacted more and, in turn, benefitted more from the
joint narrative condition. Peer-assisted learning contexts require
high levels of intersubjectivity, which needs to be accomplished
by mutual adjustments of the two partners (Ginsburg-Block et al.,
2006; Tarchi and Pinto, 2015). None of the other comparisons was
statistically significant. Students in incremental and decremental
couples seemed to interact in a similar way: they mainly
interacted to define and elaborate the topic of their narrative,
exchanged information and confirmed that they agreed on their
partner’s story-lines.
CONCLUSION
This study describes the effect of peer-interaction on mental
state talk. Our results suggest that a peer interaction intervention
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is mostly beneficial for children with lower levels of individual
mental state talk. This is consistent with a traditional line of
research on socio-cognitive conflict emphasizing how children
progress as a function of interacting with others is significant
when they are in the initial stages of the elaboration of the
target process (Mugny et al., 1981). Moreover, interaction played
an essential part in the effect of peer-learning. Children who
improved their mental state talk in the joint condition have
been able to create a high level of intersubjectivity with their
partner, as demonstrated by the higher number of interventions
to orchestrate the dialog. When focusing on the interaction,
as well as the product, children were also able to achieve a
mutual understanding of the activity by being exposed to each
other’s reasoning behind their own viewpoint (Kruger, 1993).
This mechanism appeared to be more important than having
students working with a more expert peer (peer tutoring, Duran
and Monereo, 2005).
This finding provides useful information for educators:
children’s ToM can be improved through children’s engagement
in a peer-assisted learning task. Moreover, in agreement with
Pelletier and Beatty (2015), we believe that this study also
contributes to improving children’s appreciation of narratives,
which could be hindered by an impaired understanding of
the story characters’ mental states. Furthermore, our results
emphasize the importance of the role played by the teacher.
Incremental couples were characterized by more interventions
by the adult, which scaffolded children’s interactions and co-
construction of the story.
This study was affected by a few limitations. Firstly, our
results are limited by the small sample size, which determines
problems of statistical powers and risks of not finding existing
associations between variables. Moreover, the size of our sample
sizes did not allow to test the moderation effect of age on
the association between peer interaction and mental state talk.
Secondly, although several studies used and validated mental
state talk as an implicit measure of ToM (e.g., Dunn and Hughes,
1998; Astington and Baird, 2005; Symons et al., 2005; Antonietti
et al., 2006), results from this study would be sounder if an explicit
evaluation of ToM with a specific test was included. Thirdly,
past studies have shown that children’s ToM and mental state
talk correlate with other variables, such as executive functions
(Bianco et al., 2015). Future studies should include these variables
and examine whether the results obtained in this study partially
depend on their influence. Fourthly, generalization of results is
limited by the research design of this study, in particular by
the use of oral narratives. Prior studies have demonstrated the
presence of a discontinuity in children’s narrative competence,
when writing is introduced (Pinto et al., 2015, 2016b). In primary
school children are asked to write their narratives, rather than
tell them, but we believe in the importance of keeping oral
narratives in primary school too, given their fundamental role
in eliciting and organizing children’s ToM through the use of
mental state talk (Guajardo and Watson, 2002; Pinto et al.,
2016a). Finally, in this study children were allowed to create
stories without specific directions. As a consequence, children’s
narratives resulted in a wide variety of contents. Prior studies
emphasized the influence of the context and instructions on
children’s narrative production (e.g., Berman, 1995; Cameron
and Hutchison, 2009), and future studies should verify whether
also mental state talk depends on the instructions given and the
content of the stories produced.
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The influence of internalizing and externalizing problems on children’s understanding
of others’ emotions has mainly been investigated on basic levels of emotion
comprehension. So far, studies assessing more sophisticated levels of emotion
comprehension reported deficits in the ability to understand others’ emotions in
children with severe internalizing or externalizing symptoms. The aim of this study
was to investigate the relation between emotion comprehension and interindividual
differences, with a focus on internalizing and externalizing behavior in children aged
7–10 years from the general population. A sample of 135 children was tested for
emotion understanding using the Test of Emotion Comprehension. Information on
internalizing and externalizing behavior was assessed with the Child Behavior Checklist
4/18. Age, bilingual upbringing, and amount of paternal working hours were significant
control variables for emotion comprehension. In contrast to prior research, overall level
of emotion understanding was not related to externalizing symptoms and correlated
positively with elevated levels of somatic complaints and anxious/depressed symptoms.
In addition, and in line with previous work, higher levels of social withdrawal were
associated with worse performance in understanding emotions elicited by reminders.
The present results implicate not only an altered understanding of emotions among
more specific internalizing symptoms, but also that these alterations occur already on a
low symptom level in a community based sample.
Keywords: emotion comprehension, emotion understanding, behavioral problems, internalizing, externalizing,
child behavior checklist
INTRODUCTION
Emotion comprehension is defined as the knowledge to identify and understand others’ emotions
by facial or bodily cues, and within specific social contexts (Harris et al., 2016). Emotion
comprehension develops up until early adolescence along with increasing abilities in perspective
taking and understanding of social and moral norms, and can therefore be described as the affective
side of social cognition (Wellman, 2014).
Pons et al. (2004) identified at least nine successive components of emotion comprehension,
which children master until the age of 11 years and which can be assessed via the Test of Emotion
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1917 | 69
fpsyg-07-01917 December 5, 2016 Time: 16:0 # 2
Göbel et al. Emotion Understanding and Behavioral Problems
Comprehension (TEC, Pons et al., 2004). The proposed
components can be categorized into three developmental phases:
First, in the external phase, children between 3 and 5 years
are able to recognize and label facial expressions of basic
emotions (e.g., Bullock and Russell, 1985), infer a person’s
emotion based on situational cues (e.g., Cutting and Dunn,
1999), and understand that an external reminder may reactivate
a past emotional state (e.g., Lagattuta et al., 1997). By the age
of 7 years, children master the mental phase characterized by
the improved ability of perspective taking. Within this phase,
children understand that two persons can experience different
emotions regarding an object depending on how strong their
desire to receive the object is (e.g., Harris et al., 1987). Further,
children understand that the same situation can elicit different
emotions in two persons depending on their belief about the
context of the situation (e.g., being aware of danger or not;
Pons et al., 2004). At the same age, they know that a person’s
outward emotional expression and internal emotional experience
can deviate from each other (Wellman and Liu, 2004). Finally,
by around 9 years, children take different, divergent perspectives
on the same scenario into account and by doing so, learn
to understand the components of the reflective phase. They
understand that incorporating different perspectives on a given
situation may result in conflicting, mixed emotions in the same
person, that a transgression of moral rules to satisfy a desire leads
to negative emotions (e.g., Lagattuta, 2005), and moreover that
cognitive strategies can effectively regulate emotions (e.g., Stegge
and Terwogt, 2007).
Although it was shown that despite of small variations on
component level, the development of emotion understanding
from a rather external to a deeper, more complex understanding
is similar among western and non-western cultures (Janke,
2008; Roazzi et al., 2009; Molina et al., 2014), some studies
report evidence that interindividual differences influence the
ontogenesis of emotion comprehension. Especially the child’s
receptive (understanding and comprehension of spoken or
written words/sentences) and expressive (production of spoken
or written words/sentences) language abilities are related to
emotion comprehension throughout childhood (e.g., Cutting and
Dunn, 1999; Pons et al., 2003; Beck et al., 2012). Moreover,
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies indicate that not general
language abilities only, but also the amount of communication
of mental and emotional states with parents and older siblings
influences children’s current and later emotion understanding
(Brown and Dunn, 1992; Cutting and Dunn, 1999). In accordance
with these findings, training studies confirm the positive effect
of explicit emotion state talk on emotion comprehension (e.g.,
Pons et al., 2003; Gavazzi and Ornaghi, 2011). Additionally,
factors like the socioeconomic status, the quality of attachment
between family members, or non-verbal intelligence scores have
been identified as positive predictors of emotion comprehension
(Meins and Fernyhough, 1999; Albanese et al., 2010; Colle and
Del Giudice, 2011).
Besides the aforementioned factors, children’s behavioral
problems in form of internalizing and externalizing symptoms
have been identified to be associated not only with social
adjustment but also with their ability to understand others’
emotions. Among children and adolescents, internalizing and
externalizing problems are the most common mental health
problems with prevalence rates of ∼10 and 14%, respectively
(Ihle and Esser, 2002; Hölling et al., 2007). Internalizing problems
are characterized by anxious and depressive symptoms, social
withdrawal and somatic complaints. Externalizing problems on
the other hand are defined as aggressive, oppositional, and
delinquent behavior. Long-term consequences are problems
within social, school and later professional environment (Ihle
et al., 2000). Over the course of development, gender differences
for the prevalence rate of emotional problems and behavior
problems occur: While boys show higher rates of internalizing
symptoms during childhood, an increase in internalizing
symptoms is reported for teenage girls and young women with
greater long-term stability (Ihle et al., 2000; Hölling et al., 2007).
Externalizing symptoms are in general more common among
boys, have an earlier onset in childhood, and show higher
persistence rates with more unfavorable courses (Plück et al.,
2000).
Longitudinal studies investigating the relation between
behavioral problems and emotion understanding in samples
from the general population report that pre-schoolers’ ability
to recognize others’ facial expression negatively predicted
the level of externalizing symptoms during pre-school years
(Denham et al., 2002). Further, the comprehension of facial
emotional expression and emotion situation knowledge of
socially disadvantaged first-graders predicted their level of self-
reported internalizing symptoms 4 years later (Izard, 2001; Fine
et al., 2003). In a recent meta-analysis, Trentacosta and Fine
(2010) investigated the comprehension of discrete emotions,
which can directly be identified via facial expression, gesture,
vocalization, or social context. The authors report robust low to
medium negative effect sizes for internalizing and externalizing
symptoms present in both community and clinical samples.
Considering the age subgroups separately, effect sizes varied as
a function of age –with small negative effect sizes for 3- to 5-
year-olds, and medium negative effect sizes for 9- to 15-year-olds.
However, for 6- to 11-year-old children, no significant effects of
internalizing or externalizing symptoms were found.
Noteworthy, the few studies comprising the oldest age
group mostly assessed emotion knowledge in samples of
children with clinically relevant behavioral problems. Overall,
the above-mentioned results support the assumption that
children with internalizing and externalizing behavior in both
clinically diagnosed and community samples have difficulties in
understanding discrete emotions.
However, only a few studies have investigated this relation
testing more complex aspects of emotion comprehension
(Southam-Gerow and Kendall, 2000). Regarding internalizing
symptoms, most evidence for a relationship with higher levels
of emotion comprehension derives from studies investigating
clinically referred children with depression and anxiety disorders.
Researchers focusing on individual components of emotion
comprehension report that children diagnosed with depression
or anxiety disorders show a significant worse understanding of
situations eliciting mixed emotions (Meerum Terwogt, 1990)
and less knowledge of strategies to regulate or hide emotions
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(Southam-Gerow and Kendall, 2000). In a study testing the
performance in all TEC components in a sample of clinically
anxious 8- to 12-year olds, no association between emotion
comprehension and the general level of anxiety symptoms
could be found, but between more specific forms of anxiety
in obsessive-compulsive and post-traumatic stress disorder and
emotion comprehension (Bender et al., 2015). To our knowledge,
no study so far investigated the association between all nine TEC
components and internalizing behavior in a sample from the
general population.
Regarding the understanding of higher levels of emotions in
children with externalizing behavior, studies are rare and report
mixed results. Sutton et al. (1999) report that 7- to 10-year-
old children, who were identified by their teachers as ringleader
bullies (defined as verbally or physically attacking others) actually
showed a better understanding in social cognition tasks including
emotion comprehension compared to their classmates. Belacchi
and Farina (2010) were first to test the correlation between the
TEC and teacher-rated social role in a pre-school aged sample
and confirmed a better emotion understanding in children being
categorized as bullies, their reinforcers or assistants for the first
component of emotion comprehension (facial recognition) only.
No relations were found for the remaining components, or the
total TEC score. On the contrary, children being categorized
as members of prosocial groups showed positive associations
with the understanding of affective expressions and emotions
elicited by situational cues or desires. However, these studies
focus on teachers’ reports of students’ social roles in the
school environment, which might not validly reflect externalizing
behavior in general. Therefore, research on the relation of higher
levels of emotion comprehension and symptoms of behavioral
problems is needed.
A model to explain the association between deficits in
emotion comprehension and behavioral problems is the Social
Information Processing Model (SIP) by Crick and Dodge (1994).
Originally developed to explain the association between an
altered perception and processing of social information in
children with externalizing behavior, the model was later adapted
to children with internalizing symptoms (Luebbe et al., 2010).
Within SIP, six steps are proposed to explain how information
is processed, and how subsequent actions are planned and
performed. First, stimuli from the social environment or own
body signals (e.g., increased heartbeat) are encoded and in a
second step interpreted based on the evaluation of possible
intentions of the other person (e.g., to be nice or mean), own
goals, motivations and the perception of own personality. In a
third step, based on this evaluation, actual personal goals for
this interaction are defined (e.g., wish to play with the other
person or to leave the situation). Next, based on information
from the long-term memory, possible actions are generated to
reach this goal. The fifth step is to choose the reaction fitting
best to the prior defined goals or outcome expectations, which
is afterward performed in the sixth step. Part of this process is
also to consider, how socially accepted the generated options of
reactions are. For example, to punch someone might seem like
the easiest way to end a conflict, but would most likely not be the
most socially acceptable solution. Social responses following the
reaction and its effectiveness are themselves processed, evaluated
and stored in long-term memory. Early subjective experiences
from the social environment form scripts and schemata on how
social interactions are constructed and usually take place. These
scripts and schemata are necessary to ensure fast, efficient and
subconscious information processing, orientation and capacity to
act in everyday life (e.g., Salzer Burks et al., 1999). The more often
they are activated, the stronger they are anchored in the long-
term memory, leading to an even faster and automated activation
in the right context. Therefore, they can show high stability
from child- to adulthood. Despite its efficiency, information
processing based on automatically activated scripts and schemata
leaves out non-compliant information and situational stimuli,
subsequently leading to a bias in processing social situations,
and consequently influences the development and stabilization
of maladjusted behavior patterns. Maladjusted behavior on the
other hand leads to negative experiences from the environment
and might strengthen processing biases in a feedback loop (Crick
and Dodge, 1994).
Several studies support this model. A meta-analysis of 36
studies investigating clinical and community samples found
that children with disruptive and aggressive behavior showed
a bias in the first steps of SIP during the processing of
situational cues and stimuli (Yoon et al., 1999). The authors
do not only report an attentional bias with neglecting relevant
general situational cues, but also higher rates of encoding cues
associated with hostility. Furthermore, children more often
attributed negative intentions behind the behavior of others.
Longitudinal studies investigating community samples report
that an altered and biased information processing in pre-
schoolers predicted both lower popularity among peers, and an
increased amount of aggressive behavior in the same children
when they were school-aged and teenagers (Dodge et al., 2003;
Lansford et al., 2006). Studies applying the SIP paradigm
to children with anxious and depressive symptoms also find
a negative information processing style with higher rates of
attributing ambiguous situations as negative, attributing negative
intentions to others in social interactions and generating contra-
productive behavior responses to solve a hypothetical situation
(Daleiden and Vasey, 1997; Luebbe et al., 2010). Bell et al. (2009)
found associations between negative attributional biases and
symptoms of both anxiety and depression in a factor-analytic
study assessing 8- to 13-year-old children recruited from public
schools. Additionally, only depressive symptoms were negatively
associated with positive SIP. The associations between SIP biases
in perception and evaluation of information from social contexts
might also explain the above reported associations between both
externalizing and internalizing behavior and the comprehension
of others’ emotion.
Overall, the aforementioned studies indicate a lower
understanding of others’ emotions in children showing
both internalizing and externalizing symptoms. However,
impairments in emotion comprehension cannot easily be
traced back to behavioral problems in general. Most studies
investigating this association focus on the comprehension of
discrete emotion in pre-school-aged children. Little is known
about the relation of more sophisticated aspects of emotion
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comprehension and internalizing and externalizing behavior
in children beyond the pre-school years from the general
population. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to
investigate the nine components of emotion comprehension
in normally developing, school-aged children (7–10 years of
age) and interindividual differences in emotion comprehension
related to internalizing and externalizing behavior. In accordance
with prior research, we expected to find an age effect for emotion
comprehension, with older children outperforming younger
ones.
In line with the above mentioned results from both
community and clinical samples, and based on the assumption
of an altered information processing in maladjusted children, we
expected internalizing and externalizing behavior to negatively
correlate with emotion comprehension and to independently
explain unique variance of emotion understanding.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The final sample comprised N = 135 children (72 female),
with 34 7-year-olds (age in months M = 90.5, SD = 3.19, 17
female), 33 8-year-olds (M = 100.64, SD = 3.56, 19 female),
34 9-year-olds (M = 113.85, SD = 3.8, 18 female), and 34 10-
year-olds (M = 124.62, SD = 3.7, 18 female). Of these, 12%
were raised bilingually, 42.2% had one sibling and 34.8% two
or more siblings. Regarding parental educational background,
69.7% of the fathers and 58.2% of the mothers had a high school
or university degree. Further, 14.8% of the mothers and 3.7%
of the fathers were unemployed, 66.7% of mothers and 9.6%
of fathers were working half-time, and 18.5% of the mothers
and 86.7% of the fathers were working full-time. All participants
lived in Saarbrücken or its adjacent municipalities. The sample
was recruited during open house events at Saarland University,
Germany, by handing out flyers at schools, and by contacting
interested families who had already participated in other studies
of the department. Additional 12 children were tested but
excluded due to developmental disorders (n = 2) and chronic
diseases (n = 2) possibly influencing their performance, or to
insufficient data provided by the parents (n= 8). The experiment
was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty for Social
and Applied Human Sciences at Saarland University (running
number of ethical approval EK16-10).
Measures
Socio-Demographic Questionnaire
Parents were asked to answer questions about their maternal
and paternal education level as indices of their socioeconomic
status (no degree = 0; general school certificate = 1, secondary
school certificate = 2, advanced technical college certificate = 3,
vocational technical diploma = 4, high school diploma = 5,
university degree = 6), marital status (married/cohabiting = 0
and separated/single-parent household = 1) and number of
siblings and friends. Maternal and paternal working hours
(unemployed = 0, half-time employment = 1, and full-time
employment = 2) were assessed as indices of their potential
time spent with the family. Since Saarbrücken is located
within the German-French border region, child’s mother
tongue (German = 0; other = 1) and bilingual upbringing
(monolingual = 0, bilingual = 1) were also assessed. Further,
the child’s medical history regarding chronic diseases or
developmental disorders was assessed as exclusion criteria.
Child Behavior Checklist 4/18
The degree of internalizing and externalizing symptoms was
assessed with the German version of the Child Behavior Checklist
(CBCL 4/18, Döpfner et al., 1994a). The CBCL 4/18 is a widely
used parent report questionnaire assessing their child’s social
competence and problematic behavior within the last 6 months.
This screening tool was developed as part of the empirically
based dimensional classification system by Achenbach and
Rescorla (2001). Within the dimensional approach, mental health
problems are understood as characteristics along continuous
dimensions of psychologic functioning, differing from normal
development due to the intensity of reported symptoms. One
hundred and eighteen problem items form in total eight
syndrome scales, which can be combined to second order, broad
scales. The for this study relevant broad scale Internalizing
Problems is formed by the sum score of the three syndrome
scales Withdrawn, Somatic Complaints, and Anxious/Depressed.
Further, the broad scale Externalizing Problems is formed by
the two syndrome scales Rule-Breaking Behavior and Aggressive
Behavior. Each syndrome scale consists of those items, which
loaded in factor and principal component analyses together on
one factor and therefore form a syndrome cluster on the specific
scale. Answers to each item are coded on a 3-point Likert- scale
with 0 = not true, 1 = somewhat or sometimes true, 2 = very true
or often true. Final T-values for broad scales and syndrome scales
are calculated sensitive to gender. The T-values of the CBCL
broad scales differ from those of the syndrome scales. For the
broad scales Internalizing Problems and Externalizing Problems,
a score from 60 to 62 marks behavior problems on a subclinical, a
score of 64 or higher on a clinically relevant level. On syndrome
scale level, a T-value between 67 and 70 marks behavior problems
on a subclinical, a score of 71 or higher on a clinical level.
For the German translation, Cronbach’s alpha of the syndrome
scales and broad scales ranges between α = 0.56 and α = 0.91.
Further, confirmed convergent and discriminant validity of the
German version was previously reported (Döpfner et al., 1994b;
Schmeck et al., 2001). In this study, Cronbach’s alpha of the broad
scale Internalizing Problems was α = 0.82 and ranged between
α = 0.36 and 0.79 in the syndrome subscales. Regarding the
Externalizing Problems scale Cronbach’s Alpha was α = 0.88.
Cronbach’s Alpha for the subscales Rule-Breaking Behavior and
Aggressive Behavior were α= 0.39 and α= 0.88, respectively.
Intelligence and Development Scales 5–10
To control for the level of language comprehension, a test
taken from the Intelligence and Development Scales 5–10 (IDS
5–10, Grob et al., 2009) was conducted to assess receptive
language comprehension. The IDS 5–10 is a test battery to assess
cognitive development, language comprehension, mathematics,
achievement motivation, psychomotor, and socio-emotional
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development. In the test for receptive language comprehension,
the examiner first shows different toys to the child, introducing
them one after the other with a specific name (e.g., girl, boy,
dog, cat) and puts them on the table in front of the child.
Afterward the examiner reads aloud a behavior description of one
or more characters, which the child is asked to reenact using the
specific toys. The tests consists of 12 successive sentences, with
increasing difficulty due to higher complexity of the behavior
sequences. Scoring ranges between 0 (wrong reenactment), 0.5
(right reenactment but order of sequences is wrong), and 1
(right reenactment, right order of sequences). To compare the
different age groups, T-values are calculated for each age group
individually. Reliability of the receptive language subtest is
satisfactory with a Cronbach’s Alpha of α = 0.88 and a test-retest
reliability of rtt = 0.57. Construct and criterion validity are also
reported (see also Grob et al., 2009 for more details). For this
study, the Cronbach’s Alpha values were α = 0.57 and by this
below those reported by the Grob et al. (2009).
Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC)
The TEC (Pons and Harris, 2000) was developed to test nine
components of emotion understanding, namely (I) recognition
of facial expression, (II) external causes of emotions, (III)
desire-based emotions, (IV) belief-based emotions, (V) the
influence of a reminder on present emotional states, (VI)
regulation of emotional states, (VII) hiding emotional states,
(VIII) having mixed emotions, and (IX) emotions caused by
moral considerations. In this study, the German version of the
TEC was used (Janke, 2008). The test material consist of a
picture book with simple drawings. The examiner presents nine
short stories to the child, each accompanied by at least one
drawing. Below the drawing for each vignette, its protagonist
is portrayed with four out of five possible different emotion
outcomes (“happy,” “sad,” “angry,” “scared,” or “just alright”).
Depending on participants’ own gender, a corresponding version
of the picture book with either female or male protagonists was
presented. At the end of each story, the child is asked to point
on the most appropriate emotion outcome. For each component,
a score of 1 is assigned if answered correctly. The overall score
of emotion understanding ranges from 0 to 9. Since research by
Janke (2008) with a German sample and Albanese et al. (2006)
with an Italian sample showed that especially for components III
and IV, children often chose the neutral instead of the expected
positive emotion outcome, scoring was adjusted accordingly.
Therefore, in addition to the original scoring by Pons et al. (2004),
choosing the neutral emotion outcome for the components III
and IV was accepted as a correct answer. The British version
of the TEC showed in a sample of 9-year-olds good test-retest
reliability after 3 months with r(18) = 0.84 (Pons et al., 2002).
In another study with a sample of 7-to-11-year-olds, test-retest
reliability after 13 months controlled for age and gender was
r(40) = 0.68 (Tenenbaum et al., 2004). Its validity was also
positively evaluated (see Pons et al., 2004).
Statistical Analysis
Cases were excluded from further analyses, if information on
sociodemographic variables (n= 6) was missing. Additionally, in
line with the manual guidelines, CBCL scores were not calculated
when answers on more than eight items were missing (Döpfner
et al., 1994a). Further, if more than 20% of items were missing for
a specific scale, this scale was excluded from analyses (n = 2).
Answers missing completely at random were replaced by the
average of the other items for this scale (Schafer and Graham,
2002). Since there was only one child being raised with another
mother tongue, this variable was excluded from further analyses.
Inspection of means, standard deviations, skewness, and
kurtosis of the assessed variables revealed that both the CBCL
broad and syndrome scales had right-skewed distributions.
Therefore, their T-values were log-transformed for further
analyses. In order to assess differences in emotion comprehension
for gender and the four age groups, a 2 (gender) × 4 (age:
7, 8, 9, and 10 years) ANOVA was performed with the total
TEC score as the dependent variable. Prior to conducting
the ANOVA, the data were checked for homogeneity of
variance and independence of observed variables. Additionally,
a Kruskal–Wallis-test was conducted to test for significant age
differences on the individual components of the TEC. To test for
associations between the TEC total score and potential control
variables (IDS score, maternal/paternal educational background,
maternal/paternal working hours, bilingual upbringing, number of
siblings, number of friends, marital status), bivariate Pearson and
Spearman correlations were performed. Since for each variable a
specific direction of relation was expected based on the literature,
significance of the correlations were tested one-tailed.
To test the hypotheses of negative relations between emotion
comprehension and internalizing or externalizing symptoms,
Spearman correlations (one-tailed) were conducted. Following
this, backward regression analyses were performed to investigate
the amount of variance in emotion comprehension explained by
each predictor. Finally, the associations between the CBCL broad
and syndrome scales and each TEC component using Pearson
bivariate correlations (two-tailed) were explored. All statistical
analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS R© 22 and the statistical
level for significance was set at α= 0.05.
RESULTS
Test of Emotion Comprehension
For the total sample, the TEC score ranged from 3 to 9, (M= 7.21,
SD = 1.8, n = 135). A 2(gender) × 4 (age group) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of age on the total TEC score,
F3,127 = 6.95, p < 0.001; ηp2 = 0.14. Moreover, neither a
significant main effect for gender (F1,127 = 0.862, p = 0.36,
ηp
2 = 0.007), nor a significant interaction between age and
gender (F3,127 = 6.95, p = 0.574, ηp2 = 0.015) were revealed.
Post hoc contrast analyses using Tukey- HSD controlling for
Type 1 error revealed that 7-year-olds (M = 6.56; SD = 1.44)
had significantly lower TEC scores than 9-year-olds (M = 7.38;
SD = 1.02; p < 0.05) and 10-year-olds (M = 7.85; SD = 0.989;
p < 0.01). In addition, the 8-year-olds showed significant lower
TEC scores than the 10-year-olds (p < 0.05). The 9-year-olds did
not significantly differ from the 8-year-olds (M= 7.03; SD= 1.29;
p≥ 0.629) or 10-year-olds (p≥ 0.375). Further, while component
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I (recognition) and component II (external cause) had a correct
response rate of 100% for the whole sample, a Kruskal–Wallis-
test revealed significant age differences in the expected direction
for the components IV (belief- based emotion), V (reminder), VII
(hiding emotions), and VIII (mixed emotions, see Table 1).
Regarding the assessed control variables, analyses revealed
significant correlations between the total TEC score and Paternal
working hours (rs = −0.235, p < 0.01), and total TEC score
and bilingual upbringing (r = 0.154, p < 0.05) only. Children
of fathers with less working hours or no employment and those
being raised with a second language scored higher on the total
TEC score. For the variables IDS score, maternal educational
background, paternal educational background, maternal working
hours, number of siblings, number of friends, or marital status no
significant correlations were found (all p-values ≥ 0.111).
Internalizing and Externalizing Behavior
An independent t-test revealed a significant gender difference for
the Externalizing Problems scale, with girls (M= 49.2, SD= 8.82)
having a significantly lower score than boys (M = 55.3,
SD = 9.59, t(133) = −3.6, p < 0.001, d = 0.66). For Internalizing
Problems, the difference of mean scores between girls (M = 52.0,
SD = 9.13) and boys (M = 54.9, SD = 8.88) was not significant
(t(133) =−1.77, p ≥ 0.08, d = 0.32).
Regarding the broad CBCL scale Internalizing Problems (total
M = 53.4, SD = 9.10), 13.3% of the sample reached a score of
64 or higher, which indicates behavioral problems on a clinically
relevant level. Regarding the broad scale Externalizing Problems
(total M = 52.1, SD = 9.65), 10.6% of the total sample reached
a score of 64 or higher. These rates of behavioral problems
are overall comparable to prevalence rates reported for German
community samples (Ihle et al., 2000; Hölling et al., 2007). When
considering clinically relevant scores of T ≥ 70 on the individual
syndrome scales, 3.7% of the sample reached this score on the
Withdrawn syndrome scale (total M = 55.4, SD = 6.86), 2.5%
on the Somatic Complaints syndrome scale (total M = 54.1,
SD= 5.82), 2.5% on the Anxious/Depressed syndrome scale (total
M = 56.1, SD = 7.37), 5.2% on the Rule-Breaking Behavior
syndrome scale (total M = 54.3, SD = 5.72), and 3% on the
Aggressive Behavior syndrome scale (total M = 55.1, SD= 8.40).
Relationship between Emotion
Comprehension and Behavioral
Symptoms
Pearson bivariate correlations (one-tailed) revealed significant
positive correlations between the total TEC score and the
syndrome scales Somatic Complaints (M = 54.0, SD = 5.84;
r = 0.156, p< 0.05) and Anxious/Depressed (M = 56.0, SD= 7.3;
r = 0.191, p < 0.05). None of the other syndrome or broader
scales were significantly correlated to the TEC total score (all
rs < 0.114, all ps ≥ 0.094).
To further investigate the amount of explained variance in
the TEC score by the two syndrome scales Somatic Complaints
and Anxious/Depressed and the relevant control variables age,
bilingual upbringing and paternal working hours, backward
regression analyses were performed. The ordinal variable paternal
working hours was dummy coded before entering it into the
regression model. Since the majority of fathers worked full-
time (n = 117), the category full-time employment was used as
reference group. Therefore, two dummy variables were calculated
for the categories part-time employment and unemployment.
Since the scales Somatic Complaints and Anxious/Depressed were
not independent from another (r = 0.268, p < 0.001), individual
regression analyses were performed for both scales (see Table 2).
The final model including Somatic Complaints explained 21.6%
of variance in total TEC score, with age explaining 12.8%
and bilingual upbringing 5%. Unemployment explained 3.49%
and part-time employment 2.31%. Finally, Somatic Complaints
independently explained 2.37% of variance.
The same regression analysis was conducted including the
Anxious/Depressed scale. This model explained 23.1% of variance.
The explained variance of the control variables was comparable to
the first model, with age explaining 13.1%, bilingual upbringing
4.97%, unemployment 3.65%, and part-time employment 2.13%
of variance. Anxious/Depressed independently explained 3.84%
variance of the total TEC score.
Further exploration of the associations between the CBCL
scales and each TEC component revealed significant correlations
(one-tailed) for both the internalizing broad and syndrome
scales. For the component VIII (mixed emotions) again positive
correlations were found with the syndrome scales Somatic
Complaints (r = 0.177, p < 0.05), Anxious/Depressed (r = 0.203,
p < 0.05), and the broad scale Internalizing Problems (r = 0.194,
p < 0.05). On the contrary, component V (reminder) was
negatively correlated with the syndrome scale Withdrawn
(r = −0.266, p < 0.01). None of these associations could be
explained by extreme values. No further correlations between
the remaining components and CBCL syndrome or broad scales
could be found (all rs < 0.132, all ps ≥ 0.063).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate emotion comprehension
in 7- to 10-year old children from the general population.
Moreover, interindividual differences in the association between
emotion comprehension and internalizing and externalizing
symptoms were investigated. Based on the SIP model (Crick and
Dodge, 1994), the hypothesis of a negative association between
emotion comprehension in TEC and both externalizing and
internalizing symptoms was formulated.
Regarding the performance in the emotion comprehension
tasks, 7-year-olds’ scoring was as expected significantly worse
than the performance of 9-year-olds and 10-year-olds. Also, 10-
year-olds significantly outperformed the group of 8-year-olds. On
component level, component I (recognition of facial expressions)
and II (external causes of emotions) showed a ceiling effect
with a rate of 100% correct answers by all children within the
four age groups. This is not a surprising result since already
toddlers understand facial expressions of their caregiver during
social referencing (Sorce et al., 1985), and 3- to 4-year-old
children make precise distinctions between facial expressions
of basic emotions and understand situations as their elicitor.
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TABLE 1 | Distribution (frequency and percentage) of correct answers to each TEC component across age groups and total sample.
TEC total score TEC component
age n M SD I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
7 years 34 6.56 1.44 135
(100%)
135
(100%)
29
(85.3%)
14
(41.2%)
21
(61.8%)
27
(79.4%)
27
(79.4%)
22
(64.7%)
15
(44.1%)
8 years 33 7.03 1.28 135
(100%)
135
(100%)
24
(72.7%)
18
(54.5%)
27
(81.8%)
27
(72.7%)
32
(97%)
27
(81.8%)
14
(42.4%)
9 years 34 7.38 1.02 135
(100%)
135
(100%)
28
(82.4%)
22
(64.7%)
26
(76.5%)
28
(82.4%)
29
(85.3%)
30
(88.2%)
20
(58.8%)
10 years 34 7.85 0.99 135
(100%)
135
(100%)
34
(100%)
28
(82.4%)
32
(94.1%)
32
(94.1%)
33
(97.1%)
34
(100%)
15
(44.1%)
Total 135 7.21 1.28 135
100%
135
100%
106
78.5%
82
60.7%
106
78.5%
111
82.2%
121
89.6%
113
83.7%
64
47.4%
K–W 0.00 0.00 2.36 12.78∗∗ 10.78∗ 5.47 8.38∗ 16.09∗∗ 2.38
Ranking 1/2 1/2 6/7 8 6/7 5 3 4 9
TEC, Test of Emotion Comprehension; n, sample size; M, mean; SD, standard deviation; I, recognition; II, external cause; III, desire-based; IV, belief-based; V, reminder;
VI, regulation; VII, hiding; VIII, mixed emotions, IX, morality; K–W = χ2(3) of Kruskal–Wallis-Test, two-tailed; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 2 | Explained variance in total TEC score of the control variables age, bilingual upbringing, paternal working hours, and either Somatic
Complaints (Model 1) or Anxious/Depressed (Model 2).
Independent variable R2adjusted B SE B β 1R2
Model 1
Age 0.216 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.36 0.36
Bilingual upbringing 0.87∗∗ 0.30 0.23 0.22
Paternal unemployment 1.28∗ 0.52 0.19 0.19
Paternal half-time employment 0.66∗ 0.33 0.16 0.15
Somatic complaints 4.48∗ 2.22 0.16 0.15
Model 2
Age 0.231 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.37 0.36
Bilingual upbringing 0.80∗∗ 0.30 0.23 0.22
Paternal unemployment 1.30∗ 0.52 0.19 0.19
Paternal half-time employment 0.64∗ 0.33 0.15 0.15
Anxious/Depressed 4.68∗∗∗ 1.80 0.20 0.20
Multiple regression with total TEC score as dependent variable, and age, bilingual upbringing (0–1 dummy coded), paternal working hours (0–1 dummy coded, with full-time
employment as reference group), and mean T-value of either Somatic Complaints (Model 1) or Anxious/Depressed (Model 2). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Looking at the components of the mental and reflective phase,
an increase in correct responses over different age groups is
evident. These results are in line with the assumption of a
maturation of emotion comprehension throughout pre-school
years (e.g., Pons et al., 2004; Janke, 2008). Component IX (asking
for emotions elicited by an action, which satisfies desires but
leads to a moral conflict) was the most difficult component and
was answered correctly by only 47.4% of the total sample. This
replicates the finding by Janke (2008) that German children
less often ascribe the correct negative emotion “sad” to a moral
conflict than British children do. This can be explained due to
differences in the development of social norms or differences
in parental rules between both countries, or due to changes
in the meaning of the emotional expressions caused by the
translation of the TEC. Lagattuta (2005) investigated emotion
comprehension in ambiguous situations in 4- to 7-year-olds and
adults. In her study, participants were asked to describe the
emotion elicited by scenarios, in which the protagonists break
rules to fulfill a specific desire. Older children and adults more
often predicted next to negative also mixed emotions as a result
to a transgression. Therefore, ascribing the single basic emotion
“sad” as the right answer to morally wrong behavior might not
fully cover the content of the elicited emotional experience.
Instead of using forced-choice answers, it would be interesting
to let children with German mother tongue freely describe the
elicited emotions.
In this study, we were not able to replicate the above-
mentioned association between language abilities and emotion
comprehension. The explanation for this might be the chosen
age range. Looking at the study by Pons et al. (2003), the groups
of 8-to-9-year-olds and 10-to-11-year-olds did neither differ
significantly in their language abilities. Therefore, it is likely that
differences in language development at this age are not strong
enough to be detected by the language test used in this study.
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Despite the missing association between general receptive
language skills and emotion comprehension, children with
a bilingual background showed a better overall emotion
comprehension compared to monolingual children. The second
languages of the bilingual children in our sample were French,
Polish, Russian, English, Italian, or Montenegrin. Therefore, their
advantage cannot be explained by a simply difference between the
cultures of the first and second languages. According to research
from social cognition, Goetz (2003) conducted a study with 3-
and 4-year-olds being raised either monolingual or bilingual in
English and/or Mandarin Chinese, and reported an advantage
for bilingual children in their understanding of Theory of Mind
tasks. The author’s explanation refers to the fact that children
raised bilingual learn to refer to the same concept from different
language perspectives, enhancing their understanding of the
bare existence of different systems and also train their ability
for metarepresentation. The explanations presented by Goetz
(2003) might also be applicable for the associations between
bilingualism and emotion comprehension, since especially
the higher components of emotion comprehension from the
mental and reflective phases require sophisticated abilities in
perspective taking. Particularly with regard to the observed
cultural deviations in ranking order of the TEC (see e.g., Roazzi
et al., 2009), it would be interesting to not only compare
emotion comprehension in mono- vs. bilingual samples, but
also subgroups of bilingual children from different cultural
backgrounds.
Paternal working hours showed a low-to-medium negative
correlation with the total TEC score. Therefore, children with
fathers working full-time showed a significant lower level of
emotion comprehension than children of fathers with either
half-time or no employment. It is important to note that, we
did not individually assess, why fathers were unemployed or
working part-time. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether part-
time or no employment necessarily represents a critical living
situation regarding the socioeconomic status. It might be possible
that ongoing studies or paternal leave could be reasons for this,
which is not equivalent to a critical living situation with one
partner being long-term unemployed. Looking at the importance
of relationships among family members for the development of
emotion comprehension (e.g., Colle and Del Giudice, 2011) and
results from attachment literature about the unique contribution
of child-father quality of attachment on their social development
and adjustment (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2002), one possible
explanation for this association could be that children have both a
more regular, vivid exchange and closer relationship with fathers
not working full-time. Lagattuta and Wellman (2002) found
that conversations with the father play an important role for
the development of mental states understanding. Since higher
levels of emotion comprehension require sophisticated skills in
perspective taking, a more regular exchange with the father might
positively influence higher levels of social cognition and by this
also influence emotion understanding. Future research needs to
investigate the paternal role for emotion comprehension beyond
the pre-school years to test this assumption.
The main goal of this study was to investigate the relation
between internalizing and externalizing symptoms and emotion
comprehension. As the ceiling effect of the TEC components
I and II revealed, none of the children in our sample
had difficulties labeling emotions or understanding external
events as their causes. This is in line with findings by
Trentacosta and Fine (2010), who could not report significant
associations between discrete emotion comprehension and
externalizing or internalizing symptoms for the age group
6–11 years. Noteworthy, the reported negative associations
between understanding of discrete emotions and behavior
problems in older children originated mostly from samples
categorized by clinical diagnoses or by placement status (e.g., in a
detention center).
For externalizing symptoms, no significant correlations were
found with the total TEC score or individual, more complex
components, neither for the overall Externalizing Problems
scale nor on level of the two syndrome scales Rule-Breaking
and Aggressive Behavior. Therefore, the hypothesis of an
altered comprehension of others’ emotion in children showing
externalizing behavior could not be confirmed and is in line with
findings by Belacchi and Farina (2010) that pre-schoolers who
were classified as member of hostile, aggressive social groups
like bullies, their reinforcers and assistants, show overall no
correlation with the TEC components in contrast to children who
were attributed with prosocial roles.
For internalizing symptoms, the initial hypothesis could only
be confirmed in terms of a relatively small negative correlation
between the syndrome scale Withdrawn and component V
(reminder). Hence, children showing higher levels of withdrawn
behavior were less often able to name the right emotion elicited
by specific reminders. This result is in line with the above-
mentioned results by longitudinal and cross- sectional studies
investigating the relation between emotion comprehension and
internalizing symptoms (e.g., Fine et al., 2003). However,
further research is needed to confirm the component specificity
of this exploratory finding. Contrary to our expectation,
we found a small positive correlation between the overall
score of emotion comprehension and the syndrome scales
Somatic Complaints and Anxious/Depressed, explaining 2.37
and 3.84% of variance, respectively. Therefore, children with
reported higher levels of internalizing symptoms showed a
significantly better understanding of others’ emotion. In general,
children with these symptoms more often report low self-
esteem, insecurity, and fear of exclusion and devaluation in
social contexts (Luebbe et al., 2010). Further, brooding and
worrying on potential or actual experiences and emotions
is a common symptom among anxious-depressed children
and youth (Verstraeten et al., 2011). Because of their fear
of devaluation, children with internalizing symptoms might
therefore more frequently think about others’ minds and
motives and by this actually train their understanding of
others’ emotions. An interesting phenomenon supporting this
assumption is that of co-rumination among children and
adolescents with internalizing problems. Co-rumination is
defined as the excessively discussion of personal problems within
a dyadic relationship (Rose, 2002). According to Rose (2002),
the repeated discussion of especially problematic experiences
and negative emotions does on the one hand strengthen the
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specific friendship, but on the other hand also contribute
to the stability of internalizing symptoms (see also Rose
et al., 2007). With reference to the reported important role
of internal state and emotional talk for understanding others’
mind and emotions (e.g., Pons et al., 2003), the mutual
encouragement in co-ruminating dyads to focus on and
analyze emotions might in contrast to withdrawn children
further train their perspective taking skills and emotion
comprehension.
With regard to the diverging effects for the internalizing
subgroups, Bell et al. (2009) reported individual differences
in information processing patterns among children with
internalizing symptoms. While children with both depressive and
anxious symptoms showed a negative style in processing social
information, children with depressive symptoms additionally less
often made positive attributions to social situations than anxious
children. While the assessment of emotion comprehension with
the TEC focusses on the understanding of others’ emotional states
in a specific situation, in studies focusing on SIP there are often
scenarios presented in which the participant is asked to evaluate
the social behavior and intentions of the protagonist above
merely labeling a specific emotion. Therefore, one explanation
for these divergent results could be that children with elevated
levels of anxious/depressed symptoms can generally understand
others’ emotions, but rather struggle with the evaluation of social
scenarios, others’ intentions and social behavior.
Further, studies reporting a negative association between
higher order emotion comprehension and anxious/depressed
symptoms mainly stem from clinical samples (e.g., Meerum
Terwogt, 1990; Bender et al., 2015). The divergent direction of
associations for this study leads to the conclusion that while
children from the general population having elevated but not
clinically relevant levels of symptoms can master the different
components of emotion comprehension, and even show a better
performance, clinically diagnosed children might have problems
in emotion comprehension due to the severity of their symptoms.
The assumptions about the relation between the TEC
components and internalizing and externalizing syndromes
in community and clinical samples clearly need further
investigation. Especially, for children with externalizing
symptoms more research is required.
Further, it would be interesting to investigate the nature
behind the differences found for the three internalizing syndrome
scales, and which individual associations occur between higher
levels of emotion comprehension and somatic complaints,
depression and different forms of anxiety with or without social
withdrawal.
One limitation of this study is that, we assessed children’s
behavior and emotional problems by parent-report only. It
has been critically claimed that parents and children show
discrepancies in reporting on externalizing and internalizing
symptoms: While for externalizing symptoms due to a lack of
awareness children tend to report less problems than parents,
it is vice versa for internalizing symptoms (Seiffge-Krenke and
Kollmar, 1998). However, experts agree that around the age of
eight children can reliably report on their mental health (Riley,
2004). Therefore, it might be more reliable to assess especially
internalizing symptoms directly by children’s reports or multiple
sources. Another limitation of this study is the lack of diversity
in educational background. 69.7% of the fathers and 58.2% of the
mothers had a high school or university degree, which is above
the German average. Therefore, generalization of these results is
limited. We conducted regression analyses to investigate, how
much variance of emotion comprehension is explained by the
assessed variables. We want to emphasize that due to the cross-
sectional design of our study, a causal interpretation of the
observed associations is not possible.
Finally, in our sample the gender was unbalanced with 72
girls and 63 boys. Even though the difference in number of
participants between the two genders was rather small compared
to the full sample, this should be mentioned concerning the
generalizability of our results
In sum, the results of this study support the assumption of the
development of emotion comprehension from a general, external
to a deeper, complex understanding (e.g., Pons et al., 2004).
In concordance with Janke (2008), the ninth TEC component
addressing emotion after transgression of a moral rule turned out
to be the most difficult one. Whether this is caused by cultural
differences or due to a methodological artifact needs further
investigation.
With regard to interindividual differences in this develop-
ment, we found that emotion comprehension develops with
increasing age, and benefits from bilingual upbringing. Moreover,
emotion comprehension seems to be related to paternal working
hours in such ways that children showed slightly worse abilities in
understanding others’ emotions with increasing working hours of
their fathers.
To our knowledge, this is the first study simultaneously testing
the impact of both externalizing and internalizing symptoms
on emotion understanding operationalized by the TEC. The
assumption of a negative association between externalizing
and internalizing symptoms due to an altered SIP could
only be partially confirmed. While no relationship was found
between externalizing symptoms and emotion comprehension,
we found different response patterns in the TEC in children with
reported anxious/depressed symptoms and social withdrawal,
implicating an individual style of SIP. These findings need further
investigation in samples both from the general population and
being clinically diagnosed with internalizing problems.
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The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship among age, first- and second-order
Theory of Mind and the increasing ability of children to understand and produce different
kinds of communicative acts – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts –
expressed through linguistic and extralinguistic expressive means. To communicate
means to modify an interlocutor’s mental states (Grice, 1989), and pragmatics studies
the inferential processes that are necessary to fill the gap, which often exists in human
communication, between the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterance and what the
speaker intends to communicate to the interlocutor. We administered brief video-clip
stories showing different kinds of pragmatic phenomena – sincere, ironic, and deceitful
communicative acts - and first- and second-order ToM tasks, to 120 children, ranging
in age from 3 to 8 years. The results showed the existence of a trend of difficulty
in children’s ability to deal with both linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic tasks,
from the simplest to the most difficult: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative
acts. A hierarchical regression analysis indicated that age plays a significant role in
explaining children’s performance on each pragmatic task. Furthermore, the hierarchical
regression analysis revealed that first-order ToM has a causal role in explaining children’s
performance in handling sincere and deceitful speech acts, but not irony. We did not
detect any specific role for second-order ToM. Finally, ToM only partially explains the
observed increasing trend of difficulty in children’s pragmatic performance: the variance
in pragmatic performance explained by ToM increases between sincere and deceitful
communicative acts, but not between deceit and irony. The role of inferential ability
in explaining the improvement in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks
investigated is discussed.
Keywords: pragmatics, development, theory of mind, deceit, irony, direct and indirect speech acts
INTRODUCTION
Pragmatic ability refers to the use of language (Levinson, 1983) and other expressive means, such
as non-verbal/extralinguistic means, i.e., gestures and body movements (Bara, 2010), to convey
a specific meaning in a given context. Interesting examples of such ability are indirect speech
acts, meaning acts through which the speaker communicates more than is literally said to the
listener (Searle, 1975); deceitful communicative acts, meaning intentional attempts to manipulate
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the listener’s mental state in order to induce them to
believe something untrue (Perner, 1991); and irony, meaning
communicative acts expressing the opposite of what is meant by
the speaker (Grice, 1989).
Evidence in the literature show that pragmatic ability
correlates with Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff,
1978), i.e., the human ability to attribute mental states to
oneself and to other individuals. Evidence also show that
this ability increases during childhood (Wellman and Liu,
2004) and adolescence (Bosco et al., 2014, 2016; Brizio et al.,
2015). Similarly, the increasing ability of children to manage
these pragmatic phenomena as they grow older has been well
documented in the literature. At around one year of age
children start to understand and use direct speech acts, meaning
utterances that express literally and exactly what the speaker
intends to say (Searle, 1975), in order to communicate with
another person (Garvey, 1984). However, children also become
able to handle indirect speech acts early on in their development.
Reeder (1980), for example, showed that starting from 2;6 years of
age, children understand equally well, in an adequate context, that
direct utterances like ‘I want you to do that’ and indirect requests
like ‘Would you mind doing that?’ have the same conventional
communicative meaning (see also Bernicot and Legros, 1987).
Bucciarelli et al. (2003) also showed that, starting from 2;6 years
of age, children understand direct and conventional forms of
indirect speech acts (“Would you mind” “Do you know?”, etc)
equally well, and that such ability increases with age (see Bosco
and Bucciarelli, 2008).
Studies in the literature have shown that children’s ability to
deal with verbal deceit also increases with age. In particular,
starting from three years of age (Lewis, 1993; Bussey, 1999),
children start using lies, meaning false utterances proffered with
the intention of avoiding a disagreeable consequence such as
a punishment (Leekman, 1992). Talwar and Crossman (2011)
argue, in their review of the literature, that a child’s ability to
lie could be considered normative, testifying the child’s social
and cognitive development. The ability to handle lies of different
complexity evolves during the pre-school to school period: as
they grow up, children become able to consider the speaker’s
intention and the impact of the social acceptability of lying and
they start deceiving (for a review, see Talwar and Crossman,
2011). A deceitful communicative act is a speaker’s intentional
attempt to manipulate the listener’s mental states in order to
induce them to believe something untrue (Perner, 1991). Peskin
(1996) claims that, in order to comprehend deceit, the speaker
must take as shared with the listener something the speaker
does not really believe. Peskin also claims that it is necessary to
understand that the listener thus comes to hold a false belief,
and observes how starting from the age of 4, children fully
comprehend the speaker’s intention to deceive. The ability to
deceive has thus been frequently explained on the basis of the
ability to use a fully developed ToM (Chandler et al., 1989; Polak
and Harris, 1999; Ma et al., 2015). Talwar et al. (2007, p. 804)
for example affirm that “Lying, in essence, is ToM in action”;
to deceive consists of creating a false-belief in the interlocutor’s
mind (Lee, 2000). In particular, Talwar et al. (2007) investigated
the relation between first- and second- order ToM and children’s
ability to lie. First-order ToM involves the comprehension of
another person’s belief about a certain state of the world,
while second-order ToM involves the ability to infer what one
person believes about another person’s thoughts, meaning to
understand nested mental states (Perner and Wimmer, 1985).
Talwar et al. (2007) reported a correlation between 6 and 11-year-
old children’s second-order ToM and the ability to lie. Similarly,
Cheung et al. (2015) found a correlation between 7 and 9-year-
old children’s second-order ToM and their ability to understand a
liar’s intention. The increasing ability of children to manage more
complex forms of deceit has thus been explained on the basis
of the children’s development from first-order to second-order
ToM. However, the exact role of (first- and second-order) ToM
in explaining a growing child’s ability to manage deceit is not
yet completely clear (Talwar and Crossman, 2011). For example,
some authors (Russell et al., 1995), claimed that not yet fully
developed ToM abilities are not the best factor for explaining
children’s difficulty in managing complex deceit, and proposed
that the executive demand (in terms of executive functions as
planning and shifting) that the comprehension of complex deceit
requires is the best explanatory factor. Bosco and Bucciarelli
(2008) also argued that ToM did not seem to be the best factor
for explaining children’s ability to manage deceitful speech acts of
increasing complexity.
Focusing now on irony, in its easiest form, this typically
takes place when an utterance expresses the opposite of what
the speaker means (Grice, 1989). In particular, irony involves
a discrepancy between the literal meaning and the speaker’s
communicative intent (Mey, 2001). Children usually start to
develop the ability to recognize ironic speech acts between five
and six years of age (Dews et al., 1996; Harris and Pexman,
2003; Filippova and Astington, 2010), although younger children
may sometimes also understand irony (Loukusa and Leinonen,
2008; Angeleri and Airenti, 2014) and such ability improves
over time (Demorest et al., 1984; Dews et al., 1996; Dews
and Winner, 1997; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Filippova and
Astington, 2008). Loukusa and Leinonen (2008), for example,
found a significant difference between 6- and 7-year-olds in their
ability to provide a correct explanation in a comprehension task
on a simple ironic utterance, and Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008)
reported that children of 6, 8, and 9 years of age found it easier
to comprehend simple forms of irony, that is, utterances directly
in contrast with the background knowledge, than complex ones,
involving utterances implying knowledge that is in contrast with
the background scenario.
According to Winner (1997), in order to interpret an ironic
utterance correctly, the child must have the ability to detect
incongruity or falsehood, to avoid mistaking irony for error, to
understand another person’s beliefs, and to avoid interpreting
irony as deception. In line with this theoretical proposal, Nilsen
et al. (2011) showed that second-order ToM is correlated
with children’s comprehension of verbal irony. Specifically, they
pointed out that adults and older children aged between 8 and 10,
but not younger children aged 6 to 7 years, were able to recognize
that listeners require contextual knowledge to comprehend irony.
The studies in the literature have mainly focused on one single
pragmatic phenomenon (and its possible relation with ToM) at
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a time, and only a few have undertaken a direct comparison of
the different phenomena (Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bucciarelli
et al., 2003). In particular, Bosco et al. (2012a, 2013) provided a
broad assessment of the abilities of children ranging in age from
5 to 8;6 years, to comprehend and produce: direct and indirect
speech acts (that the authors define as standard communication
acts), and deceitful and ironic communication acts, using both
linguistic and nonverbal/extralinguistic means of expression,
such as gestures and body posture. The authors reported that the
ability to perform all the pragmatic tasks investigated increases
with age in children aged between 5 and 8;6 years, and their ability
to deal with standard communication acts (direct and indirect),
and deceitful and ironic speech acts also improves. In line with
Bucciarelli et al. (2003), the authors explained the existence of
such an increasing trend of difficulty on the basis of the Cognitive
Pragmatic theory (Bara, 2010) and the increasing complexity
of the inferential processes involved in the various pragmatic
tasks investigated. The ability to infer refers to the cognitive
capacity necessary to fill the gap, which often exists, between the
literal meaning of an utterance and what the speaker actually
means (Searle, 1975). According to the Cognitive Pragmatic
theory, in expressing a sincere communicative act (direct and
indirect communicative acts), the actor says something that is
in line with his/her private beliefs. In terms of the inferential
processes involved, the comprehension or production of a sincere
communicative act merely requires the partner to refer to the
background knowledge shared between the interlocutors. By
contrast, the comprehension and production of deceitful and
ironic communicative acts requires more complex inferential
processes. In particular, in deceit, what the speaker says is in
conflict with his private knowledge, but it does not contradict
the knowledge given as shared with the partner. In a case
of deceit, the partner has to recognize the difference between
what is expressed and what the speaker privately entertains. In
irony, the actor’s communicative intention is again in conflict
with his private knowledge, as in the previous case, but it also
contradicts the knowledge given as shared with the partner.
This makes an ironic communicative act more difficult to
entertain than a deceitful one (for a detailed description, see
Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bara,
2010).
However, a possible different explanation for the increasing
trend of difficulty in the comprehension and production of the
pragmatic tasks described above implies a role for ToM, and
in particular it states that ToM could play a greater role in
deceitful communicative acts (Flanagan, 1992; Sodian and Frith,
1992) and ironic communicative acts (Happé, 1993) as compared
to standard (direct and indirect) ones. Winner and Leekman
(1991) assume that it is more difficult to understand irony than
deceit because the former requires second-order ToM, whereas
the latter only requires first-order ToM. In particular, Sullivan
et al. (1995) found that starting from 7 years of age, children can
distinguish lies from jokes, and they attribute this to the acquired
ability to attribute second-order mental states.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have
empirically investigated such a hypothesis by assessing, in the
same sample of participants, the possible role of first- and
second-order ToM in explaining children’s increasing ability
to comprehend and produce sincere (direct and indirect),
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. For this reason, the
aim of the study was to investigate the increasing ability of
children to manage different kinds of pragmatic phenomena,
i.e., direct and indirect, deceitful, and ironic speech acts,
and the possible role of first- and second-order ToM in
explaining such performance. In detail, we wished to replicate
the findings of Bosco et al. (2013, see also Bucciarelli et al.,
2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008), and expected: (i) to find
children’s performance on all the investigated tasks to improve
with age; (ii) to find an increasing trend of difficulty in the
comprehension and production of the investigated pragmatic
phenomena, namely sincere communicative acts (direct and
indirect), and deceitful and ironic communicative acts, in
both the linguistic and non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities,
including the use of gestures and body movements. In particular,
the novelty of the present study was (iii) to explore the causal
role of ToM (first- and second-order) in explaining such an
improvement in their performance, in both the linguistic and
non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities, within each investigated
phenomenon. Moreover, (iv) we investigated the possible role of
ToM in explaining the increasing trend of difficulty we expected
to find across the various pragmatic phenomena investigated.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The sample consisted of 120 Italian children (60 males and 60
females) ranging in age from 3 to 8 years. In order to compare
the subsamples’ performance in a more reliable way, the sample
was organized in 4 age groups so that there was a one year
difference between one age group and the next: Group A (3 years;
6 months – 4 years) (M = 3;10; SD = 0;2); Group B (5–5;6)
(M = 5;3; DS = 0;2); Group C (6;6–7) (M = 6;10; DS = 0;2);
Group D (8–8;6) (M = 8;3; DS = 0;3). Each age group was
composed of 30 children and was balanced for gender, including
an equal number of males and females.
The children were recruited from four different schools in
the Piedmont area (Italy). Research assistants visited the schools
before data collection commenced, and provided the teachers
with details about the study. A letter containing all the details
about the research was sent to the children’s families, together
with an informed consent form, which the parents were required
to complete. Only children whose parents gave their consent were
included in the sample.
Material
The experimental protocol consisted of a selection of 48 items
taken from the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the
ABaCo (Sacco et al., 2008; Angeleri et al., 2012; Bosco et al.,
2012a), a validated assessment tool to evaluate pragmatic abilities
in typical (Bosco et al., 2013) and atypical (Angeleri et al.,
2016) development. Examples of ABaCo items are provided in
Appendix A.
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For each expressive modality (i.e., linguistic and
extralinguistic), the experimental task contained the same
number and structure of items, and assessed the same type
of pragmatic phenomena (half in comprehension and half in
production):
- 8 sincere communicative acts, namely 4 direct and 4 indirect
communicative acts;
- 8 deceitful communicative acts;
- 8 ironic communicative acts.
Each item consists of a video lasting 20–25 s, comprising a
controlled number of words (range: 7 ± 2), and representing a
communicative interaction between two people. The linguistic
items investigate pragmatic phenomena expressed primarily
through linguistic means, while the extralinguistic items are
composed of communicative acts expressed through gestures (for
a detailed description of the items, see Bosco et al., 2013).
In comprehension tasks, participants observed an interaction
between two actors, and they were required to understand what
was communicated (e.g., In your opinion, what did the girl want
to say to the boy?). In production tasks, participants observed
only the initial part of an interaction, and they were asked to
produce a communicative act appropriate with respect to the
proposed communicative situation (e.g., The child doesn’t want
to be discovered. What could he say?).
For each pragmatic task, it was possible to obtain a score of
“0” when the answer was considered incorrect and “1” when the
answer was considered correct. More details concerning scoring
criteria are reported in Appendix A (see also Sacco et al., 2008;
Bosco et al., 2013). Inter-rater reliability was calculated using
Cohen’s Kappa on the scores assigned to 40 randomly selected
children (about 33% of the total sample): K was 0.67 (p < 0.001)
95% CI (0.653, 0.696), indicating substantial agreement (Landis
and Koch, 1977).
In addition to the pragmatic tasks, a number of ToM tests
were administered to the children. See Appendix B for a detailed
description of the items.
Sally and Ann Task
In this task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), the child is required to
observe a scene acted out by two paper dolls, Sally and Ann: Sally
places her ball in the basket and leaves the scene. Ann moves the
ball from the basket to the box. Then the child is required to reply
to a test question (When Sally comes back, where does she think
the ball is?) and a justification question (Why does Sally think the
ball is there?). A score of 1 is gained when both the test and the
justification questions are answered correctly.
Modified Smarties Task
This is a revised version of the original task developed by Perner
et al. (1987). Because nowadays many children are no longer
familiar with the famous candy brand, we introduced a packet
of a currently famous brand of potato chips as the target object.
During the task, the experimenter shows the packet of chips to
every child and asks: What is in there? Then the experimenter
opens the packet, showing that it contains pencils rather than
the expected chips. The next question is: What will someone
else, who has not seen what the packet contains, think is in there,
before it is opened? A score of 1 is obtained when the child
replies “chips” and a score of 0 is attributed to any other kind
of answer.
John and Mary and Maxi Stories
These tasks (Sullivan et al., 1995) are a modified version of
those used by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and Perner and
Wimmer (1985) respectively, and they are told using cardboard
puppets in order to reduce the memory load. The two stories
assess second-order ToM, and they have an identical structure
but different characters and settings. In the Maxi story, for
example, the scenario is the following: Maxi and Bobby are
in their kitchen when their mother brings in some chocolate.
Maxi would like to have some chocolate and his mom tells
him he can have some after walking the dog. Unbeknownst to
Maxi but not to Bobby, their mother takes the chocolate to the
neighbor’s place. Unbeknownst to Bobby, Maxi discovers that their
mom has taken the chocolate to the neighbor’s place. Bobby then
goes to look for Maxi in the yard. His mother tells him that
Maxi has gone to get some chocolate. The task consists of a
‘second-order ignorance question’ (i.e., Does Bobby know that
Maxi knows where the chocolate is?) and a ‘second-order belief
question’ (i.e., Where does Bobby go to look for Maxi?). Along
with the story-telling, a number of factual questions (e.g., Why
is Maxi in the yard?) and first-order ToM questions (e.g., Does
Maxi know where the chocolate is now?) were used to help the
children to follow the storyline, but they were not taken into
account in the scoring procedure. The children’s answers could
be scored 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect) for both second-order
ignorance and belief questions. The mean value of the scores
obtained from the two test questions was run to perform the
analyses.
Picture Sequencing Task
Within the present study, just part of the original task (Langdon
and Coltheart, 1999; Porter et al., 2008) was administered: the
tasks used comprise six stories, including two social scripts (more
than one person interacting in everyday social routines) and four
false-belief sequences (a person, unaware of an event in a story,
acts on a false belief). Internal consistency among these items was
calculated (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.77). Each story was depicted in a
set of four black-and-white picture cards. Two practice runs were
used to allow the child to become familiar with the procedure of
the task, and these were not considered in the scoring procedure.
The set of cards for each story was placed face down in front
of the child, and the child was required to arrange the cards
in the correct order to tell the story according to the logical
sequence of events, like in a comic-strip. Scores ranged from 0–6;
each sequence scored 2 points if the first card was in the correct
position, 2 points if the last card was in the correct position, and
1 point for each of the second and third cards being in the correct
positions. Failure to produce a sequence was scored as 0.
Inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa also
for ToM tasks scores attributed by two raters in about 33% of the
total sample: Sally and Ann task, Modified Smarties task, John
and Mary and Maxi Stories task. It was not calculated on the
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Picture Sequencing task scores, because the scoring procedures
for this test only involve comparing the order of the sequences
provided by the child with the correct ones provided by the test
instructions. Since no different interpretation is possible, we did
not consider it necessary to have a second rater for such scores. K
ranged from 0.76 to 1 (p< 0.001), indicating substantial to almost
perfect agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977).
Procedure
The experimenters visited the schools before the beginning of
the study, in order to familiarize with the children. The children
dealt with the experimental tasks in a single individual session,
lasting approximately 50 min and performed in a quiet room at
the school. The video-taped stories were shown to the children
one at a time, using a portable computer, and each session was
video-recorded, to allow offline coding procedures. The tasks
were presented in two different random orders, A and B; the
participants in each group were balanced for age and gender,
and were assigned to order A or B of the protocol in a balanced
way. The ToM tests were also balanced, so that they were
presented to half of the participants before the presentation of
the pragmatic protocol and to half of the participants after the
presentation of the pragmatic protocol. Moreover, the ToM tasks
were presented in two different random orders (first-order tasks
followed by second-order tasks and vice versa). When performing
the analyses, first- and second-order ToM scores were considered
separately. In particular, the first-order ToM value was obtained
using the average scores gained from the Sally and Ann, Smarties,
and Picture Sequencing tasks. Likewise, the second-order ToM
value was obtained by combining the average scores obtained
from the John and Mary and Maxi tasks.
Data Analysis
The distribution of scores for each kind of task was not normal
in most age groups. In particular, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test showed the distribution to be normal only in a few cases,
namely extralinguistic deceit in group B and extralinguistic
irony in both groups C and D, while data were not normally
distributed in any of the other cases: linguistic sincere acts
0.001 < p < 0.011; linguistic deceit 0.001 < p < 0.042;
linguistic irony: 0.001 < p < 0.027; extralinguistic sincere
acts p < 0.001; extralinguistic deceit: 0.001 < p < 0.200;
extralinguistic irony 0.001 < p < 0.181. We also performed
a Shapiro–Wilk test, which confirmed the previous results:
the distribution of scores was normal in only a few cases,
namely linguistic irony in group D, extralinguistic deceit in
group B, and extralinguistic irony in groups C and D; data
were, instead, not normally distributed in any of the other
cases: linguistic sincere acts.001 < p < 0.022; linguistic deceit
0.001 < p < 0.010; linguistic irony 0.001 < p < 0.164;
extralinguistic sincere acts 0.002 < p < 0.010; extralinguistic
deceit 0.001< p< 0.178; extralinguistic irony 0.001< p< 0.214.
We thus conducted an arcsine transformation on the children’s
answers in each pragmatic task (linguistic and extralinguistic
sincere communicative acts, deceit, and irony) and each ToM
task (first- and second-order). We were thus able to perform
parametric analyses while satisfying the required assumptions.
To investigate children’s performance in managing different
kinds of pragmatic tasks, we conducted a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA), with age as between-subject factor (type of
age group: Group A 3;6–4, Group B 5–5;6, Group C 6;6–7, and
Group D 8–8;6) and performance at sincere communicative act,
deceit, and irony as dependent variables on both the linguistic
and the extralinguistic scales. Analogously, children’s ability
to manage different kinds of ToM tasks was investigated by
conducting a MANOVA with age as between-subject factor (type
of age group: Group A 3;6–4, Group B 5–5;6, Group C 6;6–7, and
Group D 8–8;6) and performance at first- and second-order ToM
tasks as dependent variables.
Moreover, in order to investigate the effect of performance
on the different pragmatic tasks within each age group (type
of pragmatic phenomena: sincere, deceit, irony), we performed
separate ANOVA analyses, for both linguistic and extralinguistic
tasks.
In order to investigate the correlation between pragmatic and
ToM ability, we calculated the partial correlation (Pearson’s r,
controlling for age) between children’s performance on pragmatic
and ToM tasks in the overall sample.
Lastly, in order to investigate the specific effect of age
and of first- and second-order ToM in explaining children’s
pragmatic performance, we conducted a hierarchical regression
analysis, including three steps: Age (step1), first-order ToM
(step2) and second-order ToM (step3). Such variables were
entered into the regression model as predictors to detect
their impact on children’s performance on the pragmatic
tasks (i.e., sincere, deceit and irony). Statistically significant
correlations were found between linguistic and extralinguistic
performance on the different types of tasks: sincere (r = 0.29;
p = 0.001), deceit (r = 0.74; p < 0.001), irony (r = 0.63;
p < 0.001). For this reason, and since the trends in scores
were the same for both modalities in all age groups, in this
regression analysis we collapsed the scores obtained for the
linguistic and extralinguistic tasks into a single type of pragmatic
task score. Despite the differences implied in these pragmatic
phenomena, collapsing them into a single score provides a
more statistically robust measure of overall pragmatic ability
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.93).
RESULTS
The scores obtained by each age group on the pragmatic and ToM
tasks are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
In Tables 3 and 4 the correlation coefficients among pragmatic
tasks and ToM tasks, respectively, are provided.
On the linguistic scale, the MANOVA revealed a significant
effect of age on the pragmatic performance [F(9,348) = 8.97;
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.19]. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the
outcome variables revealed a significant effect of age on
deceits [F(3,116) = 36.77; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.49] and ironies
[F(3,116) = 12.09; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.24] but a not significant
effect on sincere communicative acts [F(3,116) = 2.12; p = 0.10;
η2 = 0.05]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni) between
the performance of A vs. B, B vs. C and C vs. D age group at each
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TABLE 1 | Performance of each age group at the pragmatic tasks, mean (standard deviation).
Linguistic Scale Extralinguistic Scale
Sincere Deceit Irony Sincere Deceit Irony
Age Group
A (3;6–4) 0.75 (0.18) 0.34 (0.30) 0.15 (0.17) 0.44 (0.28) 0.19 (0.19) 0.06 (0.11)
B (5–5;6) 0.73 (0.16) 0.70 (0.30) 0.38 (0.23) 0.64 (0.26) 0.53 (0.30) 0.28 (0.30)
C (6;6–7) 0.79 (0.13) 0.93 (0.10) 0.45 (0.24) 0.84 (0.12) 0.81 (0.17) 0.43 (0.28)
D (8–8;6) 0.83 (0.12) 0.91 (0.12) 0.49 (0.22) 0.83 (0.13) 0.88 (0.13) 0.47 (0.28)
Overall sample 0.77 (0.15) 0.72 (0.33) 0.37 (0.25) 0.68 (0.27) 0.60 (0.34) 0.31 (0.30)
TABLE 2 | Performance of each age group at the Theory of Mind (ToM)
tasks.
First-order
ToM
Second-order
ToM
ToM overall
Age Group
A (3;6–4) 0.29 (0.25) 0.30 (0.29) 0.29 (0.23)
B (5–5;6) 0.53 (0.29) 0.40 (0.25) 0.46 (0.22)
C (6;6–7) 0.74 (0.24) 0.54 (0.25) 0.64 (0.20)
D (8–8;6) 0.80 (0.17) 0.62 (0.28) 0.71 (0.17)
Overall sample 0.59 (0.31) 0.47 (0.29) 0.53 (0.26)
pragmatic task highlighted the following results: no differences
were detected among the groups at the sincere acts (p = 1.0);
the groups performed significantly differently at the deceitful acts
(p < 0.001), with the only exception being Group C vs. Group
D, which showed no differences (p = 1.0); finally, at the ironic
tasks, a significant difference was found between Group A and
B (p = 0.003), while no differences were detected between the
remaining groups (0.999 < p < 1.0).
In terms of the extralinguistic scale, the MANOVA revealed
a significant effect of age on the pragmatic performance
[F(9,348) = 10.11; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.21]. Separate univariate
ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed a significant effect
of age on all the communicative acts investigated: sincere
[F(3,116) = 20.51; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.35], deceits [F(3,116) = 48.63;
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.56] and ironies [F(3,116) = 13.18; p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.25]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni) between
the performance of each age group at each pragmatic task
highlighted the following results: the groups performed
significantly differently at the sincere (0.003 < p < 0.016) and
deceitful acts (p < 0.001), with the only exception being Group
C vs. Group D, which showed no differences both at sincere
(p = 1.0) and at deceitful acts (p = 0.863); for what concerns
ironies, again a significant difference was found between Group
A and B (p = 0.033), while no differences were detected between
the remaining groups (0.235 < p < 1.0).
The ANOVA analyses performed within each age group
separately and concerning the linguistic tasks, revealed an effect
of the type of task in all age groups [20.09 < F(2,58) < 57.06;
p< 0.001; 0.41< η2 < 0.66]. Moreover, introducing contrasts for
each analysis, we detected a linear contrast, depending on the type
of pragmatic task in each age group [25.39 < F(1,29) < 145.53;
p < 0.001;.47 < η2 < 0.83]. The same pattern of results was
TABLE 3 | Correlations of pragmatic tasks scores.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Linguistic scale - Sincere –
(2) Linguistic scale – Deceit 0.28∗∗ –
(3) Linguistic scale – Irony −0.01 0.51∗∗ –
(4) Extralinguistic scale – Sincere 0.38∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.35∗∗ –
(5) Extralinguistic scale – Deceit 0.21∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.69∗∗ –
(6) Extralinguistic scale – Irony −0.04 0.45∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.57∗∗ –
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
TABLE 4 | Correlations of I and II order ToM tasks.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Sally & Ann task; First-order ToM –
(2) Smarties task; First-order ToM 0.39∗∗ –
(3) Picture Sequencing task; First-order ToM 0.43∗∗ 0.32∗∗ –
(4) Ice Cream Story task. Second-order ToM 0.44∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.30∗∗ –
(5) Maxy task. Second-order ToM 0.22∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.39∗∗ –
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
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found concerning extralinguistic tasks: an effect of the type of
task was detected in all age groups [14.21 < F(2,58) < 36.48;
p < 0.001; 0.33 < η2 < 0.56] and contrast analysis revealed a
linear contrast, depending on the type of pragmatic task in each
age group [24.60 < F(1,29) < 39.10; p < 0.001; 0.46 < η2 < 0.61].
In terms of children’s ability to manage different kinds of
ToM tasks, the MANOVA revealed a significant effect of age
on the children’s performance [F(6,232) = 10.86; p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.22]. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome
variables revealed a significant effect of age on first-order
ToM performance [F(3,116) = 27.60; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.42] as
well as on second-order ToM performance [F(3,116) = 7.37;
p< 0.001; η2 = 0.16]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni)
between the performance of each age group at first-and second
order ToM tasks revealed the following results: the groups
performed significantly differently at the first-order ToM tasks
(0.003 < p < 0.005) with the only exception being Group C vs.
Group D, which showed no differences (p = 1.0); at the second-
order tasks, no differences were found between the performance
of the age groups (0.512 < p < 1.0).
Partial correlation coefficients between linguistic and
extralinguistic pragmatic tasks (comprehension and production
ability) and overall ToM ability (first- and second-order tasks)
are reported in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, we found a significant correlation
between overall ToM tasks and all the pragmatic tasks
investigated, in both the Linguistic and Extralinguistic scales,
with the only exception of sincere linguistic communicative acts
and Extralinguistic irony. The same result applies for first-order
ToM tasks. By contrast, the only significant relation we detected
for second-order ToM tasks was between linguistic deceit and
second-order ToM.
Table 6 displays the results of multiple hierarchical regression
analysis on the overall sample. In particular it shows all the
coefficients of the regression models as well as the information
about the summary of the model: adjusted regression coefficients
(R2Adj.) for each predictor variable, the change in R2 after the
addition of first- and second-order ToM (R2Change), the change
in F (FChange), and its significance value (Sig. FChange).
The regression analysis revealed that age (Step 1) explains 26%
of the variance in children’s performance on sincere tasks, 53% on
deceitful tasks and 26% on ironic tasks. The model also including
children’s performance on first-order ToM tasks as a regressor
(Step 2) only significantly improved the prediction for sincere
(i.e., direct and indirect communicative acts) and deceitful tasks,
but not for ironic ones. The addition of scores for performance on
second-order ToM tasks (Step 3) did not improve the prediction
for any of the pragmatic tasks.
As a final point, the analyses also showed that within both
the model including first-order ToM (Step 2) and the model
comprising second-order ToM (Step 3), R2 only partially follows
the trend of increasing difficulty exhibited by children in solving
pragmatic problems, when considering both linguistic and
extralinguistic tasks, i.e., first-order ToM (sincere, R2 = 0.304;
deceit, R2 = 0.558; irony R2 = 0.269), second-order ToM
(sincere, R2 = 0.310; deceit, R2 = 0.565; irony R2 = 0.269). In
particular, the R2 value increases across tasks between sincere
and deceitful communicative acts, but not between deceitful and
ironic ones.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to investigate the possible role
of ToM – both first- and second-order - in explaining children’s
ability to comprehend and produce different kinds of pragmatic
phenomena, namely sincere (direct and indirect), deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts, expressed through linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic modalities.
First of all, and in line with our expectation and the relevant
literature (Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008;
Filippova and Astington, 2010; Talwar and Crossman, 2011;
Bosco et al., 2013), overall our results showed that children’s
ability to comprehend and produce the pragmatic phenomena
investigated increases with age, in both the linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic modalities. Analyzing deeper this result
for each pragmatic task and comparing age groups we found
that, for the linguistic modality, children showed no differences
at the sincere acts, while performed significantly differently at
the deceitful acts with the only exception of oldest groups
of age of 6- vs. 8- year-olds children; for what concern
ironic acts, younger group of 3- year-olds children showed a
significant worse performance than all the other groups, while
children belonging to the remaining age groups had comparable
performance. We explain such results on the base of the Cognitive
Pragmatic theory, proposing that, because of the inferential
process involved, sincere communicative acts are the easiest
task to solve for children and thus they performed quite well
starting from 3;6–4 years of age. Always following the tenets
of the Cognitive Pragmatic theory a deceitful communicative
TABLE 5 | Partial correlation (Pearson r, controlling for age) between overall ToM tasks (first- and second-order) and pragmatic tasks, in the overall
group.
Linguistic Scale Extralinguistic Scale
Sincere Deceit Irony Sincere Deceit Irony
First-order ToM tasks 0.14 0.30∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.19∗ 0.20∗ –0.02
Second-order ToM tasks 0.12 0.19∗ 0.14 0.16 0.14 –0.07
Overall ToM 0.15 0.32∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.25∗ 0.23∗ –0.05
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
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TABLE 6 | Hierarchical regression analysis: pragmatic tasks (linguistic and extralinguistic) in the overall group.
DVs IVs B SE B β t p R2 R2Adj R2Change FChange Sig. FChange
Pragmatic task
Sincere Step 1
-Age 0.007 0.001 0.517 6.554 0.001 0.267 0.261 – 42.952 0.001
Step 2
-Age 0.005 0.001 0.366 3.743 0.001 0.304 0.292 0.037 6.291 0.014
-First-order ToM 0.157 0.063 0.245 2.508 0.014
Step 3
-Age 0.005 0.001 0.351 3.549 0.001 0.310 0.292 0.006 0.962 0.329
-First-order ToM 0.138 0.066 0.215 2.100 0.038
-Second-order ToM 0.057 0.058 0.086 0.981 0.329
Deceit Step 1
-Age 0.017 0.002 0.725 0.725 0.001 0.526 0.522 – 130.858 0.001
Step 2
-Age 0.014 0.002 0.586 0.586 0.001 0.558 0.550 0.032 8.457 0.004
-First-order ToM 0.255 0.088 0.227 0.227 0.004
Step 3
-Age 0.014 0.002 0.570 0.570 0.001 0.565 0.553 0.007 1.837 0.178
-First-order ToM 0.218 0.092 0.194 0.194 0.019
-Second-order ToM 0.110 0.081 0.094 0.094 0.178
Irony Step 1
-Age 0.008 0.001 0.514 6.508 0.001 0.264 0.258 – 42.349 0.001
Step 2 0.269 0.257 0.005 0.829 0.364
-Age 0.007 0.001 0.458 4.570 0.001
-First-order ToM 0.064 0.070 0.091 0.910 0.364
Step 3
-Age 0.007 0.002 0.457 4.486 0.001 0.269 0.250 0.000 0.006 0.938
-First-order ToM 0.062 0.074 0.089 0.842 0.402
-Second-order ToM 0.005 0.065 0.007 0.077 0.938
Variables significantly predicting pragmatic performance is marked in bold.
act represents a more difficult pragmatic task to solve and only
starting from 6;6–7 years of age children handle it without
errors. Finally, irony is the most difficult task to solve and
it represents a really hard task to manage for children as
young as 3;6–4 years of age. However, it remains a quite
difficult task also for the older children. Globally considered
the same pattern of results and the same explanation hold for
the extralinguistic modality; the only exception is represented
by the younger 3- and 5- years-olds, who showed differences
in performance at sincere communicative acts. A possible
explanation for this difference is that the extralinguistic modality
was harder for 3- and 5- year-olds children to deal with and
this additional difficulty allowed this difference in performance
to emerge.
In line with our hypothesis, and considering each age
group separately, we also found an increasing trend of
difficulty in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks
investigated: children were able to comprehend and produce
sincere communicative acts more accurately than deceit, which
was followed by ironic speech acts, which were the most difficult
task to deal with. Considered overall, this linear increase in
difficulty holds in both the linguistic and extralinguistic modality
following the patterns of results found in previous studies
(Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al.,
2013).
The novelty of the present research was to explore the
causal role of age and ToM – both first- and second-order
- in explaining children’s pragmatic performance, in both
the linguistic and non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities. Some
authors have indeed proposed that pragmatics/communicative
ability involves mentalizing, i.e., ToM, abilities (Sperber and
Wilson, 2002; Tirassa et al., 2006a,b; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008;
Fernandez, 2011; Bosco et al., 2012b; Cummings, 2015). In
line with this proposal we found a correlation, controlling for
age, between overall ToM tasks (first- and second-order tasks)
and linguistic and extralinguistic irony and deceit, but not
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between linguistic sincere communicative acts and extralinguistic
irony. The same pattern of results holds for first-order ToM.
Considering second-order ToM, we only found a significant
correlation with linguistic deceit.
The correlation we found between children’s performance
on ToM tasks (overall and first-order) and sincere acts
may be considered a surprising result. We can explain this
result by considering that half of the items making up our
experimental material were indirect communicative acts. Studies
in the literature have suggested that ToM has a role in the
comprehension of indirect speech acts. For example, Corcoran
et al. (1995) and Corcoran (2003) showed that patients with
schizophrenia, a disorder explained (e.g., Frith, 1994) on the
basis of a primary deficit in ToM, have difficulties in the
comprehension of indirect speech acts.
Our results concerning the correlation between ToM (overall
and first-order) and deceit are in line with the current literature
(see for example Chandler et al., 1989; Polak and Harris, 1999;
Ma et al., 2015). In particular, our result regarding the significant
role played by second-order ToM in dealing with deceitful acts
is in line with Talwar and Lee (2008). The authors showed
that the performance of children aged from 3 to 8 years on
second-order ToM tasks is related to their ability to maintain
a plausible explanation in order to not reveal their lies. Some
authors also found that second-order ToM ability correlates
with pro-social lies (Cheung et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2016),
which are considered more sophisticated than lies. In particular,
Broomfield et al. (2002) found that only pro-social, but not
other forms of lies, are related to second-order ToM. However,
our experimental material did not include pro-social lies, so
a direct comparison is not possible. Our results concerning
the correlation between ToM (second-order) and irony are
also consistent with the literature, in particular with Winner
(1997), who argued for the role of second-order ToM in irony
comprehension and Nilsen et al. (2011), who reported that
second order ToM is correlated with children’s comprehension
of verbal irony.
Taken globally, our results are also in line with the
literature concerning autism, a pathology characterized by a ToM
impairment (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and showing how people
with autism have difficulties in comprehending and producing
indirect, deceitful and ironic communicative acts (Happé, 1993;
Angeleri et al., 2016, for a review see Loukusa and Moilanen,
2009).
However, in order to conduct an in-depth investigation
of the possible role of age and of first- and second-
order ToM in explaining the improvement in children’s
performance across each pragmatic task (linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic), we performed a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis. We found that, as expected, age has a
significant role in explaining children’s performance on all the
investigated tasks. The results also showed, consistently with
the correlation analysis, a significant role for first-order ToM
in explaining children’s performance in the comprehension and
production of sincere (direct and indirect) communicative acts
as well as their ability to manage deceitful communicative
acts. By contrast, we did not detect any significant role for
second-order ToM in explaining any of the pragmatic tasks
investigated, thus testifying, when the role of age and first-
order ToM is kept under control, a limited causal role of
this more sophisticated ToM aspect in explaining children’s
ability to deal with sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative
acts.
A direct comparison of this result with the current literature
is not possible, since other studies (see for example Talwar and
Lee, 2008; Nilsen et al., 2011) usually limit their investigation
to the correlation analyses. An exception is the study by
Angeleri and Airenti (2014) where, despite the significant
correlation found between ToM (first and second-order) ability
and the comprehension of linguistic ironic tasks, a more detailed
investigation, run through path analysis, underlined that ToM
had no direct effect on humor comprehension. In line with the
results provided by Angeleri and Airenti (2014), our hierarchical
regression analysis showed that, when the role of age is kept
under control, neither first- nor second-order ToM has a direct
impact on children’s performance on irony tasks. Our finding
thus did not provide empirical support to theories proposing
that ToM (Happé, 1993) and specifically second-order ToM
(Winner and Leekman, 1991), plays a key role in explaining
irony comprehension. Furthermore, the results of the present
investigation, in addition to those of Angeleri and Airenti (2014)
indicate that to use ironic statements - it is for example the case
of some items composing the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) –
could not be not a reliable measure to investigate ToM ability in
children.
Lastly, we now wish to focus on the role of ToM in
explaining the increasing trend of difficulty shown by children
in dealing with sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative
acts, using both Linguistic and Extralinguistic expressive means.
We found that ToM, neither first- or second- order, could
be considered the best factor explaining our incresasing trend
of difficulty in children’s performance. Indeed, we found that
R2 only partially follows the trend of increasing difficulty
exhibited by children in solving each kind of investigated task,
i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. The R2
value indicates how much variance is explained by a certain
variable. If ToM (both first- and second-order) was the factor
that best explained the difference in difficulty among the three
tasks, we would expect the R2 value to increase according
to the level of difficulty detected in managing linguistic and
extralinguistic sincere communicative acts, deceit, and irony.
However, this value increases when considering sincere and
deceitful communicative acts, but not when considering deceit
and irony.
To summarize, our results on the existence of an increasing
trend of difficulty across pragmatic tasks seem only partially
explained by the role of ToM (see also Bosco and Gabbatore,
2017). Considered overall, our results suggest a role for
first-order ToM in explaining the differences in performance
only when considering sincere and deceitful acts, but not
when considering deceit and irony. A possible alternative
explanation for the existence of such an increasing trend of
difficulty is based on the inferential complexity underlying
the pragmatic tasks investigated (see Bucciarelli et al., 2003;
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Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al., 2013). The existence
of an increasing trend of difficulty in the comprehension and
production of sincere (direct and indirect), deceitful, and ironic
communicative acts has been experimentally demonstrated, not
only in studies on children (see Bosco et al., 2009, 2012c), but
also through the assessment of pragmatic abilities in patients
with schizophrenia (Colle et al., 2013), and individuals with brain
injury (Bara et al., 2001; Angeleri et al., 2008), left brain damage
(Gabbatore et al., 2014), and right brain damage (Parola et al.,
2016). Other authors in the literature have also highlighted the
key role that the inferential processes play in the comprehension
process (Leinonen et al., 2000). In particular Pexman and
Glenwright (2007) highlighted the role of inferential ability in the
comprehension of an ironic statement.
A limit of the present investigation is that it does not
consider the role that other cognitive functions, such as
executive functions like planning, working memory, inhibition,
and shifting, might play in explaining the development of
children’s communicative-pragmatic performance. In future, it
might be useful to conduct a longitudinal study in order to
observe the development of pragmatic abilities in a specific group
of children over time. Even though the present investigation
focuses on pragmatics, a further interesting topic of study
is the influence of linguistic development on children’s ToM
ability. As a final point, the merit of the present study
was to help to clarify the (limited) causal role of first- and
second-order ToM in explaining the improvement in children’s
pragmatic performance across different kinds of pragmatic
tasks, such as sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative
acts.
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Facial expression recognition (FER) is an important aspect of effective interpersonal
communication. In order to explore whether the development of FER was delayed
in hearing impaired children, 44 child participants completed labeling, and matching
tasks to identify four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear). Twenty-
two participants had either a cochlear implant (CI) or a hearing aid (HA) while 22 had
normal hearing and participants were matched across conditions by age and gender.
The results showed that children with a CI or HA were developmentally delayed not only
in their emotion-labeling (verbal) tasks but also in their emotion-matching (nonverbal)
tasks. For all participants, the emotion-labeling task was more difficult than the emotion-
matching task. Additionally, the relative difficulty of recognizing four different emotional
expressions was similar between verbal and nonverbal tasks.
Keywords: facial expression recognition, cochlear implants, hearing aids, verbal task, non-verbal task
INTRODUCTION
Facial expression recognition (FER) is important for social interactions and effective
communication. Deficits in young children’s ability to recognize facial expressions can lead to
impairments in social functioning (Herba and Phillips, 2004; Batty and Taylor, 2006). Denham
et al. (1990) showed that peer-rated popularity and academic achievement correlated strongly with
the ability to recognize others’ emotional expressions.
Hiroko and Yamaguchi (2014) found that Japanese babies between the age of 6 and 7 months
were highly sensitive to angry facial expressions. This could possibly be an adaptation that might
allow them to determine if they are in potentially dangerous situations. Infants also use emotional
expressions as behavioral cues. For example, when their mothers appeared happy, they were
more likely to participate in novel situations. Developmental researchers used different paradigms
(matching and labeling) to measure how accurately children recognized facial expressions of
different emotions (Markham and Adams, 1992; Bruce et al., 2000). They found that, compared
to children who were 3 to 6 years old, older children more accurately recognized facial expressions
(Denham et al., 1990; Widen and Russell, 2008).
In China, there are 115,000 children under 7 years old with severe to profound or complete
deafness and 30,000 babies are born with hearing impairments annually (Liang and Mason, 2013).
A cochlear implant (CI) is a device that provides direct electrical stimulation to the auditory nerve
in the inner ear, giving deaf individuals the ability to hear. Children with severe to profound hearing
loss (71 and 90 dB HL or greater) who cannot be helped with hearing aids (HI) may resort to CIs.
Some researchers have examined the broader effects of a CI or HA on children’s
emotional and social development. Ziv et al. (2013) investigated the FER of hearing
children, deaf children who communicated with sign language, and children with a CI
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who communicated orally. They found that when completing
labeling tasks, no significant difference in performance existed
among the three groups. Additionally, they found that in pointing
tests, children with a CI and those in the hearing group achieved
higher scores than deaf children who could communicate using
sign language. Finally, they found no significant difference
between children with a CI and children with normal hearing.
However, Wang et al. (2011) found that children with a CI or HA
displayed less developed FER compared to children with normal
hearing, especially regarding their ability to recognize anger
and fear. Additional support for Wang, Su, Fang, and Zhou’s
finding was found by Wiefferink et al. (2013). Their findings
revealed that compared to hearing children, children between
the ages of 2.5 and 5 years old with a CI were less proficient in
emotion recognition of facial expressions. In all three studies,
children were presented with four photos of facial expressions
and then randomly asked “Who looks happy/sad/angry/fearful”.
The respective image that the children indicated was recorded in
another study, Most and Aviner (2009) used a written emotion
vocabulary test containing 36 items to examine 40 children
between the ages of 10 and 17 years. Their sample included
children with normal hearing, children with a CI, and children
with a HA. Each item was designed to trigger a specific emotion.
The participants were asked to indicate if each facial expression
showed happiness, sadness, anger, or fear. The children in the
study were matched by age and gender and the results showed
that children with normal hearing were no more proficient at
FER than children with a CI or HA. Additionally, no differences
were found between children with a CI and HA. Moreover,
Hopyan-Misakyan et al. (2009) found similar results in a study
of children with a CI who were between 7 and 13 years
old.
McClure (2000) asserted that there are two phases of FER
development. The first is the ability to discriminate between
different facial expressions, independent of language skills.
The matching task mentioned above is a demonstration of
this initial stage of FER. In this task, children had to match
the emotional expressions of persons in one group to those
of persons in another group purely based off the visual
stimuli presented. Subsequently, researchers found amygdala
activation during these types of non-verbal FER tasks with
low cognitive demands (Herba et al., 2006). Another study
involved identifying and labeling facial expressions. Children
were asked to point to the facial expression that matched the
label. Attenuated amygdala activation and increased prefrontal
activation were observed during the verbal FER tasks (Phillips
et al., 2003).
Székely et al. (2011) found that normally developing three
year olds showed a difference in the levels of recognition
of the four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and
fear) between the verbal and nonverbal FER tasks. For
example, on the nonverbal (emotion-matching) task, fear
was most easily recognized, while on the verbal (emotion-
labeling) task, fear was the most difficult to recognize. It
is possible that in the early rehabilitation of children with
a CI or HA, the nonverbal (e.g., matching) task was more
suitable.
The primary purpose of the present study was to explore the
differences between the performance of children with a CI or
HA and normal children, who were matched by age and gender,
for emotion-matching (nonverbal) tasks and emotion-labeling
(verbal) tasks. The secondary purpose was to examine which
FER task was more difficult and which emotional expressions
(happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) were the most difficult to
recognize during the verbal and nonverbal tasks. We assumed
that children with a CI or HA in the early rehabilitation
were developmentally delayed for both emotion-matching and
emotion-labeling tasks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The experiment included 22 children with a CI or HA (13
boys and 9 girls) from Beijing Sullivan Rehabilitation Center
and Beijing Sullivan kindergarten. There were 10 children
with a CI and 12 children using HA. In addition, the study
included 22 children with normal hearing from Beijing Normal
University kindergarten (13 boys and 9 girls). The teachers in
the kindergarten assisted in acquiring parental consent. The
children in the two groups were matched by age and gender in
order to allow for an independent-samples t-test analysis. The
results of the analysis showed that the difference between the
mean ages of normal hearing children (54.41 ± 10.76 months)
and children with a CI or HA (54.86 ± 11.97 months) was
not statistically significant, t(42) = 0.132, p > 0.05. Of the
22 children with a CI or HA, 19 had over half a year of CI
or HA experience and language rehabilitation. One had been
using a HA for one month, and two who had been using
a CI for 4 months. None of the children had an additional
disability (such as blindness or autism). All children attended
kindergarten from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, 5 days a week, Monday
to Friday, and received daily one hour, individual, auditory-oral
therapy sessions. In addition, none of the parents had hearing
impairments. There were six children living with their teachers
because their parents worked in other cities. The participants
with a CI or HA were selected by teachers who believed that
they could understand the tasks. They all had prelingual deafness
and did not know sign language. Mandarin was the children’s
first language. The attributes of the children are shown in
Table 1.
Materials and Procedure
Color images of four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger,
and fear) (Wang et al., 2011) were used in emotion-matching
tasks and emotion-labeling tasks. Black and white images of
four shapes (circle, square, rectangle, and triangle) were used as
control tasks to measure children’s basic abilities of matching and
labeling. The images were 7 cm by 9.5 cm.
Practice
Prior to the test trials, a color-matching task and an emotion-
matching task, different from those used in the test trials, were
used to ensure that the children understood both the concept of
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics of participants in each group.
Cochlear
implants (CI)
Hearing
aids (HI)
Normal
No. of children 10 12 22
Mean age (SD) (months) 52.00 (12.02) 57.25 (11.91) 54.41 (10.76)
Range of age (months) 30–70 41–84 34–77
Range of
unaided-hearing loss
(left/right)
100–115/85–115 60–103/50–108.5 //
Mean age of using CI or
HA (SD) (months)
23.00 (16.08) 21.90 (10.70) //
Ratio of males: females 3:7 10:2 13:9
Communication mode Oral language Oral language Oral language
matching and the tasks. First, the experimenter or the teacher
asked children to match the color. If a child did not successfully
complete the color-matching task, the experimenter conducted
more trials until the child correctly completed two consecutively.
The children were then asked to match the images of emotional
expressions. If a child could not complete the emotion-matching
task, the experimenter or the teacher would instruct him or her
the correct response and ask him or her to match the emotional
expression again. Children who completed these two practice
tasks could receive the formal test trials (matching task and
labeling task).
Matching Test Task
This session included two tasks: emotion-matching task and
shape-matching task. The shape-matching task was used to
control for the presence of basic matching abilities. Children
were asked to match the emotion or shape of a target stimulus
at the top of a paper with one of the four choices presented
at the bottom (see Figure 1). For example, “please match the
same facial emotional expression”. The study included eight
trials of emotion-matching. Two female and two male identity
pairs completed eight trials of shape-matching. Each emotion
and shape was used as the target stimulus twice. The position
of the stimuli was balanced and the order in which they were
presented was randomized. A correct response was given a score
of 1 and an incorrect response was given a score of 0. The total
scores for each of the emotion- and shape-matching tasks ranged
from 0 to 8.
Labeling Test Task
This session also included two tasks: emotion-labeling task and
shape-labeling task. The shape-labeling task was used to control
for the presence of basic labeling abilities. Children were asked
to point to the item that the experimenter asked for randomly,
either an emotion (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) (Wang
et al., 2011) or a shape (circle, square, rectangle, and triangle)
(control task). For example, “who is happy” was the child’s cue to
point out the respective emotional expression that matched the
label. The positions of the four facial expressions or shapes were
counterbalanced. The order that men and women were presented
in was also counterbalanced. A correct response was given a
score of 1, and an incorrect response was given a score of 0.
The total scores for the emotion- and shape-labeling tasks ranged
from 0 to 8.
The paradigms of the matching and labeling task were used
by Székely et al. (2011). In Ziv et al. (2013), the labeling task
in the present study was named “pointing task”. The order of
shape and emotion matching and labeling tasks was determined
using a Latin-square design. SPSS 19.0 was used to analyze the
data.
RESULTS
Two scatter plots (see Figures 2 and 3) show the fractional
distribution of different (shape and emotion) tasks and
participants (normal hearing, CI and HA). Figures 2 and 3 show
that some participants received the same score, most notably for
the shape tasks.
Following the fractional distribution, four homogeneity of
variance tests were conducted. The scores of emotion-matching
and emotion-labeling tasks showed homogeneity of variance
[F(1,42) = 3.77, p > 0.05; F(1,42) = 2.65, p > 0.05].
However, the scores of shape-matching and shape-labeling tasks
showed heterogeneity of variance [F(1,42) = 14.94, p < 0.05;
F(1,42)= 26.96, p< 0.05].
FIGURE 1 | The examples of materials for emotion and shape-matching tasks. Selected from a series of Chinese emotional facial expressions collected by
Guo Feng, Zheng Luo, Guangyuan Shi, and Chao Feng from department of psychology, Capital Normal University, Beijing.
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FIGURE 2 | Fractional distribution of the scores of the shape tasks.
Numbers in the graph represent the number of repeated data.
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA analysis utilizing
the type of participant (normal/CI or HA) as a between-subject
independent variable, and the type of task (matching/labeling)
and type of stimuli (shapes/emotions) as within-subject
independent variables. Because of the heterogeneity of variance,
we used a Greenhouse–Geisser correction. It showed significant
main effects for the type of participants, F(1,42)= 8.95, p< 0.01,
η2 = 0.18, which indicated that hearing children did significantly
better than children with a CI or HA. The test also indicated
significance differences in the type of stimuli, F(1,42) = 63.38,
p< 0.01, η2 = 0.60. The only significant interaction was between
the type of task and the type of stimuli, F(1,42)= 11.43, p< 0.01,
η2 = 0.21. Other interactions and the main effects for the type of
task were not significant (ps > 0.05).
Based on a significant interaction between the type of task
and the type of stimuli, we used a simple effect analysis. For
FIGURE 3 | Fractional distribution of the scores of the emotion tasks.
Numbers in the graph represent the number of repeated data.
both matching and labeling tasks, the scores using shape as
stimuli were significantly higher than those using emotions as
stimuli (p < 0.05). When the stimuli were emotions, the scores
of matching tasks were significantly higher than those of the
labeling tasks, p < 0.05. However, when the stimuli were shapes,
no significant difference was present, p> 0.05.
Because of the four different emotion scores as dependent
variables ranged from 0 to 2 only, nonparametric tests were used.
Two Friedman tests indicated that for the matching and labeling
tasks, significant differences existed among the four types of
emotions (ps < 0.05) separately. Combined with the descriptive
statistics shown in Table 2, the order of the four types of emotion
scores from high to low was sadness, happiness, anger and fear
for the labeling task and happiness, sadness, anger and fear for
the matching task.
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for the labeling and matching task for each group (M (SD)).
Type of Tasks Type of Shapes/Emotions CI/HA Normal All
Shape-labeling Circle 1.59 (0.73) 2.00 (0.00) 1.80 (0.55)
Square 1.45 (0.80) 1.91 (0.43) 1.68 (0.67)
Rectangle 1.41 (0.80) 1.91 (0.43) 1.66 (0.68)
Triangle 1.64 (0.73) 2.00 (0.00) 1.82 (0.54)
Total 6.09 (2.78) 7.82 (0.85) 6.95 (2.21)
Emotion-labeling Happiness 1.23 (0.92) 1.77 (0.43) 1.50 (0.76)
Sadness 1.55 (0.67) 1.68 (0.57) 1.61 (0.62)
Anger 1.09 (0.87) 1.32 (0.65) 1.20 (0.77)
Fear 0.82 (0.80) 1.05 (0.58) 0.93 (0.70)
Total 4.68 (2.12) 5.82 (1.65) 5.25 (1.97)
Shape-matching Circle 1.77 (0.53) 2.00 (0.00) 1.89 (0.39)
Square 1.82 (0.40) 2.00 (0.00) 1.91 (0.29)
Rectangle 1.77 (0.61) 1.95 (0.21) 1.86 (0.46)
Triangle 1.82 (0.50) 2.00 (0.00) 1.91 (0.36)
Total 7.18 (1.92) 7.95 (0.21) 7.57 (1.40)
Emotion-matching Happiness 1.41 (0.73) 1.95 (0.21) 1.68 (0.60)
Sadness 1.18 (0.85) 1.77 (0.61) 1.48 (0.79)
Anger 1.36 (0.79) 1.36 (0.85) 1.36 (0.81)
Fearful 1.00 (0.93) 1.50 (0.74) 1.25 (0.87)
Total 4.95 (2.42) 6.59 (1.76) 5.73(2.25)
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DISCUSSION
The results showed that children with a CI or HA were
developmentally delayed in the performance of both emotion-
labeling and emotion-matching. These present findings
contradict the prior findings of Ziv et al. (2013) who found
that for labeling and pointing tasks, there was no significant
difference between children with a CI and hearing children. The
two studies differ in two ways: the attributes of the participants
and the experimental stimuli. In Ziv et al.’s (2013) study, the mean
age of children with a CI was 6.6 years, whereas in the present
study, the mean age of children with a CI or HA was 4.3 years.
This is relevant because, according to Denham et al. (1990),
FER development progresses with age, meaning differences in
findings could possibly be attributed to the children being in
different FER developmental phases. In addition, in Ziv et al.’s
(2013) study, the mean age at implantation was 2.5 years, whereas
in the present study, the nineteen children with a CI or HA
had between half a year to 2 years of CI or HA experience
and language rehabilitation, and the two children with CI and
one child with a HA had less than half a year. During the
early stage of rehabilitation, participants in the present study
could not communicate with others fully and validly though
they communicate orally. The present study also used the facial
expressions of adult males and females, while Ziv et al.’s (2013)
study used photographs of boys and girls who were the same age
as the participants. Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) showed that it
was easier for participants to interpret the emotional expressions
of individuals in their own age group.
The relative difficulty of recognizing four different emotional
expressions is similar between verbal and nonverbal tasks except
for the order of happiness and sadness. These findings were
inconsistent with the results of Székely et al. (2011). One
important difference was the number of alternatives available
to choose from during each trial. Székely et al. (2011) used
only two alternatives during each trial of the matching task.
In contrast, the present study used four alternatives. Another
important difference was the different participants. All children
in Székely et al. (2011) were 3-year-olds with normal hearing,
while the participants in our experiment were children with
normal hearing and children with a CI or HA that were between
30 and 84 months old.
The findings showed that both children with normal hearing
and children with a CI or HA were most accurate when matching
and labeling happy and sad faces, followed by angry and fearful
faces. Vicari et al. (2000) found a similar rank in the four types
of emotions. They reported that children who were between 5
to 10 years old consistently and regardless of age, recognized
happiness and sadness, whereas the recognition of anger and fear
improved with age. The findings of Ziv et al. (2013) indicated that
happiness is the most difficult to recognize for the “pointing task”.
This discrepancy is possibly due to the individual socio-culture
experience and the complexity of facial expressions (Montirosso
et al., 2010; Helen et al., 2015). Hence, it is hard to reach
a universal conclusion on the developmental sequence of the
FER (Vicari et al., 2000; Herba and Phillips, 2004; Helen et al.,
2015).
The primary limitation of the present study was that we did
not compare children with a CI to those with a HA due to the
small sample size. However, Most and Aviner (2009) found no
difference in the ability of children with a CI and those with HA
to recognize facial expressions. An additional limitation of this
study was that language ability was not measured.
To summarize, the recognition of facial expressions during
verbal and nonverbal tasks was delayed in children with a CI or
HA who were in early rehabilitation stage. For all participants,
the emotion-labeling task was more difficult than the emotion-
matching task. The relative difficulty of recognizing four different
emotional expressions is similar between verbal and nonverbal
tasks. The results of this study suggest that a future study of
the rehabilitation process should be conducted to understand
how it affects the development of FER in children with a CI or
HA.
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Theory of Mind (ToM) is related to reading comprehension in hearing children. In the
present study, we investigated progression in ToM in Swedish deaf and hard-of-hearing
(DHH) signing children who were learning to read, as well as the association of ToM with
reading comprehension. Thirteen children at Swedish state primary schools for DHH
children performed a Swedish Sign Language (SSL) version of the Wellman and Liu
(2004) ToM scale, along with tests of reading comprehension, SSL comprehension, and
working memory. Results indicated that ToM progression did not differ from that reported
in previous studies, although ToM development was delayed despite age-appropriate
sign language skills. Correlation analysis revealed that ToM was associated with reading
comprehension and working memory, but not sign language comprehension. We
propose that some factor not investigated in the present study, possibly represented
by inference making constrained by working memory capacity, supports both ToM and
reading comprehension and may thus explain the results observed in the present study.
Keywords: deaf and hard-of-hearing, children, Theory of Mind, sign language, working memory, reading
comprehension
INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand and predict the mental worlds of oneself
and others and how they relate to behavior (Frith and Frith, 2012), or, simply, to represent and
understand minds. Our understanding of the functional correlates of ToM is still evolving (Carlson
et al., 2013); however, one interesting finding is that ToM is associated with reading ability (e.g.,
Kim, 2015). Early studies assessed ToM using false belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983),
in which correct solution requires a protagonist’s false belief to be kept in mind. This procedure
reflects early conceptualizations of ToM as an all-or-nothing capacity (cf, Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), typically in place at age four (for a meta-analysis, see Wellman et al., 2001). Using a five-
point scale, Wellman and Liu (2004) showed that ToM is in fact an ability with a developmental
progression, in which representation and understanding of mind emerge in a specific order
over time. Their original finding relating to North American children has been replicated in
other cultures (e.g., Germany: Henning et al., 2011; China: Wu and Su, 2014; for a review, see
Wellman, 2014). According to the five-point scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004), the first stage in ToM
development is the ability to understand that the desires of oneself and others may not be the same.
This ability appears around the age of 2 years in typically developing children. The second stage,
typically emerging at the age of three, is the ability to understand that the beliefs of oneself and
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others may differ. The third stage, also emerging at 3 years, is
the ability to understand that someone else’s knowledge may not
be the same as one’s own. The ability to understand false belief
is the fourth stage in the Wellman and Liu (2004) ToM scale,
and this is followed by a fifth stage which involves the ability to
understand that displayed and experienced emotions may not be
the same. The validity of this scale is supported by other work
showing that while children have a basic understanding of desires
at the age of two, at the age of three, they also start to differentiate
between their own beliefs and knowledge and those of others (for
reviews, see Carlson et al., 2013; Wellman, 2014). During a similar
phase in development, an increase in working memory capacity
and executive skills is typically also observed, and the level of
these skills seems to constrain development of ToM (Moses and
Tahiroglu, 2010; Carlson et al., 2013).
Several disabilities are related to changes in the development
of ToM. For example, in children with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD), ToM shows atypical developmental progression
(Peterson et al., 2005, 2012) which has been attributed to
atypical neurobiological development (Lord and Bishop, 2015).
In particular, it has been reported that children with ASD have
a better ability to understand hidden emotions than false beliefs,
possibly because it is easier to form representations of emotions,
which are concrete, than of beliefs, which are abstract (Peterson
et al., 2005, 2012). From an Australian cultural setting, it has been
reported that deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) signing children
display the same progression in ToM as typically developing
hearing children do, but that there might be delays in the age
at which different ToM concepts are understood (Peterson et al.,
2005, 2012). Such delays have been attributed to socio-cultural
factors, including restricted discussion of abstract concepts,
including mental states, due to mismatch between the language
capabilities of the child and its caregivers (Peterson, 2009;
Lederberg et al., 2013; Sundqvist and Heimann, 2014). Mismatch
of this nature may arise either because parents underestimate
the importance of such speech-based talk or because they lack
adequate sign language skills. These situations are common
since only about 5% of all DHH children grow up with deaf
parents who primarily use sign language themselves (Lederberg
et al., 2013). DHH signing children who grow up with hearing
parents having restricted knowledge of sign language, typically
display delayed ToM development (Peterson, 2009; Lederberg
et al., 2013). Other studies have shown that DHH children who
have been exposed to a sign language from birth, i.e., DHH
native signing children, perform on par with typically developing
hearing children on ToM tasks (Lederberg et al., 2013). DHH
children with poorer language capabilities are likely to have
poorer representations of mental states. According to flexible
resource models of working memory, when it is more difficult to
form representations it may be harder to process them in working
memory (Ma et al., 2014). Thus, delayed development of ToM in
DHH children may be due in part to poor language skills and
the limitations of working memory. Indeed, associations between
ToM and working memory have been reported for DHH children
(Meristo and Hjelmquist, 2009). The first purpose of the present
study is to determine whether DHH signing children in Sweden
follow the typical developmental trajectory in ToM and whether
their level of ToM skills is related to working memory and home
language.
It is estimated that between 100 and 200 DHH children are
born each year in Sweden (Assessing Health Care Interventions,
2006). With the right support, many DHH children can achieve
good speech development with technical aids1 (Kral and Sharma,
2012), as well as age-appropriate reading skills (Geers et al.,
2011; Nakeva von Mentzer et al., 2014; Asker-Árnason et al.,
2015). However, there is large variation in speech outcome
(Campbell et al., 2014) and some DHH children in Sweden
use Swedish Sign Language (SSL; Svartholm, 2010). In order
to achieve adequate linguistic development, it is important
for these children that SSL is used during both social and
learning activities (Svartholm, 2010; Lederberg et al., 2013).
Sign languages are natural languages that are used to share
thoughts, ideas and beliefs and can be understood at the same
linguistic levels as spoken languages but differ from ambient
spoken languages in their phonological and syntactic structure
(Emmorey, 2002). Thus, sign languages and spoken languages
are functionally equivalent. However, sign languages do not have
written forms, and DHH children learn to read the written form
of the spoken language in the cultural setting in which they
grow up, even though their primary language may be signed.
Generally, children learn to read by mapping written symbols
onto mental representations of speech sounds (Wagner and
Torgesen, 1987). When mapping is successful, lexical items are
accessed, revealing the meaning of written language (Perfetti
and Stafura, 2014). DHH children may lack well-established,
speech-based representations. Thus, for DHH children who use
sign language, learning to read depends both on the ability to
learn a new language system (Perfetti and Sandak, 2000; Trezek
et al., 2011), and the ability to utilize sign language skills to
understand text (Chamberlain and Mayberry, 2000; Hoffmeister
and Caldwell-Harris, 2014).
The bilingual approach to deaf education adopted at Swedish
state primary schools for DHH children involves teachers
translating written Swedish into SSL and discussing differences
between the two languages with the pupils (Svartholm, 2010).
Such discussions involve mutual reflection on the child’s thoughts
and beliefs about the content of texts. Apart from the intended
purpose of supporting reading development, such reflection
is likely to promote the ability to differentiate between the
thoughts and beliefs of oneself and others that is fundamental
to the development of ToM (Wellman, 2014). Furthermore,
ToM is likely to influence the establishment of reading skills
(Astington and Pelletier, 2005; Blair and Razza, 2007). Indeed,
ToM has been shown to explain unique variance in reading
comprehension in both typical children (Kim, 2015) and children
with ASD (Ricketts et al., 2013). In other words, ToM is likely
to be associated with reading comprehension in DHH children.
However, to our knowledge, this association has not hitherto
been studied. Thus, the second purpose of the present study is to
investigate the association of ToM and reading comprehension
in DHH children being educated using the bilingual approach.
1The term technical aids refers to hearing aids, cochlear implants or a combination
of these.
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Language comprehension and word reading skills predict reading
comprehension in DHH children (Marschark and Wauters,
2008), and they have been estimated to explain around 50%
of the variance in reading comprehension in hearing children
(Ripoll Salceda et al., 2014). In order to secure variance in reading
comprehension ability, while keeping word reading skills in
control, we selected participants who had Grade 1 word reading
skills. In addition, to rule out general language delays as a factor,
we wanted participants to display age-appropriate sign language
skills.
In the present study, we investigated ToM in children who
are at an early stage of reading development and are attending
Swedish state primary schools for DHH children. We predicted
typical developmental progression in ToM, although delayed in
children with whom caregivers did not primarily use SSL. We also
predicted that ToM would be positively related to sign language
comprehension and reading comprehension, as well as working
memory.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixteen DHH children (8 boys) with a mean age of 10.1 years
(SD = 2.1; range 7.3–14.5), attending grades 1–7 in Swedish
state primary schools for DHH children, were recruited. Three
of the participants had an additional diagnosed medical or
developmental disability and were therefore excluded from the
study. These individuals performed below the 5th percentile on
a test of non-verbal intelligence, i.e., Raven’s Colored Progressive
Matrices (Raven and Raven, 1994), indicating possible atypical
cognitive functioning. Staff members at the schools selected
participants they considered to be at a word reading level
corresponding to Grade 1 of hearing children and subsequent
testing showed that performance on word reading in the sample
did not differ from Grade 1 hearing children (Holmer et al.,
2016a). After selection, participants and their parents provided
informed consent, attested in writing by the parents. The study
was approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board, Linköping,
Sweden.
Demographics are presented in Table 1. Mean age was 10.2
(SD= 2.3). All participants but one performed within the normal
range on non-verbal intelligence. This participant scored only
one point below (M = 25.2, SD = 5.88) the normal range and
was not excluded since no additional disability was reported.
Furthermore, performance on tests of word reading skills of this
participant was within ±1SD of average performance of Grade 1
hearing children. Two participants had a vision deficit which was
corrected. Eleven used technical aids and the mean age at fitting
was 3.9 years (SD = 2.2). Up-to-date audiological records were
not available and since ToM and other cognitive and linguistic
skills were the focus of this study, audiological measurements
were not made. Seven of the participants were born abroad, one
in an expatriate family, and age at which residence in Sweden
commenced ranged from 2.2 to 10.6 years (n = 5). The age
of exposure to SSL was on average 4 years (SD = 3; range 0–
12). Three participants had been exposed to SSL since birth;
TABLE 1 | Demographics (N = 13).
n
Primary language at home:
SSL 4
Other 9
Technical aids:
HA, unilateral 1
HA, bilateral 4
CI, unilateral 1
CI, bilateral 4
HA and CI 1
No aids 2
Educational level of mother:
University 3
High school 6
Elementary school 1
Not reported 3
SSL, Swedish Sign Language; HA, Hearing Aid; CI, Cochlear Implant.
two of these participants had parents who where themselves
deaf and used SSL. One further participant had parents who
primarily used SSL; the rest had parents who spoke a language
from Europe, Asia, or Africa, sometimes with the support of signs
from SSL when interacting with the participant. The families of
three participants partly or fully omitted to provide background
data.
Measures
Theory of Mind
To assess ToM, a Swedish version (Sundqvist et al., 2014a)
of the Wellman and Liu’s (2004) five-step ToM scale was
adapted for use in SSL (see Procedure below). The Swedish
version of the scale was created by translating the original scale
in English into Swedish and back-translating into English in
consultation with the authors. The scale includes a set of tasks
(see Table 2) which were administered in an order recommended
by Wellman and Liu (2004): diverse desires, knowledge access,
content false belief, diverse beliefs, and hidden emotions. The
SSL adaptation of the scale differed from standard versions in
two ways. First, all names were replaced with their category
designator (e.g., “the man”, “the girl”). This choice was made
because the particular name was not pertinent to the task and in
sign languages all names have to be fingerspelled the first time
they are used, probably leading to letter-by-letter representation
and increased working memory load, reducing resources for
performing the ToM task. The second change was based on
recommendations of Peterson et al. (2005); a control question
was added to the HE task, i.e., when the child had pointed
to the neutral, smiling, or sad face, the child was asked why
the protagonist felt that way. In accordance with the standard
procedure (Wellman and Liu, 2004), one point was awarded
for each of the tasks where both target question and control
questions were answered correctly and the total number of tasks
solved constituted an index that was used when computing
correlations.
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TABLE 2 | Tasks in the Swedish version of the Theory of Mind scale in ascending order of difficulty (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
Task Description of task
Diverse desires The participant has to distinguish between the desires of two different actors (the participant him-/herself and a second party) about the same
object. The participant is instructed to choose which of two different snacks (carrot or cookie) he/she prefers, and then to predict which snack
the second party who has the opposite preference will choose.
Diverse beliefs The participant has to distinguish between the different beliefs of two persons (the participant him-/herself and a second party) about the
location of an object. The participant states whether he/she believes that the object is located in a garage or a shrubbery, and is then informed
that the second party believes the object is located in the other place. After that, without knowing the true whereabouts of the object, the
participant has to say where the second party will go and look for the object.
Knowledge access After learning what is inside a neutral box (a toy dog), the participant has to state whether a person that has never looked inside the box knows
what is in it. The participant is also asked whether or not the other person looked inside the box.
Content false belief Knowing that the true content (a toy pig) of a band aid box is not what is to be expected (band aids), the participant has to imagine what another
person who does not know the true content of the box (a person with a false belief) will say is in the box. The participant is also asked whether or
not the other person saw what was inside the box.
Hidden emotions The participant has to demonstrate the ability to understand that a person can express one emotion and experience another. The participant is
told a story about a boy who wants his aunt to bring him a toy car; however, the aunt brings the boy a book. Then, the participant has to judge
what the boy will feel inside (sad) and display (happy or neutral), by pointing to printed black and white emoticons (sad, happy, and neutral). The
participant is also asked to explain why the boy tried not to show that he was sad.
Reading Comprehension
A Swedish version of the Woodcock Passage Reading
Comprehension (Woodcock, 1998) test was used (i.e., Furnes
and Samuelsson, 2009). The participant silently read Swedish
sentences and paragraphs of different lengths in which one
word was omitted. The placement of the omitted word varied
over items. In total, there were 68 passages of text and testing
was stopped after a sequence of 6 errors. The first few passages
consisted of one short sentence (3 or 4 words) with subsequent
passages increasing in difficulty such that the last few included
two or three sentences with both principal and subordinate
clauses. The participant’s task was to complete the passage by
either saying, signing, or writing an appropriate word. The
dependent measure was the number of correct answers.
Sign Language Comprehension
A version of the British Sign Language Receptive Skills Test
(Herman et al., 1999) adapted for SSL was used to assess
sign language comprehension. Testing started with a vocabulary
check, and then the participant was presented with 40 videos of
SSL sentences. For each sentence, the participant judged which
picture out of three or four alternatives best matched the meaning
of the sentence. The participant was awarded one point for each
correct response and the dependent measure was total number
of correct answers. Testing was conducted by native SSL users
who had been trained to administer the test. For two of the
participants, results dating from 10 months prior to testing were
available and these participants were not re-tested due to ethical
considerations.
Working Memory
To assess working memory capacity, a visuo-spatial task called
The Clown test (Sundqvist and Rönnberg, 2010; Birberg
Thornberg, 2011) was used. The Clown test is based on the Mr
Peanut task introduced by Kemps et al. (2000). The participant
was presented with a clown figure on a magnetic board, which
had a set of colored magnets placed on it in a predefined pattern.
After a number of seconds, corresponding to the number of
magnets placed on the figure, it was turned away from the
participant and the magnets were removed. Then the participant
was asked to report the color of the magnets. When a response
was given, the participant was asked to replace the magnets
in their original configuration or point it out. The number of
magnets increased from one to ten across trials, with three trials
at each level (30 possible trials in all). On each trial, the original
configuration of the magnets had to be correctly specified for a
response to be counted as correct, and the participant had to
answer correctly on at least two out of three trials with a particular
number of magnets to move on to the next level. The participant
was awarded one point for each correct trial, and the dependent
measure was the total score.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually at their school by members
of staff who were fluent signers and familiar to the participants.
In total, there were five test leaders, of whom two deaf native
signers administered the test of sign language comprehension.
The other three were trained to administer all other tests by the
first author. Instructions were available in SSL and in Swedish,
and mode of instruction was adapted to the needs of the
participant. SSL instructions were provided by the test leader and
were based on written instructions following a formalized coding
system for rephrasing the Swedish instructions in SSL (Bergman,
2012). This procedure was used to minimize divergences in the
instructions different participants were given. Test leaders made
sure that the participant understood each task before testing took
place, and participants practiced all but the ToM tasks before
administration.
For the ToM scale, the rephrasing was done by a licensed sign
language interpreter, and was then checked by two native signing
teachers of DHH children. In the few instances that disagreement
occurred, it was discussed until a consensus was formed. The rest
of the instructions were coded by a deaf native SSL user, and
checked by three of the test leaders in the study. For practical
reasons, even though there was a recommended order, test order
was individually adapted and breaks were taken when needed.
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Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics for reading comprehension, sign language
comprehension, and working memory are reported elsewhere
(Holmer et al., 2016a,b), and here we perform new analyses
not previously reported. First, normality assumptions were
tested, descriptive statistics were computed and data was visually
inspected. Progression on the ToM scale was determined by
calculating the proportion of participants who correctly solved
each task. The total number of tasks correctly solved by each
participant was used as an individual index of ToM ability
(cf, Peterson et al., 2005, 2012). We used an independent
samples t-test to test our prediction that participants with
caregivers who mainly used SSL at home would score higher
than other participants on the individual index of ToM ability.
We then computed correlations (Pearson’s r) to investigate
our predictions that ToM would be associated with reading
comprehension, SSL comprehension and working memory. The
parametric approach was applied because Shapiro–Wilk’s test
statistics indicated that all variables were normally distributed
(p > 0.05). A significance level of 0.05 (two-tailed) was
applied for all tests. To obtain maximum power, despite low
n, no correction was made for multiple comparisons and one
missing data point on the sign language comprehension test
was replaced with group mean when calculating correlations.
All statistical computations were conducted using IBM SPSS
Statistics (Version 22.0).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3, performance on the ToM scale is shown and
compared to published results relating to similar groups. This
reveals that the developmental progression of participants in
the present study did not differ from that found in previous
studies relating to children with typical development (Wellman
and Liu, 2004; Peterson et al., 2005, 2012; Henning et al., 2011;
Wu and Su, 2014) and DHH signing children (Peterson et al.,
2005, 2012). However, it should be observed that there was
no difference in the proportion of children who solved the
diverse beliefs and knowledge access tasks in the current data
set. Furthermore, comparing ToM index of the present sample to
that of groups from earlier studies revealed that the participants
in the present study were delayed in ToM (see Table 3 and
Figure 1). Overall, comparisons indicated small to large between-
group effect sizes (Cohen’s d, with 0.2 reflecting a small, 0.5 a
medium, and 0.8 a large effect size, Cohen, 1992; see Figure 1).
In particular, performance was worse than the mean score of deaf
native signers in Peterson et al. (2005), t(12) = 4.23, p = 0.001,
d = 1.15, and that of hearing children in Peterson et al. (2012),
t(12) = 6.13, p < 0.001, d = 2.82, despite similar ages across
groups. Thus, although developmental progression did not differ
from that demonstrated in earlier studies, there was a clear delay
in development of ToM.
We have reported (Holmer et al., 2016b) that the performance
of the DHH participants in the present study on reading
comprehension (M = 3.8, SD= 1.2) was significantly worse than
that of Grade 1 hearing children (M = 14, SD = 8.8), but that
there was no difference in working memory (DHH, M = 2.1,
SD = 0.7; hearing, M = 1.8, SD = 0.8; a similar pattern from a
Swedish context was reported by Rudner et al., 2015).
Mean performance on the SSL comprehension test was 33
(out of a possible 40; SD = 5.0, n = 12). No norms are
available for the SSL version of this test. However, norms
are available for the equivalent test in British Sign Language
(BSL) for children between the ages of 3 and 12 (Herman and
Roy, 2006). One participant in the present study was older
than 12 years and performed almost 1 SD above the mean
according to the BSL norm for 12-year olds. Of the remaining
11 participants, 9 scored within ±2SD of the mean according
to the BSL norm for their age group and 2 performed even
better.
Descriptive statistics for all tasks are reported in Table 4.
Participants with parents who primarily used SSL did not differ
from other participants on ToM, t(11)= 0.07, p= 0.95, d= 0.04.
In fact, no between-group differences were initially detected on
study variables (t-test statistics, p > 0.05). However, there was a
large effect size (d > 0.8; Cohen, 1992) on SSL comprehension
(see Figure 2), suggesting that performance was better among
participants with parents who primarily used SSL. When age was
entered as a covariate, this difference reached significance, F(1,
10)= 5.70, p= 0.038, d = 1.62.
TABLE 3 | Percentage of participants who solved each task on the Theory of Mind (ToM) scale.
Present study Wellman and Liu (2004) Peterson et al. (2005) Peterson et al. (2012)
(N = 13) HC (N = 75) NS (N = 11) LS (N = 36) HC (N = 62) LS (N = 31) HC (N = 29)
Diverse desires 85 95 100 92 95 94 100
Diverse beliefs 54 84 91 92 85 94 100
Knowledge access 54 73 82 53 82 64 100
Content false belief 46 59 82 33 32 52 100
Hidden emotion 15 32 54 28 19 19 79
ToM index, M (SD) 2.5 (1.3) –a 4.1 (1.4) 3.0 (1.5) 3.2 (1.3) 3.3 (1.4) 4.8 (0.4)
Age, M (SD) 10 (2.3) 4.7 (–) 11 (1.8) 10 (2.5) 4.5 (0.6) 9.6 (1.7) 8.8 (1.2)
Results from previous studies are provided for comparison purposes and ToM index is based on the total number of solved tasks. HC, hearing children; NS, native signing
deaf children; LS, late signing deaf children. aTotal score on the five-step scale is not reported.
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FIGURE 1 | Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for comparisons of index score on the Theory of Mind (ToM) scale of the present sample with that of selected
groups of deaf native signing (NS), deaf late signing (LS), and hearing children (HC) from Peterson et al. (2005, 2012). The mean age of each comparison
group is displayed next to the group label. ∗∗One-sample t-test, p < 0.01. ∗∗∗One-sample t-test, p < 0.001.
TABLE 4 | Descriptive statistics on study variables for participants with parents who primarily use Swedish Sign Language at home (SSL) and
participants with parents who primarily use a spoken language at home (other).
SSL (n = 4) Other (n = 9)a
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
Age, years 8.7 1.3 [6.6, 11] 11 2.3 [9.1, 13]
Non-verbal intelligence, raw score 28 5.3 [19, 36] 24 6.1 [20, 29]
Theory of Mind, index 2.5 1.3 [0.5, 4.6] 2.6 1.4 [1.5, 3.7]
WPRC, raw score 3.5 0.6 [2.6, 4.4] 3.9 1.5 [2.8, 5.0]
SSL comprehension, raw score 36 2.1 [33, 40] 31 5.6 [27, 36]
Working memory, raw score 1.9 0.4 [1.2, 2.6] 2.1 0.8 [1.6, 2.7]
WPRC, Woodcock Passage Reading Comprehension; SSL, Swedish Sign Language; CI, Confidence Interval. an = 8 on SSL comprehension.
Correlations
Associations between variables are reported in Table 5. In
accordance with our predictions, index score on the ToM
scale was positively associated with reading comprehension,
r(13) = 0.69, p = 0.009 (see Figure 3), and working
memory, r(13) = 0.61, p = 0.028. However, contrary to our
prediction, no statistically significant association was found
between ToM and sign language comprehension, r(13) = 0.39,
p = 0.18. Furthermore, there was no statistically significant
correlation between sign language comprehension and reading
comprehension, r(13) = 0.42, p = 0.15, and the association
between ToM and reading comprehension was still significant
after partialling out the effect of sign language comprehension,
rp(10) = 0.63, p = 0.028. Despite the high variability in age of
exposure to SSL, there was no association with the ToM index,
r(10)= 0.11, p= 0.66.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated ToM in children attending
Swedish state primary schools for DHH who use SSL and are
TABLE 5 | Correlations between study variables.
1 2 3 4
(1) Theory of Mind 0.69∗∗ 0.39 0.61∗
(2) WPRC 0.42 0.63∗
(3) SSL comprehensiona 0.51
(4) Working memory
WPRC, Woodcock Passage Reading Comprehension; SSL, Swedish Sign
Language. aOne mean imputation. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
at an early stage of their reading development. To achieve
this, we used a version of the Wellman and Liu (2004)
five-step ToM scale adapted for SSL. The main finding was
that the order of progression in ToM development did not
differ from that reported for typically developing children
(Wellman and Liu, 2004; Henning et al., 2011; Wu and
Su, 2014) as well as for DHH signing children (Peterson
et al., 2005, 2012) in other cultural settings. However, we did
not find that DHH signing children whose parents mainly
communicated with them in SSL had more advanced ToM than
the other participants, even though their SSL comprehension
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FIGURE 2 | Comparisons of performance on Theory of Mind (ToM; triangles), Woodcock Passage Reading Comprehension (WPRC; diamonds),
Swedish Sign Language Comprehension (SSLC; circles), and Working Memory (WM; squares) between participants with parents who primarily use
SSL (n = 4; filled) and participants with parents who do not primarily use SSL (n = 9; unfilled). Scores have been standardized, and a value of 0 represents
the sample mean performance (SD = 1). Bars mark the 95% confidence intervals. Cohen’s d indicate the between group effect size (small > 0.20, medium > 0.50,
large > 0.80; Cohen, 1992).
FIGURE 3 | Association between ToM and z-score on Woodcock
Passage Reading Comprehension (WPRC; z-scores are calculated
based on the norm values for Grade 1 hearing children from Furnes
and Samuelsson, 2009, i.e., 0 represents mean performance of Grade
1 hearing children, SD = 1). Regression line (dotted) represents the strength
of relationship between variables.
was better. Furthermore, all participants appeared to be delayed
in their ToM, compared to the performance of native signing
and typically developing hearing children reported in earlier
studies. We did find an association between ToM and both
reading comprehension and working memory, in line with our
predictions, although not between ToM and SSL comprehension,
and the association between ToM and reading comprehension
was still significant after controlling for general language
skills.
Progression in Theory of Mind
While early studies regarded ToM as an all-or-nothing capacity
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), more recent work has shown
that there is a sequence in the development of different aspects
of this skill. In particular, Wellman and Liu (2004) showed that
there is a typical developmental progression ranging from the
understanding of diverse desires and beliefs through knowledge
access to understanding of false belief and hidden emotion.
Previous work has suggested that DHH children who are
not native signers are at risk of delayed ToM development
(Peterson, 2009; Lederberg et al., 2013; Sundqvist et al.,
2014b).
The results of the present study are in line with previous
studies showing typical progression of ToM development in
DHH signing children. Importantly, while earlier work has been
able to generalize findings of ToM progression in typically
developing children from the English-speaking world to cultures
with other languages (Henning et al., 2011; Wu and Su,
2014), the present work partially supports generalization of
findings of typical ToM progression in DHH signing children
from English-speaking cultures to a Swedish setting, and thus
lends support to the notion of a progression in ToM during
childhood (Wellman, 2014). DHH signing children seem to
advance in ToM across a set of developmentally differentiated
but psychologically linked achievements in much the same
way as typically developing children. However, in contrast to
previous studies there was no difference in the percentage of
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participants who solved the diverse beliefs and knowledge access
tasks. Although, our data cannot definitively determine the order
of these developmental stages, it does not suggest that it is
different in DHH signing children in a Swedish setting from
that found in previous studies. It is likely that this phenomenon
is related to the process of adapting the scale to a new culture
(Wellman, 2014) or random errors. To learn more about the
usefulness and psychometric properties of the ToM scale in a
Swedish context, future studies should use the scale to investigate
ToM development in larger samples of typically developing
Swedish children as well as children with diagnoses previously
associated with ToM difficulties (e.g., ASD; Lord and Bishop,
2015).
Delay in Theory of Mind
Although the developmental progression of ToM was not altered
in the present study, it was delayed in relation to the ToM
performance of DHH native signing and typically developing
hearing children of similar age reported in earlier studies
(Peterson et al., 2005, 2012). This applied both to participants
whose parents primarily used speech and to participants
whose parents mainly used SSL, despite the stronger sign
language skills of the latter group. It is well established that
linguistic environment and establishment of functional language
skills influence ToM development in DHH children (Peterson,
2009; Lederberg et al., 2013; Sundqvist and Heimann, 2014).
However, another important aspect is the nature of the social
interactions in the environment in which development occurs
(Reddy, 2008; Wellman, 2014). It has been shown that the
degree to which parents adapt their behaviors to the mental
world of their infants during social interaction predicts ToM
development (Meins et al., 2002; Kirk et al., 2015). Thus,
belonging to a sign language rich setting and developing age-
appropriate sign language skills may be necessary but not
sufficient for typical ToM development in DHH signing children.
Investigating parent–child interaction was beyond the scope
of the present work, but should be considered in future
studies.
ToM performance in the present sample was weaker than
that of DHH native signing children in the study by Peterson
et al. (2005) but statistical testing did not reveal that it was
weaker than that of late signing DHH children reported in
previous studies (Peterson et al., 2005, 2012), although effect sizes
indicated small to medium mean differences. SSL comprehension
for the sample was age appropriate, and thus there was no
general language delay that could explain the observed delay
in ToM. Furthermore, age of first exposure to SSL was not
related to ToM performance. In fact, it is hard to identify
any factor taken into account in the present study that can
explain the obviously delayed ToM in this group. However, at
the same time, we cannot rule out that any of these factors
has explanatory value, considering the small and heterogeneous
sample as well as the concomitant disproportionately large
effect of any confounding variables. In particular, it should
be noted that in the group of participants whose parents
mainly used SSL, only two were native signers, defined as
having at least one deaf signing parent and had been exposed
to sign language since birth. Hence, as a group, the present
sample may be very similar to late signing groups included
in earlier studies, and the lack of association between ToM
development and age of SSL exposure on the one hand and
general SSL skills on the other should be interpreted with
caution.
Correlations between Theory of Mind,
Reading Comprehension, Sign Language
Skills and Working Memory
In line with previous work in typically developing children (Kim,
2015) and children with ASD (Ricketts et al., 2013), we observed
a positive association between ToM and reading comprehension
in the DHH signing participants in the present study. To our
knowledge, this is the first time this relationship has been studied
in DHH children. In earlier studies, a relationship between ToM
and reading comprehension has been discussed in relation to
general language skills (Astington and Pelletier, 2005; Ricketts
et al., 2013; Kim, 2015), working memory and executive skills as
well as inference making (Ricketts et al., 2013; Kim, 2015), and it
has been suggested that ToM is a prerequisite for learning socially
mediated skills like reading (Frith and Happé, 1994; Ricketts et al.,
2013).
Lack of an Association between Sign Language Skills
and Theory of Mind and Reading Comprehension
Sign language comprehension was not significantly associated
either with ToM or with reading comprehension. However,
the literature indicates that general language skills and ToM
are related in typically developing children (Milligan et al.,
2007), DHH signing children (Lederberg et al., 2013), DHH
children with technical aids who use speech (Sundqvist and
Heimann, 2014), and individuals with dual sensory loss
(Frölander et al., 2014). Furthermore, general language skills are
related to reading comprehension in typically developing (Ripoll
Salceda et al., 2014) as well as DHH (Mayberry et al., 2011)
children.
It is possible that the lack of statistically significant associations
between sign language skills and ToM as well as reading
comprehension is due to low power or heterogeneity of the
sample in the present study. However, the lack of association
between ToM and sign language comprehension may also be
due to the fact that although the sign language test used
here provides an estimate of general sign language skills (e.g.,
Woolfe et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2015), it does not tap onto
linguistic aspects of central importance to ToM. For example,
it has been suggested that the ability to represent mental states
linguistically and to embed propositions under mental verbs,
e.g., “He/she thought that . . .”, is a prerequisite for reasoning
about the minds of others (Milligan et al., 2007; de Villiers and
de Villiers, 2014), and neither of these aspects was assessed in
the present study. Astington and Pelletier (2005) suggested that
general language skills explain shared variance between ToM
and reading comprehension. However, controlling for general
language skills in the present study did not seem to affect the
correlation between ToM and reading comprehension. This is
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in line with findings from a structural equation model (SEM) by
Kim (2015), where ToM, vocabulary and grammatical knowledge
all explained unique variance in reading comprehension. Ricketts
et al. (2013) also reported that ToM predicted unique variance
in reading comprehension after controlling for general language
skills in children with ASD. Thus, the findings of Kim (2015)
and Ricketts et al. (2013) and the correlations between sign
language, ToM and reading comprehension in the present study,
suggest that a positive relationship between ToM and reading
comprehension cannot be completely explained by general
language skills.
Associations between Working Memory, Theory of
Mind and Reading Comprehension
As predicted, working memory capacity was related to both ToM
and reading comprehension. In typically developing individuals,
working memory is related to comprehension of both texts
(Daneman and Merikle, 1996) and minds (Moses and Tahiroglu,
2010; Carlson et al., 2013). Positive relationships between
working memory and ToM (Meristo and Hjelmquist, 2009) and
between working memory and reading comprehension (Garrison
et al., 1997; Daza et al., 2014) have also been reported in DHH
individuals. Kim (2015) reported that working memory had a
direct relationship to ToM; however, the relationship between
working memory and reading comprehension was mediated by
vocabulary and ToM.
In the five-step ToM scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004), the
working memory demands increase across tasks. In the two
most fundamental tasks, diverse desires and diverse beliefs, the
participant has to differentiate between their own preference and
another person’s preference. Because pictures are provided to
support this decision, mental representation is supplemented.
However, the more advanced tasks (i.e., Knowledge access,
Content false Belief, and Hidden emotion) all rely more
on mental representation. To test the constraining influence
of working memory capacity on progression in ToM, we
suggest adding further tasks to the scale to determine whether
individuals who fail to solve the more advanced tasks are able
to solve the diverse desires and diverse belief tasks without
the support of pictures. If they cannot, this would suggest that
working memory capacity constrains performance on the ToM
scale.
On the Relation between Theory of Mind and
Reading Comprehension
Language skills and working memory capacity seem to be
important for comprehension of both texts and minds. However,
we suggest that neither of these variables on their own, or
in combination, can fully explain the set of results of the
present study. Kim (2015) and Ricketts et al. (2013) noted
that both ToM and reading comprehension involve inference
making, and suggested that this ability may link ToM to
reading comprehension. Furthermore, Kyle and Cain (2015)
showed that both deaf and hearing children who were poor
reading comprehenders had poorer inference making skills
than hearing controls with good reading comprehension. Since
DHH signing children learn to read in a second language,
their lack of relevant language-specific background knowledge
may make it especially difficult to make appropriate inferences
during reading (Hoffmeister and Caldwell-Harris, 2014). Poor
ToM has also been suggested to negatively influence skills that
rely on socially mediated learning (Frith and Happé, 1994;
Scheuffgen et al., 2000; Carlson et al., 2013), such as reading
(Ricketts et al., 2013), and it is possible that this is reflected
in the relationship between ToM and reading comprehension
(cf, Lecce et al., 2011, 2014). However, we tentatively suggest
that in addition to working memory and language skills,
inference making may play a crucial role in both ToM and
reading comprehension and is a plausible mechanism behind
the positive correlation between these skills in the present
study. Future studies should consider the role of inference
making ability, as well as other possible key mechanisms, when
further exploring the association between ToM and reading
comprehension.
CONCLUSION
Children attending Swedish state primary schools for DHH
children and who are at an early stage of their reading
development, displayed progression in ToM that did not differ
from previous studies. However, they had delayed ToM and poor
reading comprehension. These skills were positively associated
with each other and related to working memory capacity. Our
tentative interpretation of this set of results is that some factor
not investigated in the present study, possibly represented by
inference making constrained by working memory capacity, is
involved in constructing a representational model both of minds
and of texts.
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Children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI) often experience emotional and social
difficulties. In general, problems in social emotional functioning can be cognitively
explained in terms of Theory of Mind (ToM). In this mini-review, an overview is provided
of studies on social-emotional functioning and ToM in preschoolers (average age from
2.3 to 6.2 years) with SLI. It is concluded that, similar to school-aged children with SLI,
preschoolers with SLI have several social-emotional problems and that both cognitive
and affective aspects of ToM are impaired in those children. Based hereon, three
possible causal models for the interrelation between language, ToM and social emotional
functioning are put forward. It is proposed that future research on the construct and
measurement of early ToM, social emotional functioning and language development
in preschoolers with SLI is needed to achieve early detection, tailored treatment, and
ultimately insight into the pathogenesis of SLI.
Keywords: specific language impairment (SLI), social emotional functioning, theory of mind (ToM),
neuropsychological functioning, language
INTRODUCTION
Children with SLI have often been reported to experience behavioral, emotional and social
difficulties (Mawhood et al., 2000; Yew and O’Kearney, 2013; Helland et al., 2014). They have low
social self-esteem, poorer social skills and peer relationships and rate themselves as having a higher
risk of being bullied (Fujiki et al., 1996; Knox and Conti-Ramsden, 2003;Marton et al., 2005).While
behavioral problems appear to decrease during adolescence, emotional problems persist and social
problems have even been reported to increase (St Clair et al., 2011). Adolescents and adults with
SLI have social emotional problems like low self-esteem and symptoms of anxiety and depression
(Howlin et al., 2000; Wadman et al., 2008; Whitehouse et al., 2009; Durkin and Conti-Ramsden,
2010; Conti-Ramsden et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2016).
Problems in social-emotional functioning can be explained in terms of Theory of Mind (ToM).
The concept of ToM was introduced in the 1970s in primate research by Premack and Woodruff
(1978), who defined ToM as the ability to represent mental states of oneself and others in order
to understand behaviors. Nowadays, distinctive dimensions of human ToM, each with different
neuroanatomical underpinnings, can be discerned (Westby and Robinson, 2014). ToM can be
explained along cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal dimensions. Cognitive ToM
refers to thinking about thoughts, knowledge, beliefs and intentions and affective ToM involves
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thinking about and experiencing emotions (e.g., Dvash and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2014), which can refer either to oneself
(intrapersonal) or to others (interpersonal) (e.g., Tine and
Lucariello, 2012).
Given the above, it is not surprising that ToM abilities
are associated with social emotional maturity and social skills
(e.g., Lalonde and Chandler, 1995; Dunn and Cutting, 1999;
Carpendale and Lewis, 2004; Caputi et al., 2012). Children with
SLI have been reported to have both social-emotional problems
and ToM deficits, which bolsters this association (e.g., Andrés-
Roqueta et al., 2016). ToM development in SLI is taken to follow
a trajectory similar to that in typically developing (TD) children,
but at a different pace and with a lower final level of ToM
performance (Nilsson and de López, 2016; Spanoudis, 2016).
Hence, ToM deficits in SLI continue into adulthood (Clegg et al,
2005; Botting and Conti-Ramsden, 2008).
Studies in typically developing (TD) preschoolers show that
important progress in ToM is made during this period. During
the second year of life, joint attention, imitation and pretend play
develop, which can be taken as evidence for the understanding
of others as intentional agents, the ability to form and co-
ordinate representations of self and others, and the capacity to
form meta representations (Leslie, 1987; Rogers and Pennington,
1991; Tomasello, 1995). At this stage, emotional recognition
and mental state vocabulary also start to develop (Astington
and Baird, 2005). With a sense of self, children begin to realize
that they are separate from others, can have different emotions
from others and they start to show empathy by intentionally
comforting/helping another person (Thompson and Newton,
2013). Between 4 and 5 years of age, first order ToM, the ability
to think about what someone else is thinking or feeling, develops
(Wellman et al., 2011).
Up to now, most studies on ToM in SLI have focused on
school-aged children. Given the early onset of ToM development,
it is surprising that little research has focused on ToM in
preschoolers with SLI. Since early childhood is the primary
period for both language and ToM to develop, the early
development of language and ToM plausibly interact in an
facilitative or inhibitory manner. In order to achieve early
detection, tailored treatment, and ultimately insight into the
pathogenesis of SLI, research on the construct and measurement
of early ToM, social emotional functioning, and language
development and their existing deficits is necessary. The aim of
this review is to provide an overview of state of the art evidence
on social functioning and ToM in preschoolers with SLI (average
age range: 2.3–6.2 years), to elaborate on theoretical and clinical
implications of these empirical data and to give suggestions for
future research.
Social Emotional Functioning in
Preschoolers with SLI
Social skills of preschoolers with SLI are shown to be less well
developed or at least delayed. For instance, preschoolers with SLI
were rated lower by parents and teachers on social competence
(e.g., assertiveness, peer social skills) than TD children (McCabe,
2005). Moreover, they were found to be less likely to verbally
address other children and to engage more in adjacent rather
than sociointeractive play (McCabe andMarshall, 2006). Further,
preschoolers with SLI were rated significantly lower by their
parents on skills such as cooperation, assertion and responsibility
(Stanton-Chapman et al., 2007), although in a later study,
language-impaired preschoolers were found to score within the
average range (Pentimonte et al., 2016). Andrés-Roqueta et al.
(2016) showed young children with SLI to receive a significantly
higher number of negative peer-nominations compared to typical
children. Likewise, withdrawal was reported as the most frequent
problem behavior in language-impaired preschoolers (Maggio
et al., 2014).
ToM in Preschoolers with SLI
Deficits in social emotional functioning can be explained
in terms of ToM (e.g., Lalonde and Chandler, 1995; Ford
and Milosky, 2003; Creusere et al., 2004; Andrés-Roqueta
et al., 2016). Below, empirical evidence on ToM deficits in
preschoolers with SLI is presented (see Table 1 for an overview
of essential aspects of ToM and observed ToM deficits during
preschool).
Imitation
Several studies have focused on imitation abilities in preschoolers
with SLI. Within a sentence imitation paradigm, Snow (2001)
found that although 4-year olds with language impairment
imitate rising intonation contours in the same way as TD
children, they are impaired in terms of their segmental
phonology. Others have shown that children with SLI have
more difficulties in imitating sentences with different linguistic
and affective intonation contours and with different empathic
stress (Van Der Meulen et al., 1997). Hence, language disordered
children seemed to be less able to imitate prosodic features,
although both children with SLI and typical children were found
to show an increase in performance on prosodic imitation and
emotion identification with age.
In addition, research has been done on the effectiveness
of imitation/modeling procedures for children with SLI. The
underlying assumption is that imitation-based interventions
should generate language production under control of the
clinician aiming to facilitate spontaneous language use (e.g.,
Camarata et al., 1994). Kouri (2005) studied the effectiveness
of modeling (input that requires imitation without any
other response requirements) vs. elicitation (input that
includes prompts for production) training procedures for
late-talking preschoolers with SLI and developmental delay on
the production of comprehended lexical items. Overall, it was
concluded that both training methods are effective training
procedures for preschoolers with language impairment. The
exact mechanism through which those procedures facilitate
linguistic functioning, however, remains to be specified. Verbal
imitation is proposed as the key component, as verbal practice is
expected to stimulate language functioning in children who have
impaired verbal production. Another explanation would be that
the use of minds is what stimulates linguistic functioning in this
group of children.
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TABLE 1 | Overview of essential aspects of ToM development during preschool age and observed deficits in ToM in preschoolers with SLI.
Essential Aspects of ToM development in typically developing preschoolers Observed deficits in ToM in preschoolers
with SLI
Imitation The expression of the ability to form and coordinate representations of
self and others (Rogers and Pennington, 1991).
An aspect of interpersonal/intrapersonal cognitive and affective ToM.
Preschoolers with SLI are shown to be less able
to imitate prosodic features.
Joint attention The reflection of an understanding of others as intentional agents
(Tomasello, 1995).
An aspect of interpersonal/intrapersonal cognitive ToM.
Deficits in joint attention are observed in
preschoolers with SLI (and related to that deficits
in gestural production and comprehension).
Emotion recognition and understanding The ability to recognize and understand emotions (Westby and
Robinson, 2014).
An aspect of interpersonal/intrapersonal affective ToM.
Deficits in understanding emotional meaning are
observed in preschoolers with SLI. Findings on
emotion recognition are inconclusive, showing
typical and impaired performance in preschoolers
with SLI.
False belief understanding The reflection of the ability to see beliefs as mental entities which can
deviate from reality and differ between individuals (Wellman et al.,
2011). An aspect of interpersonal/intrapersonal cognitive ToM.
Preschoolers with SLI are shown to be impaired in
false belief understanding, (related to linguistic
functioning of the child).
See paragraph ToM in preschoolers with SLI for relevant studies supporting these empirical findings.
Joint Attention
As far as we know, only a few studies have directly investigated
into joint attention in preschoolers with SLI. Farrant et al.
(2011) studied the associations between child and maternal
socio-emotional engagement, joint attention, imitation and
conversation skill in preschoolers with SLI. Deficits were found
on all of those skills in these children, compared with TD
children. It was proposed that small impairments in parent-child
socio-emotional engagement may lead to larger deficits in joint
attention, child imitation and conversation skills. In another
study (Loveland and Landry, 1986), focus was on attention-
directing language and gesture in children with developmental
language delay and children with autism. Language delayed
children were reported to be better responders to joint attention
interactions than autistic children. Both groups of children did
not differ from each other on the number of joint attention
behaviors, nor on the types of joint attention behaviors used.
Gestural behavior of language delayed children was more
communicative than that of autistic children. Given the fact that
no typical control group was included, no conclusions could
be drawn at the level of performance [(mal)functioning]
relative to children without autism or developmental
language delay.
Emotion Recognition and Understanding
A few studies have examined emotion recognition and
understanding in preschoolers with SLI. Courtright and
Courtright (1983) observed young children with language
impairment to perform less well on interpreting vocal cues to
affect than typical controls. Similarly, Creusere et al. (2004)
examined affect comprehension in young children with SLI
using an affect discrimination task and found lower scores for
the language impaired group for measures of recognition of
facial expressions and nonfiltered speech. The authors argued
that children with SLI may miss cues to the emotional state
of their conversational partner, which in turn may hamper
their understanding of the speaker’s communicative intentions.
Similarly, other researchers (Ford and Milosky, 2003) found
young children with SLI to be able to identify facial expressions,
yet, to have problems inferring the appropriate emotion and
choosing the corresponding facial expression when presented
with an event context. McCabe and Meller (2004) showed no
differences between preschoolers with and without SLI on an
emotional expression identification test. Language impaired
children did, however, perform more poorly on a stereotyped
emotional knowledge task, based on which the authors proposed
that under certain circumstances children with SLI are impaired
in identifying emotions.
False Belief Understanding
Various studies have examined false belief (FB) understanding
in SLI, some of which have focused on preschool children.
Jester and Johnson (2016) showed young children with SLI to
perform more poorly on a FB task than their TD peers. Farrant
et al. (2006) found impairments in both visual perspective taking
and FB understanding in young children with SLI, based on
which they propose language to have a facilitating role in ToM.
Interestingly, Farrar et al. (2009) found that while syntactic
complementation was not correlated with FB performance in
preschoolers with SLI, general grammatical development and
vocabulary were significant predictors of ToM ability. In line
with this, Andrés-Roqueta et al. (2013) found that, compared
to age-matched control children, children with SLI showed
more problems on several FB tasks; moreover, FB performance
in SLI was best predicted by their overall linguistic abilities,
and their grammatical abilities in particular. In another study
from this group (Andrés-Roqueta et al., 2016), similar results
were found; preschoolers with SLI were shown to have a
significant delay both in language and performance on FB
and strange stories tasks. Several studies (Miller, 2001, 2004;
Guiberson and Rodriguez, 2013) found young children with SLI
to be able to perform FB tasks with low linguistic complexity,
but to show impairments on linguistically more complex
FB tasks.
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DISCUSSION
Given the empirical findings presented above, we conclude
that preschoolers with SLI have moderate to severe social-
emotional problems. ToM deficits can be taken to play an
underlying role in these social emotional problems. That
is, in preschoolers with SLI impairments in cognitive ToM
(imitation, joint attention, false belief understanding) as well as
affective ToM (recognizing and understanding emotions) have
been found.
The association between social emotional functioning, ToM
and language abilities in SLI is not surprising. From early
childhood until adolescence, language development and ToM
development are entangled (Tager-Flusberg, 2000). Further, the
ability to form a ToM is indispensable for mastering language
and efficient communication and interaction (e.g., Baldwin and
Moses, 2001). Mental representations of one’s own and others’
inner world are necessary to come to adequate communicative
skills. At the same time, language is essential in understanding
mental representations and controlling/regulating emotions and
thus in mastering ToM (e.g., Dunn and Brophy, 2005; Grazzani
and Ornaghi, 2012; Kolk, 2012; Grazzani et al., 2016). Hence,
both ToM and language abilities promote social communication,
the understanding and regulation of one’s own and others’
inner worlds and social emotional maturation. Thus, it is not
unexpected that children’s level of social emotional functioning
can be explained in terms of ToM (e.g., Lalonde and Chandler,
1995) and language abilities (e.g., Jenkins and Astington,
1996). Once they emerge, social emotional problems can, in
turn, further affect the development of language and ToM.
Importantly, deficits in ToM and language cannot account for
the full range of social emotional difficulties in SLI. Plausibly,
other cognitive functions (such as level of executive functioning)
but also environmental factors (such as parental social emotional
engagement) influence the development of language and ToM
and social emotional maturation (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Bishop, 1997;
Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Farrant et al., 2011; Stanzione and
Schick, 2014; Vissers et al., 2015).
Social emotional problems in preschoolers with SLI can thus
(at least partly) be understood in terms of an interplay between
ToM and language, and social emotional problems may in
turn further hamper both language and ToM development. The
findings presented do not reveal whether ToM impairments
cause language impairments or vice versa. Three possible causal
models for the relation between language and ToM can be put
forward.
According to the first model, ToM facilitates language
development. Following this approach, social understanding
informs word learning, even in the infancy period (Baldwin and
Moses, 2001). ToM is proposed to allow children to learn new
words through their sensitivity to referential intentions of others.
Accordingly, word learning problems can be explained by ToM
deficits (Bloom, 2001; Birch and Bloom, 2002). Bolstering the
essential role of ToM in language development, Morales et al.
(2000) found that the capacity to respond to joint attention of
infants across the first and second year is related to subsequent
vocabulary acquisition (see also Mundy and Gomes, 1998).
The second model argues that language fuels ToM
development. Stronger relations were found between early
language ability and later ToM performance than the reverse,
which suggests a causal role for language in ToM development
(see Milligan et al., 2007, for a meta-analysis combining results
of 104 studies). The importance of language in developing
ToM is further emphasized by the finding that deaf children
of hearing parents, who typically demonstrate language delays,
have ToM deficits, whereas deaf children from deaf families
perform identically to same-aged hearing controls on ToM tasks
(e.g., Schick et al., 2007). This is explained by assuming that
deaf children with deaf parents share a common sign language
and are thus exposed to a rich language context. In line with
a central role for language in ToM development, Rosenqvist
et al. (2014) found language to be the most important predictor
(compared to several neurocognitive capacities) of children’s
emotion recognition ability. There is no consensus on which
aspects of language influence ToM development. The semantic
approach argues that the development of mental state verbs (e.g.,
think and feel) enhances the understanding of own and others’
mental representations (Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Peterson
and Siegal, 2000). Others highlight syntactic processing to play
an essential role in ToM acquisition (de Villiers, 2007), from
the mastering of basic syntax, such as word order (Astington
and Jenkins, 1999), to the use of linguistic structures which are
embedded or the mastery of syntactic complementation (e.g.,
De Villiers and Pyers, 2002; Schick et al., 2007). Interestingly,
Slade and Ruffman (2005) state that both syntax and semantics
contribute to FB understanding. Further, there is substantial
evidence for the conversational approach, proposing that ToM
development is influenced by conversational interactions about
events and aspects of the external world as well as about inner
concepts and states. For instance, it has been suggested that
parent-child conversations about situations that involve themind
enhance children’s understanding of psychological terms and
thereby the development of ToM (Turnbull et al., 2009). Talking
about the mind is said to promote the differentiation of one’s own
viewpoint from others’ and to stimulate reflection on social and
emotional experiences (e.g., Appleton and Reddy, 1996; Symons,
2004; De Rosnay and Hughes, 2006). Bianco et al. (2016) suggest
that conversations about the mind promote ToM by enhancing
the accuracy of mental-state attributions. Others found that the
use and comprehension of meta-cognitive language correlates
with FB performance and emotion comprehension (Grazzani
and Ornaghi, 2012). Supportive hereof, training 2-year-old
children in using mental-state talk appears to enhance ToM
(Grazzani et al., 2016). Moreover, engagement in conversations
on emotions appears to stimulate ToM (Ornaghi et al., 2014).
Emotion understanding can also be enhanced by participation
in explanatory conversations (i.e., about emotional reactions)
(Tenenbaum et al., 2008). Hence, according to the second model
it is language (semantics and syntax but also conversational
interactions) that promotes ToM.
According to a third model, language deficits and ToM
deficits co-occur because they are driven by a single factor. Both
language abilities and ToM abilities could be manifestations of
a single neuropsychological underlying structure, for instance
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working memory (WM) an aspect of executive functioning.
Accordingly, various studies have revealed correlations between
WM ability and FB performance (e.g., Jenkins and Astington,
1996; Gordon and Olson, 1998), and also between WM and
language development (e.g., Adams and Gathercole, 1996;
Baddeley et al., 1998; Vissers et al., 2015).
Future research is needed to investigate the nature of
the interplay between language, ToM and social-emotional
functioning in SLI. Longitudinal designs are helpful to monitor
progress in this interplay across the lifespan. As ToM starts to
develop already within the first months from birth, at which
point linguistic (dis)abilities are still far from clear, longitudinal
cohort studies would be of value starting at birth with children
at-risk. Further, up to now, most research has focused mainly on
aspects of (interpersonal) cognitive ToM. In order to gain more
insight into ToM development in SLI, it is necessary to examine
interpersonal/intrapersonal cognitive and affective ToM abilities
(Westby and Robinson, 2014).
Neuropsychological insight into social-emotional functioning
has important clinical implications. The effects of training studies
exposing (young) children to ToM vocabulary for instance are
promising (e.g., Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann and
Tomasello, 2003; Bianco et al., 2016). The fact that language and
ToM development start in infancy and continue into adulthood
implies that to prevent and treat social emotional dysregulations
language and ToM interventions should extend into adulthood
(see also Stanzione and Schick, 2014).
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Much is known about when children acquire an understanding of mental states, but few,
if any, experiments identify social contexts in which children tend to use this capacity
and dispositions that influence its usage. Social exclusion is a common situation that
compels us to reconnect with new parties, which may crucially involve attending to
those parties’ mental states. Across two studies, this line of inquiry was extended to
typically developing preschoolers (Study 1) and young children with and without anxiety
disorder (AD) (Study 2). Children played the virtual game of toss “Cyberball” ostensibly
over the Internet with two peers who first played fair (inclusion), but eventually threw
very few balls to the child (exclusion). Before and after Cyberball, children in both
studies completed stories about peer-scenarios. For Study 1, 36 typically developing
5-year-olds were randomly assigned to regular exclusion (for no apparent reason) or
accidental exclusion (due to an alleged computer malfunction). Compared to accidental
exclusion, regular exclusion led children to portray story-characters more strongly as
intentional agents (intentionality), with use of more mental state language (MSL), and
more between-character affiliation in post-Cyberball stories. For Study 2, 20 clinically
referred 4 to 8-year-olds with AD and 15 age- and gender-matched non-anxious
controls completed stories before and after regular exclusion. While we replicated the
post regular-exclusion increase of intentional and MSL portrayals of story-characters
among non-anxious controls, anxious children exhibited a decline on both dimensions
after regular exclusion. We conclude that exclusion typically induces young children to
mentalize, enabling more effective reconnection with others. However, excessive anxiety
may impair controlled mentalizing, which may, in turn, hamper effective reconnection
with others after exclusion.
Keywords: social exclusion, early childhood, theory of mind, mentalizing, prosocial behavior
INTRODUCTION
The preschool years have long been noted for fundamental advances in mentalizing – the social-
cognitive capacity to construe oneself and others in terms of intentional mental states (Dennett,
1978; Fonagy et al., 2002). The timetable of the development of mentalizing has received much
attention over the past decades (see Wellman, 2014). Yet, as mentalizing enters the child’s
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repertoire, the question arises as to when and which children
make use of this new mental tool by mentalizing in varying social
contexts. Despite the importance of such work for theories of
mentalizing – particularly the interaction of mentalizing with
motivational states and stress regulation (Ickes and Simpson,
2001; Tomasello et al., 2005; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009) – few
if any experimental studies directly address the roles of context
and disposition in mentalizing. Indeed, if mentalizing varies
systematically as a function of context or arousal, it could be
crucial to assess context-specific mentalizing capacities of clinical
populations whose symptoms primarily appear under certain
conditions, such as anxiety disorder (AD).
Mentalizing may be relevant to a broad set of social
interactions, from dyadic emotion regulation and caregiving
to cooperative and competitive interactions, more broadly
(Dennett, 1987; Moore and Frye, 1991; Fonagy et al., 2002).
Accordingly, individuals may be thought to mentalize in a wide
variety of contexts with many authors proposing that mentalizing
permeates our everyday social cognition (e.g., Wellman, 2014).
Importantly, for the present purposes, the degree and cognitive
control of mentalizing may still show cross-situational variation
as the need and expectation to cooperate and compete with others
fluctuates.
With this in mind, one important context for inducing
shifts in social cognition may be exclusion from groups. As
a fundamental process for humans, social exclusion blocks
access to various group resources that, across phylogeny, were
essential to survival, from group protection, to collaboration for
provisions, to exchange of social information (Leary and Cottrell,
2013). Potentially for this reason, threats of exclusion still act
as powerful triggers for conformity. Serving as a deterrent for
exploiting others, threats of exclusion therefore also stabilize and
promote cooperation (Ouwerkerk et al., 2005; Williams, 2009;
Feinberg et al., 2014). Critically, to act on the first hints of
and avoid further exclusion, excluded parties may potentially
increase vigilance regarding social cues to promote more skillful
re-affiliation (Pickett and Gardner, 2005; see below). Yet, few
studies address such exclusion-responses early in development,
especially with young children.
To date, the bulk of work on peer exclusion in early
childhood has focused on risk factors for chronic peer
rejection and its adverse developmental sequelae (e.g., Crick
et al., 1999; von Klitzing et al., 2014). Consequently, we
know relatively little about typical and atypical responses
to experimental social exclusion at this age. A handful of
studies examining exclusion among preschoolers uses indirect
primes where the child observes the exclusion of a third
party. Even this simple manipulation leads some preschoolers
to behave in a way that suggests a reconnection motive has
been engaged, including more accurate imitation of others
(Over and Carpenter, 2009b; Watson-Jones et al., 2014) and
drawing pictures of themselves and friends standing closer to
one another (Song et al., 2015). Consistent with these findings,
a recent study exposed preschoolers to firsthand exclusion
while playing the virtual ball-toss game, Cyberball, also finding
increased fidelity of imitation post-exclusion (Watson-Jones
et al., 2016). Overall, these findings in young children resemble
research on adults, showing increased affiliative tendencies
(e.g., conformity, generosity, mimicry) following exclusion
compared to control conditions (see Molden and Maner,
2013).
Given the behavioral affiliation-inducing effect of social
exclusion, we sought to examine whether young children would
also attend to mental states more closely after exclusion. Indeed,
some theorists propose that exclusion gives rise to a state of
“social hunger” (Gardner et al., 2000, p. 486) that stimulates social
monitoring processes, akin to increased attention to food stimuli
after fasting. Among adults, social exclusion thus promotes
attentional biases to relevant social information (Pickett and
Gardner, 2005), including others’ perspectives (Knowles, 2014).
Coping with social exclusion by attending to other’s perspectives
and mental states may enable more adept detection and selection
of new partners likely to reciprocate while weeding out less
promising partners. Many affiliative actions (e.g., helping) could
also improve (in quality and quantity) if excluded parties attend
to mental states of potential targets for re-affiliation so as to tailor
affiliative actions to the needs, goals, and knowledge of those
targets (Tomasello et al., 2005). Despite its clear potential for
informing developmental theories on mentalizing, little or no
work currently extends this work to social exclusion in young
children. We therefore sought to address this gap in the literature
with Study 1.
In a second Study, we moved beyond examining mentalizing
in typically developing youth, to consider young children
with elevated anxiety concerns. Deficits in social cognition
and mentalizing have been linked to numerous childhood
psychopathologies (Sharp et al., 2008). However, in the case
of AD, one of the most prevalent conditions in childhood
(Costello et al., 2011), the deficit in mentalizing has proven
somewhat difficult to pin down (see Banerjee, 2008). While
socially anxious young children have shown normal responses
on standard false-belief tasks in most studies (Banerjee and
Henderson, 2001; Broeren et al., 2013; but see Colonnesi et al.,
2016), they have exhibited impairments in social behaviors
requiring insight into mental states, in self-presentational tactics
toward peers as well as in understanding the causes and
emotional effects of unintentional insults (Banerjee and Watling,
2010).
Arguably, this pattern of data could be at least partly
accounted for by context-specific deficits in mentalizing under
affectively charged conditions, such as social exclusion. Thus,
it has been proposed that controlled mentalizing varies as a
function of the arousal induced by a specific context, following
a trajectory of an inverted u-curve, i.e., first rising and then
falling with increasing arousal (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). Given
the excessive negative arousal inherent in acute anxiety, deficits
in stress-related mentalizing may typify anxious children (Nolte
et al., 2011), much like what has been shown by pilot data
in adults with panic disorder (Rudden et al., 2006). Moreover,
in acute anxiety, one’s own and others’ thoughts often take on
an imminent and threatening quality, which may derive from
insufficient distinctions between one’s mental representation and
reality, one of the hallmarks of a prementalizing mode (e.g., fear
of imagined catastrophic separation outcomes, fear of negative
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evaluation by others; Fonagy et al., 2002). Thus, in Study 2 we
examine young anxious children’s usage of mentalizing in an
acute stress-context, following social exclusion.
In the current pair of studies, we used the virtual ball-
toss game “Cyberball” (Williams et al., 2000) to manipulate
social exclusion. Children were ostensibly connected to the
Internet to toss a ball back and forth with two peers. The peers
eventually stopped passing the ball to the subject (exclusion).
Initially, we demonstrated that 5-year-olds excluded in Cyberball
report higher threat to relational needs and attribute more bad
intentions to co-players on post-Cyberball puppet interviews,
as well as more tattling to experimenters on co-players than
included children (White et al., unpublished).
Here, to capture young children’s mentalizing and affiliative
responses to exclusion, we adapted a widely used narrative story-
stem task that children completed before and after Cyberball.
In this task, children are exposed to scripted story-beginnings
and asked to show and tell the experimenter what happens
next using toy figures (see Emde et al., 2003). Story-completion
measures have a long history of use in studies of typical and
atypical child development. Many of these studies have focused
on the way children portray characters in their stories (e.g.,
parents, children) as a window to their internal representations of
themselves and others (see Yuval-Adler and Oppenheim, 2014 for
a review). Accordingly, studies suggest that the manner in which
children portray the child- and parent-characters in their stories
partly overlaps with actual real-world behaviors of these children
and their caregiving experiences (Oppenheim et al., 1997; Toth
et al., 1997). For example, the magnitude of children’s affiliative
and aggressive themes in such narratives is associated with the
tendency to express similar behaviors in various social contexts,
as reported by clinicians, parents, or teachers (e.g., Kochanska
et al., 1996; Hill et al., 2007; von Klitzing et al., 2007).
Recently, the story-stem approach has been broadened to
assess children’s tendency to mentalize in their stories (Hill
et al., 2007, 2008; Luyten and Fonagy, 2014). More specifically,
this approach assesses the degree to which children treat story-
characters as intentional agents, i.e., portraying figures as if they
have goals and mental states.1 For story-stems with positive
themes, previous research has documented an association
between mentalizing, as indexed by the story-stem approach, and
theory of mind, as indexed by a traditional false-belief measure
(Hill et al., 2008). By contrast, for stories with distressing themes
mentalizing was associated with the child’s previous attachment
history and their risk for externalizing disorders (Hill et al., 2007,
2008).
For the present studies, children completed scripted story
beginnings, themed with peer exclusion and victimization.
Importantly, and unlike most exclusion research to date (see
Wesselmann et al., 2015), the open-ended story-completion
1Various dimensions of mentalizing have been operationalized (see Luyten and
Fonagy, 2014, for an overview). Story-stem based measures primarily focus on the
child’s tendency to attribute cognitive-affective mental states to others (i.e., story-
characters) starting from the portrayals in the story-beginning. Notably, unlike
standard false belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983), story-stem based
assessments focus on the child’s spontaneous usage of mental state attribution
rather than the accuracy of these attributions.
method offers subjects much latitude to express a range of
post-exclusion responses. Specifically, we chose this measure as
it enabled assessment of spontaneous prosocial and aggressive
responses as well as children’s tendency to mentalize before and
after exclusion. Though rarely, if ever, used in the context of
an experimental task such as Cyberball, the story-completion
approach is particularly appealing for use with young children,
who may otherwise struggle to verbalize their thoughts (Emde
et al., 2003).
STUDY 1
Given the aforementioned links between affiliative and aggressive
themes in children’s story-completions and parallel behaviors
in various social contexts, it seemed plausible that exclusion
would affect children’s play analogous to adults’ affiliative
responses to exclusion (e.g., Maner et al., 2007). For typically
developing children in Study 1, we predicted that compared
to controls, excluded children would portray more affiliation
between characters in stories. While studies report that social
exclusion can elicit aggression (e.g., Twenge et al., 2001; Will
et al., 2014), few if any child studies report such effects. Thus,
we explored, but did not predict any effects of exclusion on
aggression between characters.
Beyond affiliation and aggression, story-completion narratives
are well-placed to examine post-exclusion attention to mental
states. Thus we assessed the degree to which children treat story-
characters as intentional agents (Hill et al., 2008). In line with
enhanced post-exclusion social monitoring (Pickett and Gardner,
2005), we predicted that exclusion, compared to a control
condition, would lead children to portray characters using more
mental state language (MSL) and with more intentionality.
Because social monitoring is thought to enhance reconnection
(Molden and Maner, 2013), we also predicted that increases in
mentalizing would mediate the effect of exclusion on affiliative
story-themes.
Aside from testing our main hypotheses, in Study 1 we
also employed character-specific codes to assess whether or
not children selectively describe mental states of some story-
characters and direct affiliation toward some characters over
others (i.e., victims vs. perpetrators in the story). Social
monitoring putatively helps to select good and weed out poor
targets for affiliation (Pickett and Gardner, 2005). Accordingly,
we predicted that a social exclusion condition would result in
increased references to both the victim’s and perpetrators’ mental
states compared to a control condition. Regarding affiliative
portrayals, we expected that excluded children would favor
victims over perpetrators, as victims should qualify as more
promising sources of affiliation.
Finally, in selecting an appropriate control condition for Study
1, we were aware that inclusion cues can also promote both
prosocial and antisocial responses (see Over and Carpenter,
2009a; Waytz, 2013) and that inclusion also activates fewer
behavioral responses compared to exclusion (e.g., tattling; White
et al., unpublished). Also, we aimed to ensure that children are
responding to the perceived intentions of excluders. We therefore
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opted for an accidental exclusion control condition in which
children were informed afterward that exclusion occurred due
to a computer malfunction. This maps onto procedures in adult
studies showing that affiliative responses are reliably elicited
by rejecting departures compared to accidental departures (e.g.,
Maner et al., 2007). As a manipulation check for this control
condition, we assessed whether or not children attributed more
bad intentions to regular vs. accidental excluders on a puppet
interview, after learning about the alleged computer malfunction.
Method
Sample
Thirty-six 5-year-olds with a mean age of 68.26 months
(SD = 2.43 months; 18 females) were recruited drawing on a
database of families volunteering to participate in development
studies. All subjects were native speakers. No ethnicity or SES
data were available. Boys and girls were separately randomized
to exclusion and accidental conditions. Ethical approval was
obtained from Leipzig University’s institutional review board.
Procedure
Children initially completed a warm-up story themed with a
Birthday party to acclimatize children to storytelling (Emde et al.,
2003). After completing the story, they were informed that they
could tell some more stories later. Next, children were furnished
with a real-life glove and baseball, which they tossed back and
forth with the experimenter. After a few throws, they were told
that they would now play this game on the computer over the
Internet. In the event that children were unfamiliar with the
Internet, the experimenter explained that the Internet would
allow them to play on the computer with two other children
who were playing the game on a computer in different places,
just like they were. Next, children played a first inclusion round
of Cyberball, followed by an experimenter administering the
first set of baseline story-stems. Then the child played a second
experimental round of Cyberball during which they were initially
included and then eventually either excluded or accidentally
excluded (see section on Cyberball for manipulation details).
Following either exclusion condition, a second set of story-stems
was administered (stems counterbalanced to pre- and post-test).
Puppet interviews were collected after administration of the
second set of story-stems to assess attribution of bad intentions
to co-players. Afterward, all children were over-included in
Cyberball. An over-inclusion phase was deemed more suitable
than debriefing for 5-year-olds in keeping with ethical guidelines
for young children (see Thompson, 1990). Parents were fully
debriefed after their child entered the lab, providing ample time
to withdraw from the study before the child played Cyberball
(no parents withdrew). Experimenters were blind to all research
questions.
Measures
Cyberball (see Figure 1)
Cyberball is a computerized ball-toss game designed for adults
(Williams et al., 2000) that was adapted for use with children
(Crowley et al., 2010; see below). Subjects ostensibly played online
with two other peers using a response pad. In fact, subjects
were the only ones playing the game. Peers were computer-
generated and their throws adhered to a pseudo-random event
script. An initial inclusion period comprised of 30 trials, aimed
to acclimatize children to the game interface. To help with
comprehension of the task, an experimenter initially sat beside
the child explaining the task and, if necessary, demonstrating the
first throw before inviting children to try for themselves. After the
eighth trial (third subject throw), experimenters complimented
children on their performance and told them they had to do
some paper work, taking a seat behind the child (while children
completed the acclimatization round). The “acclimatization”
round alternated between 9 “my turn” events (ball is thrown to
participant), 9 “ball-toss” events (participant throws the ball) and
12 “not my turn” events (ball is passed between co-players).
For the second experimental round of Cyberball, the
experimenter immediately took a seat behind the child,
pretending to work. The round was divided into a brief initial
inclusion period of nine trials for all children (3 “my turn,” 3
“ball toss,” 3 “not my turn” events) seamlessly transitioning into
exclusion (2 “my turn” events, 2 “throw events,” and 35 “not
my turn” events). The exclusion and accidental conditions only
differed in the two final screenshots appearing after the final
ball-pass in the accidental condition. In the accidental condition,
a first screenshot suggested that an error had occurred in red
capital letters. Experimenters read this information out loud to
children and terminated screenshots using the spacebar. The
second screenshot showed a figure holding two disconnected
ends of a red cable. To match this screenshot, response pads
were connected to computers with a red sparkling USB cable
and experimenters tampered with this cable when the second
screenshot appeared. They also asked children if they had only
received few balls, and told them that the other players could not
toss the ball to them because the cable was disconnected. After the
second set of story-stems and the puppet interview, all children
played a third 38-trial over-inclusion round (16 “my turn,” 15
“ball toss,” and 6 “not my turn” events).
Crowley et al.’s (2010) version of Cyberball adds a number
of child-friendly features. For example, a pre-recorded female
narrator asks the child to pick their favorite from a selection of six
baseball gloves before the game commences. For each throw the
ball travels in one of many arcs from player to player (e.g., curved
line), accompanied by a variety of swoosh sounds. Names and
pictures of co-players were displayed above their gloves. Pictures
of co-players were age and gender-matched, drawing on a picture
bank of neutral child faces. Besides adding a new narrator to this
version, we aimed to scaffold understanding of game controls.
Thus, each time the subject caught the ball, names of co-players
changed colors from white to red and blue to match the color of
the respective button children had to press to throw the ball to
that player (see Figure 1).
Story-stem administration
Following the MacArthur Story-Stem method (Bretherton and
Oppenheim, 2003; Emde et al., 2003), standardized story-
completions, enacted with Lego R© DUPLO R© figures, were used
to elicit narratives from each child. Trained experimenters
presented story beginnings to children following a standardized
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FIGURE 1 | Children played Cyberball ostensibly with two other
children, whose photographs were displayed on the screen, using the
red button to pass to the left player (name displayed in red) or the blue
button to pass to the right player (name displayed in blue). The children
depicted in this figure are now adults and have provided their written consent
for the publication of these identifiable images.
script before they asked children to “tell and show me what
happens next”. Experimenters employed standardized prompts
if children failed to address the problem presented in the stem.
Before playing the acclimatization round of Cyberball, children
completed a positively themed warm-up stem about a child’s
birthday to check engagement and introduce all characters
(Emde et al., 2003). Before and after the experimental Cyberball
round children first completed a stem themed with peer-
exclusion (“Sandbox,” “Snowman”) followed by a stem themed
with peer-victimization (“Fight with a Friend,” “Favorite Chair”;
Warren, 2003; Hill et al., 2007). Exclusion-themed stems were
newly developed for this study (see Supplemental Material). We
counterbalanced stems to baseline and experimental phases, so
that each stem occurred equally often before and after exclusion.
To standardize temporal gaps between stories and Cyberball,
children were allowed to narrate stories for up to 3 min each.
Story-stem coding
All stories were transcribed and scored drawing on two different
coding manuals and extensions of these systems (Robinson et al.,
2002; Hill et al., 2009). All ratings were completed individually
for each narrative from verbatim transcripts. Raters remained
blind to the condition of subjects, other narratives of that
child, order in which the stems were administered, and all
other subject information. Raters received training from authors
and/or experts of the respective coding systems. A second rater
double-coded a random sample of 25% of stories (ICCs: 0.61 to
0.93).
Based on the first manual (Robinson et al., 2002) and in line
with previous studies (von Klitzing et al., 2007), a composite of
affiliative themes was formed for each story, involving empathy
or helping (e.g., character puts band aid on other character),
affection (e.g., characters hug), sharing (e.g., characters share
items), reparation (e.g., character apologizes) and affiliation (e.g.,
characters play together) between characters. The presence of
each theme was coded in a story and summed to a maximum
score of five per story (affiliation). Each instance of affiliation
was also coded in a new character-specific fashion. Two separate
character-specific affiliative codes were derived by identifying the
beneficiaries or recipients of each affiliative action, to create two
separate affiliative codes. Affiliative actions were summed with
the victimized party as recipients (victim-directed affiliation) and
peers who perpetrated victimization as recipients (perpetrator-
directed affiliation).
Based on a second coding manual (Hill et al., 2009),
we coded the extent to which children globally portrayed
characters as intentional agents (intentionality), i.e., as if they
were goal-directed and had mental states (see Hill et al.,
2007, 2008). Extending Hill et al.’s (2009) manual, we summed
explicit intentional or mental state words children used to
describe story-characters (e.g., “She wants to play with her
in the snow.”) to create a score for mental state language
(MSL) per story. To create a new set of character-specific
scores we determined whether the child described a mental
state of the victimized character (victim-focused MSL) or the
characters perpetrating the victimization (perpetrator-focused
MSL).
Additionally, we scored aggression between characters (Hill
et al., 2009). Aggression assesses the extent to which children
portray characters as acting aggressively toward one another, with
higher scores reflecting more severe aggression. For example,
verbal aggression usually scores in the lowest range (1–3), minor
physical aggression in the intermediate range (4–6) while severe
aggression resulting in injuries or even death rate in the high
(7–9) or highest range (10–12), respectively.
To gain a more complete picture of narratives, we also scored
story-quality (coherence) following a coding manual (Hill et al.,
2009) and derived word counts from transcripts as a control a
control variable using a standard software package (Pennebaker
et al., 2007).
Preschool Ostracism Puppet Interview (POPI; White et al.,
unpublished)
We used a puppet interview protocol informed by the Berkeley
Puppet Interview (Ablow and Measelle, 1993) to assess the extent
to which children attributed bad intentions to their fellow players.
Puppets claimed they had played the game as well and made
opposing attributional statements regarding motives of their co-
players (four items; “I think the other boys/ girls wanted to tease
me” vs. “I don’t think the other boys/ girls wanted to tease me”).
Interviews were videotaped and coded on seven-point scales
(higher scores indicating stronger attribution of bad intentions;
Cronbach’s α= 0.92). Over 25% of interviews were double-coded
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(n = 12; ICC = 1.00). Due to time-constraints, two children did
not complete the interview.
Data-Analysis
We compared attribution of bad intentions by children in the
exclusion and accidental conditions using analysis of variance
(ANOVA). To compare conditions in regard to changes in
global narrative codes from pre- to post-Cyberball on affiliation,
MSL, aggression, intentionality, coherence, and word-count, we
conducted a series of mixed-design ANOVAs, with time (pre-
to post-Cyberball) as within-subject factor, and condition as
between-subject factor. To analyze character-specific affiliation
and MSL, we conducted two mixed-design ANOVAs, with time
(pre- to post-Cyberball) and story-character (victim, perpetrator)
as within-subject factors, and condition as between-subject
factor. For all analyses, we averaged scores on peer-exclusion
and peer-victimization stories before and after the manipulation
after ensuring absence of Time by Condition by Story Type
interactions. In a final step, we entered pre–post change in
word count as a covariate in analyses of global narrative codes
that yielded Condition × Time interactions, to ensure their
independence of changes in story-length. The PROCESS macro
(Hayes, 2013) was used to assess if changes in intentionality
or MSL mediated effects of regular vs. accidental exclusion
on changes in affiliative themes. Post-Cyberball affiliation and
intentionality/ MSL scores were entered as independent and
mediator variables, respectively, while pre-Cyberball scores
functioned as covariates. We conducted ordinary least squares
(OLSs) path analyses using 10,000 bootstrapping samples, a bias-
corrected 95% confidence interval (CI), and omitted covariates
to compute Preacher and Kelley’s (2011) κ2 as an effect
size (small: 0.01 to 0.089, intermediate: 0.09 to 0.249, large:
≥0.25).
Results
Manipulation check
An ANOVA revealed that excluded children attributed more
bad intentions to their co-players, compared to children
in the accidental condition, F(1,32) = 7.436, p = 0.010,
η2p = 0.189; Mexcl = 4.094; SDexcl = 1.837; Maccid = 2.625;
SDaccid = 1.284. This finding provides validity information
regarding the accidental condition, supporting that preschoolers
make distinctions between types of exclusion based on intentions
of excluders.
Effects of exclusion on story-completions
To test our hypotheses that exclusion would give rise to an
increase in affiliation, intentionality, and MSL compared to the
accidental condition, a series of 2 (Condition) by 2 (Time)
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed (see Table 1 for
descriptives, F-values and effect sizes). No main effects of
Condition or Time emerged for affiliation, intentionality, or MSL
(ps > 0.12). Confirming our hypotheses, Condition × Time
interactions were detected indicating greater increases after
exclusion for affiliation (p < 0.001) as well as MSL (p = 0.004)
and intentionality (p = 0.001) compared to the accidental
condition (see Figure 2). Condition×Time Interaction effects on
affiliation, MSL, and intentionality were robust to controlling for
pre- to post-word count changes (ps< 0.014). The same analyses
were conducted for coherence, aggression, and word count.
Coherence yielded a main effect of time (p = 0.025), but neither
an effect of condition (p = 0.652), nor a Condition × Time
interaction (p = 0.593). No main effects or Condition × Time
interactions emerged for word count (p = 0.131) or aggression
(p= 0.626; see Table 1).
To test our hypothesis that excluded children, but not
controls, would preferentially direct affiliation toward the victim
of the story, a 2 (Time) by 2 (Condition) by 2 (Character:
victim or perpetrator) mixed-design ANOVA was performed.
For affiliation, we detected a Condition × Time interaction,
F(1,34) = 11.900, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.259, which was further
moderated by Condition × Time × Character interaction,
F(1,34) = 5.100, p = 0.030, η2p = 0.130. Two follow-up 2
(Time) by 2 (Condition) ANOVAs, revealed Condition × Time
interactions for affiliation that was victim-directed (p = 0.001),
but only at trend-level for affiliation that was perpetrator-
directed (p = 0.057). This pattern of results suggested that
excluded children increased victim-directed affiliation, but not
perpetrator-directed affiliation compared to children in the
accidental condition (see Figure 3, lower panels). For MSL, we
also performed a 2 (Time) by 2 (Condition) by 2 (Character:
victim or perpetrator) mixed-design ANOVA. Here, we detected
a Condition × Time interaction, F(1,34) = 9.047, p = 0.005,
η2p = 0.210, but no evidence for a Condition× Time× Character
interaction, F(1,34) = 0.468, p = 0.499, η2p = 0.014. This pattern
of results indicated that excluded children increased victim-
focused and perpetrator-focused MSL to a comparable extent
relative to children in the accidental condition (see Figure 3,
upper panels).
From simple mediation models employing OLS path analysis,
we found evidence that regular vs. accidental exclusion generated
an increase in affiliation through their indirect effects on
intentionality (CI for indirect effect: −0.416 to −0.017) as well
as MSL (CI for indirect effect:−0.385 to−0.044). The mediation
effects were medium to large for intentionality (κ2 = 0.201;
CI= 0.053 to 0.395) and MSL (κ2 = 0.165; CI= 0.052 to 0.332).
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we aimed to test the proposal that childhood anxiety
may coincide with stress-induced deficits in mentalizing (e.g.,
Nolte et al., 2011). Accordingly, we predicted that children with
ADs would exhibit a decline in depicting story-characters using
MSL and intentionality after exclusion compared to controls. In
this study, we thus exposed all children to regular exclusion and
examined its effect as a function of anxiety. Concerning affiliative
themes, we did not make specific predictions because the
research is inconsistent, with some work suggesting that anxious
children are highly motivated to be accepted by others (Banerjee,
2008), but other research indicating that individuals with
(social) anxiety have trouble enacting reconnection behaviors
after exclusion (Mallott et al., 2009). For this study, we also
broadened our age-range as compared to Study 1. We did
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TABLE 1 | Means and ANOVA results testing effect of condition (exclusion, accidental exclusion) on global codes in pre- and post-Cyberball doll-play
narratives in Study 1.
Mean narrative score ANOVA (df = 1, 34)
Pre Post Condition (C) Time (T) C × T
M (SD) M (SD) F η2p F η
2
p F η
2
p
Affiliation 0.09 0.003 2.56 0.070 15.07∗∗∗ 0.307
Exclusion 0.94 (0.70) 1.61 (1.09)
Accidental 1.33 (0.79) 1.06 (0.97)
Aggression 0.10 0.003 3.41† 0.091 0.24 0.007
Exclusion 1.86 (0.98) 2.17 (1.70)
Accidental 1.86 (1.00) 2.39 (1.12)
Mental state language 2.09 0.058 2.27 0.063 9.52∗∗ 0.219
Exclusion 0.67 (0.84) 1.56 (1.49)
Accidental 0.83 (1.14) 0.53 (0.55)
Intentionality 2.17 0.014 2.07 0.057 13.61∗∗∗ 0.286
Exclusion 8.36 (1.54) 9.50 (1.99)
Accidental 8.83 (1.70) 8.33 (1.27)
Coherence 0.208 0.006 5.47∗ 0.139 0.29 0.008
Exclusion 7.56 (1.68) 8.22 (1.99)
Accidental 7.42 (1.95) 7.83 (1.86)
Word count 0.463 0.013 1.65 0.046 2.393 0.066
Exclusion 46.44 (39.36) 56.06 (44.17)
Accidental 43.86 (31.01) 42.97 (26.92)
†p < 0.10; ∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗p ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Changes in children’s narrative portrayals of affiliation, mental state language, and intentionality in the exclusion compared to the
accidental condition in Study 1.
this, first, because we aimed to provide initial evidence that
the patterns documented in Study 1 are not circumscribed
to preschoolers, but also generalize to older children. Second,
pragmatic reasons also played a role as the recruitment of
clinically referred young children with diagnosed ADs also posed
a challenge.
Sample
Twenty clinically referred 4 to 8-year-olds with AD participated
in this study prior to enrollment in a treatment-evaluation
study (see Göttken et al., 2014). Following referral by a senior
child psychologist of the outpatient services, presence of AD
was independently established by a trained researcher using a
diagnostic interview with the parent (see below). As a control
group, 15 non-referred age- and gender-matched children were
recruited via telephone from a group of volunteers for studies
of child development. All children of the comparison group
scored below the clinical cut-off of the emotional symptoms
subscale of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ;
Goodman, 1997; see below), which assesses anxiety and mood
symptoms. The control group (hereafter referred to as non-
anxious children or controls) was also comparable to the AD
group in regard to years of parental schooling as well as
rate of parental separation (see Table 1). All children in the
AD group were recommended for enrollment in a treatment-
evaluation study (see Göttken et al., 2014). Ethical approval
was obtained from Leipzig University’s institutional review
board.
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FIGURE 3 | Change in children’s narrative portrayals of victim- and perpetrator-focused MSL and victim- and perpetrator-directed affiliation and in
the exclusion compared to the accidental condition in Study 1.
Procedure
All steps matched the regular exclusion condition of Study 1,
with the following exceptions: AD children completed a puppet
interview on their symptoms (not analyzed herein) prior to
engaging in the procedure. To minimize the time-burden for AD
children, the POPI was omitted after completion of the second set
of story beginnings.
Measures
Cyberball
The identical set-up was used as for the exclusion condition in
Study 1.
Story-stem narratives
Administration (e.g., counterbalancing) and coding procedure
of child narratives matched Study 2 in all regards, except
the following: coding was limited to hypothesis-related
dimensions of affiliation, aggression, coherence, intentionality,
and MSL. A random sample of 20% of the present stories
were double-coded by trained coders (ICCs: 0.66 to
0.86).
Psychiatric Disorders and Symptoms
Preschool Age Psychiatric Assessment (PAPA)
The interviewer-based Preschool Age Psychiatric Assessment
(PAPA; Egger and Angold, 2004) was administered to mothers of
the AD group. The PAPA is a 2–3 h structured clinical interview
to assess DSM-IV criteria of preschool and young school-age
children below age 9 (Egger, 2012, personal communication).
Across a 3-month primary period, mothers report frequency,
duration and onset of child psychiatric symptoms to the
interviewer. After entering all data into the electronic interview
interface of the PAPA, algorithms designed by the developers of
the PAPA and implementing DSM-IV criteria generate symptom
scores and categorical diagnoses. The PAPA was translated
and adapted between 2009 and 2010 by a research group at
the University of Leipzig, assisted by the US PAPA authors.
PAPA modules included in this study were: Oppositional Defiant
Disorder (ODD), Conduct Disorder (CD), Depression (D), Social
and Specific Phobia (SOP; SP), General Anxiety Disorder (GAD),
and Separation Anxiety Disorder (SAD). A high degree of
inter-rater reliability was established on primary diagnoses and
subthreshold diagnoses (kappa coefficient = 0.92; range: 0.62 to
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1.00; Göttken et al., 2014). The PAPA has shown good test-retest
reliability and construct validity (Egger and Angold, 2006; Egger
et al., 2006).
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire
All caregivers completed the 25-item Strengths and Difficulties
Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997) – a commonly used
child-psychiatric screener that yields symptom scores for
emotional symptoms (i.e., anxiety and mood symptoms),
conduct problems, hyperactivity, and peer problems. Validity
and adequate reliability for English and German versions were
established in several studies (Goodman, 2001; Klein et al., 2013),
for example, showing significant overlap between clinician-
rated emotional disorders and parent-rated emotional symptoms
(Becker et al., 2004). To screen the control group negative
for anxiety symptoms, the Emotional symptoms subscale was
checked to ensure that all controls scored below the clinical
cut-off of 5, established within a representative German sample
(Woerner et al., 2004).
Verbal Competence
Receptive verbal ability was assessed using the picture-based
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R; Dunn and
Dunn, 1981) to ensure that groups were comparable in terms of
verbal competence.
Data-Analysis
First, to confirm successful matching, anxiety-disordered
children and controls were compared on all demographic
factors and verbal competence using χ2 and a series of one-way
analyses of variance (ANOVA). For the main analyses, a series
of two-way 2 (Time: Pre- vs. Post-exclusion) by 2 (Group:
AD group vs. Controls) mixed-design analyses of variance
(ANOVA) were conducted to assess group by time interactions
on intentionality, MSL, coherence, aggression and affiliation.2
Significant interactions were followed up with separate one-way
repeated measures ANOVAs in both groups to analyze whether
effects of time (Time: Pre- vs. Post-exclusion) in the AD or the
control group or both accounted for the results.
Results
Children with ADs were comparable to non-anxious controls on
child age, gender, verbal competence, rate of parental separation,
and parental education (all ps > 0.10; see Table 2). To compare
AD children with controls on pre- to post-exclusion changes
in narrative dimensions (prosociality, aggression, coherence,
intentionality, MSL), a series of mixed-design ANOVAs were
conducted (see Table 3 for means, standard deviations, and test
statistics). For intentionality and MSL, no main effects of group
or time were observed, but, as predicted, an interaction between
group and time emerged for intentionality (p < 0.001) and MSL
(p< 0.006), showing that intentionality and MSL decreased from
2Including story-type in a three-way 2 (Time: Baseline vs. Post-exclusion) by 2
(Group: AD group vs. Controls) by 2 (Story Type: exclusion vs. peer-conflict)
mixed-design ANOVA, yielded no evidence of a three-way interaction. Therefore,
as in Study 1, we collapsed children’s scores across stories (i.e., using mean scores
at baseline and post-exclusion).
baseline to post-exclusion in the AD group, but increased for
controls (see Figure 4). To check whether the interaction effect
mainly derived from the decrease in the AD group or the increase
among controls, a post hoc repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted separately for each group with time as within-group
variable. This revealed an increase in the non-anxious control
group on intentionality, F(1,14) = 13.55, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.492,
and MSL, F(1,14) = 6.175, p = 0.026, η2p = 0.306, as well as
decrease in the AD group on intentionality, F(1,19) = 10.322,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.352, and trend for a decrease on MSL,
F(1,19) = 3.048, p = 0.097, η2p = 0.138. Similarly, coherence
also revealed a significant interaction effect (p < 0.001). Again,
separate post hoc repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for
each group with time as within-group variable. This revealed both
an increase in the control group, F(1,14) = 11.455, p = 0.004,
η2p = 0.450, as well as a decrease in the AD group, F(1,19)= 5.93,
p = 0.022, η2p = 0.246. No main effects of group or time,
or interactions between time and group emerged for affiliation
(ps > 0.23) and aggression (ps > 0.11).
DISCUSSION
This research is the first to show that exclusion leads young
children to shift how much they attend to others’ mental
states and that the extent to which they do so depends on
their level of anxiety. Thus, exclusion, but not accidental
exclusion, led typically developing preschoolers to tell stories that
portrayed characters as intentional agents, with more references
to characters’ mental states, and increased affiliation between
characters (Study 1). Conversely, young children with ADs were
less likely to portray characters as intentional agents and made
fewer references to story-characters’ mental states after exclusion
compared to a non-anxious control group who showed similar
increases on these dimensions as in the first study (Study 2).
Across Studies 1 and 2, we provide the field with first
experimental data documenting young children’s systematic
moment-to-moment fluctuations in attention to others’ mental
states. During this crucial stage of development in understanding
mental states, children already appear capable of flexibly
increasing or decreasing mentalizing to meet the needs of a given
situation. Indeed, exclusion may compel children to increase
mentalizing, paving the way toward more effective reconnection
(Pickett and Gardner, 2005), as suggested by the parallel increase
in affiliative story-themes and their mediation by intentionality
and MSL in Study 1. Moreover, considering the character-
specific findings, children appear to monitor other minds broadly
(victims and perpetrators alike), but direct their affiliative
motivation specifically to those targets who are most open to
cooperation (victims).3 Excluded children’s contemplation of
3The post-exclusion increase in victim-directed affiliation may also reflect an
“attraction” to story-characters who share the subject’s plight (i.e., victimization),
resembling classic findings reporting that subjects expecting a novel threat
preferred to wait with similarly threatened others, rather than others in a dissimilar
situation (Schachter, 1959; Gump and Kulik, 1997). Potentially other excluded
parties may afford especially promising targets for reconnection, as they may share
the subject’s desire to reconnect, given their equally excluded state.
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TABLE 2 | Demographic data of children with and without anxiety disorder in Study 2.
Anxiety disorder (n = 20) Non-anxious controls (n = 15) AD vs. NAC
Demographic data Test-statistic p
Mean child age in months (SD) 82.80 (15.41) 86.33 (13.52) F (1,33) = 0.50 0.485
% females 50.00 46.67 χ2(1) = 1 0.845
% single parents 45.00 26.67 χ2(1) = 1.23 0.267
Parental education (Median) High School Diploma University Degree U(33) = 78 0.107
Mean verbal score 75.80 (13.27) 81.55 (7.89) F (1,33) = 2.22 0.146
TABLE 3 | Means and ANOVA results testing effect of group (anxious, non-anxious) on global codes in pre- and post-Cyberball doll-play narratives in
Study 2.
Mean narrative score ANOVA (df = 1, 33)
Pre Post Condition (C) Time (T) C × T
M (SD) M (SD) F η2p F η
2
p F η
2
p
Affiliation 0.82 0.024 1.47 0.043 0.078 0.002
Anxious 1.38 (0.84) 1.50 (0.74)
Non-anxious 1.60 (1.00) 1.80 (0.98)
Aggression 2.05 0.059 1.60 0.046 2.59 0.073
Anxious 3.30 (2.63) 3.20 (2.51)
Non-anxious 1.90 (1.00) 2.73 (1.27)
Mental state language 0.12 0.003 0.24 0.007 8.52∗∗ 0.205
Anxious 1.32 (1.24) 0.77 (0.72)
Non-anxious 0.75 (0.68) 1.53 (1.36)
Intentionality 1.63 0.047 0.82 0.024 17.69∗∗∗ 0.349
Anxious 9.95 (1.69) 8.40 (2.19)
Non-anxious 9.27 (1.05) 10.27 (0.98)
Coherence 2.56 0.072 0.10 0.003 15.45∗∗∗ 0.319
Anxious 8.43 (2.00) 7.40 (2.74)
Non-anxious 8.33 (1.29) 9.53 (1.56)
Word count 1.28 0.037 2.93† 0.082 0.133 0.004
Anxious 97.00 (61.72) 107.88 (87.20)
Non-anxious 70.97 (44.58) 87.73 (44.58)
†p < 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
the mental states of those around them may thus help them
navigate toward target individuals who are most worthwhile to
approach in order to restore a sense of connection. In turn,
closely attending to a target’s mental states may also facilitate
post-exclusion affiliative behaviors by the excluded party, given
that genuinely prosocial and cooperative actions demand that
the actor keeps the needs and goals of the recipient in mind
(Tomasello, 2014). In that sense, excluded children may be
thought of as adopting a “cooperative mindset.”
A distinct, but related interpretation of our data may
suggest that exclusion prompted children to more strongly
anthropomorphize story-characters in an attempt to cope
with exclusion. Indeed, other studies have documented that
exclusion or a dispositionally high need for inclusion leads
individuals to anthropomorphize ambiguous or inanimate
agents, thus augmenting the perception of social connection
(Epley et al., 2008; Powers et al., 2014). Scholars have
speculated that these patterns may assist excluded individuals
in seeking solace in imaginary “parasocial” relationships or
reflect adjustment of information-processing thresholds after
exclusion to seek out new partners in more places (Knowles,
2013; Molden and Maner, 2013). We would suggest that
this account complements the view that excluded children
adopt a “cooperative mindset,” in that increased mentalizing
post-exclusion may prepare children should opportunities for
reconnection arise.
However, adopting a “cooperative mindset” does not appear
to be a universal response to exclusion. Indeed, young children
with ADs instead showed a decline in attending to mental states
after exclusion. This deficit in mentalizing upon social threat
therefore provides one potentially important reason why anxious
children may have trouble applying their intact mentalizing
skills to affectively charged social situations (see Banerjee, 2008).
Excessive negative arousal, typical of childhood anxiety, may
interfere with controlled mentalizing, potentially resulting in a
more automatic mode of mentalizing after exclusion, coinciding
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FIGURE 4 | Changes in anxious and non-anxious children’s narrative portrayals of MSL and intentionality in Study 2.
with reflexive assumptions about others’ internal states (Fonagy
and Luyten, 2009).
Notably, we recently reported neural data suggesting that
insecure attachment strategies lead children to respond to the
Cyberball paradigm with more excessive and enduring negative
expectations regarding re-inclusion than securely attached
children (White et al., 2012, 2013). The present anxiety-related
drop in mentalizing could set the stage for an over-extension of
these negative expectations to other encounters after exclusion.
Specifically, anxious children might effectively be making
unjustified, reflexive, and sweeping assumptions about the mental
attitudes of others toward themselves (automatic mentalization)
that promotes generalization of their own negative views of
themselves, others, and the world (“Nobody will ever let me back
in”). Inasmuch as reduced mentalizing may then, in turn, impede
affiliation after exclusion, it may partly explain why childhood
anxiety is associated with increased risk for peer rejection in
many studies (e.g., Perren et al., 2006; von Klitzing et al., 2014).
Indeed, given that most individuals get exposed to exclusion at
some point or another (Nezlek et al., 2012) – perhaps especially
so in early childhood when children are less socially skilled and
exclusion may even occur accidentally (Monks, 2011) – much
may depend on the capacity to recover from exclusion once it has
transpired.
Limitations and Future Directions
First, it may seem surprising that anxious children did not also
evidence diminished affiliative themes in their story-completions
in Study 2. However, scholars frequently caution against equating
portrayals in story-completions with the actual experiences they
denote (e.g., Bretherton and Oppenheim, 2003). The exclusion-
induced increase in affiliative portrayals in Study 1 may thus
potentially signify a behavioral disposition of the excluded child
or a wish for such behavior from others, rather than the behavior
or experience itself. Perhaps anxious children preserve their
wish and motivation to be accepted by others, despite a failure
to act accordingly to reach this goal (Banerjee, 2008), which
would reconcile our findings with data showing diminished
post-exclusion reconnection behaviors among socially anxious
adults (Mallott et al., 2009). Given that we have shown that
social exclusion impacts what children “think about,” future
work may examine how attention to mental states relates to
what they actually do, for instance, if given an opportunity to
“reunite” (White et al., 2013) or if aggressive options are available
(Warburton et al., 2006).
Second, our data also raise important questions regarding the
exclusion-specificity of the observed changes in mentalizing for
typically developing and anxious children. To draw conclusions
on this issue, we would need to compare effects of various types
of stressors (e.g., negative pictures, tackling unsolvable tasks,
losing a game). However, we speculate that other social-evaluative
stressors (e.g., giving a presentation to an audience) would also
generate similar results. Indeed, even non-social threat may
sometimes kindle an affiliative motivation (Schachter, 1959), and
may therefore, by extension, also lead to elevated mentalizing
among healthy individuals. Future research could attempt to
disentangle the effects of arousal and affiliative motivation in
different populations.
Third, in a related vein, future research should also aim
to specify the dispositional factors that influence context-
dependent shifts in mentalizing. Indeed, in other work using the
story-completion method, conduct disorders and externalizing
symptoms have also been associated with reduced portrayals
of characters as intentional agents, but only in stories with
distressing themes (Hill et al., 2007, 2008). In keeping with recent
proposals, stress-induced mentalizing deficits may therefore
reflect a transdiagnostic vulnerability to mental disorder, rather
than a vulnerability specific to anxiety (see Fonagy et al., 2016).
Future work could examine children with other clinical problems
that promote high arousal under challenge (e.g., aggression),
likely impeding children in bouncing back from rejection.
Fourth, it is also noteworthy that unlike some behavioral
data in adults (Twenge et al., 2001), we did not observe
any increases in aggressive story-themes in our data either
among typical or anxious young children. Interestingly, this
corresponds to a finding in our previous study, showing that
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preschoolers in contrast to adults do not feel threatened in
their subjective sense of control by exclusion (White et al.,
unpublished). Notably, control-threat has been identified as
the single-most important mediator of aggressive responses to
exclusion, as excluded individuals act aggressively to regain a
sense of agency and influence over events (Gerber and Wheeler,
2009). Potentially, during this early period when children are
still gaining familiarity with peer interactions and may show
greater generosity than at later stages (Fehr et al., 2008), peer
exclusion may serve as a stronger suppressant of aggression than
at later stages (Barner-Barry, 1986). More generally, this null-
finding additionally strengthens our conclusion that the increases
in mentalizing observed here primarily occurred in the context
of a motivation to reconnect. Yet, a sample which included
dispositionally aggressive children may potentially yield increases
in aggressive story-themes.
Fifth, in this study we used a story-completion measure
to assess the degree to which children engage in mentalizing
following exclusion. However, it is conceivable that other
measures of mentalizing, such as standard false belief tasks that
tap into the capacity to infer beliefs that contrast with the
child’s own knowledge (Wellman, 2014), may yield divergent
results. For a more complete picture, researchers should also
aim to administer such tasks before and after exclusion in future
studies.
Sixth, future work should also assess healthy and anxious
children’s responses to inclusion conditions. For the present
study, an inclusion condition was primarily deemed less
appropriate, given that previous studies document that inclusion
cues may also promote cooperation and trust (Over and
Carpenter, 2009a; Hillebrandt et al., 2011). Therefore, inclusion
may prove suboptimal as a control condition to examine
reconnection responses to exclusion. However, inclusion
responses may be of interest in their own right.
Finally, a set of alternative interpretations also deserve
attention. Thus, it might be suggested that children merely
ponder mental states of others after exclusion because they
are wondering why they were excluded. Indeed, Cyberball is
a causally ambiguous task (Williams and Zadro, 2005), i.e.,
participants are not informed why their co-players stopped
passing them the ball. However, if increased mentalizing merely
reflected a wish to understand the reasons for exclusion in
Cyberall, excluded children would be expected to focus their
attention more narrowly on mental states of perpetrators in
their stories. Yet, we did not find evidence for this using
character-specific scores in Study 1. A second account might
suggest that Cyberball gives children a firsthand experience
of exclusion that leads to a better understanding of mental
states of story-characters facing similar situations. However,
if this were the sole explanation, excluded children might
primarily be expected to better understand mental states of the
story-victim. Instead, we observed an increase in mentalizing
in relation to victims and perpetrators. Notably, we are
not claiming that neither of these social-cognitive processes
operate after exclusion. Rather, we are suggesting that they
are unlikely to fully explain our pattern of findings. Indeed,
neither of these lean interpretations of our data are easily
reconciled with the fact that intentionality and MSL mediated
the effect of exclusion on affiliative story-themes in Study 1,
suggesting that mentalizing in this context provides a means
for reconnection and that young children may already flexibly
adapt their level of mentalizing to match their affiliative
goals.
CONCLUSION
A developmental theory of mental state understanding is
incomplete as long as we know relatively little about the
circumstances and dispositions that determine the extent to
which children actually use this competence or not. Our findings
show that social exclusion offers an important stimulus for the
usage of mentalizing from preschool age onward. As excluded
children weigh the benefits of reconnection (promotion) against
the cost of potential further rejection (prevention; Molden and
Maner, 2013), attending to others’ mental states may provide a
useful “mental reconnection tool” to vigilantly filter, approach,
and re-engage with potential social partners. However, this
“mental reconnection tool” may not be readily available to all
children facing social exclusion. Thus, we showed that children
with ADs exhibit a drop in mentalizing following exclusion.
Given a general model of mentalization and regulation of
negative affect (Fonagy et al., 2002), it is likely that the process
of impaired mentalizing under the social challenge of exclusion
reflects a transdiagnostic vulnerability factor that more broadly
lies at the core of developmental psychopathology.
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Preterm birth is a major risk factor for children’s development. It affects children’s
cognitive and intellectual development and is related to impairments in IQ, executive
functions, and well-being, with these problems persisting into adulthood. While preterm
children’s intellectual and cognitive development has been studied in detail, their social
development and social-cognitive competencies have received less attention. Namely,
preterm children show problems in interactions with others. These interaction problems
are present in relationships with parents, teachers, and peers. Parents’ behavior has
been identified as a possible mediator of children’s social behavior. Maternal sensitivity
and responsiveness as well as absence of mental disorders foster children’s social
development. In this article, we will report on the social side of impairments that preterm
children face. The review of the literature revealed that preterm infants’ joint attention
abilities are impaired: They are less likely to initiate joint attention with others and to
respond to others’ efforts to engage in joint attention. These deficits in joint attention
might contribute to later impairments in social cognition, which in turn might affect social
interaction skills. Based on these three domains (i.e., problems in social interaction,
parental behavior, and impairments in joint attention), we suggest that preterm children’s
social cognitive abilities should be investigated more intensively.
Keywords: preterm birth, social cognition, social problems, Theory of Mind, joint attention
INTRODUCTION
Preterm birth is a major risk factor for children’s development (Aarnoudse-Moens et al., 2009b).
It affects preterm children’s motor development (Jeyaseelan et al., 2006; Sansavini et al., 2015) and
somatic health (Saigal and Doyle, 2008), as well as their cognitive and intellectual development:
Impairments in IQ, executive functions, and well-being are related to a preterm birth, and these
problems persist into adulthood (Løhaugen et al., 2010). While these factors of preterm children’s
intellectual and cognitive development have been studied in detail, their social development
and social-cognitive competencies have received less attention. This lesser interest in social-
cognitive development is surprising, as preterm children face problems not only in their intellectual
development but also in social interaction (for a review, see Chapieski and Evankovich, 1997).
Reading the following paragraphs, it should be noted that the definitions of preterm and very
preterm birth vary across studies, both in the criteria used (birth weight or gestational age or both)
and the specific critical values. Usually, the critical values are a birth weight of less than 1500 g and
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a gestational age under 33 weeks (Aarnoudse-Moens et al.,
2009b). According to WHO criteria, preterm birth is defined by a
gestational age of less than 37 weeks. Therefore criteria defining
preterm birth should be taken into account thoroughly before
comparing various findings (for an overview of definitions of
preterm birth given by the studies reported below, see Appendix,
Table 1).
INTERACTION DIFFICULTIES WITH
OTHERS
Preterm children’s interaction difficulties are reported to be
manifold: A systematic review of 23 studies dealing with social
development in children between 0 and 17 years of age revealed
16 out of 21 studies reporting more peer problems and social
withdrawal in preterm children compared to full-term children
(Ritchie et al., 2015). More specifically, at 2 years of age, children
born very preterm already have lower social competence (e.g.,
listening to parents or playing with other children, Spittle et al.,
2009) and are rated as less socially competent by their parents
(Alduncin et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2015) than their full-term
peers. Preterm children also show more externalizing behaviors
than their full-term peers (Bhutta et al., 2002; Potijk et al., 2012),
imposing special challenges on their social environment.
Other studies considering very-low-birth-weight infants
between 5 and 10 years of age have reported a persistence of social
problems into school age (Ross et al., 1990; Hille et al., 2001;
Reijneveld et al., 2006), underlining the relevance of this topic.
Preterm children were found to be not as accepted by peers as
full-term children, and were more likely to withdraw from social
situations (Hoy et al., 1992; McCormick and Workman-Daniels,
1996; Nadeau et al., 2003). They were also verbally victimized
more often (Nadeau et al., 2004), and rated as socially immature
(Nadeau et al., 2003). Various possible reasons for these findings
have been discussed (Nadeau et al., 2004). For instance, minor
motor difficulties might lead to exclusion from the peer group
and to victimization, and preterm children have more of these
motor difficulties than their full-term peers (Holsti et al., 2002).
Preterm children might themselves feel uncomfortable during
physical activities with their peers who are more dexterous than
themselves (Yude et al., 1998).
However, some studies indicate that preterm children do
not, in general, show more difficulties in social interaction than
their peers. A study differentiating between two subgroups of
preterm children revealed only preterm children with medical
risk factors (e.g., intraventricular hemorrhage) exhibiting more
difficulties in social interaction than full-term peers (Landry
et al., 1990). In accordance with this finding, brain abnormalities
could be identified as a predictor of social competence (Ritchie
et al., 2015). The predictive power of gestational age and brain
abnormalities might serve as an explanation for one report
that does not support the suggestion of differences in social
competence between preterm and full-term children (Jacob et al.,
1984). This study included preterm children with a birth weight
up to 2500 g and a gestational age up to 37 weeks. These values
are higher than in the studies that reported differences in social
competence between preterm and full-term children, thereby
favoring the inclusion of preterm children at lower medical risk.
Besides brain abnormalities and motor difficulties, parental
behavior emerged as a crucial factor in preterm children’s
interaction problems. Therefore this aspect will be considered in
more detail in the following section.
THE ROLE OF PARENT’S BEHAVIOR IN
THEIR PRETERM CHILDREN’S SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR
Preterm children’s social behavior cannot be considered without
taking a closer look at its relationship to parents’ behavior and
mental condition. A recent study revealed that mothers who
reported more depressive symptoms, more perceived stress as a
parent, and a reduced sense of coherence had children with fewer
social skills. This relationship, however, was not domain-specific
for social skills, but was also prevalent in emotional-behavioral
problems as well as in fewer executive functions (Huhtala et al.,
2014). The relationship between maternal stress and children’s
social problems applies to preterm as well as full-term children
(Assel et al., 2002). However, there is a higher prevalence of
perceived stress (Huhtala et al., 2011), anxiety (Brooten et al.,
1988; Bener, 2013) and depression (Brooten et al., 1988; Huhtala
et al., 2011; Bener, 2013) among mothers of preterm infants
compared to mothers of full-term children.
In addition to mothers’ mental condition, the parental
interaction style seems to be important for preterm children’s
social development. The first point to mention is maternal
directiveness. In general, parental behavior that is not highly
controlling or that does not restrict children’s behavior predicts a
larger and faster increase in social development (e.g., compliance
with maternal requests, Landry et al., 1997b). Mothers of preterm
children were found to give their 3-year-old children fewer
choices in interaction than mothers of full-term children (Landry
et al., 1990), and this directive behavior was negatively associated
with children’s initiation of activities. For preterm infants with
medical risk factors, this might have been an adaptive strategy,
because it takes into account the individual cognitive delay.
However, for preterm infants without these risk factors, maternal
directiveness was not related to the children’s cognitive delay or
social problems.
Using a micro-analytic coding system, 12-month-old preterm
infants could be shown to differ from full-term controls
concerning co-regulation and affective intensity in mother–infant
interaction (Sansavini et al., 2015). More precisely, co-regulation
patterns of preterm dyads were less frequently characterized
by symmetry and showed more frequent unilateral elements.
These characteristics of mother–infant interaction pose a risk to
preterm children since symmetrical co-regulation was positively
related to motor development in this group. Additionally, dyads
including preterm infants were characterized by less positive and
more neutral affective intensity exhibited by infants as well as
their mothers.
Examining parental behavior from a long term perspective
reveals growing evidence that it is also predictive for preterm
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children’s later development: Positive parenting during early
childhood resulted in better cognitive as well as social-emotional
outcomes at kindergarten entry (Maupin and Fine, 2014). More
specifically, maternal sensitivity (i.e., mother following child’s
topic in play) and verbal reciprocity (i.e., responding vocally to
infant vocalization) in 1-year-olds predicted social competence
(i.e., solving hypothetical problems in a non-hostile way) in
5-year-olds (Beckwith and Rodning, 1996). In a recent study,
researchers found not only that preterm infants have more
problems in social situation than full-term infants (Forcada-
Guex et al., 2006), but also that the mothers’ and the infants’
interaction behavior at 6 months of age predicted problems in
social situations at 18 months of age. Mother–infant dyads in
which the mothers were rated as controlling and the infants
were rated as compulsive-compliant had more problems in
social situations than other dyads, including preterm infants and
full-term infants.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, preterm children
show more externalizing behaviors than same-aged full-term
children (Bhutta et al., 2002; Potijk et al., 2012). Again, this
relationship is not independent of parental behavior in the way
that maternal responsiveness has been found to moderate the
prevalence of externalizing behavior: Preterm children of high
responsive mothers at 2 years of age show less externalizing
behavior at 8 years of age than preterm children of low responsive
mothers (Laucht et al., 2001). Converging findings come from
another longitudinal study with a group of full-term and preterm
children, in which the mothers’ warm sensitivity at 2 years of age
predicted social responsiveness at 4 years of age (Miller-Loncar
et al., 2000).
SOCIAL-COGNITIVE SKILLS IN
PRETERM CHILDREN: EVIDENCE FROM
STUDIES ON JOINT ATTENTION AND
THEORY OF MIND SKILLS
This article focuses on the role of social-cognitive skills in
explaining preterm children’s interaction problems. Since these
skills develop rapidly within the 1st years of life and might be
impaired in similar ways to intellectual and cognitive skills. In
the 1st year of life, full-term infants typically start to attribute
goals to another person’s behavior (Gergely et al., 1995) and
are even able to imitate observed behaviors (Meltzoff, 1988).
They also start to learn words for objects (Friedrich and
Friederici, 2008). In order to learn novel actions or novel words
in social interactions, infants have to direct their attention
to the same object as the interaction partner. This so-called
‘joint attention’ is regarded as a basic social-cognitive skill
(Tomasello et al., 2005) that also predicts preterm infants’ later
social language and intelligence (Smith and Ulvund, 2003):
In particular, the initiation of joint attention—and not the
response to offers of joint attention—contributes to later IQ.
Preterm infants’ attention also mediates the link between the
risks of prematurity and later cognitive development. Therefore
prematurity per se does not directly affect cognitive development.
More likely, gestational age correlates with focused attention
which in turn is related to cognitive performance (Reuner et al.,
2014).
Joint attention skills differ between preterm and full-term
infants. Responding to joint attention signals (i.e., following
the gaze of an experimenter) was more often observed in full-
term than in preterm infants at 9 months of age (De Schuymer
et al., 2011). Likewise, initiating joint attention (e.g., pointing
toward an object) was more often observed in full-term than
in preterm 2-year-olds (De Groote et al., 2006). Preterm infants
in the first 2 years of life also showed less joint attention in
terms of exploratory responses such as toy manipulation as
well as communicative responses such as following eye gaze
vocalizations and imitating social interaction (Garner et al.,
1991). These deficits translate to the infants’ behavior: Preterm
infants were less likely than full-term infants to reach for
toys in joint attention situations (Landry and Chapieski, 1988).
Difficulties in motor skills might additionally contribute to the
latter finding. In contrast, there is one report that preterm infants
responded to joint attention interactions with their mothers in
the same manner as full-term infants. However, preterm infants
moved their attention away from situations of joint attention
more often than full-term infants (Landry, 1986). Another study
also demonstrated that preterm infants with medical risk factors
showed a slower increase in social initiation (but not in social
response) than preterm infants without medical risk factors or
full-term infants (Landry et al., 1997a). The reason for differences
in joint attention skills between full-term and preterm infants
may be manifold. First, preterm infants look away from the
parents’ face more often and are less responsive than full-term
infants (Crnic et al., 1983; De Schuymer et al., 2012). Second,
preterm infants show general problems in attention, such as
shifting gaze to peripheral stimuli, in which they are slower than
full-term infants (De Schuymer et al., 2012). Third, the severity
of medical risk factors of preterm infants is negatively correlated
with abilities to regulate attentional processes such as longer
looks to an experimenter’s talking in motherese compared to full-
term infants (Eckerman et al., 1994). This finding indicates that
preterm infants are not less attentive in general. Rather, they are
more reactive and less self-regulated in their attentional behavior
than full-term infants.
However, preterm and full-term 2-year-olds were also
reported not to differ in the amount of initiation of social
interaction (Greenberg and Crnic, 1988). This discrepancy might
be partly explained by methodological aspects: The inclusion
criteria for preterm infants in Greenberg and Crnic’s (1988) study
was a gestational age of 38 weeks or younger, and in Landry’s
(1986) study, the sample size was rather low, with around 24
infants per group. These details may have obscured differences
between groups.
Social-cognitive skills besides joint attention, such as
imitation, goal understanding, and self-other differentiation
have not yet been tested in preterm infants. Research in
this regard would complement the existing knowledge about
infants’ social cognition and potential underlying mechanisms
for preterm children’s difficulties in social interaction. These
social-cognitive skills might be mediated by environmental
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factors. For example, neonatal care, such as the Newborn
Individualized Developmental Care and Assessment Program
(NIDCAP), embeds the infant in the natural parent niche,
avoids over-stimulation, stress, pain, and isolation, and supports
self-regulation, competence, and goal orientation. NIDCAP
improves brain development, functional competence, health,
and life quality (Als and McAnulty, 2011). Additionally,
administration of some nutrients (e.g., omega-3 long-chain
polyunsaturated fatty acids) to children with a gestational age
of less than 29 weeks also shows beneficial effects (Zhang et al.,
2014).
Impairments in preterm children’s social-cognitive abilities
are not restricted to early forms like joint attention but apply
to later forms as well. A variety of findings on social-cognitive
skills related to Theory of Mind indicate deficits in preterm
children. For example, at the age of 7 they were found to
show weaker empathic development compared to full-term
controls (Campbell et al., 2015). Between 8 and 11 years of age
preterm children struggle with interpreting non-verbal cues from
facial expressions and body movements properly (Williamson
and Jakobson, 2014b). Compared to full-term children, they
show a lack of competence in reasoning somebody’s emotions
on the basis of these cues. This deficit may result from a
preference for looking at eyes over the mouth which is not
as pronounced in preterm children as it is in full-term ones
(Telford et al., 2016). Additionally, when confronted with
the animated triangle task (Abell et al., 2000), school aged
preterm children demonstrated less social attribution skills
relative to full-term peers (Williamson and Jakobson, 2014a).
These difficulties were indicated by inappropriate descriptions
of the animations including overattribution of mental states to
randomly moving triangles and underattribution of mental states
to shapes interacting socially. Future research on Theory of
Mind should clarify if these attribution problems are restricted
to a rather abstract level or if they exist on the interpersonal
level as well. Both of the studies mentioned above revealed
an association between social-cognitive deficits and negative
behavioral outcomes in preterm children. These difficulties
are expressed by increased ‘autistic-like’ traits. However, both
estimations of these traits refer to parent-report exclusively.
Since autistic-like traits are likely to be overestimated in preterm
children (Stephens et al., 2012) especially when rated by parents
(Gray et al., 2015), they have to be treated with caution.
Theory of Mind represents a social-cognitive skill that has
considerable predictive power in terms of social acceptance
(Slaughter et al., 2002). By means of Theory of Mind, children
acknowledge the representational nature of an individual’s
mental state. Theory of Mind allows cognition such as perception
and beliefs to be conceived of as the result of mental acts, as well
as the realization that these mental acts can be wrong. The insight
into false beliefs is therefore a key aspect of developing a mature
understanding of others’ cognitive functioning. At around the
age of 4, children are able to solve a classic task of false-belief
understanding by Wimmer and Perner (1983), in which the
protagonist of a story, called “Maxi,” puts a chocolate in a blue
cupboard and goes outside. While Maxi is playing outside, his
mother moves the chocolate from the blue cupboard to a green
cupboard. When children were asked where Maxi will look for his
chocolate when he comes back, 3-year-olds incorrectly assumed
that he will look in the green cupboard, where the mother put the
chocolate. In contrast, 4-year-olds were aware that Maxi believes
that the chocolate is still in blue cupboard and will accordingly
look for it there. Only one study has directly tested false-
belief understanding in preterm children at the age of 4 so far.
The authors used two standard false-belief understanding tasks
and one rather novel false-belief understanding task. Preterm
children did not perform differently from full-term children on
the tasks (Jones et al., 2013). This finding is surprising, because
in the same study sample, preterm children showed the typical
deficits in social interactions compared to full-term children.
Nevertheless, the finding might be explained by the type of tasks
the researchers used. Despite the standard nature of two of the
tasks, their psychometric properties are rather unexplored, and
there is no standardized way of conducting them.
FUTURE RESEARCH: THEORY OF MIND
IN PRETERM CHILDREN
In the present article, we showed that preterm infants’ joint
attention is impaired in comparison to that of full-term infants.
This basic social-cognitive skill is important for the infants’
later development of social interactions and learning of novel
behavior. This early impairment might represent a first step
in a cascade of maladjusted social development (see Bornstein
et al., 2013 for a similar account on cognitive development). It is
interesting, however, that little is known about preterm children’s
later social-cognitive skills, such as Theory of Mind.
Impaired social-cognitive skills are mirrored in problems in
social interactions (Badenes et al., 2000; Slaughter et al., 2002;
Banerjee and Watling, 2005). These studies showed that lower
Theory of Mind abilities are associated with less social acceptance
by peers. There is also evidence that the way in which parents
interact with their children is related to their children’s Theory of
Mind. Parents who use more words that focus on mental states
(e.g., to believe, to want) have children with higher Theory of
Mind abilities than parents who use fewer of these words (Dunn
et al., 1987; Sabbagh and Callanan, 1998; Jenkins et al., 2003).
Based on the social difficulties and altered maternal interaction
styles reported above, one might assume that preterm children’s
development of a Theory of Mind is delayed or even impaired.
Further evidence for the necessity to find out more about
Theory of Mind abilities in preterm children is provided by
deficits in cognitive skills that are associated with prematurity
and impaired Theory of Mind abilities simultaneously. First,
prematurity is related to impairments in language development
(Barre et al., 2011) showing a linear relationship between
gestational age and language skills (Foster-Cohen et al., 2007).
Preterm children show problems in a variety of language
outcomes including vocabulary size, quality of word use as well
as morphological and syntactic complexity (Foster-Cohen et al.,
2007). Since it is well known that several language abilities
contribute to the development of Theory of Mind (Cutting and
Dunn, 1999; Milligan et al., 2007; Farrar et al., 2009), one might
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assume that preterm children’s language deficits hinder their
Theory of Mind abilities.
Second, children born at less or equal 34 weeks of gestation
and having a birth weight of less than 2500 g show impaired
executive functions (Alduncin et al., 2014): More precisely,
preschoolers born preterm were found to have difficulties
concerning inhibitory control (Bayless and Stevenson, 2007;
Aarnoudse-Moens et al., 2009a, 2012), working memory (Ni
et al., 2011; Aarnoudse-Moens et al., 2012; Brumbaugh et al.,
2014) and attention shifting (Bayless and Stevenson, 2007;
Aarnoudse-Moens et al., 2009a). With the exception of inhibition,
these problems persist up to adolescence (Aarnoudse-Moens
et al., 2012). The executive functions listed above are closely
linked to Theory of Mind tasks requiring working memory
to bear in mind different perspectives and inhibitory control
to suppress the own knowledge in favor of a correct answer.
Associations between executive functions and Theory of Mind
are well established especially for inhibition (Carlson and Moses,
2001) and working memory (Carlson et al., 2002). Again, these
relationships indicate impaired Theory of Mind in preterm
children.
As mentioned above, evidence concerning Theory of Mind
abilities in preterm children is limited to one study relying solely
on two tasks comprising unknown psychometric properties.
Therefore, future research should apply a Theory of Mind battery
with better psychometric properties (e.g., Peterson et al., 2012)
and additional established procedures like the Children’s Faux
Pas Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) or the “Reading the Mind
in the Eyes” Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). To gain a more
complete insight in preterm children’s Theory of Mind abilities,
it would be desirable to take into account parental judgment as
further source of information by using a questionnaire inquiring
children’s behavior in everyday situations (e.g., Tahiroglu et al.,
2014).
CONCLUSION
Preterm children face problems in social interactions. These
problems might be based on difficulties in social-cognitive skills,
and can be moderated by parental behavior. The emphasis
on preterm children’s motor, physiological, and intellectual
development in past research should be enriched by a closer look
at preterm children’s social-cognitive development.
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Many studies show a link between social cognition, a set of cognitive and emotional
abilities applied to social situations, and executive functions in typical developing
children. Children with Down syndrome (DS) show deficits both in social cognition and
in some subcomponents of executive functions. However this link has barely been
studied in this population. The aim of this study is to investigate the links between
social cognition and executive functions among children with DS. We administered
a battery of social cognition and executive function tasks (six theory of mind tasks,
a test of emotion comprehension, and three executive function tasks) to a group
of 30 participants with DS between 4 and 12 years of age. The same tasks were
administered to a chronological-age control group and to a control group with the same
linguistic development level. Results showed that apart from deficits in social cognition
and executive function abilities, children with DS displayed a slight improvement with
increasing chronological age and language development in those abilities. Correlational
analysis suggested that working memory was the only component that remained
constant in the relation patterns of the three groups of participants, being the relation
patterns similar among participants with DS and the language development control
group. A multiple linear regression showed that working memory explained above 50%
of the variability of social cognition in DS participants and in language development
control group, whereas in the chronological-age control group this component only
explained 31% of the variability. These findings, and specifically the link between working
memory and social cognition, are discussed on the basis of their theoretical and practical
implications for children with DS. We discuss the possibility to use a working memory
training to improve social cognition in this population.
Keywords: children, Down syndrome, executive functions, social cognition, working memory
INTRODUCTION
Down syndrome (DS) is the most common genetic syndrome associated with intellectual disability
(Canfield et al., 2006). So many studies have described the pattern of relative weaknesses and
strengths in this population. Previous studies also suggest that social cognition and executive
functions are critical abilities to ensure a better quality of life for infants, children and adults, also
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with DS. However, the amount of studies about the relation
between social cognition and executive functions in DS is scant.
Social Cognition in Children with Down
Syndrome
The importance of competent social cognition abilities in
having a satisfying personal life and social interactions is
widely accepted. In this study, we understand social cognition
as a set of abilities that involve cognitive capability applied
to social situations (Harvey and Penn, 2010). Thus, this
set of abilities includes understanding mental states and
intentions in oneself and in others (or what has traditionally
been known as theory of mind), emotional recognition and
perception, and social knowledge, among others. According
to this definition, some authors have suggested that socio
cognitive abilities can be divided in two parts (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2006; Tirapu-Ustárroz et al., 2007): a part more
connected with cognitive aspects, and another part more related
to affective aspects. On the one hand, from the cognitive
perspective, it has been considered essential to understanding
the difference between knowledge of self and others. On
the other hand, from the affective perspective, the empathic
appreciation of the emotional state of others has been considered
essential.
This study will address both aspects of social cognition.
Regarding the more cognitive aspect, we will focus on one
of the most widely studied developmental milestones -the
comprehension of explicit first-order false beliefs- as well as on
other abilities that are acquired either before or after it. As for
the more affective aspect, we will explore different dimensions
of emotional comprehension above and beyond facial expression
recognition.
Initially, as a result of studies like the one conducted by
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), and descriptions of people with DS as
individuals who are especially friendly and interested in others,
highly sociable and with few social problems, it was postulated
that these children had no particular difficulty in theory of mind
development.
However, subsequent research has revealed such difficulties
(Binnie and Williams, 2002; Giaouri et al., 2010). For example, the
study conducted by Giaouri et al. (2010) suggested that children
with DS have difficulties in understanding false beliefs and
appearance-reality compared with typical developing children
and children with intellectual disability of unknown etiology.
Molina and Amador (2010) found that when offered the
necessary help children with DS are able to exhibit a similar
performance to that of their peers with typical development.
With regard to the more affective aspect, most studies have
focused on the recognition of facial expressions in others, this
being a necessary ability to respond appropriately in situations
requiring social interaction. Studies like the one by Wishart et al.
(2007) show that, among all aetiologies of intellectual disability,
children with DS are the only ones that exhibit a significantly
lower performance than children with typical development in
interpreting facial expressions. Previous studies reinforce this
idea regarding difficulties with emotional recognition among
children with DS (e.g., Kasari et al., 1995), some suggesting
particular difficulty in recognizing fear, surprise and anger
(Hippolyte et al., 2008). In fact, as suggested in the work
carried out by Kasari et al. (2001), it is possible that emotional
recognition among children with DS is more related to their
mental than their chronological age.
Executive Functions in Children with
Down Syndrome
For a long time, there has been a lack of clarity over
which abilities are included under the concept of executive
functions. Some authors have posited that they are higher-
order control processes, while others have defined them as
processes aimed at achieving a milestone; some have emphasized
the constructive and creative aspect, while others still have
focused on working memory. In an attempt to encompass
all these approaches, Hughes (2011) and Low and Simpson
(2012) conceptualized executive functions as an umbrella term
that includes a set of complex cognitive abilities that guide
actions aimed at a goal and adaptive responses to new or
complex situations. According with Diamond (2013), the core
components of executive functions are inhibition, working
memory, and cognitive flexibility. So, in our study, we will focus
on them.
To succeed in life and have a healthy social, cognitive and
psychological development we need to: control our attention,
thoughts, emotions or behavior (called inhibitory control),
hold information in mind and work with it (called working
memory), and based on these two skills, change spatial
and interpersonal perspectives (called cognitive flexibility). As
suggested by Pennington and Bennetto (1998), people with
DS are expected to exhibit deficits in these executive function
skills due to the fact that they have often been described as
having persistent behavior (Wilding et al., 2002). However, some
studies suggest that in children with DS, it seems that difficulties
with executive functions do not occur equally across all of
these components (Rowe et al., 2006; Kogan et al., 2009). For
example, the study by Pennington et al. (2003) only describes
difficulties in the components associated with the functioning of
the hippocampus (such as long-term visual and verbal memory).
The one conducted by Lanfranchi et al. (2009) find them in
a simultaneous task on spatial working memory but not in
one on spatial sequencing. The study conducted by Carney
et al. (2013) shows that compared with children with typical
development of the same mental age, children and adolescents
with DS have difficulty with working memory but not inhibition
and fluency.
In a developmental study by Costanzo et al. (2013)
designed to test the hypothesis of etiological specificity, different
aspects of the executive functions were evaluated in children,
adolescents and adults with DS, Williams syndrome, and a
typical development group of the same mental age. Both groups
with intellectual disabilities displayed difficulties with some
components of the executive functions, such as selective attention
and working memory, but not others, such as inhibition.
A different pattern was also found according to the etiology
of the disability, participants with DS displaying a more
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affected performance in cognitive flexibility, memory and verbal
inhibition.
Recent studies have analyzed DS executive functions by
parent and teacher reports like the Behavior Rating Inventory
of Executive Function-Preschool (BRIEF-P; Gioia et al., 2003).
On the one hand, in the study conducted by Lee et al. (2011),
caregivers of children with DS completed these report. Results
suggest a specific pattern of executive function weaknesses in this
population; working memory was the most impaired domain and
emotional control the least impaired one. On the other hand,
in the study of Daunhauer et al. (2014) were the teachers of
children with DS who completed the report. The results of this
study suggested that in the area of school function, children with
DS showed a distinct pattern of strengths and weaknesses. On
the Activity Performance domain, children with DS reported
greatest challenge on recreational movement, following social
conventions, functional communication, positive interaction, or
behavior regulation among others. On the other hand, on Task
Supports domain, children with DS reported to need more
assistance than adaptations, and that supports on cognitive-
behavioral tasks were the subdomain in which they showed
higher levels of assistance. Apart from that, it is important to
highlight that executive functions was the only predictor of
school function in this study. The idea of greater difficulty on the
cool EF suggested by these studies was also found in the work by
Lee et al. (2015).
Furthermore, some studies suggest a dissociation between
verbal and visuo-spatial abilities in children with DS (Laws, 2002;
Brock and Jarrold, 2005), because they show deficits in verbal but
not in visuo-spatial working memory abilities (Lanfranchi et al.,
2012).
So, it seems that research about executive functions indicates
the presence of a particular profile of abilities and difficulties
in DS children. Being some components more preserved (as
inhibition or visuo-spatial working memory), and others most
affected (as working memory, verbal inhibition, or cognitive
flexibility). Therefore, this second group of components could
require the design of interventions to improve it.
The Role of Executive Functions in
Social Cognition
In the pioneering study by Russell et al. (1991) on children with
typical development, a positive association was found between
performance in a false belief task and one on strategic deception
task. Although deception tasks have been considered traditionally
as a social cognition measure, in the study of Russell et al. (1991)
has been considered as an executive control task. According with
Hala and Russell (2001), children’s difficulty in this task is related
with the executive control demands, particularly with the dual
requirement to hold in mind the task rules and the inhibition of
a prepotent response of pointing directly at the treat.
Since then, several studies have confirmed the relationship
between individual differences in executive functions and
individual differences in theory of mind (Carlson and Moses,
2001; Carlson et al., 2002, 2004a,b). The nature of this
relationship is unclear. However, one of the perspectives argues
that executive functions are needed for theory of mind (Russell,
1996, 1998; Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Austin et al., 2014). So,
in this study, we will focus on the role of executive function
components in social cognition.
Of all the theory of mind abilities, the most studied in this
regard has been the understanding of false belief, which in general
terms has been positively associated with flexibility, inhibition
and working memory, but not planning.
With regard to cognitive flexibility, both correlational and
training studies show the presence of a relationship between
this component and theory of mind. Carlson and Moses (2001),
for example, found relationships between various theory of
mind tasks and a cognitive flexibility task. Specifically, Carlson
and Moses (2001) found that inhibitory task requiring a
novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response
significantly predicted performance in theory of mind tasks.
However, inhibitory task requiring the delay of a prepotent
response was not significant in the same analysis. Additionally,
Zelazo et al. (2002) found that a poor performance in theory of
mind tasks might be caused by a lack of ability to integrate two
contradictory rules into one system. A training study conducted
by Kloo and Perner (2003) showed that false belief training
improves performance in a card classification task that evaluates
cognitive flexibility, and vice versa.
In relation to inhibition, Hughes (1998) found a correlation
between the performance of a deception task and inhibitory
control. A year later, Perner and Lang (1999) confirmed this
relationship, and Carlson and Moses (2001) subsequently also
found a strong association between inhibition and false belief.
Further studies such as that by Carlson et al. (2002) have
confirmed this association.
Regarding working memory, Olson, Kennan and colleagues
(Gordon and Olson, 1998; Keenan et al., 1998) suggested that
the ability to hold two conflicting perspectives on the same
stimulus is a prerequisite for promoting the development of
social cognition. In line with this, Davis and Pratt (1995) found
that children under 4 did not succeed in false belief tasks
because of difficulties in working memory. Gordon and Olson
(1998) described a correlation between working memory and
an appearance-reality and a false belief task. Subsequent studies
have confirmed this relationship (Keenan et al., 1998; Hala
et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2006) although there are also studies
that suggest the opposite (Hughes, 1998; Slade and Ruffman,
2005).
The relationship between the understanding of false belief and
the executive functions has been described for different stages
of development (Carlson et al., 2004a; Dumonthiel et al., 2010),
in longitudinal studies (Flynn, 2006; Hughes and Ensor, 2007),
when the tasks involve minimal executive demands (Perner et al.,
2002; Moses and Carlson, 2004) or in populations with atypical
development, such as autism spectrum disorders (Pellicano,
2007).
However, it is unclear which components of the executive
functions display a stronger relationship with theory of mind
abilities. Zelazo et al. (1996) examined the relationship between
social cognition and executive functions in adults with DS. They
found that performance in a set of theory of mind tasks and in
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a card sort task was positively correlated when mental age was
controlled. However, we do not know more studies or results in
infants or children with DS.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to take a more in-depth look
at this relationship in children with DS. We want to investigate
the role of executive functions in social cognition among children
with DS and compare this relationship with the one described for
children with typical development of the same chronological age
and a similar level of linguistic development (LD). In addressing
this aim we will be analyzing the social cognition and executive
function abilities of children with DS in depth and will focus on
how these abilities evolve with increasing chronological age and
language development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 90 participants (aged 2;9 – 12;2) took part in the
study, divided into three groups of 30 participants: one group of
children with a medical diagnosis of DS, and two control groups
composed of children with typical development; one with the
same chronological age as the participants with DS (CA), and a
second with the same level of LD. Children with other associated
difficulties were excluded from the study.
As shown in Table 1, the CA group participants had the
same chronological age and gender distribution as the DS group
participants. According to the T-test, the age of these two groups
was statistically higher than that of the LD group participants
(p < 0.0005), while the LD group participants had a similar level
of language development (±4 months) to that of the DS group
participants (the gender variable was not taken into account in
the construction of this control group). The T-test shows that
the language level of the CA group participants was statistically
higher than that of the DS and LD groups (p< 0.0005).
Tasks
In this paper, we evaluate two aspects of participants’ cognitive
functioning: social cognition and the executive functions. Below,
we detail the tasks used to evaluate each of these aspects.
Social Cognition Tasks
To evaluate social cognition, we used six tasks that have been
traditionally used to evaluate theory of mind, and one test of
emotional understanding.
We divided the theory of mind evaluation tasks into
three levels of difficulty according to their distance from the
understanding of first-order false beliefs, and we included two
tasks in each level. Apart from that, a pilot study with DS children
was conducted to ensure that participants understood the tasks
(Amadó et al., 2012). We designed visual and verbal aids to
compensate comprehension difficulties detected.
In Level 1, we used two tasks to evaluate abilities developed
by children with typical development prior to the first-order false
belief. We administered an adaptation of the task Diverse Beliefs
designed by Wellman and Liu (2004) and an adaptation of the
task Seeing is knowing developed by Pratt and Bryant (1990). In
the Diverse Beliefs task children had to predict the behavior of
the story character according to the beliefs of the character. It is
important to know that the character always had a belief contrary
to child’s. In the Seeing is Knowing task, we evaluated the capacity
of the child to understand the relationship between seeing (or not
seeing) the content of a closed box and knowing what object was
inside the box. In both tasks, we used pictures to tell the story and
facilitate their understanding. The score for each of these tasks
was one point, meaning the highest score at this level was two
points. In order to make the score at this level equivalent with the
scores in other theory of mind levels, we doubled the total score
for Level 1.
In Level 2, we included first-order false belief tasks. Thus,
we administered the Unexpected Content task, based on the
procedure designed by Gopnik and Astington (1988), and the
Change of Location task, designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983).
In the Unexpected Content task, we used a tube of Smarties R©
with rocks inside. After exploring the tube, we showed its real
content to the child. Then we asked them what they thought
there was inside the tube before opening it, and what their friend
would think the tube contained without seeing the real content.
In the Change of Location task the child had to predict, in a story
represented with small dolls, the behavior of a character when the
character held a false belief about the location of a hidden object.
Each of the Level 2 tasks was awarded two points, meaning the
highest score for this level was four points.
At Level 3, we used tasks which according to developmental
research are successfully completed after the first-order false
belief. Specifically, we used an adaptation of the Deception
task designed by Sodian (1991) and a Second-Order Change
of Location task based on the procedure devised by Sullivan
et al. (1994). The Second-order Change of Location followed a
procedure similar to that described in the first-order false belief
TABLE 1 | Characteristics (sex, age, language, and IQ) of each group of participants.
Age Languagea IQb
Group n Girls (f) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Percentile≤ 25 M (SD)
DS 30 18 4;0–12;2 8.54 (2.36) 1;8–8;6 4.49 (1.69) 90% 14.37 (3.45)
CA 30 18 4;0–12;2 8.54 (2.36) 3;5–14;5 8.81 (2.86) 0% 27.90 (9.61)
LD 30 16 2;9–9;1 4.52 (1.64) 2;1–8;3 4.53 (1.48) 0% 16.63 (5.19)
aLanguage development was calculated using the score obtained in the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test or PPVT (Dunn et al., 2006); bThe IQ score was obtained via
administration of the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven et al., 1996).
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task. However, in this story the child had to predict the behavior
of a character involved in a second order recursivity situation. In
theDeception task the child played a game, with the puppets of the
Little Red Ridding Hood and the Wolf, where the player getting
more stars was the winner. To win stars the child had to help Little
Red Ridding Hood (who gave the stars to the chid whenever she
found one) and had to deceive the Wolf (who kept the stars for
himself). Each of the tasks was awarded two points, meaning the
highest score for this level was four also points.
Finally, in order to evaluate emotional understanding, we
administered an adaptation of the Emotional Comprehension
Test by Albanese and Molina (2008). Of the nine components
included in the original version of this instrument, we
administered six, selected on the basis of results from the study
by Pons et al. (2004): recognition (I), external causes (II), desires
(III), beliefs (IV), memory (V), and hidden emotions (VII). In the
administration of each component, we followed the instructions
of the original test. Also following the instructions in the manual,
each component that was passed scored one point, meaning the
maximum score in this task was six points.
In all of our analyses in the results section, we consider
scores from the theory of mind and emotional understanding
tasks together, giving a maximum score of 18 points for social
cognition.
Executive Function Tasks
In accordance with the results presented in the study by Miyake
et al. (2000), in this study, we used different tasks to evaluate three
of the components of the executive functions: working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility.
To evaluate working memory, we administered a version of
the visual-spatial memory task used by Lanfranchi et al. (2004),
which we called the Frog Task. This entailed administering
a total of eight tests (and two trial tests) divided into four
levels of difficulty, in which the child had to follow two rules
simultaneously. In this task, we used a frog and a board with
squares. The frog jumped from one square to another. The child
had to remember the frog starting position on the board (first
rule) and to hit the table with the hand when the frog jumped
into a red square (second rule). Each test was awarded one point
only if the participant completed the game successfully; meaning
the maximum score for the task was eight points.
To evaluate inhibition, we used a simplified version of the
Stroop test, the Day-Night Task (Gerstadt et al., 1994). After two
trial tests, we administered 16 tests in random order in which
the participant had to inhibit their predominant response to
a visual stimulus. We designed a Power Point presentation in
which two images (a sun and a moon) appeared randomly. When
the child saw the sun they had to say “night” (inhibiting the
predominant response, “day”), and when the moon appeared in
the screen the child had to say “day” (inhibiting the predominant
response, “night”). One point was awarded for each correct
answer, meaning the maximum score for the task was 16 points.
Finally, we evaluated cognitive flexibility by means of an
adapted version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test developed by
Fisher and Happé (2005), which comprises a card classification
game using different shapes (triangle, round, square), colors
(red, blue, yellow), and numbers (1, 2, 3). The experimenter
put in front of the child, three stimulus cards to define the
three categories where to classify the response cards. Then,
the experimenter gave to the child each of the response cards
and asked them to classify each card in the correct category.
In accordance with the hidden classification rule governing
the game in each part (color, shape, number, and color), the
experimenter gave feedback to the child (correct or incorrect
classification). The child had to discover the classification rules
during the game. Following the recommendations of these
authors, we used the number of completed dimensions (unaided)
as a measure of overall success in this task. Therefore, the
maximum score in this task was four points (classification
criteria: color, shape, number, and color).
For a more detailed description of the procedure of the tasks
used, see the appendix of the study conducted by Amadó et al.
(2012).
Procedure
We contacted the DS participants through various organizations
dedicated to the care of people with this etiology of intellectual
disability. Participants in the CA and LD groups were selected
according to their chronological age, gender, and language
development from different schools in provinces of Catalonia
(Spain).
In all three groups, the parents/legal guardians were first
duly informed of the purpose and requirements of the
study by means of an explanatory letter requesting consent
for their son/daughter’s participation. We then carried out
between two and four individual sessions (at the school,
foundation/association or child’s family home) in order to
administer the tasks. The amount of time spent administering
each of the tasks varied from one participant to another, but
the order of administration was always the same: vocabulary,
intelligence, executive functions (working memory, inhibition,
and cognitive flexibility), and social cognition (emotional
understanding, theory of mind tasks according to their order of
difficulty).
In some analysis, participants with DS will be divided into
different subgroups. According with their chronological age, we
will distinguish between 3 subgroups with 10 participants in each
group: the younger group (4;0 – 6;11), the middle group (7;0 –
9;11), and the older group (10;0 – 12;11). According with their
level of language development (based on the score obtained in
the PPVT by Dunn et al., 2006), we will stablish 2 groups with 15
participants in each group: low LD group (0;0 – 4;0) and high LD
group (4;1 – 8;12).
RESULTS
As Table 2 shows, the DS group participants scored significantly
lower than the children with typical development in both control
groups (CA and LD) in all of the administered tasks.
As Table 2 shows, participants of the CA group obtained
higher scores in all the tasks, followed by the participants of the
LD group and the participants with DS, in this order.
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TABLE 2 | Means (standard deviations) in the social cognition and executive function tasks in each group of participants.
DS CA LD Contrastse Cohen’s df
4.24
Social Cognitiona 5.70 (3.94) 17.07 (2.05) 9.87 (5.78) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.91
2.14
−3.14
Executive Functions WMb 2.47 (2.43) 7.20 (1.03) 4.57 (2.21) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.92
1.85
−1.94
INHc 10.90 (5.12) 15.83 (0.46) 14.30 (2.32) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −1.04
1.27
−4.08
FLEXd 1.43 (1.10) 3.90 (0.31) 2.57 (1.33) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.96
1.89
aSocial Cognition (range: 0–18); b M, working memory (range: 0–8); c INH, inhibition (range: 0–16); dFLEX, cognitive flexibility (range: 0–4); eContrasts were identified using
the T-test. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1. fThe values of Cohen’s d are presented in this order: DS-CA, DS-LD, and
CA-LD.
TABLE 3 | Means (standard deviations) in the social cognition and executive function tasks in each group of participants with Down syndrome.
M (SD)a Social cognitionb Executive functions
WMc INHd FLEXe
Chronological age groups 5.73 (0.84) (A) 2.80 (2.44) 0.70 (1.25) 9 (5.44) 0.90 (0.32)
8.85 (0.85) (B) 5.10 (2.28) 2.30 (1.95) 10.20 (5.81) 1 (0)
11.05 (0.78) (C) 9.20 (3.94) 4.40 (2.46) 13.50 (2.99) 2.40 (1.51)
Linguistic development groups 3.12 (0.67) (D) 3.67 (2.64) 1.20 (1.47) 8.67 (5.47) 0.93 (0.26)
5.85 (1.21) (E) 7.73 (4.04) 3.37 (2.58) 13.13 (3.68) 1.93 (1.39)
Contrastsf A-B A < B∗
A-C A < C∗∗ A < C∗∗∗ A < C∗
B-C B < C∗ B < C∗
D-E D < E∗∗ D < E∗∗ D < E∗∗ D < E∗
aMeans (and standard deviations) of chronological age and linguistic age (calculated using the score obtained in the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test or PPVT by Dunn
et al., 2006) of the DS groups; bSocial Cognition (range: 0–18); cWM, working memory (range: 0–8); d INH, inhibition (range: 0–16); eFLEX, cognitive flexibility (range: 0–4);
fContrasts were identified using the T-test. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1.
As T-test shows, the mean score of participants with
typical development was significantly better than the mean
score of participants with DS in all the tasks. According
with Cohen (1988), the effect sizes of all these comparisons
are large. Also it’s important to consider that, in all the
tasks, the largest effects are observed between DS and CA
participants.
However, it is interesting to analyze performance in these tasks
with increased chronological age and language development in
DS children. On the one hand, to test the effect of chronological
age we divided participants with DS into three groups: the
younger group (4;0 – 6;11), the middle group (7;0 – 9;11), and
the older group (10;0 – 12;11). On the other hand, to test the
effect of linguistic level, we divided participants with DS into two
groups based on the score obtained in the PPVT (Dunn et al.,
2006): low LD group (0;0 – 4;0) and high LD group (4;1 – 8;12).
The mean scores for the chronological age and linguistic level
groups into which, we divided the participants with DS are shown
in Table 3.
As the above table shows, both chronological age and LD
were relevant factors in mastering social cognition in participants
with DS. Thus, as the chronological age and linguistic level of
this group of children increased, their social cognition abilities
improved, with significant differences observed in the group of
participants with older chronological age and both linguistic level
groups.
With regard to the executive functions, we saw that
performance in the tasks of working memory and cognitive
flexibility also improved with both chronological age and LD
of participants with DS. Therefore, these two developmental
factors were also relevant to mastering these two components
of the executive functions. Specifically, we observed a significant
improvement in working memory in the younger chronological
age group and the two linguistic level groups, and a significant
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TABLE 4 | Correlations between social cognition and executive function
components for each group of participants.
Social
cognition
Executive functions
WM INH FLEX
Social cognition − 0.738∗∗∗ 0.428∗ 0.562∗∗
0.581∗∗ 0.195 −0.154
0.800∗∗∗ 0.319 0.669∗∗∗
Executive functions WM − 0.478∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
0.363 −0.154
0.268 0.791∗∗∗
INH − 0.289
0.123
0.479∗∗∗
FLEX −
The values in the table are Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and its significance
(∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1).
The correlations appear in this order on the table: DS, CA, and LD.
improvement in flexibility in the older age group and the
two LD groups. In contrast, in the inhibition task, we only
observed a significant improvement in the two linguistic level
groups into which, we divided the participants with DS.
With inhibition, it seems that chronological age was not an
important factor, and in fact, the scores obtained by all three
age groups for this task were very close to the maximum
score.
Table 4 below illustrates the patterns of relationship between
social cognition and the executive functions for each of the
groups participating in this study. To graduate the intensity of a
correlation, we used the criteria described by Bisquerra (2004):
r = 1 perfect correlation, 0.8 < r < 1 very high correlation,
0.6< r< 0.8 high correlation, 0.4< r< 0.6 moderate correlation,
0.2 < r < 0.4 low correlation, 0 < r < 0.2 very low correlation,
and r = 0 no correlation.
In the DS group there was a significant correlation between
social cognition and all components of the executive functions
evaluated. The strongest correlation was with working memory,
this being both positive and high. The correlation with
components of cognitive flexibility and inhibition was also
positive but moderate. Similarly, in the LD group social cognition
displayed a significant, positive and high correlation with both
working memory and flexibility. In contrast, in the CA group a
significant correlation was only found between social cognition
and working memory, this being positive and moderate. It is
therefore interesting to point out that working memory was
the only component of the executive functions that remained
constant in the relationship patterns of the three groups of
participants.
It is worth noting that, as the above table shows, internal
correlations between the different components of the executive
functions followed different patterns in groups. The CA group is
the one which displayed most divergence in relation to the other
two, without significant correlations between executive function
components. On the other hand, in DS and LD groups, working
memory correlates with cognitive flexibility.
To evaluate the predictive capacity of each executive
component, we conducted a multiple linear regression model
(independent/predictive variable: score in working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility; dependent variable: total
score in social cognitive abilities). The results of the multiple
linear regressions (using the enter method of the SPSS) pointed
in the same direction, as for all three groups the regression model
only included working memory as a predictive variable of score in
social cognition. However, it is interesting to note that although
the predictive variable of social cognition is the same for all three
groups, the percentage of variance in social cognition that this
component of the executive functions was able to explain was not
the same. In the DS and LD groups, the model which includes
only the significant predictors (constant and working memory)
explained above 50% of the variability, whereas in the CA group
this component of the executive functions only explained 30% of
the variability (see Table 5).
Although this is not the aim of the present work, we have
used the same procedure to analyze the predictive capacity of
social cognition on each component of executive functions (note
that this multiple linear regression includes only one predictive
variable). As Table 6 shows, in the DS group, social cognition was
significant to predict all the components of executive functions
assessed, explaining above 50% of working memoyr, 30% of
cognitive flexibility, and 15% of inhibition. In a similar pattern,
in the LD group, social cognition is a significant predictor for
working memory (explaining above 60%) and cognitive flexibility
(explaining above 40%). And finally, in the CA group, social
cognition only predicts above 30% of working memory.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of executive
functions in social cognition among children with DS and
compare it with that described for children with typical
development of the same linguistic level and chronological age.
We will first discuss the results that children with DS obtained for
social cognition and the executive functions in the administered
tasks, as well as their evolution by chronological age and language
development. We will then discuss the role of executive functions
in social cognition and comment briefly the relationship in
reverse.
Previous studies have reported difficulties in social cognition
among children with DS, both from the cognitive aspect (e.g.,
Binnie and Williams, 2002; Giaouri et al., 2010) and the emotional
aspect (e.g., Kasari et al., 1995; Wishart et al., 2007). The results of
our study point in the same direction, showing that participants
with DS have deficits in all aspects of social cognition that, we
evaluated. We would also add, in line with the findings of Kasari
et al. (2001), that these difficulties, although remaining present,
are not as severe when mental age (or level of LD) is taken into
account.
As for mastery of the executive functions, the results
of our study on children with DS were also in line with
those suggested by previous research, in particular the fact
that the different components of the executive functions are
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TABLE 5 | Multiple linear regression models of social cognition for each group of participants.
Predictive
variables
Standardised beta
coefficients
t (p) Predictive models
Adjusted R2 F (1, 28) p
DS Constant – 1.334 (0.194) 0.529 33.585 0.000
WMa 0.592 3.228 (0.003)
INHb 0.101 0.684 (0.500)
FLEXc 0.153 0.909 (0.372)
CA Constant – 0.942 (0.355) 0.314 14.274 0.001
WMa 0.573 3.278 (0.003)
INHb −0.005 −0.030 (0.976)
FLEXc −0.066 −0.401 (0.692)
LD Constant – −0.711 (0.484) 0.628 49.875 0.000
WMa 0.755 3.914 (0.001)
INHb 0.106 0.790 (0.437)
FLEXc 0.021 0.099 (0.922)
aWM, working memory; b INH, inhibition; cFLEX, cognitive flexibility. The predictive models described in this table include only the significant predictors.
TABLE 6 | Multiple linear regression models of working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility for each group of participants.
Dependent
variables
Predictive
variables
Standardised beta
coefficients
t (p) Predictive models
Adjusted R2 F (1, 28) p
DS WMa Constant – −0.241 (0.811) 0.529 33.585 0.000
SCd 0.738 5.795 (0.000)
INHb Constant – 5.061 (0.000) 0.154 6.275 0.018
SCd 0.428 2.505 (0.018)
FLEXc Constant – 1.775 (0.087) 0.291 12.914 0.001
SCd 0.562 3.594 (0.001)
CA WMa Constant – 1.667 (0.107) 0.314 14.274 0.001
SCd 0.581 3.778 (0.001)
INHb Constant – 21.053 (0.000) – – –
SCd 0.195 1.050 (0.303)
FLEXc Constant – 8.987 (0.000) – – –
SCd –0.154 −0.827 (0.415)
LD WMa Constant – 3.149 (0.004) 0.628 49.875 0.000
SCd 0.800 7.062 (0.000)
INHb Constant – 15.919 (0.000) – – –
SCd 0.319 1.781 (0.086)
FLEXc Constant – 2.845 (0.008) 0.428 22.671 0.000
SCd 0.669 4.761 (0.000)
aWM, working memory; b INH, inhibition; cFLEX, cognitive flexibility; dSC, social cognition. The predictive models are described only in the components in which social
cognition is a significant predictor.
affected unequally (e.g., Rowe et al., 2006). In our study,
participants with DS displayed less alteration in the component
of inhibition, especially when language ability was taken into
account. This relative preservation of inhibition compared to
the other components of executive functioning has also been
described in research by Carney et al. (2013) on children and
adolescents with intellectual disability, and in the study by
Costanzo et al. (2013) on adolescents and adults with DS and
Williams syndrome. Furthermore, in the latter study participants
with DS showed a greater alteration in the components of
flexibility and working memory when compared with children
with Williams syndrome. Danielsson et al. (2012) found that
adults with intellectual disabilities have difficulties in working
memory and accessing lexical items, but not in inhibition. So
it would seem that this tendency continues in later stages of
development.
Beyond the difficulties described in the two aspects of
social cognition and the different components of the executive
functions, the results of this study suggest that, at the ages
studied at least, children with DS experience improvements in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1363 | 145
fpsyg-07-01363 September 10, 2016 Time: 15:11 # 9
Amadó et al. Social Cognition in Down Syndrome
these abilities with increased chronological age and language
development. Lee et al. (2015) found that inhibition is the only
component of executive functions that improve with age in a
sample of 85 youth with DS. However it is important to consider
that this study assess executive functions by a report completed
by parents. Molina and Amador (2010) concluded that despite
the described difficulties in social cognition, when a group of
children with DS were offered the necessary assistance they
improved and exhibited a similar performance to that of their
peers with typical development. We believe that the improvement
described in participants with DS in our study supports this
finding. Thus, contrary to the stagnation that has sometimes
been suggested in both individuals with DS and other forms
of intellectual disability, social cognition and executive function
abilities improve with development, at least in the group that
we have studied. However, in order to verify the presence of
this improvement with increasing age in participants with DS,
we would need to conduct a longitudinal study, like the one
conducted by Lee et al. (2015). Our study has not a longitudinal
nature. Therefore, we can only conclude that older children
with DS performed better than young children with DS, because
we cannot discard that older participants had better executive
function abilities in early ages.
With regard to the role of executive functions in social
cognition, we should first take a moment to discuss the
relationship between the various components of the executive
functions. Miyake et al. (2000) suggested that in the beginning
of their development, executive functions may be grouped under
the same domain and no differentiation is made between them.
According with these authors, as development progresses, these
functions can be grouped into more specialized and separated
components. The results of our study could be seen to agree
with this, because in participants with DS and peers of the
same linguistic level, both at a lower developmental level
than the control group by age, there was a high correlation
between most of the executive function components evaluated.
In the control group by age, however, which had a higher
level of development than the above groups, the correlation
between the different executive function components was non-
existent. Therefore, we believe that at this age the different
executive function components have become specialized, which
is why the correlational analysis presented them as independent
components.
Above and beyond discussion of the relationship between the
different components of the executive functions, the main aim of
this study was to analyze the role of executive functions in social
cognition abilities in DS children.
In all three of the study groups, a relationship was found
between social cognition and working memory, as described in
previous studies on children with typical development (Hala
et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2006). Surprisingly, and unlike the
findings of previous studies such as that by Carlson and Moses
(2001) or Carlson et al. (2002), the components of cognitive
flexibility and inhibition did not display any relationship with the
social cognition abilities of participants in the control group by
chronological age. However, a relationship was found between
social cognition and cognitive flexibility in the other two groups
and between social cognition and inhibition in the group of
children with DS. It is worth noting that participants in the
age control group obtained very close to maximum scores in
all the tasks, and the lack of a relationship between these
components and social cognition could therefore be caused
by this ceiling effect. As the results show, participants with
typical development of the age-matched control group obtained
a score near the ceiling on social cognition, working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility tasks. Perhaps, this ceiling
effect is hiding major or subtle differences between groups. So,
the results of this study need to be corroborated in future works
using more appropriate instruments or tasks to evaluate social
cognition and executive functions in typically developing and DS
children.
With regard to the pattern of relationships between social
cognition and the executive functions it’s important to refer
the study conducted by Zelazo et al. (1996) in adults with DS.
They found that theory of mind was correlated with cognitive
flexibility. However, we have no previous studies conducted in
children with DS with which to compare it at the present time.
What, we can state, however, is firstly that the relationship
established between social cognition and the executive functions
in populations with typical development is also extended to
children with DS, and secondly that the relationship pattern
described in individuals with DS is similar to that displayed by
their peers with typical development with similar linguistic skills.
We might therefore consider working memory, being the
only component of the executive functions in our study
to display a relationship with social cognition in all three
groups of participants, to be an essential element in improving
social cognition in children with both typical and atypical
development. The nature of our study is correlational. So, we
can not conclude, from our results, the presence of a causal
relationship between working memory and social cognition
abilities. However, our results added to the ones of other studies,
point to this direction. For example, Hughes (1998) described
a correlation between the understanding of false belief and
working memory, the relationship remaining with age and when
controlling for verbal ability (Davis and Pratt, 1995; Keenan,
1998). Though other studies, such as that by Slade and Ruffman
(2005) did not find that working memory facilitated subsequent
understanding of false belief in a group of children aged three to
four.
Regarding the predictive capacity of working memory on
theory of mind, we only know of one study that supports this
hypothesis, that conducted by Davis and Pratt (1995). Said study,
using a multiple linear regression analysis on children aged
between three and five, showed that working memory predicts
performance in a false belief task, even when controlling for
age and vocabulary. Nevertheless, the authors themselves say
that success in working memory is a necessary requirement for
competent performance in theory of mind.
We have also explored the opposite direction of this
relationship: the role of social cognition in each component of
executive functions. Our results show that social cognition is a
predictive variable for working memory in all the groups, and
also for other executive components in children with DS and
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their peers with a similar LD. However, we must be cautious with
these results because a recent meta-analysis conducted by Devine
and Hughes (2014) found an asymmetrical pattern of relationship
between social cognition and executive functions; early executive
functions predict later variation in false belief understanding
more strongly than vice versa.
According with Diamond (2013), we have enough empirical
evidence to say that executive functions can be improved at
any age across the life cycle. More specifically, training studies
like that conducted by Klingberg et al. (2005) on children with
attention difficulties, but also others conducted on children with
typical development, suggest that the component of working
memory can be trained. However, according to Shipstead et al.
(2012), the aforementioned training studies displayed many
shortcomings and a definitive demonstration of the possibility
of improving working memory through training was therefore
still required. In response to this debate, the meta-analysis
conducted by Melby-Lervå and Hulme (2013) showed that
working memory training produces only short-term effects and
cannot be extrapolated to work with other cognitive abilities.
However, in this same study the authors observed, through the
analysis of a small and surely insufficient number of studies, that
in visuospatial working memory the effects of training can last
for up to 5 months. More recent studies report specific data
about the possibility to train working memory in individuals
with DS. For example, the study by Costa et al. (2015) showed
that two adolescents with DS improved their performance
in some (trained and non-trained) working memory tasks,
specifically in visuo-spatial working memory tasks, after a six-
week school-based intervention. In the same direction, Pulina
et al. (2015) found that thirty-nine children and adolescents
with DS improved their performance in the spatial-simultaneous
component of working memory after a training administered
individually (by parents or experts) during a month. It is worth
noting that these improvements were maintained after a month
in both groups.
Aside from the results suggested by training studies, and given
that cognitive flexibility is also found to be related to working
memory in children with DS and their peers of the same linguistic
level, we might consider it to be another important element
in improving social cognition. This was demonstrated by the
findings of Fisher and Happé (2005) in research where training in
the executive functions (based on cognitive flexibility) was found
to be useful in improving the understanding of false belief in
children with autistic disorders.
Working memory or cognitive flexibility training could be an
open window for improving social cognition in this population.
However, with the research available to us today, we can state
that the effects of working memory training (or that of other
components of the executive functions) on the understanding
of false beliefs are not clear, and even less so when applied to
social cognition. It is for this reason that, taking into account the
contributions by Diamond (2012) regarding repeated practice as
a key element in the success of executive function training and the
greater benefit of this to children with poorer executive functions,
we believe it necessary and useful to continue to explore this
relationship in these populations.
In the future, this line of inquiry could provide the key to
promote the cognitive domains of social cognition and executive
functions in children with DS. But also, and more importantly,
could provide the key to ensure higher levels of inclusion in
society and a best quality of life for people with DS.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of the executive
functions in social cognition among children with DS and
compare it with that of their peers with typical development.
Apart from one study of adults with DS, we do not know of
any previous studies that have addressed this question in this
population, and neither have, we found many studies comparing
the performance of children with DS and that of their peers with
typical development of the same linguistic level.
The results of our study show that, in line with the findings
of previous studies, participants with DS underperformed in
comparison with their peers with typical development, both
in terms of social cognition and the executive functions. The
most interesting finding is that the predictive role of executive
funcitons in social cognition described in children with DS is
similar to that exhibited by their peers with typical development
with the same language skills. The results of this study confirm
the importance of the different components of the executive
functions in this relationship and highlight the central role of
working memory. Moreover, they suggest that the executive
functions may be displayed as undifferentiated in early stages of
development.
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Impaired social functioning is a well-known outcome of individuals with agenesis of the
corpus callosum. Social deficits in nonliteral language comprehension, humor, social
reasoning, and recognition of facial expression have all been documented in adults
with agenesis of the corpus callosum. In the present study, we examined the emotional
and mentalizing deficits that contributing to the social-cognitive development in children
with isolated corpus callosum agenesia, including emotion recognition, theory of mind,
executive function, working memory, and behavioral impairments as assessed by the
parents. The study involved children between the age of 6 and 8 years along with typically
developing children who were matched by IQ, age, gender, education, and caregiver’s
education. The findings indicated that children with agenesis of the corpus callosum
exhibited mild impairments in all social factors (recognizing emotions, understanding
theory of mind), and showed more behavioral problems than control children. Taken
together, these findings suggest that reduced callosal connectivity may contribute to
the development of higher-order social-cognitive deficits, involving limits of complex
and rapidly occurring social information to be processed. The studies of AgCC shed
lights of the role of structural connectivity across the hemispheres in neurodevelopmental
disorders.
Keywords: agenesis of the corpus callosum, mentalizing ability, emotion recognition, executive function,
behavioral problems
INTRODUCTION
Agenesis of the corpus callosum (AgCC) is a common cerebral malformation resulting from a
failure to develop fibers that provide the largest connective tract between the two hemispheres.
The corpus callosum consists of over 200 million axons that transfer information between the two
hemispheres. Callosal anomalies are the most frequent malformations in the brain, with imaging
studies indicating that AgCC occurs in 1:4000 live births (Wang et al., 2004; Glass et al., 2008), and
3–5% of neurodevelopmental disorders involve callosal malformation (Bodensteiner et al., 1994).
The developmental absence (agenesis) of the corpus callosum can occur in a variety of conditions
that disrupt the early development of the callosal fibers. Current studies suggest that callosal
dysgenesis can be reflected in inborn errors of metabolism, chromosomal anomalies, or genetic
syndromes (Bedeschi et al., 2006). AgCC can encompass either total or partial absence of the corpus
callous, as well as hypoplasia (formation of a thinner than expected corpus callosum). Surprisingly,
the comparison of partial and total agenesis of the corpus callosum showed only slight differences
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in medical and behavioral outcomes (Paul et al., 2007). Patients
with the syndromic form of corpus callosum dysgenesis (a
callosal abnormality associated with other genetic syndromes
e.g., Aicardi syndrome) show severe developmental delay and
intellectual disabilities (Sztriha, 2005). Whereas individuals with
isolated AgCC (Symington et al., 2010), meaning they do
not have additional syndromes or disorders or evidence of
other brain pathology, typically only have mild behavioral and
cognitive problems (Moutard et al., 2003). However, the outcome
of isolated AgCC is often unclear because their intellectual
development can range from severely delayed to “perfectly
normal” (Paul et al., 2007).
Initial studies examining individuals diagnosed with AgCC
suggested impairments in their higher-order cognitive functions
and social interaction. Neuropsychological studies found
evidence for cognitive impairments in abstract reasoning
(Brown and Paul, 2000), problem solving, and processing speed
(Marco et al., 2012). These cognitive abilities become more
impaired as the task’s complexity increases (Brown and Paul,
2000). However, those with isolated AgCC do not show severe
general cognitive disabilities (Sauerwein et al., 1994) or language
impairments regarding naming, receptive language, and lexical
reading abilities (Brown and Paul, 2000). While deficits were
observed in linguistic pragmatics, AgCC sufferers have difficulty
understanding idioms, proverbs (Banich and Brown, 2000), and
narrative humor (Paul et al., 2003) as they tend to ignore the
second-order meaning of narratives or conversations.
Acallosal patients generally exhibit difficulties in social
cognition and social behavior, with adults showing impairment
in understanding others’ mental states (Symington et al., 2010)
and in recognizing emotions (Bridgman et al., 2014). The deficit
in emotion recognition seems to be directly associated with
atypical facial scanning; adults with AgCC spend less time in
the eye region while observing emotional expressions of others
(Bridgman et al., 2014), resulting in poorer detection of others’
emotional and mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). The
social-cognitive impairment in AgCC was also demonstrated
by mild theory of mind (ToM) deficits (Symington et al.,
2010), poor social self-awareness (Brown and Paul, 2000), and
difficulties in social perspective taking (Symington et al., 2010;
Turk et al., 2010). Overall, the findings of social cognition
research suggest that AgCC patients have particular difficulties
understanding complex socio-emotional and life-like contexts of
everyday situations. These social cognitive impairments in people
with callosal agenesis overlap with the profile of autism spectrum
disorders (ASD). Individuals with ASD show similar patterns
of emotion recognition, being significantly worse at recognizing
emotions compared with normal controls, particularly when
only the eye region of faces is presented. There is also evidence
that AgCC individuals share the characteristic of impaired
social cognition with ASD patients, especially with respect to
the difficulties in recognizing another person’s mental states,
feelings, intentions, and goals. Survey studies, completed by
caregivers of children with AgCC, reported that a significant
number of children and adults have problems with social
behaviors (Badaruddin et al., 2007), and exhibit significant
autistic symptomatology (Moes et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2013).
To clarify the relationship between the autistic-like behavior
and callosal agenesis, a recent study (Paul et al., 2014) directly
compared AgCC adults with ASD adults. Using the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, they found that one third
of the adults with AgCC met the clinical criteria for autism,
whereas very few subjects were consistent with the ASD diagnosis
when developmental history was included. The autistic traits seen
in AgCC patients appear to emerge in differing time-courses,
depending on the age of the AgCC patient.
Despite the convergent evidence reviewed here, with regard
to social and cognitive deficits in AgCC, much work is still
needed. At present there are only a few studies that have
directly examined the mentalizing abilities in persons with
agenesis of the corpus callosum, and these have mainly been
case studies. In addition, even less research has been conducted
in children with AgCC that has specifically investigated the
developmental course of social-cognitive domains, including
emotion recognition and theory of mind. Previous studies
involving adults implicitly proposed that these impairments
are not likely to be exhibited in younger children with AgCC
(Paul et al., 2014), because normally, the corpus callosum is
not yet fully myelinated until adolescence (Giedd et al., 1996).
However, parent reported assessment studies have suggested
that children with AgCC are more likely to exhibit autistic
symptoms, including social-cognitive deficits, compared with
adults (Moes et al., 2009). Additionally, the specific social and
communicative abnormalities emerge early on, at about the
age of three, in ASD children who share important clinical
and neuroanatomical parallels with AgCC children. Therefore,
the social and cognitive deficits in emotion recognition and
mentalizing capacities are more likely to occur in childhood in
AgCC children. The present study addresses this issue in a sample
of 6–8 year old children with isolated AgCC. We chose this age
range because the social and higher-order cognitive functions
(theory of mind, understanding emotions, inhibitory control,
working memory), which are necessary for school readiness, are
available for typically developing children at this age.
The first aim of this study was to characterize the social
and higher-order cognitive functions in a sample of 18 children
diagnosed with isolated AgCC. In light of previous studies
examining social and cognitive functions in AgCC and ASD
individuals, we predicted that when given the task of recognizing
complex mental states from faces, children would perform
poorly; but would perform normally at recognizing basic
emotions. Additionally, we expected that AgCC children would
have more difficulty identifying mental states or emotions that
involved the eye region. We also hypothesized that children
with AgCC would have difficulties in inferring the mental states
of others, but this deficiency only becomes apparent in more
complex situations, when more information must be processed
and integrated. We expected that children would be more likely
to pass first-order false belief tasks, but would perform poorly in
second-order false belief tasks. Alternatively, the impaired social
cognitive function could reflect deficits in inhibitory control
and working memory. Here, we predicted that performance
of inhibitory control becomes more impaired in children with
AgCC relative to normally developing children, and the impaired
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executive functions makes a unique contribution to the ability of
theory of mind. In this study, we test the relative contributions
of inhibitory control, working memory, and assessment of
intelligence to AgCC children’s social abilities (ToM and emotion
- mental state recognition). Our second aim was to examine
the relationship between social cognition and the severity of
behavioral problems in children with and without corpus callous
agenesia. To answer these research questions, we employed
validated social cognitive tasks (emotion recognition, theory of
mind, executive function, and working memory), and parent-
reported assessments. Our study is the first comprehensive direct
comparison of AgCC children with typically developing children,
in cognitive and social domains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants included 18 children with isolated corpus callosum
agenesia between the age of 6 and 8 years, and 18 normally
developing children as control (Table 1 shows the demographic
and psychological background information). Groups were
matched with respect to IQ, age, gender, children’s education,
and caregiver’s education. The two groups had exactly the
same number of males (14) and females (4), and they were
perfectly matched for age and education level; each child with
AgCC was individually paired to a typically developing child.
In the AgCC cohort, five were left-handed and four were
ambidextrous, while in the control group two were left-handed
and 16 were right-handed, with handedness being determined by
the administration of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. The
AgCC group included 16 with complete agenesis of the corpus
callosum and two with partial agenesis (we did not exclude two
children with partial AgCC because the individual connectivity
pattern and differences was beyond the scope of our study,
and previous studies also included both partial and complete
AgCC individuals, e.g., Lau et al., 2013; Paul et al., 2014). The
inclusion criteria for both groups were: 6–8 years of age, IQ
scores>75, nomajor head trauma or neurosurgery, no additional
genetic syndromes (e.g., Aicardi syndrome), and no severe
psychopathology (children with anxiety, ADHD, and children
undergoing psychotherapy treatment and/or taking psychotropic
medication were excluded). Regular and neuropsychological
examinations for all AgCC participants were conducted at the
Neurology Department of Obstetric and Gynecology Clinic
(Semmelweis University) in Budapest. The controls were
recruited from the local kindergarten and primary school.
Children with AgCC were first diagnosed before birth; the
absence of the corpus callous in utero was identified upon routine
high-resolution ultrasound, and, then a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan confirmed the diagnosis. For all participants
with AgCC, previousMRI and radiological reports were gathered
to confirm the diagnosis of complete or partial AgCC by an
independent second neuroradiologist. Images were evaluated for
the presence and size of the corpus callosum, Probst bundle,
anterior commissure, white matter abnormalities, and cortical
malformations (e.g., subcortical heterotopia, polymicrogyria).
Participants with AgCC were included if they had structural
TABLE 1 | Demographic and background psychological measures.
AgCC
(N = 18)
Control
(N = 18)
t, x2 p-value
AGE (YEARS)
Mean (SD) 6.80 (0.84) 6.93 (0.76) t = −0.496 (p = 0.623)
Range 5.9–8.1 6.1–8.0
FSIQ
Mean (SD) 98.16 (8.79) 100.83 (6.48) t = −1.036 (p = 0.308)
Range 85–108 88–109
PIQ
Mean (SD) 94.66 (8.79) 98.33 (8.12) t = −1.081 (p = 0.287)
Range
VIQ
Mean (SD) 96.94 (14.00) 102.83 (7.74) t = −1.561 (p = 0.128)
Range
GENDER M: 14 F: 4 M: 14 F: 4 x2 = 0.0, (p = 1.0)
HANDEDNESS L: 5 R: 9 A:4 L: 2 R: 16 x2 = 7.246, (p = 0.02)
CHILDREN PRESCHOOL: PRESCHOOL: x2 = 0.0, (p = 1.0)
EDUCATION 10SCHOOL: 8 10 SCHOOL: 8
CAREGIVER EDUCATION
Mean (SD) 12.77 (2.36) 13.00 (2.11) t = −0.297 (p = 0.786)
Range 11.0–17.0 11.0–17.0
The comparison based on the t-test for age, FSIQ, PIQ, VIQ, caregiver education and x2
for gender, handedness and children education.
findings that commonly co-occur with AgCC: Probst Bundle,
colpocephaly, and interhemispheric cysts. Children with other
structural brain abnormalities (known genetic syndrome, frontal
lobe dysgenesis) were excluded. The presence of anterior
commissure was confirmed in all participants. The intelligence
scores, based on the Test of Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children - III (Hungarian standard version), were also
collected from previous neuropsychological records (assessed
within a year). Control participants’ intelligence scores were also
established using the Test of Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children -III.
The caregiver of each participant signed an informed consent.
All participants were treated in accordance with the Hungarian
Psychological Association Ethical Codes. This study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of Psychology
Research Guidelines of the Ethical Committee of the Hungarian
Psychological Association, with written informed consent from
each caregiver of the subjects, in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Measures
Theory of Mind
To assess ToM, we used two classic False Belief Tasks with
some modification to test AgCC children’s ability to understand
others’ mind. The first-order false belief task was the traditional
The Smarties tube test (Perner et al., 1989). The task involves
a familiar Smarties box, but filled with pencils instead of
candies. The experimenter first asks the child “What do you
think is in this box?,” and the child naturally replies “Candies,”
because they have an expectation of what is in the box (false
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belief). The child is then shown the pencils inside the box.
Then the experimenter closes the lid of the box and asks
the child two belief questions. The first question is “When I
first showed you this box what did you think was inside?,” and
the second question is “What will your mother (who did not
see the pencils) think is inside the box?” If the child has a
theory of mind, they will realize that their mother would also
think candies are inside, and a normal 4-year-old child mostly
answers “Candies,” by referring the other’s false belief, but 3-
year-old children or children with impaired ToM usually reply
“pencils.”
The second-order false belief task was a modification of
the Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In the original
task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) the child is introduced to two
dolls, Sally and Anne, who are playing with a marble. The
dolls put the marble in a basket then Sally leaves the scene.
Anne takes the marble out of the basket and she puts it away
in a different container. When Sally returns the child is asked
“Where will Sally search for the marble?” The child fails the
theory of mind task if she answers that Sally will search for
it in the second container. The second-order modification of
the Sally-Anne task is that when Sally leaves, she looks back
through the key-hole while Anne is transferring the marble
to the new location. When Sally returns, the test question is
no longer “Where will Sally search for the marble?,” instead it
is “Where does Anne think Sally will search for the marble?”
We used this modification of the Sally-Anne Task to test the
children’s second-order theory of mind ability. Children were
successful if they responded correctly to both the test and
control questions. These tasks were scored as pass = 1, fail
= 0. Performance across the two tasks was summed (range
0–2) to create a single indicator of false belief understanding.
Additionally, we also analyzed each test individually as the
indicator of first-order false belief test and second-order false
belief test.
Emotion and Mental State Recognition
We administered the Faces Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) to
measure the emotion and mental state recognition of children.
The Faces Test consists of 20 photographs of an actress posing,
10 photos of basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, afraid, disgust,
distress, surprise), and 10 photos of complex mental states
(scheme, guilt, admire, interest, thoughtfulness, quizzical, bored,
arrogant, flirting, quizzical). In our experiment, under each
photo, two words were typed, but only one described the
target basic emotion or mental state the actress was posing.
Subjects were presented with 20 photos (10 basic emotions and
10 complex mental states) separately in a random order. For
each photo, the experimenter read the two words under the
photo, and the child was asked to choose the emotion/mental
state that best described what the person was thinking or
feeling in the picture. Each trial was scored as pass = 1,
fail = 0. The dependent measure was the number of correct
answers for basic emotions and for complex mental states.
Performance across the two conditions was summed (range 0–
20) to create a single indicator of emotion and mental state
recognition.
Executive Function
Two executive function tasks were administered, providing
measures of inhibitory control (Day and Night Stroop), and
working memory (Digit Span forward and backward).
For working memory, we administered the standardWechsler
Digit Span Task to measure the working memory capacity. This
test requires the examiner to verbally present digits at a rate
of one per second, and children are asked to repeat the digits
verbatim in the same order (forward test). The backward test
requires the participant to repeat the digits in reverse order.
The number of digits increases by one until the participant
consecutively fails two trials of the same digit span length. The
task was preceded by a brief training procedure. Two practice
items preceded the experimental trials, and the task was only
started if the child passed the practice trials. Children were
administered two different trials of each sequence length, which
ranged from two to nine.
To measure inhibitory control, the Day and Night Stroop
task (Gerstadt et al., 1994) was used to assess executive function
measurement of interference control in young children. Children
were instructed to say the word “night” when they saw a white
sun card and to say “day” when shown a black moon card.
We used two conditions, an Incongruent Condition to test the
ability of inhibition and a Congruent Condition as a control. In
the Incongruent Condition, children were required to say the
opposite of what was shown on the day-night cards, maintain
the task instructions over the procedure, and inhibit a dominant
response associated directly to the stimulus while executing the
subdominant response. In the Congruent condition, children
simply said what the stimulus represented. The order of the
conditions was counterbalanced across participants, for half of
the participants, the experiment started with the presentation of
Congruent Condition, while for the other half of the participants
the Incongruent Condition was conducted. The participant did
four practice trials. In each condition 16 trials were administered,
in which eight night cards and eight day cards were shown in a
pseudo-random order (n(ight), d(ay), n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, d, n, d,
n, n, d, n, d). No feedback was given to the children. The task was
presented on a computer screen and was controlled by PsychoPy,
presenting the stimuli and recording the participants’ responses.
The dependent measure was the total number of correct answers
for each condition. Response latency was not measured because
most of the children were unable to correctly use the response
panel.
Behavior Questionnaire
We used the validated Hungarian version of the extended
Strength and Difficulty Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997, 1999,
SDQ) to measure the children’s emotional and behavioral
difficulties. The SDQ was administered by parents and covers the
major areas of emotional and behavioral difficulties, and predicts
psychiatric disorders. The SDQ consists of 25 items, divided
into five subscales: the prosocial subscale, the inattention-
hyperactivity subscale, the emotional symptoms subscale, the
conduct problems subscale, and the peer problems subscale. Each
item can be scored “not true,” “somewhat true,” or “certainly
true.” The extended version includes questions that ask whether
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the respondent considers the young person to have a problem and
its impact on their social emotional life. All subscales expecting
pro-social behavior are summed to compute a total difficulties
score. The dependent variables taken from the SDQ include the
total score of difficulties and five subscale scores. The SDQ is
available on the internet website: www.sdqinfo.com.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room, at the clinic
of Semmelweis University for AgCC children, and at the local
primary school for control children. All children were tested
in a single session for the target tasks, the control children
completed the intelligence test in a separate session. Intelligence
was assessed in the AgCC children prior to the study, by a
neuropsychologist during a regular yearly visit. On arrival, the
child was asked to be seated at the table, then the experimenter
explained that they were going to play some “games.” Prior
to each test, participants were trained on how to do the task.
Parents received a child behavior questionnaire and were asked to
complete the questionnaires and return them. All children were
administered individually over two separate sessions, and there
was no time limit.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were conducted using IMB SPSS Statistics
(Version 22.0). We used an independent t-test and chi2 test
to examine the group differences between the AgCC group
and control group for social-cognitive factors and behavioral
problems. We then computed correlations (Pearson’s r) to test
our prediction that social-cognitive abilities would be associated
with behavioral symptoms. We used a significance level of 0.05
(two-tailed) for all tests.
RESULTS
Theory of Mind
First, we evaluated the control questions (reality and memory)
of the false belief tasks, and only those subjects who passed
the control questions were included in the present analysis.
One AgCC child was excluded from the analysis due to failing
the control questions. We compared the performance of AgCC
children with control children for on each false belief test using
chi2 test. The proportion of subjects in the AgCC group who
passed either the first-order false belief task [Smarties tube test,
x2(35) = 7.098, 1df, p = 0.00], or the second-order false belief
task [modified Sally-Anne false belief task, x2(35) = 3.736, 1df, p
= 0.05] was significantly smaller than that of the control group.
Finally, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test confirmed that
children with AgCC performed poorer, with lower total scores
on the ToM tasks [z(35) = −2.612, p = 0.009]. Table 2 shows
numbers of children who passed the Smarties or Sally-Anne M
false belief tasks.
Additional analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted
in order to investigate the effect of verbal intelligence on false
belief performance. When VIQ was applied as a covariate in
ANCOVA, it indicated that false belief scores were significantly
poorer for the AgCC group [F(1, 32) = 6.42, p= 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.01].
TABLE 2 | Number of subjects in each group who passed on Smarties or
Sally Anne M belief tasks (an AgCC child did not pass the control
questions).
AgCC (N = 17) Control (N = 18) Total (N = 35)
Smarties 8 16 24
Sally Anne M 4 10 14
FIGURE 1 | Emotion recognition and mental state recognition mean
accuracy by group. Error bars represent standard error.
ANCOVA shows that the main effect of verbal ability (VIQ) on
false belief performance was not significant [F(1, 32) = 2.90, p =
0.09, ηp2 = 0.08].
Emotion and Mental State Recognition
First, we compared the performance on recognition of basic
emotions and complex mental states in AgCC and control
subjects. The AgCC group were less accurate than the control
group on overall Faces scores [for total scores t(35) = −3.483,
p = 0.001, d = 1.16]. Subjects with AgCC showed poorer
performance (M = 12.83, SD = 3.05) on selecting the target
emotional and mental states compared with the control children
(M = 15.55, SD = 1.29). Repeated measures of ANOVA,
comparing group (AgCC vs. control) and complexity of mental
states factor (basic vs. complex), revealed a significant group
effect [F(1, 34) = 12.13, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.26], indicating that
children with AgCC were less accurate than control subjects. A
significant difference was also found for complexity of mental
states factor [F(1, 34) = 15.93, p = 0.00, ηp
2
= 0.31]; children
recognized the basic emotional mental states more accurately
than complex mental states in both groups. The group ×
complexity interaction was not significant [F(1, 34) = 1.602, p =
0.21, ηp2 = 0.045] for complexity and group factors. The mean
scores (Figure 1) indicate that subjects with AgCC performed less
accurately on both basic emotion trials (M= 7.16, SD= 1.65) and
complex mental state recognition trials (M = 5.66, SD = 1.87)
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TABLE 3 | Results of FACES Test, showing number of subjects passing
each trial.
AgCC
subjects
(N = 18)
Control
subjects
(N= 18)
Pearson x2
BASIC EMOTIONS
Picture 1: Happy vs. Surprise 18 18 0.0
Picture 2: Afraid vs. Angry 13 17 3.200
Picture 3: Surprise vs. Happy 17 18 1.029
Picture 4: Disgust vs. Sad 14 18 4.500*
Picture 5: Sad vs. Disgust 15 17 1.125
Picture 6: Angry vs. Afraid 10 9 0,111
Picture 7: Surprise vs. Happy 9 9 0.0
Picture 8: Distress vs. Sad 11 10 1.114
Picture 9: Happy vs. Surprise 15 16 0.232
Picture 10: Angry vs. Afraid 7 15 7.481**
COMPLEX MENTAL STATES
Picture 11: Scheming vs. Arrogant 5 12 5.461*
Picture 12: Guilt vs. Arrogant 10 16 4.985*
Picture 13: Thoughtful vs. Arrogant 13 17 3.200
Picture 14: Admiring vs. Surprise 15 16 0.232
Picture 15: Quizzical vs. Guilt 11 10 0.114
Picture 16: Playful vs. Happy 13 11 0.500
Picture 17: Bored vs. Sleepy 10 11 0.114
Picture 18: Interested vs. Disinterested 9 16 6.415*
Picture 19: Interested vs. Disinterested 5 12 5.461*
Picture 20: Arrogant vs. Guilt 11 11 0.0
The first term is the target (correct) term. The position of the target term and the order of
the picture pairs were randomized. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
compared with the control children (for basic emotion:M= 8.16,
SD=1.04, and for complex mental states:M = 7.38, SD= 1.29).
Table 3 shows the number of children choosing the correct
basic emotion or complex mental state for each trial. Using
chi2 test to compare the performance of AgCC individuals
and control subjects on each trial, the analysis revealed that
there was a significant difference between the AgCC group and
control group, but only on the “angry vs. afraid” and “sad vs.
disgust” trials in the basic emotion trials. As for the trials of the
complex mental states, children with AgCC were significantly
less accurate on the trials of the “guilt vs. arrogant,” “interest
vs. disinterest,” “scheming vs. arrogant” compared with control
subjects (Table 3).
Executive Function
Working Memory
The independent sample t-test results showed no significant
effect for the forward digit span (p = ns.), or for the backward
digit span (p= ns.).
Inhibitory Control
A 2 groups (AgCC vs. control) × 2 conditions (congruent
vs. incongruent) mixed model ANOVA was conducted for
performance (correct response rate). The analysis of performance
showed a significant main effect for the condition [F(1, 30) =
FIGURE 2 | Day and night Strop accuracy performance separated by
group and congruency. Error bars represent standard error.
65.29, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.684], and for the group [F(1, 30) =
36.39, p = 0.000, ηp2 = 0.548], and for the interaction between
group and condition [F(1, 30) = 33.61, p = 0.000, ηp
2
= 0.527].
The results demonstrate that Stroop-like interference is higher
in children with AgCC (M = 14.0, SD = 0.41) compared
with control children (M = 17.35, SD = 0.46), regarding the
performance (Figure 2).
Relationship between Social and Cognitive
Factors
We computed additional correlational analysis for both groups
separately to determine correlations between social and cognitive
factors (Table 4). Within the AgCC group, there was a medium
strength correlation between forward digit span and basic
emotion recognition, as well as between backward digit span
and complex mental state recognition and inhibitory controls,
with significant correlation coefficients ranging from r = 0.41
to r = 0.62, p < 0.05. For the inhibitory control measures,
there was no significant correlation with social factors (false
belief and emotion and mental state recognition). Similarly,
intelligence factors (general IQ, verbal IQ, and non-verbal
IQ) also showed no significant correlation with social and
cognitive factors (theory of mind, emotions, and mental state
recognition, inhibitory control and working memory). For
the control group, significant correlations were only found
between backward digit span and false belief [r(18) = 0.51, p =
0.03].
Behavioral Questionnaire
We compared differences in behavioral, emotional and
relationship problems between the two groups using independent
sample t-test, and computed Cohen’s d effect size. Comparison
of the SDQ subscale scores and the total difficulties revealed that
children with AgCC had significantly higher mean scores (p <
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TABLE 4 | Correlation r between social factors and behavioral problems measures separately for each group (AgCC Group/Control Group).
Control AgCC
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. False belief 1 0.22 0.49* 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.18
2. FACES BE −0.12 1 0.49* 0.84 0.22 0.46* 0.37
3. FACES MS 0.17 −0.22 1 0.88** 0.35 0.42 0.52*
4. FACES Total 0.04 0.62** 0.61** 1 0.35 0.51* 0.52*
5. Day-Night 0.46 −0.10 −0.28 −0.31 1 0.44 0.62*
6. Digit Span FW 0.51* 0.06 0.21 0.22 −0.06 1 0.77**
7. Digit Span BW 0.16 0.26 −0.23 0.22 0.14 0.2 1
False belief, FACES BE, Basic Emotion recognition, FACES MS Mental States, FACES Total, Day-night, Day and Night Stroop, Digit Span Forward, Digit Span Backward **p < 0.001,
*p < 0.05.
TABLE 5 | Results of Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ).
(Sub)scales AgCC
(N = 18)
Control
(N = 18)
Effect size
(Cohen’s d)
t-test
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Emotional problems 4.61 (1.50) 2.00 (1.23) 1.90 5.69**
Conduct problems 3.27 (1.31) 1.50 (1.15) 1.43 4.38**
Inattention-hyperactivity 4.00 (2.27) 3.72 (1.77) 0.13 0.40
Peer problems 3.16 (1.88) 1.88 (1.28) 0.79 4.64**
Prosocial behavior 5.47 (2.03) 8.69 (1.46) 1.81 −6.52**
Total difficulties 15.05 (5.17) 7.88 (3.17) 1.67 5.00**
Number of children (N), SDQ mean scores, standard deviations (SD) and effect sizes for
SDQ (sub) scales and t-test values.
Statistical significance of differences between children with and without AgCC (t-test):
**p < 0.001.
0.001) on the total difficulties scale, and on all subscales, expect
for the inattention-hyperactivity subscale (p = ns.). Table 5
shows the mean scores and Cohen’s d effect size values in the
AgCC cohort (Figure 3).
Relationships between Social-Cognitive
Factors and Behavioral Problems
We carried out further correlational analysis for each group
separately to determine correlations between social and cognitive
factors, and the severity of behavioral problems. The analysis
involved the following factors: ToM ability (the total score of
false belief tasks), emotion and mental state recognition (Faces:
basic emotion recognition, complex mental states recognition,
and Faces total score), and executive function (inhibitory control:
Day and Night Stroop incongruent condition, working memory:
digit span forward and digit span backward). The relationship
of social cognitive factors to behavioral problems was examined
separately for each SDQ subscale (Table 6). The AgCC group
revealed a borderline significant correlation between ToM and
the SDQ Peer Problems subscale [r(17) = −0.45, p = 0.06], and
the Prosocial subscale marginally correlated with ToM [r(17) =
0.46, p = 0.06], complex mental state recognition [r(18) = 0.42,
p = 0.08], and inhibitory control [r(15) = 0.48, p = 0.06]. In
the control group, a significant correlation was found between
complex mental state and the SDQ Inattention-hyperactivity
subscale [r(17) = −0.51, p = 0.03], and digit span backward
and SDQ Conduct problems subscale [r(17) = −0.49, p =
0.03].
We used a value of z (Weaver and Wuensch, 2013)
that can be applied to assess the difference between two
correlation coefficients of the AgCC group and control group.
We computed z-tests for each pair of correlations. The z-
test results showed that the observed correlations did not
differ from one another between two groups (z coefficients
ranged from z = −1.08 to z = 1.66, p = ns.), except for
the relationship between Hyperactivity-inattention subscale and
complex mental state recognition (z = −1.98 p = 0.02).
This finding indicates that the relationship between social
cognition and the severity of behavioral problems in children
with and without AgCC does not differ significantly. This
means that typically developing children and AgCC children
represent the two endpoints of the same scale. Control children
showed fewer behavioral difficulties, with good performance in
social and cognitive tasks, while AgCC children showed more
behavioral difficulties associated with weaker cognitive and social
abilities.
DISCUSSION
In order to provide evidence to clarify the role of the corpus
callosum, regarding the nature of understanding others’ mind, we
investigated the main socio-emotional and cognitive functions
in a group of children with isolated AgCC. We administered
theory of mind tasks, emotion/mental state recognition,
executive measures, and a parent-reported behavioral problems
questionnaire. The findings of the present study are in line
with previous studies showing typical mild social cognitive
impairments in individuals with AgCC, even in childhood.
On the theory of mind tasks, children with AgCC performed
significantly poorer than age- and IQ-matched controls. AgCC
children performed poorly on both false belief tasks, with only
half of the AgCC children passing the first-order-false belief task
compared with 89 percent of control children. Only 23% of AgCC
children passed the second-order false belief task compared
with 55% of normally developing children in our sample. These
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FIGURE 3 | Parent rating on Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire. Mean scores for parent rating scales including (A) Emotional problems, (B) Conduct
problems, (C) Inattention-Hyperactivity, (D) Peer problems, (E) Prosocial behavior, and (F) Total difficulties. Higher scores indicate greater symptomatology. Error bars
represent standard deviation.
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TABLE 6 | Correlation r between social factors and behavioral problems measures for the whole sample and for separately for each group (AgCC
Group/Control Group).
SDQ
Emotional problems Conduct problems Inattention-hyperactivity Peer problems Prosocial behavior Total difficulties
False Belief −0.47** (−0.22/−0.23) −0.37 (−0.11/−0.08) −0.03 (0.22/−0.31) −0.55** (−0.45/−0.24) 0.57** (0.48/0.34) −0.47* (−0.17/−0.39)
FACES BE −0.26 (−0.04/0.01) −0.25 (−0.08/−0.02) −0.05 (−0.09/0.09) −0.32* (−0.07/−0.30) 0.29 (0.16/−0.09) −0.16 (−0.14/−0.08)
FACES SE −0.36** (0.35/−0.13) −0.12 (0.27/0.22) −0.06 (0.16/−0.51*) −0.40** (−0.19/0.01) 0.58** (0.43/0.23) −0.33* (0.81/−0.25)
FACES Total −0.36** (−0.02/0.11) −0.21 (0.12/0.15) −0.01 (0.05/−0.33) −0.44** (−0.16/−0.23) 0.52** (0.34/0.11) −0.34** (−0.07/−0.27)
Day-Night −0.39* (−0.36/0.01) −0.47** (−0.18/−0.02) −0.01 (−0.08/0.28) −0.46** (−0.18/0.11) 0.71** (0.48/0.19) −0.43* (−0.05/0.20)
Digit Span FW −0.04 (−0.24/0.08) −0.13 (−0.28/0.08) −0.17 (−0.15/−0.30) −0.05 (−0.26/0.01) −0.08 (−0.03/0.04) −0.09 (−0.21/−0.25)
Digit Span BW −0.22 (−0.31/−0.05) −0.13 (−0.07/−0.49*) −0.05 (−0.22/0.17) −0.05 (−0.03/0.04) 0.21 (0.06/0.22) −0.16 (0.14/0.14)
False belief, FACES BE, Basic Emotion recognition, FACES SE, Social emotion recognition, FACES Total, Day-night, Day and Night Stroop, Digit Span Forward, Digit Span Backward
**p < 0.001, *p < 0.05.
findings suggest that children with AgCC have an increased
risk of having problems in understanding other people’s mind.
Similar deficits in theory of mind are known from findings in
children with autism. They typically fail the false belief task
(e.g., Smarties Tube Task or Sally Anne task), while 4-year-
old normally developing children, or even children with Down
syndrome, are able to pass it. A previous study with AgCC adults
(Symington et al., 2010) also found mild theory of mind deficits
in various mentalizing tasks, such as understanding sarcasm and
interpreting visual and textual social cues. However, this study
has not reported serious deficits in specific theory of mind tasks
that required mental state attribution (Faux Pas Test and Happé
Theory of Mind Stories). A more recent study (Paul et al., 2014),
directly comparing the social functions in an AgCC group and an
ASD group, reported that AgCC adults had higher empathizing
scores than ASD adults. These findings together indicate that
individuals with AgCC have difficulties in understanding others’
mental state, and they share some impaired social cognition
with ASD persons, but AgCC individuals seem to have better
mentalizing capacities. Our findings support this conclusion;
children between the age of 6 and 8 years with callosal dysgenesis
also indicated developmental delay in standard ToM tasks, but
their performance showed high variability, ranging from severely
impaired to “perfectly normal,” and their ToM performance
was not associated with intelligence factors or any executive
functions.
With respect to emotional and mental state understanding
(Faces Test, Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), children with AgCC had
fewer difficulties recognizing basic emotions from photographed
facial expressions; they only showed some deficits on negative
emotion trials (angry-fear and disgust-sad distinctions). In
contrast, the AgCC children showed more deficits in recognizing
complex mental states compared to the control children. In
particular, AgCC children failed to identify expressions that
depicted a specific mental state (interest vs. disinterest), or a
complex social emotion (scheming vs. arrogant, and guilt vs.
arrogant). Similar impaired recognition of emotions has been
shown in previous studies, which examined social-emotional
abilities in clinical samples. Individuals with schizophrenia have
difficulties recognizing emotion expression of disgust (Bediou
et al., 2005), anger (Gogharie and Sponheim, 2013), fear, and
surprise (Barkl et al., 2014). While individuals with autism often
fail to recognize fear and anger, they tend tomislabel anger as fear
(Pelphrey et al., 2002). Additionally, the impaired recognition
of complex mental states is more well-known in subjects with
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). A prior study with AgCC
subjects (Bridgman et al., 2014) found similar patterns of emotion
recognition. AgCC individuals also had difficulties in recognizing
fearful expressions and they often mislabelled anger as disgust or
sadness, and fear as surprise. Individuals with callosal dygenesis
also showed atypical face perception, including reduced gaze to
the eyes and increased focus on the mouth. In line with this
evidence, the present findings indicate that children with AgCC
are able to identifymost of the primary emotions, however, AgCC
children have some difficulties in detecting a complex mental
state from facial expressions, particularly those expressions that
require processing information from the eyes (e.g., interest, guilt,
arrogance, scheming). This finding supports the idea that AgCC
and ADS individuals share some impairment in social cognition.
The executive functions in AgCC children showed a
normal range of working memory abilities, but difficulties in
performance of inhibitory control; the Stroop-like interference
was higher than the performance of control children. Executive
functions are a set of higher-order cognitive skills that depend
upon specific callosal connectivity. A comprehensive study
(Marco et al., 2012) directly investigating the executive functions
in an AgCC cohort also found impairments in inhibition and
flexibility tasks, but the performance in executive tests was
attributed to slow cognitive processing. In contrast, Brown et al.
(2001) found evidence that individuals with AgCC have normal
executive functions with respect to the inhibition/flexibility
skills. They speculated that the presence of other cerebral
commissures in AgCC allow for the interhemispheric transfer
of information in inhibitory control tasks. The inconsistency of
findings, probably comes from the high variability of difficulty
levels in test batteries that were used. It is likely that AgCC
individuals exhibit more errors and slower processing speed
when the information is more complex and less easily encoded.
Our findings also showed that children without the corpus
callosum committed more errors in interference tasks. Response
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time was not measured reliably in our study; therefore, we have
no information on whether this performance is a consequence of
processing speed when the nervous system uses the alternative
routes connecting the hemispheres.
Taken together, findings presented here support several
potential explanations that may account for the impaired social
cognition in children with AgCC. First, the language explanation
suggests that the impaired social function is mediated by the
decreased capacity in linguistic pragmatics. Previous findings of
linguistic studies have also suggested that AgCC patients tend to
use the literal meaning of the narrative information and ignore
the second-order meaning of narratives or conversations. It is
possible that children with AgCC have trouble understanding
the false belief tasks because they do not understand different
perspectives in the context of ToM tasks required to describe
the world linguistically. Additionally, AgCC individuals tend to
use fewer “mentalizing words” (Symington et al., 2010), that
reflect others’ mental states (“know,” “think,” “feel”), resulting
in deficits that infer mental and emotional processes of others.
The lack of callosal interconnectivity may support the decreased
capacity in linguistic pragmatics, as the callosal dysgenesis
reduces the accessibility to the more complex integration
of the semantic network, which is widespread in the two
hemispheres. According to the second explanation, executive
functioning is also a potential candidate for mediating impaired
social cognition in AgCC patients. The absence of callosal
connections in AgCC functional brain connectivity seems to
be more limited during tasks that require complex cognitive
operation, such as inhibitory control, working memory, and
flexible switching. A previous brain imaging study (Hinkley et al.,
2012) demonstrated that impairment of functional interaction
appears in regions in the frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices,
which indicated social-cognitive functions, known to be impaired
in AgCC patients. Indeed, performance in executive function
(Tower of London task) directly correlated with resting-state
functional connectivity of dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex in
individuals with AgCC (Hinkley et al., 2012). Our findings,
however, do not support that executive functions, namely
the inhibitory control, reflect the impaired social cognitive
function, like theory of mind and mental state recognition.
A third possible explanation is the deficit in the process of
integration of multiple sources of information. AgCC patients
have difficulties using the context of a complex situation to
interpret the meaning of linguistic information, and inferring the
mental states of other persons based on the available, simpler
information. The absence of the corpus callosum disrupts the
interhemispheric connection and limits the size of the functional
processing network of complex social cognitive functions.
However, individuals with complete AgCC do not experience
disconnection syndrome, they exhibit a limited amount of
interhemispheric transfers, mediated by anterior commissure
and additional alternative anatomical tracts, developed in AgCC
subjects, such as Probst and heterotopic bundles, providing
compensatory mechanisms for social cognitive processes (Marco
et al., 2012). However, these alternative connections cannot
compensate fully for the complex function of the corpus
callosum, and results in a slower processing speed. Moreover,
the lacking interhemispheric connection leads to an alteration
in intrahemispheric connectivity that increases the likelihood
of other cognitive deficits. Other developmental disorders, such
as ASD, ADHD, and schizophrenia also demonstrated reduced
callosal size that contributed to impairments in interhemispheric
transfer and processing speed (Paul et al., 2007).
The secondary aim of this study was to investigate whether
difficulties in social cognition and/or executive functioning are
related to the severity of behavioral problems, and whether they
increase the prevalence of emotional- and social problems in
children with AgCC. Mental health problems were assessed by
the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, which had never
been used before in a sample of children with AgCC. Using
parent-administered questionnaires, we found that children with
AgCC had more problems with all domains (behavior, emotions,
prosocial behavior, and relationship), except the inattention-
hyperactivity domain, compared with control subjects. However,
the lack of differences in the Inattention-Hyperactivity subscale
can be explained by the fact that there were three children
in the control group who also reached the cut-off score on
the Inattention-Hyperactivity subscale. The results of the SDQ
indicate that the functional changes in brain connectivity might
contribute to behavioral problems in childhood, as several
previous studies reported mild to severe behavioral anomalies
in AgCC individuals, with the most frequently mentioned
disorders being autism and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) (Paul et al., 2007). The abnormal development
of connectivity during childhood is likely to mediate the
reduced capacity in complex social cognitive processes, which
may contribute to the symptoms of behavioral problems or
early onset of psychiatric disorders. The findings within the
AgCC group demonstrated that the deficits in social cognitive
skills are only marginally correlated with behavioral problems.
AgCC children show mild dysfunction in three domains of
mental state recognition, theory of mind, and executive function
(inhibitory control), and these dysfunctions are associated with
behavioral problems. It seems that the peer problems and
prosocial behaviors are linked to mentalizing capacity (false
belief and complex mental state) and inhibitory control, and the
complemental state recognition and inhibitory control are related
to the Prosocial behavior subscale. Children who lack the capacity
for understanding others’ mind have more problems in social
domains.
One of the limitations of this study the relatively small size of
sample, which might have prevented findings the hypothesized
correlation between the socio-cognitive factors the behavioral
adjustment. Another limitation of our findings are that the
AgCC cohort involved children with partial corpus callosum
agenesis (pAgCC), whose behavioral performance did not differ
from the complete AgCC, but the different brain condition
might predict variable social-cognitive performance. Previous
studies showed that the residual fibers of the callosum of
pAgCC probably provide higher variability in the pattern of
interhemispheric connectivity (Wahl et al., 2009), increasing
the variability of the behavioral and cognitive outcome. Further
study is necessary in order to understand how the compensatory
anatomical changes and residual callosal tracts contribute to the
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social and cognitive functioning. It may be more informative
to investigate the emerging social cognitive performance and
mapping of the developmental tracts assessed with MR and DTi
imaging techniques, in parallel.
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that there are mild
deficits in mental state understanding, executive functions,
and behavior symptoms in children with AgCC. The findings
indicate that dysgenesis of the corpus callosum constitutes a
specific risk factor for developing social cognitive symptoms.
AgCC individuals tend to misconstrue social information and
misunderstand the mental states of others within complex
social contexts, including problems with emotion recognition
and complex mental state recognition, theory of mind, and
inhibitory control. The absence of the corpus callosum seems
to affect the development of behavioral characteristics and cause
specific behavioral anomalies. Taken together, evidence from
previous studies with AgCC patients suggest that social cognitive
impairments may relate to the missing corpus callosum. The
callosal agenesis results in deficiencies in imagining and inferring
the mental, emotional, and social functioning of others. This
pattern of cognitive and social deficits has been labeled as primary
AgCC syndrome, by Symington et al. (2010) for that condition,
when there is callosal absence without evidence of other brain
pathology or the observable cognitive and social impairments
primarily related to the absence of the corpus callosum. The
primary AgCC syndrome profile includes impaired emotion
recognition, restricted verbal interpretation of social scenes,
and emotional experiences, as well as mild deficits in theory
of mind. The lack of callosal interconnectivity might explain
the decreased capacity in the higher-order cognitive domain,
as the callosal dysgenesis reduces the accessibility to the more
complex integration of social networks, which is widespread in
the two hemispheres. In AgCC individuals it is likely that the
functions involved are those that are hemispherically lateralized
(emotions, language, visuospatial processing), or the complex
social functions, in which the information is spatially distributed
between the two hemispheres. If the development of the corpus
callosum is impaired, the normal interaction and competition
between the hemispheres is abolished, resulting an alternative
routes in the adult brain.
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Do children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) develop the ability to take into account an
agent’s mental states when they are judging the morality of his or her actions? The present article
aims to answer this question by reviewing recent evidence on moral reasoning on children with
autism and typical development. A basic moral judgment (e.g., judgments of violations in which
negative intentions are followed by negative consequences) and the ability to distinguish between
conventional and moral violations appear to be spared in autism (Leslie et al., 2006). However,
a closer look at the data reveals that these capacities can be explained by the tendency of ASD
individuals to rely heavily on actions consequences and other external factors rather than agents’
mental states. By contrast, studies that presented typically developing (TD) children with accidental
and failed attempts actions have shown that even preschoolers can display an intent-based moral
judgment (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni and Surian, 2016). The tendency to rely on outcome
in ASD children is further confirmed by those studies that direcly show that ASD individuals fail to
attend to the agents’ intentions when the cases are more complex or ambiguous, like in accidentally
harmful actions or failed attempts to harm. We propose that the impairment in understanding
others’ mind hinders the development of an intent-based moral judgment in children with ASD.
MENTAL STATE REASONING IN THE MORAL JUDGMENT TASKS
In our social life, we often engange in the evaluation of others’ actions and intentions, and we
are very sensitive to harmful acts and violations of rights. For example, we maintain friendships
on the basis on an assessment of our friends’ moral behaviors toward us. The production and the
justification of a moral judgment is a complex socio-cognitive task that often requires the use of
mental state reasoning abilities (Young et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2011). In particular when people
are asked to evaluate accidental harming (or helping) actions or failed attempts to harm (or help),
they need to weigh the agents’ intention, that requires a mental state analysis, against the external
consequences of the action. Several neuroscientific studies confirm the association between moral
judgment and theory of mind (Young et al., 2007, 2010; Young and Saxe, 2009).
Then, to what extent individuals with ASD, who present deficits in theory of mind abilities
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, 2000; Bowler, 1992; Surian and Leslie, 1999; Abell et al., 2000;
Castelli et al., 2002), meet with difficulties in the acquisition of an intent-based moral judgment?
Individuals with ASD are characterized by impaired social interactions and communication
abilities, and a set of restricted and repetitive behaviors. Here we focus on their impairment
in mentalizing, that has been shown to be a main factor affecting their socio-moral abilities.
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Studies on themoral judgment of ASD children have traditionally
focused on (a) the capacity to distinguish between moral and
social-conventional transgressions and (b) the ways in which
individuals with autism judge the moral rightness or wrongness
of an action.
MORAL AND CONVENTIONAL
TRANSGRESSIONS
One fundamental aspect of the moral competence has been
identified by social domain theorists in the capacity to distinguish
between moral and social-conventional violations. While the
former involve a victim and are to be blamed regardless of the
social context, the latter do not need to involve a victim and are
contingent over a specific group consensus or authority mandate
(Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1981; Killen and Smetana, 2015). By the age
of three, children judge moral violations, like hit someone, more
harshly, and less authority-dependent than social-conventional,
like wearing pajamas at school (Nucci, 1985; Smetana and
Braeges, 1990).
The capacity to distinguish between these two types of
violation is intact in ASD individuals (Blair, 1996; Rogers
et al., 2006; Zalla et al., 2011; Shulman et al., 2012). However,
ASD individuals produce poorer justifications compared to TD
individuals, and they do not evaluate moral violations as more
serious than non-moral but disgusting actions, such as drinking
tomato soup out of the bowl at a dinner party.Moreover, contrary
to TD children, school-aged children with ASD are swayed by the
victims’ emotion and judge wrong actions that caused the crying
of the victim more harshly than wrong actions that did not cause
any crying (Weisberg and Leslie, 2012). ASD children usually
succeed in tasks devised to investigate the moral-conventional
distinction, but they rely mainly on external factors that could
depend on irrelevant variables such as the particular emotional
level of the agents.
THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF INTENTION
AND OUTCOME IN THE JUDGMENTS OF
ASD INDIVIDUALS
A working hypothesis here is that ASD children respond as TD
children do when they are presented with simple, unambiguous
moral cases (i.e., a negative/positive outcome produced by
an intentional action with the same valence). In those cases,
the difficulties encountered in integrating the mental state
understanding in the moral reasoning can be overcome by the
children’s reliance on action outcomes and victims’ emotional
reactions. For this reason, ASD children appear to develop a basic
moral judgment.
ASD school-aged children evaluate actions that are motivated
by positive or negative intentions and are followed by congruent
outcomes as TD children do (Leslie et al., 2006; Li et al.,
2014). Moreover, they are able to judge an agent that caused
intentionally a bad outcome more harshly than an agent that
caused it accidentally, although they do not produce verbal
justifications that refer to the agent’s intention (Grant et al.,
2005). However, Steele et al. (2003) found that children with
ASD aged 4–14 failed to distinguish between intentional and
accidental bad acts (e.g., failing to come to a planned meeting
as a result of canceling the plan without telling or as a result
of the bus breaking). Studies on ASD adults also showed
that they judge an accidental harm both more punishable and
more intentional compared to TD adults, suggesting a partial
impairment in the ability to rely on intentions (Buon et al., 2013;
see also Rogé andMullet, 2011; Zalla and Leboyer, 2011; Salvano-
Pardieu et al., 2015). Nevertheless, ASD school-aged children
distinguish between a distressed victim and an individual in
distress that however is not a victim (Leslie et al., 2006). So,
their judgments do not completely rely on the external outcomes
assessment.
However, what about the judgments of more complex cases
such as the failed attempts to help or harm, that require a more
substantial contribution of mental state reasoning? In fact, in
judging an ambiguous case such as a failed attempt to harm, it is
not possible to rely solely on action outcomes, and still produce a
moral condemnation of the agent.
A first evidence of an outcome-bias in the judgment in
ASD individuals comes from those studies that reported a
“heteronomous” (i.e., rules are understood as handed down
by authority, and violations are wrong because they produce
bad outcomes, namely they lead to punishment) rather than
an “autonomous” (i.e., rules are based on socially agreed-on
principles, and violations are wrong because of the agent’s beliefs
and motivations) moral reasoning in ASD school-aged children
(Grant et al., 2005; Takeda et al., 2007; see also Fadda et al.,
2016). ASD children attributed moral wrongness and badness
to actions that caused bad outcomes. A second and more direct
evidence comes from a study that presented ASD individuals with
accidental and failed attempted harms. Moran et al. (2011) found
that they failed to distinguish between the two scenarios, and they
judged the accidental harm significantly more harshly than TD
individuals. Moreover, there is evidence of an activation of the
right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ)—an area associated with
mental state reasoning—in TD individuals during the evaluation
of intentional vs. accidental harm, but such result has not been
found in adults with ASD (Koster-Hale et al., 2013). These results
clearly suggest that ASD individuals fail to integrate the agent’s
mental states in their moral reasoning when judging situations
in which intentions and outcomes present different valences (see
Figure 1).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
STUDIES ON MENTAL REASONING IN ASD
INDIVIDUALS’ MORAL JUDGMENTS
Three main theoretical implications relevant for the current
understanding of the relationship between theory of mind and
moral reasoning could be inferred from the results we briefly
discussed. First, the evidence that ASD individuals, who are
characterized by an impaired mental state understanding, show
an atypical moral judgment, further confirms that theory of mind
is fundamental for the development of a mature moral reasoning.
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FIGURE 1 | Main results concerning the mental state reasoning in ASD individuals’ moral reasoning.
Second, the study of moral judgment in ASD individuals
could prove useful in assessing the role of cognitive empathy in
the production of a moral evaluation. ASD individuals show a
spared capacity for emotional empathy (e.g., Blair, 1999; Rogers
et al., 2007), that is, the proper emotional response to others’
emotions, but an impaired capacity for cognitive empathy, that
is, the proper knowing how others may feel. While emotional
empathy skills help ASD children developing a basic moral
judgment by relying on the emotional and external aspects
of the moral case such as the victims’ emotional reactions or
the actions outcomes (Leslie et al., 2006; Hobson et al., 2009;
Weisberg and Leslie, 2012), the poor understanding of the
cognitive aspects hinders the development of an intent-based
moral judgment. Further studies confirm this interpretation by
reporting that aspects related to cognitive empathy impairment
affect the moral evaluations of ASD individuals (Channon et al.,
2010; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Patil et al., 2016).
A third relevant theoretical implication concerns whether the
action understanding required in moral evaluation is mentalistic.
A mentalistic understanding represents and explains others’
actions by ascribing mental states such as beliefs, desires, and
internal representations to the agents (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985; Leslie, 1987; Surian et al., 2007; Baillargeon et al., 2010).
By contrast, a non-mentalistic or teleological understanding
represents others’ actions without ascribing mental states, by
linking directly the agent’s actions, the goal-states and the
situational constraints through the principle of rational actions
(i.e., agents act to achieve certain goals choosing the most
efficient means; Gergely and Csibra, 2003; Schlottmann et al.,
2009). According to the proponents of teleological accounts of
action understanding, humans first develop very early in life
a non-mentalistic understanding, and only later they acquire a
mentalistic understanding. While it could be argued that ASD
individuals possess the ability to interpret actions in a non-
mentalistic way already during preschool years (Hamilton, 2009;
Vivanti et al., 2011), we have seen that they do not develop a
mature intent-basedmoral judgment. Therefore, the literature on
ASD individuals suggests that a non-mentalistic understanding
is not sufficient for the development of a full-blown intent-based
moral reasoning.
CONCLUSIONS
The ability to produce moral evaluations often requires the
understanding of others’ mental states and it is central for
living in human social groups. While much more research is
needed to acquire a full understanding of the development
of moral judgment in ASD individuals, the current state of
the literature suggests that this clinical population encounters
some difficulties in developing a mature intent-based moral
judgment because of the well-known impairment in mental
state understanding. Nevertheless, ASD individuals show the
ability to produce a basic moral judgment by relying on external
cues such as the action outcomes and the victims’ emotional
reactions.
Can these results turn out to be useful in guiding programs
designed to improve moral judgment in children with ASD?
Since a main result of the literature we reviewed is that
individuals with ASD show difficulties in integrating mental
states information in their judgments, clinical treatments, and
educational programs aimed at improving their theory of
mind abilities are likely to have, as a side-effect, a positive
impact also on their moral reasoning abilities. Further research
is needed to point out whether such a desiderable effect is
achieved equally by any effective training on mentalizing skills
(e.g., Silver and Oakes, 2001; Fisher and Happé, 2005; Begeer
et al., 2011), or it is best achieved by a program that requires
both mental state attribution and the generation of moral
judgments.
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it would be more in line with the current studies, that primarily presented ASD individuals with
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Therefore, we replaced “Attempted Harm” with “Accidental Harm” in the top boxes, and we also
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The original article has been reproduced with the correct image, originally it was published with
the version of Figure 1 displayed here.
The original files have been updated.
FIGURE 1 | A comparison of moral judgment in children with typical development and children with autism.
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Early Childhood and Is Profoundly
Impaired in Children with Autism
Spectrum Condition
Tobias Schuwerk1,2*, Irina Jarvers1, Maria Vuori1,3 and Beate Sodian1
1 Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany, 2 Department of Psychiatry and
Psychotherapy, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany, 3 Institute of Medical Psychology,
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Implicit mentalizing, a fast, unconscious and rigid way of processing other’s mental
states has recently received much interest in typical social cognitive development in
early childhood and in adults with autism spectrum condition (ASC). This research
suggests that already infants implicitly mentalize, and that adults with ASC have a
sustained implicit mentalizing deficit. Yet, we have only sparse empirical evidence
on implicit mentalizing beyond early childhood, and deviations thereof in children
with ASC. Here, we administered an implicit mentalizing eye tracking task to assess
the sensitivity to false beliefs to a group of 8-year-old children with and without
ASC, matched for chronological age, verbal and non-verbal IQ. As previous research
suggested that presenting outcomes of belief-based actions leads to fast learning
from experience and false belief-congruent looking behavior in adults with ASC, we
were also interested in whether already children with ASC learn from such information.
Our results provide support for a persistent implicit mentalizing ability in neurotypical
development beyond early childhood. Further, they confirmed an implicit mentalizing
deficit in children with ASC, even when they are closely matched to controls for
explicit mentalizing skills. In contrast to previous findings with adults, no experience-
based modulation of anticipatory looking was observed. It seems that children with
ASC have not yet developed compensatory general purpose learning mechanisms.
The observed intact explicit, but impaired implicit mentalizing in ASC, and correlation
patterns between mentalizing tasks and executive function tasks, are in line with theories
on two dissociable mentalizing systems.
Keywords: mentalizing, implicit Theory of Mind, autism spectrum condition, executive function, eye tracking
INTRODUCTION
Implicit mentalizing, or implicit Theory of Mind (ToM), a fast, unconscious and rigid way of
processing others’ mental states, such as beliefs or desires, has recently received much interest
in research on typical and atypical social cognitive development (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Sodian, 2011; Senju, 2012). One key finding is that already children
younger than 4 years of age implicitly mentalize. For example, results from violation of expectation
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paradigms suggest that already in their second year of life,
children process an agent’s true and false belief. In these tasks,
they look longer at events in which an agent acts incongruently
to her mental state, e.g., when she does not look for an object
where she believes it is located, but at a different location (Onishi
and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Song et al., 2008).
According to recent theories, implicit mentalizing continues to
exist alongside the ability to explicitly mentalize, that is, to
deliberately consider another’s mental state, in children above the
age of 4 years, as well as in adults (cf., Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Perner and Roessler, 2012).
Anticipatory looking paradigms revealed that children
younger than 4 years of age not only expect an agent to act
according to her beliefs, but that they also use her mental state
to predict upcoming actions (Clements and Perner, 1994; Surian
and Geraci, 2012; Thoermer et al., 2012; Low and Watts, 2013).
In an influential study, Southgate et al. (2007) familiarized
25-month-olds with an agent and her goal to retrieve an object
in one of two boxes. In the test trial, the agent was distracted and
did not witness that the object was removed from the box she
had lastly seen it in. When the agent turned back to the scene,
the children’s anticipatory gaze indicated that they predicted the
agent would open the door next to the now empty box. This
suggests that they were sensitive to the agent’s false belief.
Another key finding is that individuals with autism spectrum
condition (ASC) have an implicit mentalizing deficit (Senju et al.,
2009; Schneider et al., 2013; Sodian et al., 2015). This deficit is
thought to contribute to social interaction deficits in ASC (Frith,
2012; Senju, 2012). Employing equivalent anticipatory paradigms
as described above, Senju et al. (2009) found that adults with ASC
lacked the spontaneous appreciation of the agent’s false belief and
did not reliably produce according action predictions.
Interestingly, this and other studies found a dissociation
between implicit and explicit mentalizing (Senju et al., 2009;
Schneider et al., 2013; cf., Abell et al., 2000): While implicit
mentalizing seemed to be persistently impaired, participants with
ASC were able to solve explicit mentalizing tasks. This led to the
conclusion that individuals with ASC, especially those with high-
functioning autism and Asperger syndrome, cope with explicit
mentalizing deficits (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) by developing
compensatory strategies (Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1995; Ozonoff
and Miller, 1995).
However, a recent study by Schuwerk et al. (2015) found
that an implicit mentalizing deficit might be addressable by
compensatory learning. In contrast to previous anticipatory
looking false belief tasks, Schuwerk et al. (2015) presented
the false belief-based action and its outcome, i.e., looking for
the object in the empty box. Based on this perception-action
contingency it is possible to form the non-mentalistic rule “if
the agent did not witness the object transfer, she will look into
the box that is empty by now.” Interestingly, after adults with
ASC had the critical outcome information at the end of the
first test trial, their performance on the second test trial in this
implicit mentalizing task was comparable to that of neurotypical
controls. This suggests that individuals with ASC might be able
to modify their performance in an implicit mentalizing task by
experience.
To date, we lack clear understanding of implicit mentalizing
in typical and atypical social cognitive development in two
aspects. First, we know little about an implicit mentalizing
deficit in children with ASC. In the one study that documented
this deficit in 8-year-old children with ASC, the children with
and without ASC differed also to some extent in their explicit
mentalizing competence (Senju et al., 2010). Thus, for drawing
more firm conclusions about the implicit – explicit dissociation
and impaired implicit mentalizing in ASC, one has to look at
implicit mentalizing in children with and without ASC who pass
explicit mentalizing tasks.
Moreover, a recent study employing a presumably more
engaging mentalizing paradigm showed that 10-year-old children
with ASC were able to spontaneously track another’s belief
(Peterson et al., 2013). In a competitive game, one of two agents
ended up with a false belief about the location of a prize. The
other agent and the child knew where the prize was hidden. The
child was encouraged to get the price, but only after he or she had
nominated one of the agents to look for it first. Thus, to gain the
price, the child should choose the agent with the false belief, who
would not find it so that they could get it themselves. The majority
of 10-year-olds with ASC opted for the agent with the false belief.
At the same time, they performed poorly on a standard explicit
false belief paradigm.
Although it is unclear to what extent the task by Peterson et al.
(2013) tapped into the same implicit/spontaneous mentalizing
ability as the anticipatory looking paradigm employed by Senju
et al. (2010), their findings suggest that the conclusion that
children with ASC have an implicit mentalizing deficit may be
premature.
Second, we have only sparse empirical evidence on implicit
mentalizing beyond early childhood, as most previous research
studied infant or adult samples (for an example of the latter,
see van der Wel et al., 2014). One recent example of a
study investigating implicit and explicit mentalizing in older
children comes from Grosse Wiesmann et al. (2016). These
authors found the usual developmental trend in explicit false
belief understanding between 3 and 4 years of age. However,
implicit false belief understanding was already present and
stable in this age range (see also Low, 2010). More evidence
is necessary to conclude that implicit mentalizing continuously
persists in parallel to a corresponding explicit system beyond
early childhood, when children become increasingly proficient
in advanced and second order mentalizing (e.g., Perner and
Wimmer, 1985; Osterhaus et al., 2016).
To address these issues, we administered an implicit
mentalizing task to a group of 8-year-old children with and
without ASC, who were matched for chronological age, verbal
and non-verbal intelligence, executive function skills1 and
explicit mentalizing ability. We employed an anticipatory looking
eye tracking paradigm that was previously used with adults
(Schuwerk et al., 2015) and that was adapted from previous
paradigms (Southgate et al., 2007; Senju et al., 2010). In this
1The two groups were meant to be matched for executive function. However,
although both children with ASC and controls performed comparably well, they
differed significantly in their executive function skill. We provide details on this
result, post hoc analyses and a discussion of this finding.
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task, an agent looks for an object in one of two boxes. In
two familiarization trials, she observes the self-propelled object
entering one box, opens the box, and finds the object. In two test
trials, the agent is distracted, and consequently ends up with a
false belief about the object’s location and reaches for the object
in the empty box.
We reasoned that if implicit mentalizing is a phenomenon
dissociated from explicit mentalizing and specifically impaired
in ASC, we should observe a group difference in the implicit
mentalizing task in the current sample of children with ASC who
are competent in explicit mentalizing tasks.
Further, as the previous study by Schuwerk et al. (2015)
suggested that presenting the outcome of a false belief-based
action leads to fast learning from experience and false belief-
congruent looking behavior in adults with ASC, we were
interested in whether already children with ASC learn from such
information. If this were the case, we should find an effect of
test trial repetition on false-belief congruent action anticipation
in children with ASC.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 14 children with ASC (Mage = 8.0 years, SD= 1.8 years;
one female) participated in the study. Another 10 children
with ASC were tested, but had to be excluded due to missing
gaze data in one or both test trials of the implicit mentalizing
task (n = 6) or not fulfilling inclusion criteria in the implicit
mentalizing task (n = 4, see the data analysis section for
details). All participants with ASC were clinically assessed by
a psychologist or a psychiatrist and were required to fulfill the
International Classification of Diseases-10th Revision (ICD)-
10 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) for either
Asperger Syndrome (n = 8), high-functioning autism (n = 5) or
atypical autism (n = 1). We used two ASC screening tests which
were filled by the caregivers to corroborate group assignment: the
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), introduced by Constantino
and Gruber, 2005 (German version by Bölte et al., 2008; cut-
off criterion: T-score ≥ 60), and the Social Communication
Questionnaire (SCQ, current form; discriminative cut-off: sum
score≥ 15) introduced by Rutter et al. (2003; German version by
Bölte and Poustka, 2006). The SRS was used as a more general
assessment of autistic traits whereas the SCQ questionnaire was
applied as a measure of current communication skills and social
functioning. In the SRS, the ASC group had a mean T-score of
80.8 (range = 70–100, SD = 9.1). The mean SCQ sum score was
16.6 (range = 9–27, SD = 6.0). Note that seven participants with
ASC scored below the cut-off value of 15, indicating a currently
alleviated communication skills and social functioning deficit in
this subgroup.
The control group consisted of 21 neurotypical children
(Mage = 7.2 years, SD = 1.4; six females). Five additional
participants had to be excluded due to missing gaze data
in one or both test trials of the implicit mentalizing task
(n = 1) or not fulfilling inclusion criteria in the implicit
mentalizing task (n = 4). The control group was matched for
chronological age, t(31) = 1.45, p = 0.156, Cohen’s d = 0.52,
non-verbal IQ, t(31) = −0.02, p = 0.988, Cohen’s d = −0.01,
verbal IQ, t(31) = 1.26, p = 0.219, Cohen’s d = 0.45, and
explicit ToM ability, t(31) = −1.64, p = 0.112, Cohen’s
d = −0.59, based on the ToM scales by Wellman and Liu
(2004, for details see the tasks and material section). The
verbal and non-verbal IQ were obtained using subtests of
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-
III (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2002; German Version: Hannover-
Wechsler-Intelligenztest für das Vorschulalter – III, HAWIVA-
III; Ricken et al., 2007) and the Wechsler Intelligence Score
for Children-IV (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2004; German Version:
Hamburg-Wechsler-Intelligenztest für Kinder – IV, HAWIK-IV;
Petermann and Petermann, 2007). For the verbal IQ the subtest
used from the WPPSI-III was Vocabulary (passive and active)
and from the WISC-IV Vocabulary and Picture Concepts. For
the non-verbal IQ the subtest Block Design and Matrix Reasoning
were used from both IQ test. The control group had significantly
less autistic traits as assessed by the SRS and SCQ. The average
SRS T-score was 38.9 (range = 25–55, SD = 8.5), the average
SCQ sum score was 2.7 (range = 0–7, SD = 1.7). There was
a significant difference between the ASC group and the control
group in both the SRS, t(33)= 13.91, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 4.84,
and the SCQ, t(33)= 10.11, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.52.
The caregivers gave informed written consent. Children
received a present for their participation. Their caregivers
received monetary compensation for travel expenses. The ethics
committee of the Department of Psychology and Education of
LMU Munich approved the study.
Tasks and Material
Implicit Mentalizing Task
This implicit mentalizing task was adapted from previous eye
tracking false belief paradigms (Southgate et al., 2007; Senju
et al., 2010; Thoermer et al., 2012). The same task was previously
used with a sample of adults with and without ASC (Schuwerk
et al., 2015). Figure 1 provides an overview of trials and scene
setup. In two familiarization trials (each lasting for 32 s), an
agent watched a toy car moving from one into another box.
Subsequently, the agent disappeared behind a screen. Two doors,
one next to each box, were illuminated, accompanied by a chime.
This scene was frozen for 3 s and served as anticipatory period.
After that, the agent opened the door next to the box she had
seen the toy car disappear in. Finally, she reached for the car.
These two trials served to familiarize the participants that the
agent wants to get the car and therefore opens one of the
two doors. Second, participants learned about the contingency
between the illumination of the doors/chime and the opening
of the door in these familiarization trials. The subsequently
presented two test trials lasted for 41 s each. In the test trials,
the agent was distracted by a phone ring and did not see that
the car, after arriving at the second box, drove back to the first
box and then left the scene. Then the phone ringing stopped,
the agent turned back to the scene, and disappeared behind
the screen. The doors were illuminated, the chime sounded,
and the 3 s-long anticipatory period started. Finally, the agent
opened the door and reached for the box she falsely believed
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FIGURE 1 | Implicit mentalizing task: Still frames depicting key events of (A) one of two familiarization trials and (B) one of two test trials. In the
familiarization trials, the agent watches a car moving from one box into the other. She disappears behind the occluder, opens the door next to the box the car is in,
and takes the car. In the test trials, the agent did not witness that the car left the box she had seen it disappear in and she fruitlessly looks for it in the empty box.
Gaze data from the 3 s-long anticipatory period was analyzed. Each trial ended with the presentation of the belief-congruent action and its outcome.
the car would be located in. Half of the participants watched
horizontally flipped movies to counterbalance for the laterality of
events.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
We used the ToM scale by Wellman and Liu (2004) to assess
explicit mentalizing ability. The ToM scale consists of 6 tasks
including the following concepts: diverse desires, diverse beliefs,
knowledge access, contents false belief, real apparent emotion,
and explicit false belief. We used the validated German version by
Kristen et al. (2006). All tasks were presented with the help of toys
and pictures. The first two tasks do not require a representational
understanding of mental states whereas the following tasks do.
Overall, a score of 6 for solving all six tasks could be achieved.
We adhered to the procedure as described by Wellman and Liu
(2004).
Executive Function Tasks
Executive function was assessed employing two card-sorting
tasks, which draw on cognitive flexibility and self-control, namely
the dimensional change card sorting task (DCCS) and the
reversal shift test. Both tasks consist of two different sets of cards,
which include two goal cards and 30 test cards. The goal cards
were assigned to a box each and the test cards had to be sorted
into the boxes according to a certain rule. There were always three
phases for the tasks: a pre-switch phase, a post-switch phase, and
a mix-phase that consisted of a mix of the previous two phases.
The DCCS (modified by Kloo et al., 2008) was administered
according to the procedure described by Zelazo (2006). The two
goal cards depicted a green apple and a red banana. Children were
asked to sort cards either according to the form or according to
the color. In the pre-switch phase, children had to sort everything
according to color. In the post-switch phase, the rule was to sort
according to form. The last phase, namely the mix-phase, was
added to the procedure by Zelazo (2006), to have an additional
level of difficulty and thereby the ability to further differentiate
performance. In this last phase participants had to switch back
and forth between the previous two tasks and rules.
The reversal shift test was based on the one-dimensional card
sorting task by Perner and Lang (2002). The two goal cards
showed an elephant and a bunny. Both cards had the color
beige and therefore only differed in the type of animal shown.
Here, the pre-switch phase was to play the game “correctly”,
i.e., put the elephants to the elephants, etc., and the post-switch
phase required playing the game “incorrectly”, i.e., putting the
elephants to the bunnies and bunnies to the elephants. In the
mix-phase, which was added just like in the DCCS, the rules were
intermixed.
Procedure
The children performed the implicit mentalizing task first. Eye
tracking stimuli were presented with Tobii Studio (Version
2.2, Tobii Technology) on a Tobii T60 eye tracker (60 Hz
sampling rate, inbuilt 17-inch TFT screen, 1280 × 1024 pixels;
Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). The participants sat
on a chair with a distance of approximately 60 cm from the
screen. A 5-point calibration procedure preceded the stimulus
presentation. The explicit mentalizing task and the executive
function tasks were performed at a table with the experimenter
seated across from the child. Subsequently, verbal and non-verbal
IQ subtests were administered. Caregivers filled the SRS and SCQ
questionnaires during the experimental session with the child.
Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 23
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). As preliminary analyses revealed
no influence of sex, data was collapsed across this variable. The
significance level was p ≤ 0.05.
Implicit Mentalizing Task
Analyses of raw data were conducted using customized scripts in
R (R Core Team, 2013). A velocity-based fixation filter (Salvucci
and Goldberg, 2000) with a velocity threshold of 0.05◦/ms was
used to define the fixations. Additionally, a temporal threshold
was set to exclude fixations that lasted less than 80 ms. As
fixations on the doors during the 3 s-long anticipatory period
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1696 | 171
fpsyg-07-01696 October 26, 2016 Time: 16:30 # 5
Schuwerk et al. Mentalizing in ASC beyond Infancy
FIGURE 2 | Implicit mentalizing task: mean differential looking scores
(DLS; ±SEM) from children with ASC and children from the control
group per test trial.
were the critical measure, the two doors were chosen as areas
of interest (AOIs; approximately 2.8◦ × 2.8◦) for data analysis.
The door the character opened after the anticipatory period was
defined as the “correct door,” whereas the other door is referred
to as the “incorrect door.” A differential looking score (DLS)
according to Senju et al. (2009) was calculated by subtracting the
total duration of fixations on the incorrect door from the total
duration of fixations on the correct door, and then dividing it
by the sum of the total duration of fixations on both doors. The
DLS ranges from 1 (visual preference for correct door) to −1
(visual preference for incorrect door). A value around 0 indicates
no preference for one of the two doors. Participants who had
a looking bias toward the correct door in at least one of the
two familiarization trials were included in the further analysis.
Four children from the ASD group and four children from the
control group had to be excluded as they did not show this belief-
congruent anticipatory looking behavior. Note that this differs
slightly from Senju et al. (2010), who only included participants
who looked longer to the correct than to the incorrect door in
the last familiarization trial. Senju et al. (2010) presented four
familiarization trials in contrast to only two in the current study.
This presumably made it easier for their participants to learn
the contingency between the door illumination and the reaching
action. Because of this, and to be consistent with our previous
study with adults, we adjusted our criterion. Applying Senju
et al.’s criterion to our sample would have resulted in excluding
five additional participants with ASC and one additional control
participant. Notably, preliminary analyses revealed that using
Senju et al.’s criterion did not change the pattern of DLS results.
Additionally, first looks toward the two doors in the
anticipatory period were analyzed. It was coded whether the first
fixation after the illumination of the doors was on the correct or
incorrect door.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
To pass each of the ToM scale subtests it was required to
answer both the test and the control questions correctly. For
each solved task a point was given resulting in a maximum
of 6 points. The percentage of correct responses was used for
statistical analyses. One child with ASC and one child from
the control group refused to take part in the ToM scale.
A second coder recoded test and control questions of 33% of
the whole sample from a video recording of the test session The
Inter-rater reliability revealed an agreement of 100% (Cohen’s
kappa= 1).
Executive Functions Task
To pass the DCCS and the reversal shift tasks a certain number
of cards had to be sorted correctly. For the first two phases of
the tasks it was necessary to sort at least five cards correctly. To
pass the last phase, at least nine cards had to be sorted correctly
(Zelazo, 2006). The third phase was only administered if a child
sorted at least five cards in each of the other phases correctly.
None of the children failed the pre-switch-phase. One control
child refused to take part in the executive function tasks. The
maximum that could be achieved in this set of tasks was a score
of 6 for passing all three phases of both tasks. Statistical analyses
are based on the percentage of correct responses. Inter-rater
reliability was assessed as in the explicit mentalizing task. It again
revealed a perfect agreement (Cohen’s kappa= 1).
RESULTS
Implicit Mentalizing Task
The DLS was analyzed via a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA
with the between factor group (ASC group, control group) and
the within factor test trial (first, second). Figure 2 displays mean
DLS scores for group and test trial. The ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of group, F(1,33) = 10.55, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.24,
but no effect of test trial, F(1,33) = 0.60, p = 0.446, η2 = 0.02.
There was also no significant interaction between group and test
trial, F(1,33) = 0.34, p = 0.441, η2 = 0.02. Overall, the control
group showed a stronger looking bias toward the correct door
(M = 0.21, SD= 0.42) compared to the ASC group (M =−0.23,
SD= 0.33).
Because of our a priori interest in a potential learning
effect from one test trial to another, we checked for significant
differences in DLS scores between the first and second test trial
within each group. Neither in children with ASC, nor in the
control group, the DLS differed between the first and second test
trial [ASC group: t(13) = 0.96, p = 0.357, Cohen’s d = 0.53;
control group: t(20) = −0.01, p = 0.995, Cohen’s d = 0.00].
Consequently, we collapsed the DLS score across both test trials
for further analyses.
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FIGURE 3 | Implicit mentalizing task: percentage of correct first
fixations from children with ASC and children from the control group
per test trial. The dotted line indicates chance level.
To check whether children from the ASC group and the
control group had a looking bias significantly different from
chance, we calculated one-sample t-tests against zero for each
group. The control group looked significantly more at the correct
door compared to the incorrect door, t(20) = 2.28, p = 0.034,
Cohen’s d = 1.02, whereas the ASC group looked significantly
more at the incorrect door compared to the correct door,
t(13)=−2.53, p= 0.025, Cohen’s d =−1.41.
For the first fixations, a binominal logistic regression
was calculated with the dichotomous dependent variable
performance (0 or 1) and the categorical independent variables
group (ASC group = 1, control group = 0) and test trial
(first test trial = 0, second test trial = 1). Figure 3 shows
percentage of correct first fixations per group and test trial. The
intention was to assess the influence of group and test trial
repetition on the location of first fixations. The logistic regression
model was statistically significant, χ2(1) = 6.84, p = 0.033; and
explained 12.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in first fixations.
The model correctly classified 62.9% of all cases. There was a
significant effect of group as a predictor (B = 1.02, SE = 0.52,
Wald = 3.86, p = 0.049). Participants with ASC were 2.77 times
more likely to direct their first fixation to the incorrect door as
compared to the controls. There was no significant effect of test
trial as predictor (B= 0.86, SE= 0.51, Wald = 2.91, p= 0.088).
Analogous to the DLS analysis, we compared first fixations
between the first and second test trial within each group. There
was neither a difference in first fixations between trials for the
ASC group (p = 0.414, McNemar’s Test, one-tailed), nor for the
control group (p= 0.687, McNemar’s Test, one-tailed).
To check whether children from the ASC group and the
control group had a first fixation preference for the correct door
significantly different from chance, we created a percentage score
over both test trials, which was then tested against zero for each
group. Neither the ASC group, t(13)=−1.47, p= 0.165, Cohen’s
d = −0.82, nor the control group differed significantly from
chance, t(20)= 1.45, p= 0.162, Cohen’s d = 0.65.
Explicit Mentalizing Task
The control children achieved an average performance of 85%
(range = 25–100%, SD = 21%). The children with ASC solved
70% (range = 25–100%, SD = 31%) of tasks from the ToM
scale. Performance of children with ASC and controls did not
significantly differ, t(31)=−1.51, p= 0.112, Cohen’s d =−0.54.
Executive Function Task
In the executive function tasks the control children solved an
average of 98.3% of the tasks correctly (range= 5−6, SD= 6.6%).
The ASC group solved 81.7 tasks on average (range = 2–6,
SD = 21.7%). The groups differed significantly in their executive
function skill, t(32)=−3.26, p= 0.003, Cohen’s d =−0.99.
Post hoc Analyses
As the two groups differed in executive function, the ANOVA
of the DLS performance − the variable of key interest − was
repeated with executive function task performance as a covariate.
The pattern of results did not change. We again found a
significant effect of group, F(1,31) = 5.57, p = 0.025, η2 = 0.15,
but no effect of test trial, F(1,31) = 0.23, p = 0.634, η2 = 0.01.
Also the group × test trial interaction was not significant,
F(1,31) = 0.28, p = 0.471, η2 = 0.02. Additionally, we checked
for each group whether executive function tasks performance is
related to performance in the implicit and explicit mentalizing
task. Neither in children with ASC, nor in the control group,
a significant correlation between performance in the implicit
mentalizing task and the executive function tasks was observed
(ASC group: r = 0.34, p = 0.232; control group: r = 0.36,
p = 0.879). However, there was a significant correlation between
executive function tasks performance and explicit mentalizing
task performance in the ASC group (r = 0.61, p = 0.012) and
the control group (r = 0.45, p= 0.045).
DISCUSSION
The current implicit mentalizing task revealed a difference
between 8-year-old children with ASC and matched control
children in the spontaneous anticipation of an agent’s false belief-
based action. Whereas neurotypical children’s looking bias over
two test trials suggests that they predicted the agent’s action based
on her false belief, children with ASC lacked this appreciation of
the agent’s false belief-congruent action. In contrast, over both
test trials, they even displayed a significant looking bias toward
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the incorrect door. Repeating the test trial had no effect on
anticipatory looking.
The finding that 8-year-olds with ASC did not systematically
generate false belief-based action anticipations confirms an
implicit mentalizing deficit in children with ASC, previously
documented in 10-year-olds (Senju et al., 2010). However, in the
previous study by Senju et al. (2010), children with ASC and
their controls differed not only in implicit, but also in explicit
mentalizing task performance. Thus, it could not be ruled out
completely that group differences in implicit mentalizing arose
from differences in explicit mentalizing, maybe mediated by
verbal intelligence. Our results advance previous research by
showing that poor performance persists, even when children
with ASC and their control group are closely matched for
chronological age, verbal and non-verbal intelligence and explicit
mentalizing skills. Together, both studies point to a specific deficit
in implicit mentalizing in children with ASC.
By repeating the test trial, we were able to check whether
participants learned from the presentation of the false belief-
based action and its outcome. The lacking effect of test
trial repetition indicated no experience-based modulation of
anticipatory looking in the repeated presentation of the test trial.
Consequently, we collapsed gaze data over the two test trials for
each group. Comparing anticipatory looking over both test trials
against chance performance showed that neurotypical children
systematically predicted that the agent would open the box in
which she falsely believed the car would be located. This finding
helps closing a gap of evidence on implicit mentalizing beyond
early childhood. Recent two-systems accounts on mentalizing
claimed that implicit mentalizing is already present in infancy
and co-exists in parallel to later developing explicit mentalizing
(Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). Yet, this remains to be proven
empirically. Together with other recent work (Low, 2010; Senju
et al., 2010; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016), our findings suggest
that implicit mentalizing indeed is a phenomenon presumably
persisting across lifespan.
Contrary to what we expected, test trial repetition had no effect
on anticipatory looking in 8-year-old children with ASC. In a
previous study with adults with ASC, showing the false-belief
based action and its outcome (i.e., the agent opens the empty box
and vainly looks for the ball) only once, was sufficient to increased
the looking bias toward the false belief-congruent door in the
second test trial (Schuwerk et al., 2015). In the second test trial,
adults with ASC performed as good as neurotypical controls. This
suggested that rapid learning from action-outcome contingencies
modulated gaze behavior in this implicit mentalizing task.
However, although the current stimulus material was identical,
this was not what we observed in the present sample of children
with ASC. On the contrary, in the second test trial the DLS was
even more negative than the one in the first test trial, what led to
a significant looking bias toward the incorrect box.
A possible explanation for this finding is the counterbalancing
of our stimulus material across the two test trials. In the first test
trial, the agent opened the right door (left door, respectively) to
look for the car. In the second test trial, the presented movie
was flipped horizontally, so that the door that would be opened
was on the opposite side. It could be that children with ASC
perseverated on the location in which they saw the agent reaching
for the car in the previous test trial. This could in turn reflect
a simple action prediction strategy, which might be fruitful in
several cases, but not in the current situation. It seems that
children with ASC let themselves be guided by superficial scene
properties (i.e., location) and that they were not yet able to
use action-effect contingencies. Yet, future research is needed
to pin down whether children with ASC make use of such a
location-bound action prediction strategy.
In summary, our findings point to a sustained implicit
mentalizing deficit that cannot be easily addressed by experience.
It seems that 8-year-old children with ASC, in contrast to adults
with ASC, are not yet capable of employing information about
perception-action contingencies to compensate for an implicit
mentalizing deficit.
Notably, our group of children with ASC performed poorer
than the control children in the executive function tasks. To
check whether poorer executive function could contribute to
the observed group difference in the implicit mentalizing task,
we ran post hoc analyses. First, including the performance in
the executive function tasks as a covariate and the DLS analysis
revealed the same pattern of results. Second, within each group,
executive function performance was unrelated to anticipatory
looking in the implicit mentalizing task. This gives us good reason
to conclude that anticipatory looking in the current implicit
mentalizing task did not rely on voluntary cognitive control and
that the lacking systematic false belief-based action prediction
of children with ASC cannot be explained by poorer executive
function skills.
Interestingly, our post hoc analyses revealed a positive
correlation between performance in the executive function tasks
and explicit mentalizing ability. This is in line with a large body
of evidence on the close link between both cognitive domains
(for a recent meta-analysis, see Devine and Hughes, 2014).
Further, consistent with recent evidence (Low, 2010; Grosse
Wiesmann et al., 2016), we found that executive function task
performance was related to performance in the explicit, but not
in the implicit mentalizing task. This provides further support
for two-systems accounts of mentalizing (Apperly and Butterfill,
2009; cf., Perner and Roessler, 2012). The implicit system enables
already young children to be sensitive to false beliefs. This system
works involuntarily, fast, effortless, but inflexibly. The around the
age of 4 developing explicit system allows to voluntary switch
perspectives and to consider another’s false belief to generate
action explanations. This system is flexible but slow, and draws
on cognitive resources.
When investigating social cognition in ASC using eye
tracking, potentially confounding deficits in general visual
processing have to be taken into account. In other words, is
the group difference we observed in the implicit mentalizing
task attributable to an implicit mentalizing deficit, or did this
difference arise from general – and not specifically social –
visual processing deficits in ASC? The following aspects of our
paradigm help to address alternative explanations in terms of
general atypical visual processing in the group of children with
ASC. First, to account for a potentially weaker saccadic accuracy
in ASC (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2014), a calibration procedure prior to
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the implicit mentalizing task ensured that the fixation of targets
was sufficiently accurate. Second, Wang et al. (2015) recently
reported atypical visual saliency in the first few seconds of scene
perception in ASC. The scene, the agent and the objects of the
present paradigm, were introduced for several minutes to avoid
potential group differences in early visual processing of the scene.
Third, events took place slowly, and the anticipatory period
was statistic without displaying an agent. This should render
any impact of movement/biological motion and social stimuli
processing deficits in ASC (Blake et al., 2003; Dakin and Frith,
2005; Guillon et al., 2014) neglectable.
Future research that carefully contrasts social and non-
social stimuli is necessary to unravel the relationship between
implicit social cognitive and rather general visual processing
characteristics in ASC (for an example, see von Hofsten
et al., 2009). To date, it is unclear whether these two
are independent phenomena, whether visual processing
characteristics contribute to social cognitive deficits (Behrmann
et al., 2006; Hellendoorn et al., 2014), or whether both are
manifestations of an impaired underlying cognitive ability (Sinha
et al., 2014).
In summary, our findings provide support for a persistent
implicit mentalizing ability in neurotypical development beyond
early childhood. The observed intact explicit, but impaired
implicit mentalizing in ASC, and the observed link between
executive functions and explicit, but not implicit mentalizing,
is in line with theories on two dissociable mentalizing systems.
Further, it seems that 8-year-old children with ASC are not
yet capable of employing information about perception-action
contingencies to compensate for an implicit mentalizing deficit.
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Mentalization research focuses on different aspects of this topic, highlighting individual
differences in mentalizing and proposing programs of intervention for children and
adults to increase this ability. The “Thought in Mind Project” (TiM Project) provides
training targeted to adults—teachers or parents—to increase their mentalization and,
consequently, to obtain mentalization improvement in children. The present research
aimed to explore for the first time ever the potential of training for teachers based on
the TiM Project, regarding the enhancement of mentalizing of an adult who would have
interacted as a teacher with children. For this reason, two teachers – similar for meta-
cognitive and meta-emotional skills - and their classes (N = 46) were randomly assigned
to the training or control condition. In the first case, the teacher participated in training on
the implementation of promotion of mentalizing in everyday school teaching strategies;
in the second case the teacher participated in a control activity, similar to training for
scheduling and methods, but without promoting the implementation of mentalization
(in both conditions two meetings lasting about 3 h at the beginning of the school year
and two supervisions during the school year were conducted). The children were tested
by tasks assessing several aspects of mentalization (second and third-order false belief
understanding, Strange Stories, Reading the mind in the Eyes, Mentalizing Task) both
before and after the teacher participate in the TiM or control training (i.e., at the beginning
and at the end of the school year). The results showed that, although some measured
components of mentalization progressed over time, only the TiM Project training group
significantly improved in third order false belief understanding and changed - in a greater
way compared to the control group – in two of the three components of the Mentalizing
Task. These evidences are promising about the idea that the creation of a mentalizing
community promotes the mentalization abilities of its members.
Keywords: mentalizing, theory of mind, training, teacher-pupil relationship, TiM Project, resilience
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INTRODUCTION
Mentalizing and theory of mind are two constructs often used
interchangeably, although they cannot be considered perfectly
overlapping (Sharp and Venta, 2012). Analyzing the studies
in this area, it emerges that mentalizing is the construct
more often used in the “clinical framework,” whereas theory
of mind is the construct more often used in the “cognitive
and socio-constructivist one.” This study is in line with those
theoretical positions that highlight the similarities rather than
the differences between these two concepts. We also explicitly
refer to the literature that stresses the relational co-construction
of children’s theory of mind thanks to their relationships with
significant caregivers (Dunn et al., 1991; Dunn, 1994). The
importance of this interpersonal dimension is largely responsible
for the individual differences in the developmental paths of
mentalization. Mentalization, or mentalizing (Allen, 2006), is a
mental activity consisting in the ability to understand and to
interpret human behavior on the basis of intentional mental states
as beliefs, desires, intentions, goals, and emotions (Bateman and
Fonagy, 2006; Fonagy, 2006; Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008;
Fonagy and Allison, 2012). Mentalizing is an imaginative activity
including a wide range of cognitive operations about one’s own
and others’ mind, such as interpreting, inferring, remembering
and so on (Allen, 2003). Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008)
identified three dimensions of the construct of mentalization: (1)
the functioning (implicit and explicit), (2) the objects (self and
others), and (3) the aspects (cognitive and affective). The first
dimension refers to the fact that mentalization can be an implicit,
automatic, and pre-reflective process when the subject acts on the
basis of an intuition about mental contents (for example, during
a conversation), but also an explicit, symbolic, and conscious
activity when the individual intentionally reflects about the
mind (for example, in psychotherapy; Allen et al., 2008). The
second dimension indicates that mentalizing happens during
interactions (Allen, 2006) where people reflect about the minds
of all the participants of the social exchange. The third dimension
highlights the fact that reasoning about intentional mental
states is usually cognitively focused and affectively laden; the
cognitive and affective aspects are closely connected. Moreover,
the mentalizing process integrates the ability to reason about
the epistemic mental contents and about emotions. Finally, the
developmental model suggested by Allen et al. (2008) argues
that the mentalization process is rooted in the attachment
relationship established with the first caregiver in infancy and
early childhood.
The concept of mentalization that Fonagy (1991) proposed
derives both from the psychoanalytic term “reflective
functioning,” and from the psychological construct of “theory
of mind” (Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008). Based on psycho-
analytic work with borderline patients, a Mentalization Based
Treatment (MBT) was created (Allen and Fonagy, 2006; Bateman
and Fonagy, 2006, 2013): it is a clinical treatment designed to
improve mentalization processes, which is impaired in these
individuals. Recently, MBT has been adapted and applied to other
clinical or atypical situations, including substances abuse, eating
disorders, antisocial personality disorder, parental relationships
at risk (Bateman and Fonagy, 2011), families with adopted
children (Muller et al., 2012), and self-harm in adolescence
(Rossouw and Fonagy, 2012). On the basis of the positive effects
obtained from MBT in increasing mentalizing abilities in the
above-mentioned situations, in recent years several researchers
have been developing programs of intervention for non-clinical
settings, such as schools. For example, Twemlow and colleagues
(2005a,b) applied the mentalization principles in the Peaceful
Schools Program, with the aim to create mentalizing school
communities to reduce violence and bullying. The authors
illustrated the two key components of their approach: (1) violent
individuals and communities are impaired in mentalization,
and (2) power dynamics involving these individuals and their
communities tend to further reduce mentalization abilities. “The
difference between a violent and a non-violent community must be
the degree to which the implicit social conventions are structured
to encourage all participants to be aware of the mental states of
others” (Twemlow and Sacco, 2012, pp. 195–196). The main
components of the Peaceful Schools Program are the following:
(1) positive climate campaigns, stimulating and supporting the
awareness of mental states and their role in violent contexts; (2)
classroom management; i.e., training teachers to not use coercive
discipline, but rather to refer to their mentalization abilities
and to those of children; (3) peer and adult mentorship; i.e.,
training other adults to become mentors, able to intervene in a
mentalistic way during violent episodes outside the classroom;
(4) the “gentle warrior physical education program”; i.e.,
teaching children physical self-control in violent situations (a
low activation of the body allows high activation of the mind);
and (5) reflection time; i.e., the introduction in the classrooms
of a 10 min period at the end of each day devoted to talking,
from a mentalistic point of view, about the trend of the day and
any situations of violence that occurred. The evaluation of the
Peaceful Schools Program, longitudinally applied to children
aged 8–11 years are encouraging (Fonagy et al., 2009). In contrast
with traditional school psychiatry consultation and with usual
treatment at school, this program moderated the increase of
aggressiveness typical of this age period, the victimization
phenomena, and the decline in empathy. Additionally, the
program decreased the number of self-reported aggressive acts
and aggressive bystanding.
Another proposal of the educational application of
mentalization is the “Thought in Mind Project” (TiM Project),
also named “Resilience Program,” created by Bak (2012). The TiM
Project shares with the Peaceful Schools Program the assumption
that the creation of a mentalizing community promotes the
mentalization abilities of its members. Furthermore, it claims
that in these type of communities mentalizing children can
develop several strategies to react to the difficulties in their life,
thus increasing their resilience (see Stein, 2006). This approach
is also in line with the recent rethinking of resilience within
a developmental systems framework, that claims – among
other things – “the possibility of changes that spread across
domains and levels through the many interactions of systems”
(Masten, 2016, p. 301). The TiM Project addresses mentalization,
resilience, and self-control concepts using simple language,
metaphors, pictures, and short movies available on a dedicated
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website1. Clinicians or researchers propose and explain these
materials to a target group (usually teachers and/or parents),
who then use the materials as they deem most appropriate for
their condition. A follow-up supervision is sometimes provided.
An exploratory pilot study (Bak et al., 2015) proposed the TiM
Project to the staff members of a social club for adolescents with
disruptive behavior in a low income urban area in Denmark.
Results showed that as a consequence of the TiM Project training,
the yearly frequency of situations where the staff members of the
club had to use physical force to solve high-risk conflicts among
adolescents decreased significantly. The mental health of the staff
increased and the methods introduced by this project continued
to be used by the majority of the staff 3 years later.
The TiM Project training aims to clarify those cognitive
processes strongly impregnated with mental contents through a
metacognitive approach related to both emotional and epistemic
contents. In addition, the training emphasizes the relational
dimension, because it proposes an intervention directed to the
caregivers that is likely to have a positive and long-term effect
on children or adolescents. It may be interesting also to consider
some indicators of the potential changes in children’s mentalizing
ability. In our opinion, the psychological construct that fits this
goal is the theory of mind. The reason is threefold: (1) it is a key
component of mentalizing, (2) it has been explored through a
broad and substantial range of tasks, and (3) its development can
be supported by training specifically designed for this purpose.
Theory of mind is the ability to understand mental states
(intentions, desires, thoughts, and beliefs), and to predict one’s
own and others’ behavior on the basis of these understandings
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Theory of mind develops during
childhood and continues to evolve in adolescence (Valle et al.,
2015) and adulthood (Apperly et al., 2009; Sommerville et al.,
2013). According to a socio-constructivist approach, theory of
mind emerges within contexts of social interactions, thanks to
the participation in social exchanges (Astington and Olson, 1995;
Carpendale and Lewis, 2004). In this theoretical perspective, an
interesting construct that focuses on the relational potential in
the mother–child dyad in supporting the development of theory
of mind is mind-mindedness. It is the maternal proclivity to
consider infants as intentional agents with mental states and to
interact with them on the basis of such a belief (Meins et al.,
2002, 2003). In this regard, it was highlighted that maternal
mind-mindedness, operationalized as the ability to individuate
and comment appropriately on their 8-month-olds’ internal
states, was negatively related to children’s externalizing and
internalizing behaviors specifically in low socioeconomic status
families (Meins et al., 2013). Furthermore, mind-mindedness
appears to be an important aspect of personal relationships
rather than a trait-like quality (Meins et al., 2014). In this
sense, it is likely that adults—supported in the development
of activities of mentalization—may find it easier to engage
in mentalization-oriented relationships. This evidence provides
support to the implementation of the TiM Project, whose strong
point is the involvement of the adults who take care of the
children in the educational setting. Moreover, many research
1http://myresilience.org
studies have shown that high levels of theory of mind are
linked to different abilities, such as social competences (Jenkins
and Astington, 2000; Razza, 2009), prosocial behaviors (Caputi
et al., 2012), academic results (Malecki and Elliot, 2002; Lecce
et al., 2011), and attribution of intentions in different daily
situations (for example, attribution of fair or unfair intention
during economical exchanges; Castelli et al., 2010, 2014). In light
of these findings, several interventions have been constructed
and evaluated in order to implement theory of mind in children.
In typical development, different types of training positively
affect theory of mind abilities in the short and medium term
(Slaughter and Gopnik, 1996; Kloo and Perner, 2008; Grazzani
and Ornaghi, 2011; Lecce et al., 2014; Ornaghi et al., 2014;
Grazzani et al., 2016). In the case of learning disorders (Ashcroft
et al., 1999) and intellectual disabilities (Adibsereshki et al.,
2014), theory of mind training improved reflective and social
skills. To construct and directly evaluate such training and its
effects on the psychological development of children, classical
and advanced theory of mind tasks are used. The possibility
to rigorously evaluate the effect of these different types of
training using psychological tasks has supported our idea that
it is possible to realize a similar assessment in the TiM Project,
which has been subjected only to indirect evaluations thus
far (Bak et al., 2015). Any confirmation of the validity of
the TiM project would be particularly interesting. In fact,
this training is aimed at teachers and supports them in the
implementation of strategies for the development of children’s
mentalizing. The effects of this training are therefore indirect,
as the aim is to support the children through an intervention
involving teachers. If effective, the potential is considerable:
maximum efficiency with low costs (since the teachers can
use these strategies with all the children with whom they
come into contact), and a greater likelihood of generalization
and persistence of acquired skills due to the high integration
of support practices to mentalizing within normal teaching
strategies.
Aims and Hypotheses
This research aimed to evaluate for the first time the efficacy of
the TiM Project on a group of 10-year-old pupils. The hypothesis
was that children whose teacher participated in the TiM Project
training would improve theory of mind and mentalization styles
more than a control group of children whose teacher participated
in a training without mentalistic contents.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-six ten-year-old children belonging to two school classes
and the respective two teachers who spend more time with
the class during the school year took part in the study. The
two school classes were randomly assigned to the study groups:
the TiM Project training group (N = 23, M = 10.26 years,
SD = 3.16 months; 10 boys, 13 girls) and the control training
group (N = 23, M = 10.23 years, SD = 5.16 months; 13 boys,
10 girls). All children were Italian and of middle socioeconomic
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status based on the parents’ education and socioeconomic
levels. Children were not clinically referred for any cognitive
or learning difficulties and were neither referred to social
services nor reported by teachers for learning and socio-relational
difficulties. The children were tested for those skills on which
we hypothesized that the TiM Project training with the teachers
would have a positive effect. The two teachers who participated
in the study were both female, 34 and 35 years of age, and had a
master degree and 10 years of working experience at the school.
The teachers, depending on the class, participated in either the
meetings for TiM project training or the meetings for the control
group training.
Tasks and Training
All children were evaluated by the following tasks in both the pre-
and post-training phases (i.e., at the beginning and at the end
of the school year, which was approximately a 6-month interval
between the two phases).
Mentalizing Task
The Mentalizing Task (Sharp et al., 2007; Di Terlizzi, 2010)
evaluates children’s mentalizing attributional styles in everyday
life situations. The styles include the following: overly negative
(ON), a cognitive mentalizing bias characterized by a global,
negative, and stable self-attribution of the causes of social
situations (“They would think nobody likes me”) typical of
children with symptoms of depression and anxiety (Quiggle
et al., 1992; Barrett et al., 1996); overly positive (OP), a cognitive
mentalizing bias characterized by a global, positive, and stable
self-attribution of the causes of social situations (“They would
think I’m cool not to play silly games with the rest of the
kids”) typical of aggressive children (David and Kistner, 2000)
idealizing their own competence in interpersonal relationships;
rational or neutral (R), a non-self-referent, non-stable type of
interpretation of social situations (“They would think I’m just
sitting down to have a think and a rest”) typical of children
with a helpful, functional, and adaptive coping style. This forced-
choice task, which lasts 10 to 15 min per child, included 15 stories
and vignettes about social situations that happen at school to a
certain child. At the end of each story, the researcher asked the
participant the following: “Imagine you are [the character]. If you
were, what do you think the other kids would be thinking about
you?” The participant can choose among three options that reflect
one of three mutually exclusive categories: ON, OP, or R that
represent the three final variables. Each variable score can range
from 0 to 15.
False Belief Tasks
To test children’s cognitive theory of mind competence we used
two second-order false belief tasks (second FBTs; Sullivan et al.,
1994; Astington et al., 2002; Liverta Sempio et al., 2005) and a
third-order false belief task (third FBT; Valle et al., 2015), all based
on the unexpected transfer paradigm. The two second FBTs were
the Look Prediction version (LP) and the Say Prediction version
(SP) (Sullivan et al., 1994; Astington et al., 2002; Liverta Sempio
et al., 2005). In the LP and SP versions there are two control
questions, two false belief questions, and a justification question.
In the third FBT there are two control questions, a second-order
false belief question with its justification, and a third-order false
belief question with its justification. We attributed 1 point for
each correct answer and 0 points for each wrong answer. The total
score range is 0–2 for the second FBT and 0–2 for the third FBT.
Two raters independently coded 33% of the responses at pre- and
post-test and inter rater agreement was established using Cohen’s
Kappa. This agreement was very high for both the second FBTs
(at pre-test, LP: κ= 0.92; SP: κ= 0.89; at post-test, LP: κ= 1; SP:
κ = 0.90) and the third FBT (at pre-test, κ = 0.92; at post-test,
κ= 0.93).
Strange Stories
The Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) evaluate the application of
theory of mind ability in everyday social situations. This task
consists of 24 short stories where the protagonist does or says
something strange, in order for the participant to explain the
character’s strange behavior or provide a statement referring to
the mental contents of the protagonist. As a control task the
Physical Stories were used, in which in order to explain the
character’s behavior or provide a statement, the participant has
no need to refer to the mental contents of the character. In the
present research we selected four Strange Stories (concerning
sarcasm, double bluff, persuasion, and contrary emotions) and
four Physical Stories. Two Strange Stories have one question,
whereas the other two Strange Stories have two comprehension
questions. Furthermore, each story has a justification question.
Each comprehension question is scored 1 if correct and 0 if
wrong. The justification question is scored 2 if correct and has
an explicit answer, 1 if partially correct, and 0 if wrong. The total
score range is 0–18. Each Physical Story has a comprehension
question coded 2 if correct and has an explicit answer, 1 if partially
correct, and 0 if wrong. The total score range is 0–8. Two raters
independently coded 33% of the responses at pre- and post-test
and inter rater agreement was established using Cohen’s Kappa.
This agreement was very high for both the Strange Stories (at pre-
test, κ = 0.89; at post-test, κ = 0.90) and the Physical Stories (at
pre-test, κ= 0.92; at post-test, κ= 0.98).
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Child Version
To test the affective component of theory of mind we used the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Child Version (RMET; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; Castelli, 2010) that requires the attribution of
mental states to other people by observing the eye region of their
face. The test comprises 28 pictures of the eye region of different
people. The participant has to choose among four options the one
that best represents what the character is thinking or feeling. Only
one option is correct and is scored 1 point, with all other answers
receiving a score of 0 points. The total score range is 0–28.
Teacher Characteristics and Teacher Training
The two teachers took part in the training and control activities,
depending on their group assignment. We constructed and
proposed training based on the TiM Project principles and
methods, and supervised the teacher during the application
of the TiM Project methods with two meetings during the
school year. We also developed a control activity, similar to
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training for scheduling and methods, but without promoting the
implementation of mentalization within the standard educational
strategies. Meta-cognitive and meta-emotional skills of the two
teachers were evaluated prior to the study by administering the
MESI (Moè et al., 2010), a set of questionnaires that assess
working practice, teaching satisfaction, positive and negative
emotions related to work, positive and negative emotions related
to the role of teacher, teaching strategies, self-efficacy and
upgradeability (see Table 1). Both teachers showed values in
line with the psychometric characteristics derived from the
Italian validation of the measure. Specifically, all the scores
were significantly distant from the critical thresholds identified
for each scale and the two teachers’ values for each scale
differ one from another appreciably less than one standard
deviation.
Test Condition: the TiM Project Training
The aims of the TiM Project training were to introduce and to
explain the key concepts and methods of the TiM Project, to
involve the teacher in the direct experience of these methods, and
to reflect together on the way to apply the TiM Project methods
in the classroom with children. The TiM Project training was
organized in two meetings, each lasting 3 h. At the end of the
training, the teacher proposed the TiM Project methods to the
classroom in the way the teacher liked, meeting the researcher for
a supervision session on 2 days during the school year. Moreover,
the teacher could ask for support at any time, contacting the
researcher by e-mail or by the phone.
In the first meeting of the TiM Project training the researcher
explained “The Thinking Brain and The Alarm Center,” which
concern two concepts regarding brain functioning and are the
basis of the TiM Project (Bak, 2012; Bak et al., 2015). Moreover,
the researcher explained the importance of the ability to direct
attention to one’s own thoughts in order to know one’s own
mind. For each concept, activities and games were proposed
to clarify explanations and to suggest possible activities to use
with children. In the case of “The Thinking Brain and The
Alarm Center,” the teacher had to draw a picture representing
her brain on alert, then the teacher had to build a spotlight of
attention with paper and use it to observe the world around.
In both cases, reflection on the activities was promoted by the
researcher.
In the second meeting, the term “resilience” was introduced
and it was linked to the body-mind relationship. The activity
proposed was the construction of a poster with a list of stressful
situations of everyday life at school and the identification of the
strategies that the teacher could use, with a focus on cognitive and
emotional regulation strategies (involving the management of
the alarm system). Moreover, the researcher introduced the TiM
stories, such as the story of the “House of Thoughts” (Bak, 2012;
Bak et al., 2015): a metaphor of the brain as a house of thoughts
with the possibility to visit different rooms containing positive
and negative thoughts (an example of the story is provided in the
Appendix). To better understand the contents of this story, the
teacher participated in a role play acting the role of a thought that
inhabits one’s own brain.
At the end of this training the researcher guided a reflection on
how to use the TiM Project methods with the children, and then
the researcher delivered to the teacher the TiM Project Manual
consisting of the Italian translation of the contents of the TiM
Project website. During the following months, the researcher
met the teacher twice to know how the teacher proceeded in
applying the techniques, and to guide her in the preparation of
new activities for the classroom. The teacher could also benefit
from online or telephone support (advice, clarification, and
suggestions) provided by the researcher over the entire length of
the project.
Control Condition: the Non-mentalizing Training
The aims of the control condition training were to promote
reflection about the teaching strategies that the teacher can
apply in the classroom. More specifically, the focus was on the
advantages and disadvantages of the traditional lecture method,
and the strategies to support collaborative and cooperative
learning. The control condition training was organized in two
meetings.
In the first meeting the researcher explained the advantages
and disadvantages of the traditional lecture method, and the
teacher discussed professional experiences with this method and
on the role as tutor of collective reasoning.
In the second meeting, the properties and the differences
of cooperative learning (Johnson and Johnson, 2012) and
collaborative learning (Nagata and Ronkowski, 1998) were
discussed. The researcher explained the strategies and methods
to encourage the active participation of students, and to promote
the responsibility of each pupil in the working group. As in the
TiM Project training, the teacher could also benefit from online
or telephone support (advice, clarification, and suggestions)
provided by the researcher over the entire length of the project.
TABLE 1 | Value of the MESI scales for the two teachers.
Measures WP TSA ERW+ ERRT+ ERW− ERRT− TS SE UP
TEACHER 1 (Training
group)
4.08 5.80 4.20 3.92 1.53 2.06 3.6 8.00 8.5
TEACHER 2 (Control
group)
4.12 6.00 4.23 4.15 1.65 1.76 4.13 8.29 8.88
CRITICAL
THRESHOLDS (SD)
<3.68 (0.40) <3.89 (1.10) <2.87 (0.63) <2.50 (0.71) >2.38 (0.52) >2.60 (0.59) <2.99 (0.59) <5.97 (1.06) <5.92 (1.20)
WP, working practice; TSA, teaching satisfaction; ERW+, positive emotions related to work; ERRT+, positive emotions related to the role of teacher; ERW−, negative
emotions related to work; ERRT−, negative emotions related to the role of teacher; TS, teaching strategies; SE, self-efficacy; UP, upgradeability.
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Procedures
The research was organized in three steps.
Step 1: Children were tested for their mentalization and theory
of mind abilities (pre-test, 5 weeks after the beginning of the
school year), and teachers participated in the TiM Project training
or the control group training.
Step 2: Each teacher applied the training that she participated
in, and teachers received supervision both in the presence of the
researcher (two meetings during the school year, respectively, 2
and 4 months from the pre-test) and remotely (on-line).
Step 3: Children were re-tested for their mentalization and
theory of mind abilities (post-test, 5 weeks at the end of the school
year).
Each child was interviewed individually in two sessions of
about 20–25 min each in a quiet room at the school. The
procedure was identical for each participant. All tasks were
administered in a fixed order. No feedback was given to children’s
answers in the pre-test and in the post-test sessions. Teachers
were trained in a room of the school. Informed parental
consent was obtained for the children, and informed consent
was obtained from each teacher. The three steps of the research
were conducted by independent researchers. The research was
conducted according to APA ethical standards and was approved
by the local ethics committee.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the explored variables
at pre-test and post-test for the two groups; namely, the total
scores of each task as they have been used in subsequent analyses
unless otherwise specified.
We conducted some preliminary analyses to verify the
homogeneity of the groups for the considered variables at the
pre-test session. The t-test for independent samples did not
show any statistically significant differences between the children
assigned to the TiM Project training group and the children
assigned to the control training group (all ps > 0.05).
Next, we performed a GLM for repeated measures for each
variable explored (Mentalizing task, second and third order false
belief tasks, Strange Stories, RMET) with time (pre-test and
post-test) as the within-subjects factor and training groups (TiM
Project and control) as the between-subjects factor. In order to
test the training effect. The results showed a significant main
effect of time for LP and SP tasks, Strange Stories, and the OP
and R Mentalizing styles. Performance increased over the time
for second order false belief LP: [F(1,44) = 9.85, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.186, θ= 0.866]; SP: [F(1,44) = 9.40, p= 0.004, η2p = 0.227,
θ = 0.845] and Strange Stories understanding [F(1,44) = 27.46,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.384, θ = 0.999]. Furthermore, the OP style
decreased [F(1,44) = 30.1, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.406, θ = 1],
whereas the R styles increased [F(1,44) = 37.30, p = 0.000,
η2p = 0.459, θ = 1]. The results also showed a significant
interaction between time and training groups for the third
FBT [F(1,44) = 24.18, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.392, θ = 0.999] and
the Mentalizing task [F(2,43) = 4.48, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.173,
θ= 0.737].
More specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed that, for the
third FBT, the children in the TiM Project training group showed
a significantly higher post-test performance compared to the
post-test performance of children in the control training group
[F(1,44) = 26.62, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.377, θ= 0.999] (see Figure 1).
With regard to the Mentalizing task, in the post-test the
children in the TiM Project training group showed a significantly
higher performance on the R style of the task [F(1,44) = 12.44,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.220, θ = 0.932] and a significantly lower
performance on the OP style of the task [F(1,44) = 24.24,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.355, θ = 0.998] than children in the control
training group (see Figures 2 and 3).
DISCUSSION
The present research preliminarily explored the efficacy of the
TiM Project training on mentalization performance in 10-year-
old pupils. To this aim, we tested children’s cognitive, affective,
and social components of theory of mind as well as mentalizing
styles. The training succeeded in promoting specific elements of
mentalistic ability. We will discuss these results starting from
disentangling this specificity from the mere time effect that
occurred with regard to some variables.
Performance on the second-order false belief tasks and Strange
Stories showed an increase over time. The understanding of the
second level of recursivity begins to be successfully overcome
around 7 years of age, although in his review Miller (2009)
pointed out that the available studies indicate that this type of
task continues to improve until pre-adolescence. This period
appears to be a sensible one also for the development of the
comprehension of ambiguous social situations—here measured
through the Strange Stories—where mentalization is implied. On
the contrary, this was not the case for the capacity to “read”
the mind through the eyes, because performance on average was
already well developed and the RMET did not improve with
time. The rational attributional style and the overly positive style
also changed with time: the former increasing and the latter
decreasing in respective scores. However, while the improvement
in second order false belief understanding and ambiguous social
situations understanding seems not to depend on the TiM project
training, third order false belief understanding and the changes
in mentalizing styles appear to be significantly supported by the
training itself.
As for the comprehension of the third level of recursivity,
the presence of the training effect could be interpreted
in terms of efficacy of the teacher’s intervention in the
pupils’ zone of proximal development (ZoPed), although no
classroom observations were taken. In fact, this action pulls the
comprehension from very low levels to intermediate ones. The
same does not happen in the case of the second order false belief
tasks (LP and SP). Considering together the results about the
false belief understanding, the ZoPed acts on the comprehension
of the third level of recursivity similar to what time does with
the second level of recursivity. The absence of the effect of
time and training on the RMET is not surprising; in fact, the
average performance is already medium-high in the pre-test
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the explored variables for children.
TiM project condition Control condition
Pre Post Pre Post
Measures n M SD n M SD p n M SD n M SD p
SS 23 8.70 2.49 23 9.91 2.31 0.002 23 7.87 1.77 23 9.65 2.67 0.001
PS 23 5.04 1.77 23 5.57 1.38 0.208 23 5.00 1.54 23 5.65 1.37 0.126
RMET-C 23 19.09 3.83 23 19.65 3.08 0.483 23 18.13 3.07 23 17.52 2.57 0.359
Third FBT 23 0.56 0.79 23 1.65 0.57 0.016 23 0.56 0.79 23 0.61 0.78 0.285
Second FBT SP 18 0.67 0.91 22 1.23 0.97 0.004 18 0.94 0.99 21 1.47 0.87 0.003
Second FBT LP 22 1.45 0.74 22 1.95 0.21 0.002 23 1.35 0.93 23 1.74 0.69 0.106
MT ON 23 4.00 1.86 23 3.39 1.73 0.225 23 3.61 1.92 23 3.04 1.55 0.178
MT R 23 6.70 2.10 23 9.91 2.02 0.000 23 7.09 1.86 23 7.83 1.99 0.077
MT OP 23 4.26 1.68 23 1.70 1.40 0.000 23 4.30 1.49 23 4.00 1.76 0.455
n, number of participants; M, mean score; SD, standard deviation; SS, Strange Stories; PS, physical stories; RMET-C, Reading the mind in the eyes test-child version;
third FBT, third-order false belief task; second FBT SP, second-order false belief task say prediction version; second FBT LP, second-order false belief task look prediction
version; MT ON, mentalizing task overly negative style; MT R, mentalizing task rational style; MT OP, mentalizing task overly positive style. P-values refer to the t-test for
paired samples between pre- and post-conditions within each group.
FIGURE 1 | Third-order FBT performance for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
session. Furthermore, it is in line with the performance of slightly
older subjects (see for example Sharp, 2008, in which a sample
of children with an average age equal to 11 obtained a mean
performance of 17.96 on the RMET). So, we can hypothesize that
the time frame considered was not sufficiently long enough in
order to have an effect on this ability. Kaland et al. (2008) showed
that the performance of a sample with an average age of 15.6
obtained a mean performance score of 23.16. In addition, the
training did not have more of an effect by being more focused
on metacognitive abilities than affective aspects directly implied
in the RMET.
With regard to the training effect on the OP and R mentalizing
styles, the literature shows that the critical age for a change in
attributional style is 7–11 year-olds. Indeed, from 4 to 7 years
of age children generally attribute an overly positive judgment
to peers about their behavior, whereas from 8 years on the
attributional style becomes more rational and more congruent
with objective indicators (Damon and Hart, 1991; Berndt and
Burgy, 1996; Harter, 1999). Furthermore, Sharp et al. (2007)
also corroborated the presence of a critical period for variations
in the attributional style of children ages 7 to 11 years old,
suggesting that these changes are closely related to the ability to
take the perspective of others in complex social situations. The
participants in the present study are in the top margin of this
critical range. Therefore, it is plausible that they have already
undergone the developmental changes. This fact would explain
the absence of the effect of time. On the contrary, the training
may promote a change in the ZoPed, anticipating a change that
it is likely to appear later. This explanation is also consistent with
the work of Meins et al. (2002, 2006) showing that the maternal
proclivity to consider the child as an individual with mental states
and not just as the bearer of needs supports the acquisition of
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FIGURE 2 | MT-Rational style for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
FIGURE 3 | MT-Overly positive style for TiM Project group and control group at pre-test and post-test.
the child’s mentalistic skills according to longitudinal dynamics.
This attitude, otherwise known as mind-mindedness, offers the
child the opportunity to engage actively with his or her own
and others’ mental states, and to understand the mentalistic
attitudes that people have toward the world. This relational
competence is exercised in the ZoPed and, through the process of
internalization, affects the child’s ability to interact mentally with
partners (Laranjo et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2014).
The fact that the teacher had attended the TiM Project
training and had used the training in the classroom increased
the children’s capacity to apply a rational attributional style
to other’s mind, and decreased the tendency to use an overly
positive attributional style. This result supports the efficacy of
the TiM Project training application in the classroom, and
suggests that teachers involved in it can help their pupils
to increase an attributional style that can act as a potential
protective factor against psychopathology (Baumeister et al.,
1996). In fact, although it has been observed that children
have the tendency to misperceive the thoughts, feelings, and
intentions of others (O’Connor and Hirsch, 1999), it seems that
emotional disorders are associated with specific attributional
styles in childhood (Ingram et al., 1998). Sharp et al. (2007)
affirmed that an overly positive attributional style (i.e., estimating
the judgment of peers on themselves in an overly positive way)
combined with a lack of a rational attributional style (i.e., an
objective evaluation of other people’s thoughts) is associated
with symptoms of externalizing disorder (as individuated by
teachers). Additionally, Hughes et al. (1997, 2001), David and
Kistner (2000), and Brendgen et al. (2004) linked together the
aggression in primary school children, the over-estimation of
peer acceptance, and the tendency to idealize the perception of
one’s own qualities.
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Although Mentalizing tasks and the Strange Stories have the
common aim of investigating theory of mind understanding
in complex social situations, the performance on the Strange
Stories was not affected by the training. This discrepancy can
be explained by considering two aspects related to the tasks.
The first one concerns the characteristics of the tasks in terms
of instructions and test questions. In fact, theory of mind
understanding is evaluated in the mentalizing task by asking
the child to put him/herself in another person’s shoes, whereas
the Strange Stories asks the child to explain another person’s
behavior. The Mentalizing task requires a first person simulation
of another’s mind, which is isomorphic to the way the content
of the TiM project training is implemented by the teachers in
the classroom. The second aspect that can explain the above-
mentioned discrepancy regards the structure of the test questions.
In the Mentalizing task, children are faced with a forced choice
among three possible answers (corresponding to the three
mentalizing styles), while in the Strange Stories children are
faced with open questioning. Due to its intrinsic metacognitive
features, the TiM project training appears to be more suited
for promoting a form of mentalization more coherent with
the forced choices format than with the open questioning
format. Finally, the social situations proposed in the Strange
Stories imply the understanding of numerous components of
theory of mind that the TiM Project training does not involve
[for example, the case of irony and sarcasm (Massaro et al.,
2014)].
This study, despite offering some interesting evidence
supporting the implementation of mentalizing strategies,
presents some methodological issues that need to be carefully
evaluated for the interpretation of the results. First, the sample
size is limited: only two classes were compared. Accordingly,
only two teachers, for the training and the control groups,
were involved. Secondly, classroom observations should be
implemented in order to evaluate the teacher’s strategies
applied to support mentalization and to identify situations in
which the TiM Project can be used with the greatest impact.
Finally, although teachers did not differ in metacognitive
and metaemotional skills, their mentalizing abilities were not
directly evaluated in the pre-training phase. The possibility
that the significant variation observed in children’s mentalizing
abilities depended on past differences between the teachers
cannot be excluded. However, it is important to note that
teachers were involved in training and the children tested for
mentalizing abilities during the 5th year of primary school
(i.e., after 4 years of interaction with their teachers), and
that in the pre-training phase there were no differences in
children’s mentalizing abilities between the two groups of
children.
Future research should replicate these results with better
management of these issues. Furthermore, given that recently
Bak et al. (2015) evaluated the welfare of the operators involved
in the training, the inclusion of teacher evaluations may prove
to be a significant element. Finally, the inclusion of a wider
sample of teachers that allows the exploration of possible
covariates of the implementation of mentalizing strategies is
highly desirable.
CONCLUSION
This study provides some preliminary evidence to support
the validity of the TiM Project. It is likely that a teacher
who has an increased understanding of mental functioning,
and who can talk about it in the classroom, is able to
help children to increase their mentalistic skills. In particular,
children improve their mentalizing attributional style (from
overly positive to rational), which consequently can reduce the
risk of psychopathology, increase the level of recursive thinking
in cognitive theory of mind, and increase learning to reason
at a third level of recursivity. Although these findings require
further investigation, they remain promising about the idea
that the creation of a mentalizing community promotes the
mentalization abilities of its members, evaluating for the first
time this efficacy on children’s competencies. These communities
can be consistently regarded as the extension of ZoPed within
which, as just mentioned, the mother uses the mind-mindedness
(Laranjo et al., 2014; Meins et al., 2014) to support child’s
mentalization. Similarly, the teachers, specifically trained, will
accompany children in the acquisition of more and more
effective and socially adaptive mentalist abilities (Meins et al.,
2013).
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APPENDIX
Example of TiM Project Story
The Story of The House of Thoughts2
In some way, we may say that our thoughts live inside our heads.
Imagine that your thoughts live in a house with many rooms
where you can wander around and discover them. When you
discover thoughts you are using the world’s finest tool – your
attention, which is a kind of spotlight. When you throw light
on a thought, you spot it and discover it. Thereafter you can
shift your attention and discover another thought. The House of
Thoughts has plenty of rooms – a number of exciting thoughts
may live in one room, perhaps some sad or angry thoughts live in
another room and various happy thoughts live in a third room.
2 From the web site “Resilience” http://robusthed.dk/en/stories-even-stories-from-
real-life/stories/the-story-of-the-house-of-thoughts.
From The House of Thoughts, your thoughts can call you if they
want to be discovered. This may be really exciting and good, but
could be irritating too – especially if the thoughts are annoying
and they keep knocking all the time, trying to take charge over
your attention. In the case, where you have sad or angry thoughts
that take charge and force you into their room all the time, you
might end up believing there are no exciting or happy thoughts
to be found anywhere and that is not much fun.... Yet this is
not the case at all. All the happy and exciting thoughts are just
waiting in other rooms in the House of Thoughts, waiting for
you to discover them with your attention. Maybe there even are
tools to be found in one room that could be used to fix some
other thoughts in another room in the house. There may also be
thoughts in a room who need to be left in peace, so they won’t
disturb you to much. If you often go to explore The House of
Thoughts with your attention, then it becomes easier to be in
charge with your thoughts.
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We present the ToMenovela, a stimulus set that has been developed to provide a
set of normatively rated socio-emotional stimuli showing varying amount of characters
in emotionally laden interactions for experimental investigations of (i) cognitive and
(ii) affective Theory of Mind (ToM), (iii) emotional reactivity, and (iv) complex emotion
judgment with respect to Ekman’s basic emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, fear,
sadness, surprise, Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Stimuli were generated with focus on
ecological validity and consist of 190 scenes depicting daily-life situations. Two or more
of eight main characters with distinct biographies and personalities are depicted on
each scene picture. To obtain an initial evaluation of the stimulus set and to pave the
way for future studies in clinical populations, normative data on each stimulus of the set
was obtained from a sample of 61 neurologically and psychiatrically healthy participants
(31 female, 30 male; mean age 26.74 ± 5.84), including a visual analog scale rating of
Ekman’s basic emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise) and free-
text descriptions of the content of each scene. The ToMenovela is being developed to
provide standardized material of social scenes that are available to researchers in the
study of social cognition. It should facilitate experimental control while keeping ecological
validity high.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, stimulus set, ecological validity, social cognition, photographs, empathy, emotions
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a steep increase in behavioral and brain imaging research of human social
cognition. Defining, differentiating and operationalizing cognitive and emotional subprocesses
of social cognition such as empathy, Theory of Mind (ToM), and emotion recognition, have
attracted increasing interest from psychologists and neuroscientists. Two related, but yet separable
constructs have been employed by researchers to describe the cognitive processes that may enable
humans to understand others’ cognitive and affective states – empathy and ToM. While ToM
describes the ability to understand and predict another’s mental states, intentions, or beliefs,
empathy as a psychological construct rather describes the phenomenon to share other people’s
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affective states, which is likely to form the basis for social
emotions like guilt or compassion. Hein and Singer (2008)
explicitly distinguish empathy from “cognitive perspective taking
as the ability to understand intentions, desires, beliefs of another
person, resulting from (cognitively) reasoning about the other’s
state”, a concept that can be called “cognitive empathy”, whereas
the classical definition could be referred to as “affective empathy.”
The related concept of mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2006) has
been defined as “the process by which we make inferences about
mental states” and comprises an immediate recognition and
understanding of emotional states, also via cognitive inference.
A triple-dissociation of the ToM/empathy complex suggested
by Walter (2012) divides the ToM concept into three separable
cognitive mechanisms: Cognitive ToM comprises the ability of an
individual to mentalize about cognitive states of others, Affective
ToM – or Cognitive Empathy – is defined as an individual’s ability
to cognitively reflect on affective states of others, and Affective
Empathy is characterized by the induction of others’ affective
states in the perceiving individual.
Numerous experimental paradigms have been developed to
formalize the ToM construct in a way that allows researchers to
assess both behavioral manifestations and neural underpinnings
of ToM-related cognitive mechanisms. These include the well-
known False Belief Task (initially developed by Wimmer and
Perner, 1983), a paradigm commonly used in developmental
research, and the related Sally-Anne Tasks (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), which have been employed to demonstrate ToM deficits
in children with Down’s Syndrome and Asperger’s Syndrome.
A different approach to the experimental assessment of ToM
and empathy was introduced with the publication of the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997), in which participants have to assign mental states to
static pictures of eye regions. Notably, comparisons of the
behavioral performance in different ToM tasks have yielded poor
correlations (Ahmed and Miller, 2013).
Despite this lack of correlation, the cognitive processes tested
by the presently available tasks do most likely all contribute
to enabling ToM in real-life social situations. It is conceivable
that, in the real world, people rely on highly multimodal
information when engaging in social cognitive tasks, and
different individuals are therefore likely to potentially employ
distinct strategies during social cognition. Achim et al. (2013)
have proposed the Eight Sources of Information Framework (8-
SIF) as a theoretical framework to analyze mentalizing tasks
with respect to the information participants can use for task
performance. It consists of a 2*2 matrix, with the axes reflecting
the temporal characteristics of information [immediate (I), with
the subcategories “linguistic” and “perceptual”, vs. stored (S),
with the subcategories “general” and “source-specific”] and agent-
related versus context-related information. The authors suggest
that the multimodal nature of information described in the 8-SIF
framework is best met by more naturalistic – or ecologically
valid – paradigms or stimuli.
The need for ecologically valid stimulus material has been
recognized in cognitive neuroscience, and several stimulus sets
of various categories have been developed for this purpose. For
example, a number of photograph-based sets of object stimuli
have been developed as an alternative for the commonly used
Snodgrass pictures, line drawings of common objects (Snodgrass
and Vanderwart, 1980). These include the Amsterdam Library
of Object Images (ALOI; Geusebroek et al., 2005) or the Bank
of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS; Brodeur et al., 2014)1. The
importance of examining ecologically valid information is well-
established in the field of visual perception research (Kayser et al.,
2004), but only few ecologically valid stimulus sets applicable
to emotion processing and social cognition have been published
so far. A notable exception is the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008), which contains images of
different degrees of emotional valence and arousal, including
highly aversive images of accidents and mutilation.
Based on the IAPS stimuli, the MET (Multifaceted Empathy
Test; Dziobek et al., 2008) has been developed to study both
affective ToM as well as affective empathy. In this photograph-
based stimulus set, human beings are depicted in various
emotional situations and participants are asked to infer the
mental states of the persons depicted (affective ToM) and to
indicate the level of own emotional involvement when perceiving
or evaluating the scenes (affective empathy). The MET has
been extensively validated by experts and is therefore suitable
for assessing response accuracy in social cognitive tasks. One
potential limitation of the MET is that the images are based on
IAPS stimuli, which are –to a large extent– not representative for
daily-life situations.
With a strong focus on ecological validity, Dziobek et al.
(2006) have developed the MASC (Movie for the Assessment of
Social Cognition). The stimulus set consists of a 15-min video
showing four main characters at a dinner party. In 46 breaks,
subjects have to answer questions on the feelings, thoughts,
and intentions of the characters. The task shows rather high
ecological validity, but its design as a movie with a fixed location
and a small number of protagonists limit its use particularly
in neuroimaging studies that require precise trial timings and
appropriate baseline conditions. In neuroimaging studies of
ToM and empathy, it is also important to employ appropriate
controls, both at the task level (e.g., first-person perspective
versus “pure” ToM) and at the item level (e.g., different degrees
of task difficulty or emotional salience and valence), preferably
using the same stimulus material. Schnell and Walter have
developed a task that allows one to distinguish first-person and
third-person perspective during emotional and cognitive/visual-
perceptual processing (Schnell et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2011).
The stimulus set consists of cartoon stories that are usable as
false-belief tasks, but have been designed in a way that suitable
first-person perspective control questions can also be applied
to all stories. Cartoon stories consisting of three sequentially
presented pictures are shown, and participants are instructed to
either count the number of animate objects (self-cognitive), to
state whether the protagonist can see more or less animate objects
than in the previous picture (third-person cognitive), whether
they feel better or worse than during the picture presented
before (first-person affective), or whether the protagonist feels
better or worse than during the previous picture (other-affective).
1http://www.cogsci.nl/stimulus-sets
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Notably, that stimulus set is devoid of any direct indicators of the
protagonists’ affective states, like expressive facial elements.
Here, we present a stimulus set (The ToMenovela) that was
specifically designed to combine the high ecological validity of
the MASC and the MET with the applicability of first-person
control tasks as in the cartoon task by Schnell and Walter. We
chose to base the task on photographs rather than movies, in
order to make it more suitable for event-related fMRI and EEG
studies. To achieve high ecological validity, we set up a fictional
circle of eight friends (four male and four female; see Figure 1)
and designed a background story that contains biographies and
personalities of each protagonist as well as the relationships
between the characters. Each of the characters possesses stable
characteristics (traits) that are distinct from one another (e.g.,
homely, outgoing, artistic, etc.). Based on this social arrangement,
we scripted a series of scenes that would be comprehensible from
a single still photograph. We aimed to balance the scenes with
respect to location (indoor vs. outdoor) and appearance of the
characters (each scene depicts at least two of the protagonists).
After selection of the suitable stimuli, we collected normative data
on the stimulus set in a cohort of 61 healthy study participants (31
women, 30 men), in order to obtain normative data with respect
to content, emotional salience and valence, as well as cognitive
and affective ToM. Because emotion recognition constitutes an
important facet of human social cognition, the scenes were
designed to Ekman’s basic emotions (happiness, anger, disgust,
fear, sadness, surprise; Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman and Friesen,
1975, 1978) to a various degree, and the evaluation contained
specific questions testing for emotion recognition (see Methods
section for details). One important reason for including Ekman’s
emotions was the potential for future clinical applications:
Emotion recognition and cognitive ToM show parallel deficits
in certain neuropsychiatric disorders like schizophrenia (Sparks
et al., 2010; Barbato et al., 2015) or temporal lobe epilepsy
(Amlerova et al., 2014), but may be differentially affected in other
conditions like Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia
(Gregory et al., 2002; Freedman et al., 2013). Therefore, the
inclusion of Ekman’s emotions may be useful for future clinical
applications.
As will be outlined in the following sections, the ToMenovela
has several potential advantages for future studies of human
social cognition:
(1) With respect to ecological validity, the use of a defined
group of protagonists may induce a sense of familiarity,
thereby accounting for the fact that most social
interactions in daily life occur with individuals with
whom humans are at least to some extent familiar.
(2) Also for the purpose of high ecological validity, scenes
were designed to differ in their emotional salience and
valence, but we avoided extreme emotional situations, in
order to match the content of the scenes with the daily-life
experience of the likely study participants.
(3) By using photographs, the stimulus set is highly suitable
for event-related neuroimaging studies.
(4) Finally, beyond social cognition, the stimuli may also
be suitable for studies of other cognitive processes like
higher-level vision, memory, or face and scene processing
(Zweynert et al., 2011; Hofstetter et al., 2012; Rossion et al.,
2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In order to generate a stimulus set of pictures depicting daily-life
social interactions for use in future studies of social cognition,
we scripted a total of 220 distinct daily-life scenes, 193 of which
were subsequently staged and photographed (see Figure 2 for
example scenes). Because we aimed to generate stimuli that would
be particularly suitable for neuroimaging studies, we opted for
photographs rather than video clips. Two scenes were excluded
due to technical problems, and one due to ambiguous evaluation
results, resulting in a final set of 190 scenes.
In a subsequent validation study, each scene was rated
with respect to principal content, cognitive and affective first-
and third-person perspective, emotional valence along six basic
emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise;
Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman and Friesen, 1975, 1978). Those
ratings were complemented by two free-text open questions, and
the response data will be reported in a future publication.
Generation of the Stimulus Material
Script
We first developed an initial sketch of eight distinct human
characters that constitute a circle of friends with diverse
relationships (a long-term married couple, a new romantic
relationship, two sisters, colleagues, high school friends, the
“new guy in town”, etc.). Figure 1 describes the biography and
personality traits of the main characters and the interpersonal
relations within the group.
We next scripted a total of 220 scenes, each of which was
to depict at least two of the eight main characters. Each scene
was constructed with respect to general content, basic emotions
(happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise), dramatic
setting, characters displayed, requisites, and location. The scripts
also included mindsets of the different protagonists instructing
the actors to feel and express specific emotions (for example
scripts, see Supplementary Tables S1A,B). When scripting the
scenes, we aimed to balance the appearance of the eight main
characters, basic emotions and location (indoor vs. outdoor). Due
to external conditions during the shooting of the scenes (e.g.,
sicknesses of actors or unexpected weather changes), some scenes
deviated in details from their original script.
Team
We recruited eight professional and semi-professional actors
as main cast and, depending on the specific scene, additional
experienced lay actors. The cast for the main characters and
reoccurring background actors were recruited in early 2013.
The final ensemble consisted of two professionally educated
actors and six amateurs with previous stage experience (drama
and/or music). The actors were known to each other prior to
the shootings and specifically selected based on their certain
style and personality, although it should be noted that their
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FIGURE 1 | Description of the main characters and interpersonal relations within the group. The names and biographies shown here were used in our
evaluation study, but future researchers should be readily able to adapt them to their needs. Suggested English names in italics are suggestions from the authors to
replace the German names used during evaluation.
actual biography and personality differ from that of the fictional
characters described here. All actors gave written informed
consent for the use of the resulting photographs for research
purposes.
All main actors were familiarized with their respective
character by authors MCH, a trained psychologist, and BR
who holds a B.A. in theater studies and has extensive previous
experience in directing. MCH and BR also directed and
supervised the shootings of all scenes.
Photographs were acquired and processed by Sven Reichelt2,
a photographer with extensive previous experience in portrait
photography.
2http://www.lensbreaker.com
Shootings
To ensure a continuous look and feel of each character, clothes,
accessories, and make-up were obtained from a previously
assembled pool of equipment prior to the beginning of the
shootings. Each shooting session was carefully prepared in terms
of location, equipment, clothes, make-up, and look. Depending
on the complexity of the scene and external conditions (e.g.,
availability of the actors, weather conditions at the time of
shooting), between four and 22 different scenes were shot on
one day. All shootings took place in Berlin, Germany, between
May 4th, 2013 and July 20th, 2013. Because the scenario
is intended to take place in an unnamed major city in an
unspecified country in Europe (possibly also North America
or Australasia), we aimed to minimize recognizable German
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FIGURE 2 | Four example pictures. The pictures shown here were generated along with the actual stimulus set, but excluded for technical reasons. They are
nevertheless representative for our stimulus set and should be used in publications.
writing and strictly avoided any iconic buildings (e.g., the
Brandenburg Gate or the Emperor William Memorial Church)
in the pictures.
Photographs were taken using a Nikon D300s digital SLR
camera with a sensor size of 23.6 mm× 15.8 mm and a resolution
of 12.3 megapixel (4352× 2868). All pictures were taken in sRGB
color mode. Depending on the requirements posed by the scene,
either a AF-S Nikkor 16-85 mm1:3.5 – 5.6G ED medium-angle
lens or a Sigma 10–20 mm F 4.0 – 5.6 EX DC HSM wide angle
lens were used. If necessary, two Nikon SB900 were used as flash.
Post-processing and Picture Selection
Procedure
We used a multi-level picture selection and processing procedure
to obtain a final set of images that best represented the intended
social interactions and emotional valance.
Pictures were first screened for technical, compositional,
and photographic aspects. All approximately 10 000 pictures
were screened with respect to sharpness, lighting conditions
or unintended facial expressions and with regard to the final
aspect ratio. To this end, the photographer and the first author
selected between one and eight pictures per scene for post-
processing. Post-processing of the pictures was done using
PhotoShop (Adobe, San José, CA, USA) and the open source
image manipulation software GIMP3. Camera RAW images were
3http://www.gimp.org
adjusted for brightness, contrast and color, and converted into
JPG format. All images were clipped horizontally to set the
horizontal to vertical aspect ratio to 4:3. When necessary (e.g.,
due to distracting content outside the focus of the picture),
images were clipped further, keeping the aspect ratio.
A resulting set of 555 pictures belonging to 191 scenes was
presented to five raters who had not been involved in the initial
shootings and did not know the actors personally (authors CS
and NG, prior to their further participation in normative data
collection and/or data analysis; and one other man and two other
women). They were asked to answer two questions on a 5-point
Likert scale.
(1) How clearly can you identify the depicted
situation/interaction? [clarity; “completely ambiguous or
random” to “completely unambiguous”]
(2) How clearly can you identify (any) emotions in the scene?
[emotion; “not at all” to “very clearly”]
Based on the raters’ responses, weighted sum scores were
calculated (clarity ∗ 3 + emotion), and the pictures with the
highest sum scores were selected for the final picture set. The
aim of this pre-rating procedure was to have only one picture
per scene with the highest possible rating clarity. It left 46
scenes for which two or more pictures had equally high scores.
The pictures in question were inspected by the first and last
authors, and the final image was selected based on consensus. The
resulting final set of 191 unique images was used in the validation
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1883 | 193
fpsyg-07-01883 November 30, 2016 Time: 17:26 # 6
Herbort et al. The ToMenovela Stimulus Set
study. Figure 2 depicts four example images [Note: The pictures
displayed here are not part of the actual stimulus set and may be
used for illustrative purposes in publications].
Normative Data Collection Study
The evaluation of the final stimulus set of 191 pictures was
performed using a computer-based rating procedure and was
carried out in Berlin and Magdeburg, Germany, from December
2014 to November 2015.
Participants
Sixty-one participants of the validation study (31 women,
30 men) were recruited via advertisements, through various
academic mailing lists, and by contacting former participants
of earlier experiments done by the authors. A total of 41
participants (26 female) were recruited and tested in Berlin, and
20 participants (five female) performed the task in Magdeburg.
Detailed demographic data of the study cohort are displayed in
Table 1. People interested in participating were first informed
about the evaluation process via e-mail and were asked to answer
to a set of psychological questionnaires at home, including
a general health questionnaire and the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV, (First et al., 1996, 1997; Saß et al.,
2003) Section II (SCID-II) screening questionnaire. Participants
were interviewed for present or past DSM-IV psychiatric
disorders using a SCID-I-based screening questionnaire and the
appropriate SCID-I modules when applicable. Clinical interviews
were performed by the first author under supervision of the
last author, who is a board-certified psychiatrist. Exclusion
criteria were insufficient knowledge of the German language, a
history of head trauma, neurological illness, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia or substance use disorder, and the use of centrally
acting medication. Participants with above-cut-off values in the
SCID-II questionnaire were interviewed according to the SCID-II
manual by the first author, and a potential clinically relevant
diagnosis led to exclusion from the study. All participants
TABLE 1 | Demographic and psychometric parameters.
Male (n = 30) Female (n = 31) Statistics
Parameter distribution Parameter distribution
Age ø = 27.10 (±4.54); min = 19, max = 40 ø = 26.39 (±6.92); min = 19, max = 49 t59 = −0.474, n.s.
Smoking Yes = 3; Never = 22; Former or occasional = 5 Yes = 1; Never = 22; Former or occasional = 8 Fisher’s exact test: F = 1.61, n.s.
Education ø = 17.97 (±2.83); min = 12, max = 22 ø = 17.15 (±2.69); min = 12.5, max = 22 t59 = −1.163, n.s.
LPS (PR subtest 3+4) ø = 91.21 (±7.35) SW = 0.817, p < 0.001 89.38 (±9.43) SW = 0.81, p < 0.001 U = 432, Z = 0.714, n.s.
MWT-B (IQ) ø = 100.87 (±5.53) SW = 0.979, n.s. 100.00 (±7.19) SW = 0.833, p < 0.001 U = 394, Z = 0.823, n.s.
BDI (sum) ø = 3.90 (±3.44) SW = 0.877, p < 0.05 2.42 (±2.78) SW = 0.803, p < 0.001 U = 344.5, Z = 0.823, n.s.
STAI-trait (PR) ø = 50.03 (±29.88) SW = 0.934, n.s. 45.45 (±25.55) SW = 0.96, n.s. t59 = −0.644, n.s.
STAXI
Subscale State Anger
(normal range: 10–40)
ø = 10.77 (±1.61) SW = 0.569, p < 0.001 11.16 (±1.90) SW = 0.639, p < 0.001 U = 388, Z = 0.722, n.s.
Subscale Trait Anger
(normal range: 5–20)
ø = 7.93 (±4.03) SW = 0.629, p < 0.001 7.03 (±1.78) SW = 0.85, p < 0.05 U = 442, Z = 0.659, n.s.
Subscale Anger Temperament
(normal range: 5–20)
ø = 7.90 (±2.19) SW = 0.922, p < 0.05 8.55 (±2.77) SW = 0.877, p < 0.05 U = 413, Z = 0.495, n.s.
Subscale Anger Reaction (PR) ø = 35.70 (±26.73) SW = 0.907, p < 0.05 34.90 (±25.03) SW = 0.897, p < 0.05 U = 442, Z = 0.714, n.s.
Subscale Anger-in (PR) ø = 38.70 (±35.92) SW = 0.834, p < 0.001 22.00 (±20.47) SW = 0.872, p < 0.05 U = 371, Z = 1.05, n.s.
Subscale Anger-out (PR) ø = 50.23 (±17.91) SW = 0.962, n.s. 48.06 (±18.83) SW = 0.912, p < 0.05 U = 414, Z = 0.584, n.s.
Subscale Anger Control (PR) ø = 49.93 (±23.71) SW = 0.958, n.s. 52.26 (±26.05) SW = 0.939, n.s. t59 = −0.364, n.s.
BIS (sum) ø = 59.97 (±8.43) SW = 0.94, n.s. 59.71 (±9.94) SW = 0.977, n.s. t59 = −0.109, n.s.
ADHS (sum) 3.03 (±3,15) SW = 0.76, p < 0.001 2.81 (±3.59) SW = 0.749, p < 0.001 U = 406, Z = 0.483, n.s.
AQ (sum) 17.62 (±7.02) SW = 0.955, n.s. 12.90 (±4.99) SW = 0.945, n.s. t59 = −2.985, p < 0.05
SPF – Fantasy
(M = 100, SD = 10)
93.24 (±8.16) SW = 0.965, n.s. 101.40 (±8.62) SW = 0.909, p < 0.05 t59 = 3.731, p < 0.001
SPF – Empathic concern
(M = 100, SD = 10)
98.69 (±6.70) SW = 0.951, n.s. 104.83 (±6.84) SW = 0.938, n.s. t59 = 3.485, p < 0.001
SPF – Perspective taking
(M = 100, SD = 10)
102.59 (±9.07) SW = 0.941, n.s. 103.73 (±7.85) SW = 0.95, n.s. t59 = 0.520, n.s.
SPF – Personal distress
(MW = 100, SD = 10)
93.34 (±6.29) SW = 0.934, n.s. 97.63 (±7.43) SW = 0.969, n.s. t59 = 2.389, p < 0.05
SPF – Score
(M = 100, SD = 10)
98.17 (±5.67) SW = 0.979, n.s. 103.40 (±5.98) SW = 0.946, n.s. t59 = 3.44, p < 0.001
Demographic information and psychometric measures are displayed separately for male and female participants. PR, percentile rank; LPS, Leistungsprüfsystem – subtests
3+ 4; MWT-B, Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest form B; BDI, Becks Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961); STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux et al., 1981);
STAXI, State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (Schwenkmezger et al., 1992); BIS, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995); ADHS, ADHS-Diagnose-Checkliste
(Rösler et al., 2004); AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient (Dammann, 2002); SPF, Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen. Standard deviations are given in parentheses; T-tests
were calculated 2-tailed. In case of normal distribution, t-tests were calculated. All scales met the Levene-Test. In case of not normally distributed, Mann–Whitney-U (U)
and Kolmogorov–Smirnov-Z (Z) were calculated.
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gave written informed consent prior to the participation in
the study in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and
received financial reimbursement. The study was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the University of Magdeburg, Faculty
of Medicine.
Schedule
Participants received the biographical chart (Figure 1) to
familiarize them with the characters and their backgrounds and
relationships. This was done for the purpose of further increasing
ecological validity, as most daily-life social interactions occur
with familiar individuals. Seven days (±2 days) after receiving the
chart, participants were scheduled for the actual rating procedure.
Due to the length of the procedure, the experiment was split into
three experimental sessions that were performed within three to
seven days. At the beginning of the study, participants were asked
to provide their individual impression of the eight protagonists in
written form and to fill in a paper–pencil two-alternative forced-
choice quiz designed to ensure that they were sufficiently familiar
with the characters (for example questions, see Supplementary
Table S2; the complete quiz is available along with the stimulus
set).
Experimental Paradigm
The actual experiment started with a standardized instruction
provided by the experimenter (author MCH, JI, or NG).
The participants were explained that they would be presented
with scenes depicting the eight characters in various daily-life
situations in a total of 191 pictures. The pictures would have no
chronological timeline and were to be considered independently
from each other.
Pictures were presented on a computer screen (resolution
1600×1200 or 1920×1080) at a resolution of 700 × 525 pixels,
together with a set of task instructions presented sequentially. The
same rating tasks were performed for each of the images:
(1) Description of the content and one’s own behavioral
reaction in free-text format.
(2) Emotional salience and valence on seven dimensional scales:
(a) one scale assessing emotional salience (first-person
affective)
(b) valence ratings across the six basic emotions according
to Ekman
(3) Affective ToM (third-person affective): This condition
intended to operationalize affective ToM and to some
degrees also emotion recognition. Two of the characters
depicted were marked with “A” and “B”, and subjects
responded to the question which person was feeling better
on the scene depicted (multiple-choice answer format: A, B,
both equally).
(4) Cognitive ToM (third-person cognitive): In analogy to the
affective ToM question, two characters were marked with
“A” and “B”, and participants were asked to indicate which
of the two characters could see more people in the scene
(multiple-choice answer format: A, B, both equally).
The affective and cognitive ToM tasks were designed to closely
match the cognitive ToM tasks used in the previously described
cartoon-based ToM paradigm developed by Schnell et al. (2011)
and Walter et al. (2011). Because single pictures rather than
sequences were presented, we opted for the use of a comparative
task between two protagonists (instead of the within-subject
across-sequence rating employed by Schnell and Walter). Also
to match the task by Schnell and Walter, the cognitive ToM
task required visual perspective taking (original task: number of
animate objects seen by the protagonist; present task: number of
human beings seen by the two protagonists).
Because all ratings were performed by lay participants –
that is, no data from either experts or clinical populations
were collected – they represent normative data rather than
accuracy scores at this point. Expert ratings of the ToMenovela
are, however, currently in preparation. While absolute accuracy
scores cannot be conclusively determined from the ratings
performed so far, our normative data do provide information
with respect to ambiguity, which reflect in part difficulty of an
item. Thus, researchers may use this information to generate
subsets of stimuli sets with different degrees of ambiguity and
thus varying difficulty.
All task instructions, along with the corresponding response
options and the purpose of each question are summarized in
Table 2. The task was self-paced, and participants could interrupt
the rating procedure at any time to ensure that they would remain
alert for the entire experiment. Supplementary Figure S1 depicts
an example trial. The software used for the rating procedure was
programmed in Java (Oracle, Redwood City, CA, USA) by author
CS and is available from the authors upon request.
Psychometric Questionnaires and Correlations with
Stimulus Rating Data
To ensure that participants of the rating procedure were
psychopathologically healthy, all participants received a set
of well-established psychometric questionnaires, including the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Hautzinger et al., 1994),
questions 21–40 from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-
trait, Spielberger and Lushene, 1966; Laux et al., 1981), the State-
Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI, Schwenkmezger et al.,
1992), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS, Preuss et al., 2003)
and an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder checklist (ADHS-
CL, adapted on Rösler et al., 2004). The Autism Questionnaire
by Baron-Cohen (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the
Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen (SPF, Paulus, 2009) were
administered to the participants in an online-based follow-up
survey in autumn 2015. As measures of cognitive functions, the
Leistungsprüfsystem (LPS, Horn, 1983) and the Mehrfachwahl-
Wortschatz-Intelligenztest (MWT, Lehrl, 2005) were obtained,
either prior or after the evaluation session.
To allow for correlational analyses of stimulus ratings and
psychometric data, we computed numeric measures that reflected
individuals’ “typical” response behavior across the stimuli.
Specifically, we computed a measure of decisiveness in the
third-person affective and third-person cognitive conditions
([OAA + OAB]/OAboth), a measure of the tendency to make
non-standard responses (i.e., the tendency to chose a response
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TABLE 2 | Task instructions.
Task Answer options Purpose
Describe the scene in your own words. Free text format Recognition of the content of the scene
Does person A or person B feel better? Check-boxes:
Person A
Person B
Both alike
Assessment of affective ToM (i.e.,
cognitive empathy; see Walter, 2012)
Emotion recognition
How much do you feel affected by the picture? Visual analog scale, designed as a slider, ranging from “not
at all” to “very much”
Affective empathy
Emotional recativity
Who can see more people? Check-boxes:
Person A
Person B
Both equally
Cognitive ToM (in analogy to Schnell
et al., 2011)
Visual perspective taking
How strongly do you recognize the following emotions in
the scene: Happiness, Anger, Disgust, Fear, Sadness,
Surprise
Six sequentially presented visual analog scales, designed
as a slider, ranging from “not at all” to “very much”
Emotion recognition
Emotional reactivity
What would you do if you were to enter the scene? Free text format Social competence
Approach/avoidance behavior
not chosen by the majority of the participants), as well as
the mean emotion recognition ratings for the Ekman emotions
across scenes. These measures were correlated with the SPF
subscales and with the AQ, employing non-parametric Spearman
correlations and robust Shepherd’s Pi correlations that include
an outlier exclusion based on the bootstrapped Mahalanobis
distance (Schwarzkopf et al., 2012). All correlations were
computed for 59 participants, due to missing SPF and AQ data
from one male and one female participant.
RESULTS
Stimuli
As a result of the rating procedure, one image (#164) had to be
excluded due to ambiguous interpretation by the raters, leaving
a total of 190 images in the stimulus set. Supplementary Table S3
displays the basic characteristics of the images.
Demographic and Psychometric Results
The demographics and psychometric data of the study cohort
are presented in Table 1, separated by gender. Women and men
in our sample did not differ with respect to age, education, and
cognitive measures (assessed with LPS and MWT). There were
also no significant differences regarding depressive symptoms
(BDI), trait anxiety (STAI), anger (STAXI), or impulsivity (BIS-
11). Fisher’s exact Test yielded no difference [F = 1.607,
p= 0.460] with respect to smoking status.
Across the study sample, autism- and empathy-related
questionnaires revealed scores in line with previous normative
data of the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the SPF.4 In both
questionnaires, we observed gender differences in the expected
directions: male participants had higher mean scores in the AQ
(t59 =−2.985, p= 0.004), while in the SPF, male participants had
lower scores on the subscales fantasy (t59 = 3.731, p < 0.001),
4The original normative data of the SPF can be found at http://psydok.
psycharchives.de/jspui/handle/20.500.11780/3343
empathic concern (t59 = 3.485, p < 0.001), personal distress
(t59 = 2.389, p = 0.02), and the overall score (t59 = 3.44,
p < 0.001), but no significant difference in perspective taking
(t59 = 5.20, p< 0.605).
Behavioral Results
The results from free-text ratings (descriptions of each scene’s
content and one’s own behavioral reactions) are not part of the
present work and will be reported separately.
Ratings of Emotional Salience and Valence
Figure 3 depicts the result of the affective salience rating,
separated by gender. When asked “How much do you feel affected
by the picture” and responding on a slider comparable to a
Likert scale, participants gave the scenes a median rating of
approximately 30 percent (women: 29.8; men: 31.4), with a broad
range from approximately 10 to 60 percent (women: 8.8 – 64.2;
men: 11.0 – 59.3). We provide detailed descriptive statistics of
the affective salience ratings (mean, median, mode, standard
deviation, skewness, standard deviation of skewness, curtosis,
standard deviation of curtosis) for each scene as along with the
stimulus set.
Emotional valence ratings were conducted for the six basic
emotions defined by Ekman (happiness, anger, disgust, fear,
sadness, surprise; Ekman et al., 1972, Ekman and Friesen,
1975, 1978). The distribution of the emotional valence ratings
across scenes is depicted in Figure 4, separated by gender.
A MANOVA with the six emotions as independent variables
and gender and scene as fixed factors suggested a small but
significant tendency for men to rate the images somewhat higher
with respect to all six emotions (main effect of gender: Wilk’s
λ = 0.978, F6,11205 = 42.83, p < 0.001; interaction gender *
scene: Wilk’s λ = 0.868, F6,11205 = 1.21; p < 0.001). However,
post hoc univariate tests revealed that gender effect could not
be observed for disgust (F1,11210 = 0.610, p = 0.435), but for
all other emotions (all F > 14.20, all p < 0.001). Interaction
effects reflecting gender differences in the rating of individual
scenes were observed for anger, fear, and sadness (all F > 1.19,
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FIGURE 3 | Mean scores of first-person affective condition “How much
do you feel affected by the picture?”, separated by gender. Box plots
depict medians, 25 percent quantiles and outliers.
all p < 0.037), but not for happiness, disgust, and surprise
(all F < 1.085, all p > 0.202). Detailed descriptive statistics of
the emotional valence ratings (mean, median, mode, standard
deviation, skewness, standard deviation of skewness, curtosis,
standard deviation of curtosis) for each scene are available along
with the stimulus set.
Cognitive and Affective ToM Ratings
To obtain a measure of ambiguity with respect to the ToM
tasks (cognitive: “Can person A or person B see more people”;
affective: “Does person A or B feel better”), we computed a
simple measure of agreement, namely the ratio of the difference
to the sum of A versus B responses (+1 to avoid division by
0: |1AB+1|/|6AB+1|). Scenes yielding values lower than 1/3
were considered ambiguous with respect to the participants’
responses. Figure 5 displays the results of our evaluation,
separated by the condition gender. In the cognitive ToM
condition, 15 photographs came out as ambiguous among female
participants, and nine among male participants. In the affective
ToM condition, 19 images came out as ambiguous in both
men and women, although there was only partial overlap.
Supplementary Table S4 lists the potentially ambiguous scenes,
separated by task and gender.
Note that the “both equally” responses were not considered in
this approach, and users of the stimulus set may choose to include
“ambiguous” scenes in an experiment when the “both equally”
answer was the most common one in the group. Cumulative
response data for each scene are available as along with the
stimulus set.
Correlations of Stimulus Ratings and Psychometric
Data
To assess a potential relationship between response behavior
during stimulus evaluation and psychometric measures of
self-reported social cognitive abilities, we computed numeric
measures that reflected individuals’ “typical” response behavior
across the stimuli. Across the cohort of study participants
(N = 59, due to missing SPF and AQ data from two participants),
we observed a significant negative correlation between the
empathic concern subscale of the SPF (SPF – EC) and the
decisiveness measure in the third-person affective condition
(i.e., the tendency to decide for either person A or B to feel
better versus choosing the option “both equally”; Spearman’s
r =−0.30375; p= 0.0193). This correlation remained significant
when bivariate outliers were excluded by bootstrapping the
Mahalanobis distance (Shepherd’s Pi correlation; Schwarzkopf
et al., 2012; see Figure 6). No other correlations between stimulus
ratings and psychometric data reached significance (all p> 0.30).
DISCUSSION
We have developed a photograph-based normative stimulus set
(The ToMenovela) specifically designed for the experimental
assessment of social cognition, particularly suitable for
neuroimaging studies. All stimuli were designed in a way that (a)
ecological validity would be high and (b) different types of ToM-
and empathy-related constructs can be assessed experimentally
(i.e., affective empathy, affective ToM (≈ cognitive empathy)
and cognitive ToM; see Walter, 2012). The stimulus set will be
available for non-commercial research free of charge for other
researchers upon contacting the authors.5
Applicability to the Study of Social
Cognition
Our focus during the generation of the here presented stimulus
set was high ecological validity. To this end, we scripted a
background story and individual scenes revolving around a
fictional circle of friends, the eight main characters. The scenes
all depict at least two of the eight protagonists, but are yet
independent of each other, showing the characters in different
combinations and across a variety of different social situations
and locations. While certain basic characteristics are fixed due to
the nature of the stimulus set (e.g., the age of the protagonists in
the twenties or early thirties, or the urban setting of the scenes),
it should readily be possible for an experimenter to adapt the
background story to their requirements.
By using a plausible real-life setting, our stimulus set bears
some similarity with the MASC, a movie-based test instrument
for the study of social cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006). While
the MASC has previously constituted a considerable advance
in ecological validity of test instruments of social cognitive
processing, it is not without limitations. Its fixed composition
5Please contact us via the ToMenovela website (http://neuro2.med.uni-
magdeburg.de/∼bschott/ToMenovela) to gain access to the stimulus
set.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean scores of emotional valence, separated by gender. Box plots depict medians, 25 percent quantiles and outliers. (A) women; (B) men.
as a movie of people at a dinner party limits the spectrum of
emotions displayed and the use of non-social control tasks. These
two limitations are less prominent in the MET (Dziobek et al.,
2008) and in the cartoon-based ToM task developed by Schnell
et al. (2011) and Walter et al. (2011), but the ecological validity of
those tasks is on the other hand limited by the somewhat artificial
construction of the MET stimuli and the lack of facial expressions
in the cartoon-based task. Here, we provide a stimulus set that
combines a plausible ecological setting with a broad range of
emotions displayed across stimuli and the possibility to apply
different tasks to the same stimuli.
One important limitation of the present stimulus set may
be the ethnic background and age range of the eight main
characters. First, the ethnic composition was rather narrow,
albeit somewhat representative for a European urban area (seven
Europeans, one East Indian), which may be an advantage when
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FIGURE 5 | Results for third-person cognitive (“Who can see more people?”, A) and third-person affective (“Does person A or B feel better?”, B) condition,
separated by gender. The shading reflects the function | 1AB+1| /| 6AB+1| , with the red line showing the value 1/3. The majority of the pictures yielded
unambiguous responses (green dots), whereas the number of scenes rated as ambiguous ranged from 9 to 19.
testing the typically available study population in Europe (or,
to some extent, North America or Australia), namely, drawing
from the student body of the researchers’ institution (Henrich
et al., 2010), but may limit the interpretation when using the
stimulus set with a non-Western study population (Adams
et al., 2010; Koelkebeck et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2015). Similar
considerations apply with respect to age. The protagonists of the
ToMenovela are all in their twenties or early thirties. They may
thus be highly comparable to the typical cohort of participants
in psychological experiments at educational institutions (Henrich
et al., 2010). As the biographies were written with considerations
to our anticipated study populations, we cannot exclude that
the biographies provided may have influenced the ratings.
Future experimenters may further improve the comparability
by adapting the characters’ biographies to their specific study
populations, although it must be cautioned that doing so might
warrant the collection of new normative data. The authors
had considered the inclusion of elderly protagonists in the
stimulus set, to make it more approachable by older study
participants. That would, however, raise the potential confound
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FIGURE 6 | Correlation of the SPF subscale empathic concern (SPF –
EC) with decisiveness, i.e., the ratio of unambiguous responses
(“person A” or “person B”) to ambiguous responses (“both”), in the
other-affective condition ([OAA + OAB]/OAboth). The plot depicts a robust
Shepherd’s Pi correlation (Schwarzkopf et al., 2012).
that the (healthy) elderly are generally capable of imagining
or retrieving information from memories of their own youth,
while younger participants cannot to the same extent imagine
themselves as being old. The authors are aware of the limitation
that may arise when applying our stimulus set to a study
population that differs substantially from our protagonists with
respect to age, ethnicity, or cultural background. We strongly
encourage researchers to expand our stimulus set presented
here by including other ethnicities or age groups, paving
the way for investigations of individual differences in social
cognition.
With respect to the 8-SIF framework, it must be noted that
the ToMenovela, does not contain any immediate (written or
auditory) verbal information. Therefore, the factors I2 and I4 of
the 8-SIF, the immediate linguistic information about agents or
context, could not be implemented in our stimulus set, at least
in its present form. While the authors do understand that this
may constitute a potential limitation, it should be noted that
all images were intended to be comprehensible without verbal
information, and preliminary analyses of the free-text responses
in our validation study confirm that the content of the images
was indeed understood by the participants.6 We encourage future
researchers interested in factors I2 and I4 of the 8-SIF to expand
the stimuli by adding – spoken or written – verbal information to
the photographs.
6Please note that one picture (#164), for which the free-text responses suggested
ambiguity of content, was excluded from the stimulus set for that reason.
Normative Evaluation
During our normative data collection, each scene was rated
with respect to principal content, cognitive and affective ToM,
and to first-person emotional salience and valence – the latter
with respect to the six basic emotions according to Ekman
(Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Ratings were performed by 61
participants (31 women, 30 men). Women and men in our
sample were highly comparable with respect to age, education,
intelligence, depressiveness, trait anxiety, anger, and impulsivity.
In line with previous studies, autism-related traits were more
pronounced in male participants scores, while men scored
lower in several subscales of the empathy-related questionnaires
(fantasy, empathic concern, personal distress, and sum scores,
but not perspective taking). Supplementary Table S5 displays
an overview of the tasks employed during evaluation and their
potential applications in future research.
Emotional Salience and Valence
Analysis of the salience ratings (“How much do you feel affected
by the picture?”) revealed a median rating of approximately 30
percent with a broad range from approximately 10 to 60 percent
(Figure 3). The relatively low median arousal with a broad range
was not unexpected, as the authors had aimed to depict real-
life situations and interactions in the stimulus set. Along the
same line, the rating of the scenes with respect to basic emotions
revealed that happiness was most strongly represented across
the stimuli, while, for example, only few scenes received high
ratings for disgust (Figure 4). Importantly for future users of our
stimulus set, all six emotions were represented in subsets of the
scenes, and researchers can select the subset of pictures suitable
for certain specific research questions.
We found small but significant gender difference of the
ratings: men tended to rate the images somewhat higher with
respect to emotional salience (first-person affective: “How much
do you feel affected by the picture?”) and to all emotion-
ratings except for disgust. As shown in the post hoc univariate
tests, gender differences could not be observed for disgust,
but for all other emotions requested. Surprisingly, rather few
studies have thus far investigated gender differences in emotion
processing. One previous study using images from the IAPS
(Lang et al., 1998) suggested that women had a higher tendency
to rate pictures as fearful (Barke et al., 2012) or found no
gender differences at all (Gruhn and Scheibe, 2008). With
respect to happiness – and possibly surprise – ratings, on
the other hand, our results are in line with previous studies
that have shown men to rate pictures more positively (Barke
et al., 2012), particularly pictures with erotic content (Bradley
et al., 2001). Our stimulus set, while not displaying explicit
nudity, does contain scenes with (in most cases implicit) erotic
content that might have contributed to the overall more positive
ratings by male participants. It must be cautioned, however,
that the scenes were not designed to elicit extreme emotional
responses as is the case with the IAPS pictures. Therefore,
further research is required to systematically characterize the
gender differences observed here. Finally, the authors would like
to emphasize that all differences observed were, albeit being
significant, quantitatively small and should therefore be unlikely
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to affect the usability of our stimulus set. Furthermore, we did not
include experts like psychotherapists or people well versed in the
Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman and Friesen, 1978) to
evaluate the pictures from a rather professional point of view and
thereby we do not deliver a gold-standard for salience and valence
norms.
Results on Third-Person ToM: Agreement across
Raters
Analysis for the cognitive and affective ToM conditions
revealed that only a small subset of images yielded ambiguous
responses. In the cognitive condition (“Who can see more
people?”), 15 photographs were rated as ambiguous among
female participants, and nine among male participants
(Supplementary Table S4). In the affective ToM condition
(“Does person A or B feel better?”), nineteen images were
rated as ambiguous by both men and women, although there
was only partial overlap. Depending on future researchers’
need for unambiguous stimulus material, scenes with little
or no disagreement can be selected from our stimulus set.
The detailed results of the rating procedure are available
along with the stimulus set. It should be noted at this point
that a certain degree of ambiguity of the scenes may be
unavoidable, given that our focus was on ecological validity
of the stimulus material, and ambiguity of certain stimuli
is most likely not unique to the ToMenovela. For example,
rating studies of the well-established IAPS stimuli suggest
that several pictures did not receive high ratings on the
initially intended emotions in a normative rating procedure
(Barke et al., 2012). On the other hand, some researchers
may want to explicitly include ambiguous scenes, for example
in order to vary cognitive load or task difficulty. Most ToM
or mentalizing tasks currently used simplified settings,
unimodal structures or highly simplified fictional characters. As
mentalizing can be conceptualized as “an executive component
managing the multiple aspects of representations that are
concurrently activated by the inherently complex everyday
social interactions” (Brunet-Gouet et al., 2011), we suggest that
the naturalistic setting employed in our paradigm invariably
includes some degree of ambiguity, at least in a subset of the
stimuli, while rather accurately representing daily life social
interactions.
Relationship of Stimulus Ratings with Self-report
Measures of Social Cognition
Correlational analyses revealed a negative relationship between
decisiveness in the third-person affective condition and the
empathic concern subscale of the SPF (Figure 6). This may
appear somewhat surprising, as this negative correlation suggests
that participants with higher empathic concern show more
difficulties in judging an individual’s emotion. On the other
hand, there is considerable debate with respect to potential
subdivisions of the ToM construct into different subprocesses
like emotion recognition, understanding of causality, or the
ability to distinguish knowledge and facts (Kanske et al., 2015).
Furthermore, a distinction has been suggested between affective
empathy, affective ToM/cognitive empathy, and cognitive
ToM (Walter, 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2015). Kanske et al.
(2015) could recently demonstrate that empathy and ToM
can be orthogonalized within the same task at both the
behavioral and neural level. With respect to the present
results, this notion points to the possibility that increased
empathic concern may induce difficulties in some individuals
when it comes to making (comparative) decisions about
other people’s feelings. One limitation in this context is
that we did not record reaction time data, which would
provide a more objective measure to further substantiate this
interpretation.
Limitations and Directions for Future
Research
It should be noted that, as of now, expert evaluation of the
ToMenovela has not been completed, and thus the stimulus set
does not represent a performance test as of yet, which can be used
for investigating mentalizing skills or deficits at the behavioral
level. Future studies are planned that will obtain both expert
ratings on the stimulus set and ratings from clinical populations
like individuals with autism spectrum disorders, both of which
will be used to establish concurrent and discriminant validity. In
addition, other researchers may develop new questions applicable
to our stimulus set, for example with respect to social cue
recognition or potential gender-related differences in ToM for
male versus female characters. We have summarized the purpose
of each question used in the initial evaluation, along with
potential use cases in Supplementary Table S5, in order to provide
suggestions for future applications of the ToMenovela stimuli.
Availability
The ToMenovela stimulus set is freely available for use in non-
commercial scientific research. Functionalities of this online
service include the picture set in three different resolutions,
full normative data and the full quiz. To prevent circulation
of the pictures unrelated to research usage, scientists will be
requested to provide contact details and a brief outline of their
research purpose when accessing to the ToMenovela database. All
details required for access can be found at http://neuro2.med.uni-
magdeburg.de/∼bschott/ToMenovela. The script of the scenes is
available in German language only and can be obtained from the
first author (maike.herbort@charite.de).
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All participants of the evaluation study gave written
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in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Some
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served as supporting actors in photographs with potentially
disturbing content (e.g., accidents, fighting, sexually suggestive
scenes).
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